The Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, was created by the U.S. congress in 1938, in order to maintain liquidity and stability in the domestic mortgage market. The company is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), meaning that while it was a publicly traded company for most of its history, it was still supported by the federal government. While there is no legally binding guarantee of shares in GSEs or their securities, it is generally acknowledged that the U.S. government is highly unlikely to let these enterprises fail. Due to these implicit guarantees, GSEs are able to access financing at a reduced cost of interest. Fannie Mae's main activity is the purchasing of mortgage loans from their originators (banks, mortgage brokers etc.) and packaging them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in order to ease the access of U.S. homebuyers to housing credit. The early 2000s U.S. mortgage finance boom During the early 2000s, Fannie Mae was swept up in the U.S. housing boom which eventually led to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The association's stated goal of increasing access of lower income families to housing finance coalesced with the interests of private mortgage lenders and Wall Street investment banks, who had become heavily reliant on the housing market to drive profits. Private lenders had begun to offer riskier mortgage loans in the early 2000s due to low interest rates in the wake of the "Dot Com" crash and their need to maintain profits through increasing the volume of loans on their books. The securitized products created by these private lenders did not maintain the standards which had traditionally been upheld by GSEs. Due to their market share being eaten into by private firms, however, the GSEs involved in the mortgage markets began to also lower their standards, resulting in a 'race to the bottom'. The fall of Fannie Mae The lowering of lending standards was a key factor in creating the housing bubble, as mortgages were now being offered to borrowers with little or no ability to repay the loans. Combined with fraudulent practices from credit ratings agencies, who rated the junk securities created from these mortgage loans as being of the highest standard, this led directly to the financial panic that erupted on Wall Street beginning in 2007. As the U.S. economy slowed down in 2006, mortgage delinquency rates began to spike. Fannie Mae's losses in the mortgage security market in 2006 and 2007, along with the losses of the related GSE 'Freddie Mac', had caused its share value to plummet, stoking fears that it may collapse. On September 7th 2008, Fannie Mae was taken into government conservatorship along with Freddie Mac, with their stocks being delisted from stock exchanges in 2010. This act was seen as an unprecedented direct intervention into the economy by the U.S. government, and a symbol of how far the U.S. housing market had fallen.

Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street, declared bankruptcy on the 15th of September 2008, becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The investment house, which was founded in the mid-19th century, had become heavily involved in the U.S. housing bubble in the early 2000s, with its large holdings of toxic mortgage-backed securities (MBS) ultimately causing the bank's downfall. The bank had expanded rapidly following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which meant that investment banks could also engage in commercial banking activities. Lehman vertically integrated their mortgage business, buying smaller commercial enterprises that originated housing loans, which allowed the bank to expand its MBS holdings. The downfall of Lehman and the crash of '08 As the U.S. housing market began to slow down in 2006, the default rate on housing loans began to spike, triggering losses for Lehman from their MBS portfolio. Lehman's main competitor in mortgage financing, Bear Stearns, was bought by J.P. Morgan Chase in order to prevent bankruptcy in March 2008, leading investors and lenders to become increasingly concerned about the bank's financial health. As the bank relied on short-term funding on money markets in order to meet its obligations, the news of its huge losses in the third-quarter of 2008 further prevented it from funding itself on financial markets. By September, it was clear that without external assistance, the bank would fail. As its losses from credit default swaps mounted due to the deepening crash in the housing market, Lehman was forced to declare bankruptcy on September 15, as no buyer could be found to save the bank. The collapse of Lehman triggered panic in global financial markets, forcing the U.S. government to step in and bail-out the insurance giant AIG the next day on September 16. The effects of this financial crisis hit the non-financial economy hard, causing a global recession in 2009.

The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Interactive chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) stock market index for the last 100 years. Historical data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI and each data point represents the month-end closing value. The current month is updated on an hourly basis with today's latest value.

This study examines the market return spillovers from the US market to 10 Asia-Pacific stock markets, accounting for approximately 91 per cent of the region’s GDP from 1991 to 2022. Our findings indicate an increased return spillover from the US stock market to the Asia-Pacific stock market over time, particularly after major global events such as the 1997 Asian and the 2008 global financial crises, the 2015 China stock market crash, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2008 global financial crisis had the most substantial impact on these events. In addition, the findings also indicate that US economic policy uncertainty and US geopolitical risk significantly affect spillovers from the US to the Asia-Pacific markets. In contrast, the geopolitical risk of Asia-Pacific countries reduces these spillovers. The study also highlights the significant impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on these spillovers. Given the increasing integration of global financial markets, the findings of this research are expected to provide valuable policy implications for investors and policymakers.

Interactive chart of the S&P 500 stock market index since 1927. Historical data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI and each data point represents the month-end closing value. The current month is updated on an hourly basis with today's latest value.

Abstract of associated article: This paper analyzes the effects of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) announcements on the stock returns of oil and gas companies around the financial crisis of 2008. Using event study methodology and regression analyses, we examine a set of 122 oil and gas related stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for 35 announcements. Our results indicate that CFTC announcements, depending on their content, can affect the stock returns of oil and gas companies. In particular, this is found to hold true during the period of high-volatility in oil prices, i.e., the period following Lehman Brothers failure. During this period, oil and gas related stock returns respond positively to most regulatory announcements, showing that the CFTC's regulatory interventions are perceived positively by the stock market.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

The Great Recession was a period of economic contraction which came in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent bankruptcies among Wall Street financial institutions, the most significant of which being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. These economic convulsions caused consumer confidence, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), to drop sharply in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. How does the Consumer Confidence Index work? The CCI measures household's expectation of their future economic situation and, consequently, their likely future spending and savings decisions. A score of 100 in the index would indicate a neutral economic outlook, with consumers neither being optimistic nor pessimistic about the near future. Scores below 100 are then more pessimistic, while scores above 100 indicate optimism about the economy. Consumer confidence can have a self-fulfilling effect on the economy, as when consumers are pessimistic about the economy, they tend to save and postpone spending, contracting aggregate demand and causing the economy to slow down. Conversely, when consumers are optimistic and willing to spend, this can have a reinforcing effect as wages and employment may rise when consumers spend more. CCI and the Great Recession As the reality of the trouble which the U.S. financial sector was in set in over 2007, consumer confidence dropped sharply from being slightly positive, to being deeply pessimistic by the Summer of 2008. While confidence began to slowly rebound up until September 2008, with the panic caused by Lehman's bankruptcy and the freezing of new credit creation, the CCI plummeted once more, reaching its lowest point during the recession in February 2008. The U.S. government stepped in to prevent the bankruptcy of AIG in 2008, promising to do the same for any future possible failures in the financial system. This 'backstopping' policy, whereby the government assured that the economy would not be allowed to fall further into crisis, along with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies used to restart the economy, contributed to a rebound in consumer confidence in 2009 and 2010. In spite of this, consumers still remained pessimistic about the economy.

Interactive historical chart showing the daily level of the CBOE VIX Volatility Index back to 1990. The VIX index measures the expectation of stock market volatility over the next 30 days implied by S&P 500 index options.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

This paper looks at the relationship between negative news and stock markets in times of global crisis, such as the 2008/2009 period. We analysed one year of front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore to examine the influence of bad news both on stock market volatility and dynamic correlation. Our results show that the press and markets influenced each other in generating market volatility and in particular, that the Wall Street Journal had a crucial effect both on the volatility and correlation between the US and foreign markets. We also found significant differences between newspapers in their interpretation of the crisis, with the Financial Times being significantly pessimistic even in phases of low market volatility. Our results confirm the reflexive nature of stock markets. When the situation is uncertain and unpredictable, market behaviour may even reflect qualitative, big picture, and subjective information such as streamers in a newspaper, whose economic and informative value is questionable.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index dropped around ***** points in the four weeks from February 12 to March 11, 2020, but has since recovered and peaked at ********* points as of November 24, 2024. In February 2020 - just prior to the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the DJIA index stood at a little over ****** points. U.S. markets suffer as virus spreads The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a turbulent period for stock markets – the S&P 500 and Nasdaq Composite also recorded dramatic drops. At the start of February, some analysts remained optimistic that the outbreak would ease. However, the increased spread of the virus started to hit investor confidence, prompting a record plunge in the stock markets. The Dow dropped by more than ***** points in the week from February 21 to February 28, which was a fall of **** percent – its worst percentage loss in a week since October 2008. Stock markets offer valuable economic insights The Dow Jones Industrial Average is a stock market index that monitors the share prices of the 30 largest companies in the United States. By studying the performance of the listed companies, analysts can gauge the strength of the domestic economy. If investors are confident in a company’s future, they will buy its stocks. The uncertainty of the coronavirus sparked fears of an economic crisis, and many traders decided that investment during the pandemic was too risky.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

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27 February 2008

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Video summary of the ALDE workshop "The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it?"

Event date: 27/02/08 14:00 to 18:00
Location: Room ASP 5G2, European Parliament, Brussels
This workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament, economists, academics and journalists as well as representatives of the European Commission to discuss the lessons that have to be drawn from the recent financial crisis caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market.

With the view of the informal ECOFIN meeting in April which will look at the financial sector supervision and crisis management mechanisms, this workshop aims at debating a wide range of topics including:
- how to improve the existing supervisory framework,
- how to combat the opacity of financial markets and improve transparency requirements,
- how to address the rating agencies' performance and conflict of interest,
- what regulatory lessons are to be learnt in order to avoid a repetition of the sub-prime and the resulting credit crunch.

PROGRAMME

14:00 - 14:10 Opening remarks: Graham Watson, leader of the of the ALDE Group
14:10 - 14:25 Keynote speech by Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, European Commission
14:25 - 14:40 Presentation by Daniel Daianu, MEP (ALDE) of his background paper
14:40 - 15:30 Panel I: Current features of the financial systems and the main causes of the current international crisis.

-John Purvis, MEP EPP
-Eric De Keuleneer, Solvay Business School, Free University of Brussels
-Nigel Phipps, Head of European Regulatory Affairs Moody's
-Wolfgang Munchau, journalist Financial Times
-Robert Priester, European Banking Federation (EBF), Head of Department Banking Supervision and Financial Markets
-Ray Kinsella, Director of the Centre for Insurance Studies University College Dublin
-Servaas Deroose, Director ECFIN.C, Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU, European Commission
-Leke Van den Burg, MEP PSE
-David Smith, Visiting Professor at Derby Business School

During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, a number of systemically important financial institutions in the United States declared bankruptcy, sought takeovers to prevent financial failure, or turned to the U.S. government for bailouts. Two of these institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), meaning that they were set up by the federal government in order to steer credit towards lower income homebuyers through interventions in the secondary mortgage market. While both were chartered by the government, they were also publicly traded companies, with a majority of shares owned by private investors. The fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac These GSEs' business model was based on buying mortgages from their originators (banks, mortgage brokers, etc.) and then packaging groups of these mortgages together as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), before selling these on again to private investors. While this allowed the expansion of mortgage credit, meaning that many Americans were able to buy houses who would not have in other cases, this also contributed to the growing speculation in the housing market and related financial derivatives, such as MBS. The lowering of mortgage lending standards by originators in the early 2000s, as well as the need for GSEs to compete with their private sector rivals, meant that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became caught up in the financial mania associated with the early 2000s U.S. housing bubble. As their losses mounted due to the bursting of the bubble in 2007, both companies came under increasing financial stress, finally being brought into government conservatorship in September 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were eventually unlisted from stock exchanges in 2010.

The Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, reaching its lowest point in June 2009. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, during which a number of systemically critical financial institutions failed or came close to bankruptcy. The crisis in the financial sector quickly spread to the non-financial economy, where firms were adversely hit by the tightening of credit conditions and the drop in consumer confidence caused by the crisis. The largest monthly drop in the IPI came in September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. government was forced to step in to backstop the financial sector. Industrial production would begin to recover in the Summer of 2009, but remained far below its pre-crisis levels.

In the decade after the 2008 financial crisis, pension providers across faced challenging conditions thanks to interest rates falling to historical lows, affecting the returns on fixed-income investments, like bonds. Revenue is expected to drop at a compound annual rate of 2.6% over the five years through 2025 to €517.9 billion, including a forecast climb of 2.5% in 2025. Profit has also edged downwards due to higher interest rates and geopolitical tensions hitting equity and bond markets, though the average industry profit margin still stands strong, at an estimated 43.7% in 2025. Pension providers invest the contributions of policyholders into investment markets like bonds and equity, with the aim of making sure their assets can meet their liabilities – the benefits paid to retirees. Pension funds invest heavily in bond markets due to their relatively low risk and low volatility. However, this type of fixed-income investment has struggled since 2022 in the rising base rate environment, which saw yields skyrocket and bond prices plummet, hitting investment income. Despite interest rates coming down over the two years through 2025, bond values have remained extremely volatile, creating difficulties in calculating long-term planning and solvency of funds. Bond markets have also been clouded by ongoing uncertainty surrounding upcoming rate cuts and trade tensions, eroding investment income. Equity markets have experienced a similarly volatile period over recent years, with investors pricing rate cuts at the tail-end of 2023, inciting hefty capital flows, and supporting investment income for funds exposed to the asset class. In 2024, US equities performed particularly well due to the dominance of big-tech firms and the excitement surrounding AI. However, Trump’s erratic policies has incited a shift away from US markets in 2025, aiding pension funds with exposure to European markets, which are seen as less risky. Revenue is anticipated to climb at a compound annual rate of 6% over the five years through 2030 to €691.5 billion, while the average industry profit margin is estimated to swell to 45.3% in 2030. The shift towards Europe markets is set to continue in the short term. However, governments must be proactive in taking measures to capitalise on this demand. This would involve the expansion of a safe investment base of sovereign bonds jointly issued by euro members, overcoming the investment headaches that traditionally arose from fragmented national government bond markets and creating a liquid market for pension funds to exploit, aiding investment income. However, an ageing population will remain a concern for pension providers as more people retire and claim their retirement benefits, ratcheting up liabilities.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

The Great Recession (2008-2009) was an economic recession largely caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street. The administration of President George W. Bush took unprecedented measures to backstop the U.S. financial system and wider economy in 2008 with its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This program was designed to purchase non-performing assets from financial institutions, such as subprime mortgage loans and related financial instruments, which had been responsible for the crisis. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his department were given an initial authorization to spend up to 700 billion U.S. dollars on the program, although this was later lowered to 475 billion. From 2008 to 2012, the TARP program disbursed 417.6 billion U.S. dollars to purchase troubled assets and equity in the companies which held such assets. Of these funds, the majority was spent on the bank support programs, while significant amounts also went to bailouts of the car manufacturing industry and to the insurance giant American International Group (AIG).