As of May 2024, 55 percent of people in Great Britain thought that it was wrong to leave the European Union, compared with 31 percent who thought it was the right decision. During this time period, the share of people who regret Brexit has been slightly higher than those who support it, except for some polls in Spring 2021, which showed higher levels of support for Brexit. The share of people who don’t know whether Brexit was the right or wrong decision has generally been stable and usually ranged between 11 and 14 percent. Is Bregret setting in? Since late July 2022, the share of people who regret Brexit in these surveys has consistently been above 50 percent. The fall in support mirrors the government’s sinking approval ratings, especially since the ruling Conservative Party, along with former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, are heavily associated with Brexit and the Leave vote. Despite there being a clear majority of voters who now regret Brexit, there is as yet no particular future relationship with the EU that has overwhelming support. As of late 2023, 31 percent of Britons wanted to rejoin the EU, while 30 percent merely wanted to improve trade relations and not rejoin either the EU or the single market. Leave victory in 2016 defied the polls In the actual referendum, which took place on June 23, 2016, Leave won 51.9 percent of the votes and Remain 48.1 percent, after several polls in the run-up to the referendum put Remain slightly ahead. Remain were anticipated to win until early results from North East England suggested that Leave had performed far better than expected, with this pattern replicated throughout the country. This event was repeated somewhat in the U.S. election of that year, which saw Donald Trump win several key swing states such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, despite predictions that these states would vote for Hillary Clinton.
https://www.data.gov.uk/dataset/be2f2aec-11d8-4bfe-9800-649e5b8ec044/eu-referendum-results#licence-infohttps://www.data.gov.uk/dataset/be2f2aec-11d8-4bfe-9800-649e5b8ec044/eu-referendum-results#licence-info
On June 23rd 2016, residents of the United Kingdom were asked whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union or leave.
This dataset contains the full results of this referendum for each local authority in London and the UK.
A blog analysing the results is also available.
This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Brexit: Everyone Loses, but Britain Loses the Most, PIIE Working Paper 19-5.
If you use the data, please cite as: Latorre, María C., Zoryana Olekseyuk, Hidemichi Yonezawa, and Sherman Robinson. (2019). Brexit: Everyone Loses, but Britain Loses the Most. PIIE Working Paper 19-5. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
As of February 2024, a significant majority of young Britons thought that leaving the EU was the wrong decision, with 70 percent of 18 to 24 year-old's and 66 percent of 25 and 49 year-old's regretting the decision. By contrast, 56 percent of those aged of 65 thought that Brexit was the right decision.
People in the United Kingdom who worked in the engineering industry were the most likely to be in favor of the the UK leaving the European Union, according to a survey conducted among UK adults in 2019. By contrast, over three quarters of people who said they worked in design wanted the UK to stay in the EU.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
This archive contains shared materials pertaining to the forthcoming paper "Local media and geo-situated responses to Brexit: A quantitative analysis of Twitter, news and survey data" by Genevieve Gorrell, Mehmet E. Bakir, Luke Temple, Diana Maynard, Jackie Harrison, J. Miguel Kanai and Kalina Bontcheva.It contains a folder with a separate document for each of the topic-model-derived topics explored in the paper. The first two columns are topic scores for material from each separate Twitter account in the corpus, along with their Brexit vote intention. After a blank column comes the national newspaper article topic scores. After a further blank column come the local newspaper article scores, along with the NUTS1 region in which they are published.Additionally there is a spreadsheet with entity-based topic scores for each newspaper.Ethics approval was obtained for the Twitter data collection from the University of Sheffield (application number 011934).
CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedicationhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
License information was derived automatically
A large dataset containing the public tweets about Brexit comprising 45 months (from January 2016 until September 2019). This dataset comprises 50.8 million tweets and 3.97 million users. It also contains additional attributes including political stance classification, sentiment analysis, and automated account (bot) scores.
Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.
Public attitudes towards Brexit, the negotiations, and associated issues such as immigration, sovereignty, and knowledge of the EU. The data also include socio-demographic variables, and many other relevant topics such as cultural capital, nostalgia, trust, political efficacy, and national and party identity.
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
SSIX BREXIT Gold Standard
This repository contains the BREXIT Twitter Gold Standard produced by the SSIX Project https://ssix-project.eu/.
Only a sample is available here, to rebuild the full dataset, follow the instructions on the SSIX Project code repository:
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
Dataset Card for Dataset Name
The dataset contains 1120 tweets related to immigration, racism, islamophobia, and xenophobia in the context of the BREXIT online discussion. Each tweet has been annotated by 6 annotators, 3 of which belong to the group targeted by the discriminatory content (immigrants and Muslim annotators living in the UK), and 3 of which are part of a "control" group, not directly targeted by the discriminatory content. We release the dataset in a disaggregated… See the full description on the dataset page: https://huggingface.co/datasets/silvia-casola/BREXIT.
This statistic displays the public perception of citizens from European Union countries concerning the effect of the “Brexit” on the EU. All countries that were surveyed had a majority that agreed that the ‘Brexit’ would have a negative impact on the EU. 89 percent of Swedes regarded it as being a bad thing.
Following the end of the Brexit transition period, we’ve looked at the main effects Brexit has had on each sector of the UK economy.
CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedicationhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
License information was derived automatically
Dataset and code for the article "Twelve Votes for an Exit" It includes division data and electoral data. Brexit has been at the centre of the last two British elections and the past legislative term. The UK’s exit from the European Union was characterized by a series of parliamentary setbacks, with several government defeats, continuous rebellions and cross-party agreements made to secure control of the agenda. In the research reported in this article, we analyse the parliamentary Brexit process through careful examination of the 12 indicative votes held in Westminster in 2019 to find an alternative solution to Theresa May’s exit agreement. We map the choices of each MP along two relevant dimensions, connecting them to the socioeconomic structure of their constituencies as well as to the preferences expressed in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Moreover, we associate these parliamentary behaviours – and thus MPs’ attitudes towards compromise and responsiveness – to the gains and losses experienced during the subsequent 2019 general election.
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
The corpus contains over 4.5 million tweets (tweet IDs) automatically labeled by a machine learning program with stance regarding Brexit: Positive (supporting Brexit), Negative (opposing Brexit), or Neutral (uncommitted).
The Brexit referendum was held on June 23, 2016, to decide whether the UK should leave or remain in the EU. In the weeks before the referendum, starting on May 12, the UK geo-located Brexit-related tweets were continuously collected resulting in a dataset of around 4.5 million (4,508,440) tweets from almost one million (998,054) users. A large sample of the collected tweets (35,000) was manually labeled for the stance of their authors regarding Brexit: Positive (supporting Brexit), Negative (opposing Brexit), or Neutral (uncommitted). The labeled tweets were used to train a classifier which then automatically labeled all the remaining tweets.
The corpus contains tweet ids and stance labels. The tweets are grouped into files one hour per file. In each file, one row represents one entry (twitter_id, sentiment_label). Lines are ordered by the tweet time.
The data collection, annotation, model training and performance estimation is described in detail in: Miha Grčar, Darko Cherepnalkoski, Igor Mozetič, Petra Kralj Novak: Stance and influence of Twitter users regarding the Brexit referendum. Computational Social Networks 4/6. 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40649-017-0042-6
IT Systems Activity since Brexit
This documentary archive was created as part of the Brexit priority grant, The Repatriation of Competences: Implications for devolution. It is currently being expanded as part of the ESRC large grant, Between Two Unions (ES/P009441/1). At the time of submission, it is complete up to July 2019. The archive is composed of documents including political speeches, government consultations and policy reports, parliamentary debates and reports, and court judgments. All documents are in the public domain, but the archive collated those most relevant to scholars of devolution, and compiled them in a searchable wiki. The wiki is
The devolution settlements in the United Kingdom have been embedded in UK membership of the European Union. Policy areas like agriculture, the environment, fisheries, regional development and justice and home affairs, are both matters for the devolved parliaments and also areas that fall under the authority of the EU. In these policy fields, the EU has provided a common framework that has limited the degree of difference that has emerged within and across the UK, and this has helped keep the nations of the UK together. Whichever model is reached after negotiations, the UK's withdrawal from the EU will affect the powers of the devolved nations in complex ways. It may lead to further decentralisation of power to the devolved institutions. Alternatively, it could lead to powers being recentralized within UK-wide institutions. A third possibility is that it could see the setting up of new forums and process to enable the UK Government and the devolved governments to cooperate more closely on policy areas where their powers overlap. The outcome of the negotiations, and the decisions taken by key actors, will have consequences for the powers and responsibilities of institutions in the devolved nations and their relationships with the rest of the UK. This project will carry out a study of these developments as the Brexit negotiations get underway, and we will examine how the outcomes will shape devolution and relations between the UK's four governments. We will study and support the role of parliaments in scrutinizing the Brexit negotiation processes and the outcomes. We will meet with civil servants to help them understand the effects of different Brexit options on devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Our project will focus on three particular areas of devolved policy - agriculture, the environment and justice and home affairs - to investigate the particular consequences of bringing powers back from the EU to the UK after Brexit. We will work with professionals and representatives from these sectors to help them prepare and plan for Brexit under different scenarios. We will also enhance broader understanding of the process, outcomes and their impact on devolution by producing easy to read and easy to access explanations, analyses and reports, and by taking up opportunities for commenting in the media.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
We analyse the effects of uncertainty and anticipation shocks associated with the 2016 Brexit vote as a treatment on trade between the UK and 14 EU and 14 non-EU trading partners, using the synthetic control method (SCM). After controlling for exchange rate and GDP changes, UK exports to both groups of countries fell below those of the synthetic Britain, with much of the shortfall developing over the year prior to the referendum, following the 2015 Conservative general election win. The results indicate that UK exports to EU countries may have lost nearly 25% by early 2018, due to the Brexit shock, somewhat more than those to non-EU countries. Imports from the EU and non-EU countries also declined a little, although there is tentative evidence that UK consumers may have been avoiding countries with preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with the EU, and possibly turning towards the Commonwealth. Overall, the results confirm that policy uncertainty has a major effect upon trade and that uncertainty about supply chain costs is a potential explanation for at least some of the shortfall.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
BackgroundInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) has been a key agent of change in the 21st century. Given the role of ICT in changing society, this research explores the responses and attitudes to change over time from ICT professionals and ICT academics in dealing with the potentially far reaching political challenge triggered by the UK’s 2016 European Union Referendum and its decision to leave the European Union (Brexit). Whilst the vote was a UK based decision its ramifications have global implications and as such the research was not confined to the UK. This article presents the second phase of the research at the mid-point in the UK/European Union (EU) Brexit process, thus complementing the findings gathered immediately after the Referendum decision. The fundamental question being researched was: What are ICT professionals’ personal and professional perspectives on the change triggered by Brexit in terms of opportunities and threats?Methods and findingsData was collected through a survey launched in March 2018, one year on from the UK’s triggering of Article 50 and marking the mid-point in the two-year Brexit process. The survey replicated the one delivered at the point of the Referendum decision in 2016 with some developments. In addition, two appreciative inquiry focus groups were conducted. The research sought to understand any shifting perspectives on the opportunities and threats that would exist post-Brexit for ICT professionals and academics. 59% of survey participants were negative regarding the Brexit decision. Participants noted the position post-Brexit for the UK, and the remaining 27 EU Member States (EU27), was still very uncertain at this stage. They observed that planned change versus uncertainty provides for very different responses. In spite of the uncertainty, the participants were able to consider and advocate for potential opportunities although these were framed from national perspectives. The opportunities identified within the appreciative inquiry focus groups aligned to those recorded by survey participants with similar themes highlighted. However, the optimum conditions for change have yet to be reached as there is still not an informed position, message and clear leadership with detailed information for the ICT context. Further data will be gathered after the UK exit from the EU, assuming this occurs.
OBJECTIVES:To estimate the potential impacts of different Brexit trade policy scenarios on the price and intake of fruits and vegetables (F&V) and consequent cardiovascular disease (CVD) deaths in England between 2021 and 2030. DESIGN:Economic and epidemiological modelling study with probabilistic sensitivity analysis. SETTING:The model combined publicly available data on F&V trade, published estimates of UK-specific price elasticities, national survey data on F&V intake, estimates on the relationship between F&V intake and CVD from published meta-analyses and CVD mortality projections for 2021-2030. PARTICIPANTS:English adults aged 25 years and older. INTERVENTIONS:We modelled four potential post-Brexit trade scenarios: (1) free trading agreement with the EU and maintaining half of non-EU free trade partners; (2) free trading agreement with the EU but no trade deal with any non-EU countries; (3) no-deal Brexit; and (4) liberalised trade regime that eliminates all import tariffs. OUTCOME MEASURES:Cumulative coronary heart disease and stroke deaths attributed to the different Brexit scenarios modelled between 2021 and 2030. RESULTS:Under all Brexit scenarios modelled, prices of F&V would increase, especially for those highly dependent on imports. This would decrease intake of F&V between 2.5% (95% uncertainty interval: 1.9% to 3.1%) and 11.4% (9.5% to 14.2%) under the different scenarios. Our model suggests that a no-deal Brexit scenario would be the most harmful, generating approximately 12?400 (6690 to 23 390) extra CVD deaths between 2021 and 2030, whereas establishing a free trading agreement with the EU would have a lower impact on mortality, contributing approximately 5740 (2860 to 11 910) extra CVD deaths. CONCLUSIONS:Trade policy under all modelled Brexit scenarios could increase price and decrease intake of F&V, generating substantial additional CVD mortality in England. The UK government should consider the population health implications of Brexit trade policy options, including changes to food systems.
What can the case of the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union (EU) teach us about message framing effects and arguments that persuade citizens whether or not to support the EU? In this article, we report findings from an innovative online survey experiment based on a two-wave panel design. Our findings show that despite the expectation that campaign effects are small for high salience issues – such as Brexit – the potential for campaign effects were high for the pro-EU frames. This suggests that within an asymmetrical information environment – where the arguments for one side of an issue (anti-EU) are “priced in”, while arguments for the other side (pro-EU) have been understated – the potential for campaign effects in a single direction are substantial. To the extent that this environment is reflected in other referendum campaigns, the potential effect of pro-EU frames may be substantial.
As of May 2024, 55 percent of people in Great Britain thought that it was wrong to leave the European Union, compared with 31 percent who thought it was the right decision. During this time period, the share of people who regret Brexit has been slightly higher than those who support it, except for some polls in Spring 2021, which showed higher levels of support for Brexit. The share of people who don’t know whether Brexit was the right or wrong decision has generally been stable and usually ranged between 11 and 14 percent. Is Bregret setting in? Since late July 2022, the share of people who regret Brexit in these surveys has consistently been above 50 percent. The fall in support mirrors the government’s sinking approval ratings, especially since the ruling Conservative Party, along with former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, are heavily associated with Brexit and the Leave vote. Despite there being a clear majority of voters who now regret Brexit, there is as yet no particular future relationship with the EU that has overwhelming support. As of late 2023, 31 percent of Britons wanted to rejoin the EU, while 30 percent merely wanted to improve trade relations and not rejoin either the EU or the single market. Leave victory in 2016 defied the polls In the actual referendum, which took place on June 23, 2016, Leave won 51.9 percent of the votes and Remain 48.1 percent, after several polls in the run-up to the referendum put Remain slightly ahead. Remain were anticipated to win until early results from North East England suggested that Leave had performed far better than expected, with this pattern replicated throughout the country. This event was repeated somewhat in the U.S. election of that year, which saw Donald Trump win several key swing states such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, despite predictions that these states would vote for Hillary Clinton.