The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for China from the Peak through the Period preceding the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (CHNRECDP) from 1978-01-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and China.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 5.20 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

Annual data on the size of China Shadow Bank credit was taken from two sources. Moodys (China) produces data 2000-2012 and Goldman Sachs 2013-2018. The average growth rate 2000-2015 was applied to generate data prior to 2000. Annual data was interpolated to produce quarterly estimates using the cubic match last function in EViews so that the integrity of the annual stock data is maintained for the 4th quarter.The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking. This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis. The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilize imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks. Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector.These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises. Secondary data was taken from multiple Reports on China Shadow Banking published by Goldman Sachs (china) and Moodys (China). The data 2000-2018 corresponds to the annual data obtained from the reports. The quarterly data was obtained by interpolation. Data prior to 2000 was generated using the assumed average growth rate of shadow bank credit for 2000-2015.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

Out of the world's seven largest economies, the United Kingdom was the most negatively affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. During the third quarter of 2020, the GDP growth rate of the UK stood at minus *** percent compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the GDPs of India and Japan were contracted by minus *** percent. Only China experienced a positive GDP growth rate of *** percent during that same period. However, in 2021, all the largest economies worldwide started to recover, with growth rates varying from *** percent (Japan) to over **** percent (India).

For most of the past two decades, China had the highest GDP growth of any of the BRICS countries, although it was overtaken by India in the mid-2010s, and India is predicted to have the highest growth in the 2020s. All five countries saw their GDP growth fall during the global financial crisis in 2008, and again during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020; China was the only economy that continued to grow during both crises, although India's economy also grew during the Great Recession. In 2014, Brazil experienced its own recession due to a combination of economic and political instability, while Russia also went into recession due to the drop in oil prices and the economic sanctions imposed following its annexation of Crimea.

This dataset includes the replication dataset and code (do file for stata) for a forthcoming article in Foreign Policy Analysis, titled "The Crisis of COVID-19 and the Political Economy of China’s Vaccine Diplomacy"

The statistic shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The gross domestic product of the United States in 2024 amounted to around 29.18 trillion U.S. dollars. The United States and the economy The United States’ economy is by far the largest in the world; a status which can be determined by several key factors, one being gross domestic product: A look at the GDP of the main industrialized and emerging countries shows a significant difference between US GDP and the GDP of China, the runner-up in the ranking, as well as the followers Japan, Germany and France. Interestingly, it is assumed that China will have surpassed the States in terms of GDP by 2030, but for now, the United States is among the leading countries in almost all other relevant rankings and statistics, trade and employment for example. See the U.S. GDP growth rate here. Just like in other countries, the American economy suffered a severe setback when the economic crisis occurred in 2008. The American economy entered a recession caused by the collapsing real estate market and increasing unemployment. Despite this, the standard of living is considered quite high; life expectancy in the United States has been continually increasing slightly over the past decade, the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily recovering and decreasing since the crisis, and the Big Mac Index, which represents the global prices for a Big Mac, a popular indicator for the purchasing power of an economy, shows that the United States’ purchasing power in particular is only slightly lower than that of the euro area.

China’s export benefits from the significant fiscal stimulus in the United States. This paper analyzes the global spillover effect of the American economy on China’s macro-economy using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-Gibbs sampling approach, with the goal of improving the ability of China’s financial system to protect against foreign threats. This paper examines the theories of the consequences of uncertainty on macroeconomics first. Then, using medium-sized economic and financial data, the uncertainty index of the American and Chinese economies is built. In order to complete the test and analysis of the dynamic relationship between American economic uncertainty and China’s macro-economy, a Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility-Vector Autoregression (TVP- VAR) model with random volatility is constructed. The model is estimated using the Gibbs sampling method based on MCMC. For the empirical analysis, samples of China’s and the United States’ economic data from January 2001 to January 2022 were taken from the WIND database and the FRED database, respectively. The data reveal that there are typically fewer than 5 erroneous components in the most estimated parameters of the MCMC model, which suggests that the model’s sampling results are good. China’s pricing level reacted to the consequences of the unpredictability of the American economy by steadily declining, reaching its lowest point during the financial crisis in 2009, and then gradually diminishing. After 2012, the greatest probability density range of 68% is extremely wide and contains 0, indicating that the impact of economic uncertainty in the United States on China’s pricing level is no longer significant. China should therefore focus on creating a community of destiny by working with nations that have economic cooperation to lower systemic financial risks and guarantee the stability of the capital market.

This is the supplementary data for the article "Estimating stranded coal assets in China's power sector" published in Utilities Policy. China has suffered overcapacity in coal power since 2016. With growing electricity demand and an economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic, China faces a dilemma between easing restrictive policies for short-term growth in coal-fired power production and keeping restrictions in place for long-term sustainability. In this paper, we measure the risks faced by China's coal power units to become stranded in the next decade and estimate the associated economic costs for different shareholders. By implementing restrictive policies on coal power expansion, China can avoid 90% of stranded coal assets by 2025.

The China home mortgage finance market, while experiencing a period of adjustment following recent regulatory changes, presents a compelling long-term investment opportunity. The market's size in 2025 is estimated at $4 trillion USD, reflecting a significant contribution from a large and growing population, ongoing urbanization, and government initiatives aimed at affordable housing. The historical period (2019-2024) likely saw robust growth, though fluctuating due to factors such as macroeconomic conditions and policy shifts. While precise figures for this period are unavailable, industry analysis suggests a CAGR in the high single digits to low double digits, considering the sustained growth in the overall real estate sector before the recent regulatory tightening. The forecast period (2025-2033) anticipates a more moderate, yet still positive, CAGR, influenced by government efforts to curb excessive speculation and promote sustainable growth in the housing market. This moderation reflects a shift towards a more balanced and controlled expansion of the mortgage finance sector. Despite recent regulatory interventions aimed at managing risk within the financial system, the underlying demand for housing in China remains substantial. Continued urbanization, a growing middle class seeking improved living standards, and government policies supporting affordable housing will contribute to the market's long-term resilience. The focus is now shifting towards a more sustainable model of growth, prioritizing responsible lending practices and minimizing systemic risks. This necessitates adaptation within the mortgage finance sector, leading to innovative lending models, enhanced risk management strategies, and increased technological adoption. The market’s future will depend on successfully navigating these challenges while continuing to meet the housing needs of a large and dynamic population. Recent developments include: October 2022: HSBC expands China's private banking network and launches in two new cities., September 2022: China Construction Bank Corp., one of the country's four largest state-owned lenders, will set up a 30-billion-yuan (USD 4.2 billion) fund to buy properties from developers. The move comes even as policymakers take steps to contain a real estate crisis weighing on the economy.. Notable trends are: Favorable Mortgage Rates is Expected to Drive the Market.

This paper uses the test proposed by Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey-Fuller to identify whether there are multiple bubbles in copper price. The empirical results show that base on market fundamentals, there are seven bubbles existed from January 1980 to March 2023. Through analyses, the first two bubbles can be explained by the demand from Japan by the industry concentration and persistent supply constraint. The third to sixth bubbles are mainly negatively impacted by the global financial crisis and growing demand of China. The last bubble is caused by the economic recovery from Covid-19. The logit regression has stated that aluminum price, copper production, all metals index and GDP have a positive impact on copper bubbles, while China’s copper imports and precious metals price negatively explains copper bubbles. The main contributions are the investigation of the copper price bubbles, its determinants and the different technique of GSADF to detect copper price bubbles. Furthermore, it provides helpful information for those investors to make reasonable investment decisions and thus, avoid potential price risk.

According to a survey conducted by Statista Consumer Insights among Generation Z in China, ** percent of respondents were trying to spend less money in light of the economic circumstances as of September 2024. In addition, ** percent of respondents felt that their cost of living has increased notably, and ** percent had been experiencing stress and anxiety. However, ** percent of respondents shared none of the worries mentioned in the survey.

The database used includes annual frequency data for 43 countries, defined by the IMF as 24 advanced countries and 19 emerging countries, for the years 1992-2018.The database contains the fiscal stress variable and a set of variables that can be classified as follows: macroeconomic and global economy (interest rates in the US, OECD; real GDP in the US, y-o-y, OECD; real GDP in China, y-o-y, World Bank; oil price, y-o-y, BP p.l.c.; VIX, CBOE; real GDP, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD, IMF WEO; GDP per capita in PPS, World Bank); financial (nominal USD exchange rate, y-o-y, IMF IFS; private credit to GDP, change in p.p., IMF IFS, World Bank and OECD); fiscal (general government balance, % GDP, IMF WEO; general government debt, % GDP, IMF WEO, effective interest rate on the g.g. debt, IMF WEO); competitiveness and domestic demand (currency overvaluation, IMF WEO; current account balance, % GDP, IMF WEO; share in global exports, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD; gross fixed capital formation, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD; CPI, IMF IFS, IMF WEO; real consumption, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD); labor market (unemployment rate, change in p.p., IMF WEO; labor productivity, y-o-y, ILO).In line with the convention adopted in the literature, the fiscal stress variable is a binary variable equal to 1 in the case of a fiscal stress event and 0 otherwise. In more recent literature in this field, the dependent variable tends to be defined broadly, reflecting not only outright default or debt restructuring, but also less extreme events. Therefore, following Baldacci et al. (2011), the definition used in the present database is broad, and the focus is on signalling fiscal stress events, in contrast to the narrower event of a fiscal crisis related to outright default or debt restructuring. Fiscal problems can take many forms; in particular, some of the outright defaults can be avoided through timely, targeted responses, like support programs of international institutions. The fiscal stress variable is shifted with regard to the other variables: crisis_next_year – binary variable shifted by 1 year, all years of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_next_period – binary variable shifted by 2 years, all years of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_first_year1 – binary variable shifted by 1 year, only the first year of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_first_year2 - binary variable shifted by 2 years, only the first year of a fiscal stress coded as 1.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

In China, official promotion evaluation based on economic performance motivates local governments to develop high economic growth targets, which has played an active role in boosting China’s economic growth in the past decades, whereas its environmental consequences have not been fully exploited. This paper finds that the economic growth target overweight has a stronger positive impact on the output of high-polluting industries than on the output of low-polluting industries, thus inducing more polluting activities. To deal with the issues of reverse causality and omitted variables bias, we take an instrumental variable approach. Examining mechanisms, we show that economic growth target overweight promotes polluting activities through the deregulation of the polluting activities in high-polluting industries. We also find an increase in the impact of the economic growth target overweight after the 2008 global economic crisis. Our study provides new evidence for explaining the dual presence of rapid economic growth and heavy environmental pollution in China.