Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner. The aim of this project was to compare the experiences in the fields of housing, education and employment of first generation West Indians and Asians with indigenous residents in areas of high immigrant concentration in Birmingham. Main Topics:

14 In-depth ethnographical interviews with UK-resident Punjabis were conducted in Birmingham, Leicester and London. These interviews paid particular attention to the ways through which people negotiate with and navigate through, both in India and UK, policies and laws attempting to formalize and regulate transnational movement and exchanges. Questions concerning the social legitimacy of ‘illegal’ migrations were explored in depths, especially with reference to degrees of legitimacy which are attributed to practice on the basis of the caste, class and gender position of immigrants. This grants will fund Dr VJ Varghese's [CDS, Trivandrum, India] research in UK. This research is connected to an ongoing research Dr Varghese is conducting, on the diverse forms of transnational exchanges between Indian Punjab and UK through Punjabi migrants and Punjabi-origin UK citizens. Firstly, the study examines the broader structural aspects of this linkage, particularly the initiatives of the state in creating a formal transnational space and the way in which transnationalism, through different national legislations and policies, engenders new contours of nation. Secondly, the study is equally interested in transformations of individual/family life-worlds, as well as in the production and reproduction of transnational networks, primarily from the perspective of a 'sending country'. The proposed field investigation in UK will supplement and contrast the ethnographic research carried out by Dr Varghese in the Doaba region of Punjab. Besides having selective interactions with Punjabis in Birmingham and Southall (London), Dr Varghese will have discussions with the UK branches of village-networks from some of the key migrant villages in Punjab. Half of the visiting time will be devoted for consultations with research partners at University of Sussex and scholars of Punjabi Diaspora elsewhere in UK and for preliminary analysis of data. 14 In-depth ethnographical interviews with UK-resident Punjabis were conducted in Birmingham, Leicester and London.

This is a late July 2013 YouGov political tracker survey combining data on attitudes to race and immigration with questions on mobility history as well as voting intention, media consumption and other background variables. Data is also geocoded to ward level and ward-level census variables appended. The quantitative research will be based on ONS longitudinal survey and census data, as well the large-scale Citizenship Surveys and Understanding Society surveys. We will identify individual respondents from the quantitative research and explore their responses through qualitative work, in the form of three focus groups - two in Greater London, one in Birmingham. These will probe connections between respondents' local and national identities, their intentions to move neighbourhood, and their opinions on immigration, interethnic relations, community cohesion and voting behaviour.In the past decade in Britain, the 'white working-class' has been the focus of unprecedented media and policy attention. While class is a longstanding discursive category, the prefix 'white' is an important rider. We live in an era of global migration. Population pressure from the global South, and demand for workers in the developed North, will power what some term a 'third demographic transition' involving significant declines in the white majority populations of the western world (Coleman 2010). In the UK, the upsurge in diversity arguably presents a greater challenge for the working-class part of the white British population than for the middle class. Why? First, because for lower-status members of dominant groups, their ethnic identity tends to be their most prestigious social identity (Yiftachel 1999). Second, minorities tend to be from disadvantaged backgrounds and are therefore more likely to compete for housing and jobs with the white working class. Finally, because the white working-class is less comfortable navigating the contours of the new global knowledge economy than the middle class, it is more attached to existential securities rooted in the local and national context (Skey 2011). How might the white working class respond to increasing diversity? Drawing upon Albert O. Hirschman's classic book Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970), we posit three possible responses: 'exit', 'voice' and 'accommodation.' The first possibility is white 'exit': geographic segregation, or, in the extreme, 'white flight'. A second avenue is 'voice': spearheading an identity politics based on opposition to immigration and voting for white nationalist parties. A third possibility is accommodation, in which members of the white working-class become more comfortable with elevated levels of ethnic diversity in their neighbourhood and nation. From exploratory research and existing literature, we suggest that a three-stage pattern of voice, exit and accommodation may be a useful way of thinking about white working-class responses to diversity in the UK. In other words, initial diversity meets strong white working-class resistance, expressed in attitudes and voting. This is followed by a degree of white out-migration, and then by a decline in anti-immigration sentiment and far right voting. Yet these broad patterns require finer-grained analysis that takes both individual characteristics and local context into account. This project will test these propositions through quantitative and qualitative research. There are three major dimensions of white working class attitudes and behaviour we seek to explain. Namely, whether members of the white working-class: 1) are more likely than other groups to leave or avoid areas with large or growing minority populations; 2) oppose immigration more strongly if they reside in diverse or ethnically changing wards and local authorities; and 3) support far right parties more if they reside in diverse or ethnically changing wards and local authorities. A central question we seek to answer is whether inter-ethnic contact reduces white working-class antagonism toward minorities (the contact hypothesis), or whether increased diversity leads to white flight, leaving relatively tolerant whites remaining in diverse neighbourhoods. The latter, 'hydraulic' process mimics the contact hypothesis but does not signify increased accommodation. Telephone interview of 1869 individuals (YouGov) in Britain. Further details available in the YouGov Archive Birbeck results pdf which is available in the related resources section of this project record.

The latest population figures produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 28 June 2018 show that an estimated 534,800 people live in Bradford District – an increase of 2,300 people (0.4%) since the previous year.

Bradford District is the fifth largest metropolitan district (in terms of population) in England, after Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester although the District’s population growth is lower than other major cities.

The increase in the District’s population is largely due to “natural change”- there have been around 3,300 more births than deaths, although this has been balanced by a larger number of people leaving Bradford to live in other parts of the UK than coming to live here and a lower number of international migrants. In 2016/17 the net internal migration was -2,700 and the net international migration was 1,700.

A large proportion of Bradford’s population is dominated by the younger age groups. More than one-quarter (29%) of the District’s population is aged less than 20 and nearly seven in ten people are aged less than 50. Bradford has the highest percentage of the under 16 population in England after the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, Slough Borough Council and Luton Borough Council.

The population of Bradford is ethnically diverse. The largest proportion of the district’s population (63.9%) identifies themselves as White British. The district has the largest proportion of people of Pakistani ethnic origin (20.3%) in England.

The largest religious group in Bradford is Christian (45.9% of the population). Nearly one quarter of the population (24.7%) are Muslim. Just over one fifth of the district’s population (20.7%) stated that they had no religion.

There are 216,813 households in the Bradford district. Most households own their own home (29.3% outright and 35.7% with a mortgage). The percentage of privately rented households is 18.1%. 29.6% of households were single person households.

Information from the Annual Population Survey in December 2017 found that Bradford has 228,100 people aged 16-64 in employment. At 68% this is significantly lower than the national rate (74.9%). 91,100 (around 1 in 3 people) aged 16-64, are not in work. The claimant count rate is 2.9% which is higher than the regional and national averages.

Skill levels are improving with 26.5% of 16 to 74 year olds educated to degree level. 18% of the district’s employed residents work in retail/wholesale. The percentage of people working in manufacturing has continued to decrease from 13.4% in 2009 to 11.9% in 2016. This is still higher than the average for Great Britain (8.1%).

Cambridge was the fastest growing city in the United Kingdom between 2013 and 2023, with its population increasing by 17.3 percent. Exeter, Milton Keynes, and Peterborough also grew quite fast, with their populations increasing by 15.2 percent, 14.9 percent, and 14 percent, respectively. Largest UK urban areas When looking at cities defined by their urban agglomerations, as of 2023, London had approximately 9.65 million people living there, far larger than any other city in the United Kingdom. The urban agglomeration around the city of Birmingham had a population of approximately 2.67 million, while the urban areas around Manchester and Leeds had populations of 2.79 and 1.92 million respectively. London not only dominated other UK cities in terms of its population, but in its importance to the UK economy. In 2023, the gross domestic product of Greater London was approximately 569 billion British pounds, compared with 101 billion for Greater Manchester, and 85 billion in the West Midlands Metropolitan Area centered around Birmingham. UK population growth In 2023, the overall population of the United Kingdom was estimated to have reached approximately 68.3 million, compared with around 58.9 million in 2000. Since 1970, 2023 was also the year with the highest population growth rate, growing by 0.98 percent, and was at its lowest in 1982 when it shrank by 0.12 percent. Although the UK's birth rate has declined considerably in recent years, immigration to the UK has been high enough to drive population growth in the UK, which has had a positive net migration rate since 1994.

Migration to and from the UK after Brexit was a thirty-nine months project (Jan 2021 – March 2024) funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through their Governance After Brexit Scheme [‘Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit’ (MIGZEN), Grant Number: ES/V004530/1] and led by researchers at the University of Birmingham (Lead Research Organisation) and Lancaster University. Brexit brought public and political attention to longstanding concerns within migration and citizenship scholarship, throwing questions of citizenship, migration and belonging into sharp relief; it also affected people's sense of belonging, mobility and settlement plans, as Britons in the EU and EU citizens and non-EU Third Country Nationals (TCN) in the UK found the status and the terms of their residence challenged, their claims to belonging, and access to rights questioned, their settlement plans in jeopardy.

With the end of the Brexit transition period came significant changes in the composition of migration flows to and from the UK, which were further compounded by the geopolitical effects and implications of the tense relationship between China and Hong Kong, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

A collaborative, mixed-method research project involving academics, policy makers, civil society and migrant-led organisations, the project therefore explored the long-term impacts of Brexit and Britain’s shifting position on the world stage on migration to and from the UK, and on migrants’ experiences of these. Through this research, we sought to inform migration policy and debate by providing evidence of the everyday challenges brought by Brexit on individuals and their families living within and across the UK borders.

The project consisted of three phases as follows: - Phase 1: Survey (‘Migration and Citizenship after Brexit’): conducted in the UK and the EU between 13 December 2021 and 16 January 2022. - Phase 2: People’s Panel: conducted in the UK and the EU between May and December 2022. - Phase 3: Interviews with repatriating British citizens: conducted in the UK between May and September 2022; Interviews with Ukrainians, family and highly skilled migrants in the UK: conducted in the UK between September 2022 and February 2023; and Interviews with British emigrants: conducted in the UK between April and August 2023.

The transcripts of 72 in-depth interviews conducted with volunteers active in different refugee support charities in London, Birmingham, Sheffield and the Midlands. The interviews were conducted between May 2017 and November 2019.This research project seeks to analyse what motivates volunteers to engage with charities that support asylum seekers and refugees, as well as how they define their engagement and reflect upon their experience. In particular, the study wants to analyse whether and how these actors distinguish between altruistic action and social or political protest. In doing so, it seeks to explore how the frontiers between different forms of engagement in society are constructed and negotiated. Looking at immigration and asylum politics ‘from below’, it also aims to analyse how public debates and policies on these issues are reflected in the forms of engagement in support of asylum seekers and refugees. Our analysis draws on 72 in-depth interviews with British volunteers supporting refugees in Britain (London, Birmingham, Sheffield and the Midlands) and in France (Calais region). The interviews were conducted between May 2017 and November 2019, with participants who engaged in different types of activities, such as hosting, offering language courses, donating food and clothes, offering emotional support in immigration removal centres, or providing legal assistance. Our respondents (all non-paid volunteers) were involved in a variety of organisations, from established and professionalised national charities, to more local and informal networks that emerged during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. In the interviews, we asked participants about their personal trajectories, their initial motivations for engaging in the field of refugee support, the dynamics of their encounters with refugees and, more generally, their practice of volunteering. Our analysis focused on the ways they describe and explain how their own engagement has evolved over time. We paid particular attention to changes in terms of how they define the beneficiaries of their action, how they view their own role and, more generally, how they make sense of their relation with refugees. Respondents were approached through gatekeepers (e.g. charity representatives) or directly. In our sampling strategy, we aimed to recruit a variety of participants in terms of age, ethnicity, gender and socio-economic background. However, it should be noted that the majority self-identified as white women, middle-class and retired (which, according to the charity representatives we worked with reflected the composition of the volunteer population).