The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q1 2025 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

The statisic shows the concern among Americans around the impact of the European financial crisis on the United States economy. According to the source, 15 percent of those polled stated that they were 'not too concerned' about the impact of the European financial crisis on the U.S. economy.

Graph and download economic data for Equity Market Volatility Tracker: Financial Crises (EMVFINCRISES) from Jan 1985 to Oct 2025 about volatility, uncertainty, equity, financial, and USA.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

Graph and download economic data for Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator (SAHMREALTIME) from Dec 1959 to Sep 2025 about recession indicators, academic data, and USA.

ABSTRACT This work, to begin with, draws attention to the clear contrast between the intensity and evolution of the crisis of the thirties and the one that bursts into the early eighties, originating the so-called “lost decade” which, in fact and except for few exceptions, has not yet been overcome. Several main issues are emphasized. On the one hand, the incidence of the first crisis was substantially more serious than the second. On the other, the external circumstances were more disadvantageous and prolonged due to the repercussion of the crisis on the “central economies” and the incidence of the Second World War. In spite of these circumstances, most of the Latin American countries could initiate their recuperation and maintain their so-called “inward development” up to, approximately, the sixties. In the last part, after analysing different facts which influenced the evolution - mainly, the role played by the central economies in the two recalled crisis -, emphasis is made on the fact that we “live in another Latin America” and that it is necessary, above all, to constitute other socio-political agglomerations inherent to the internal and external realities of present time.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Nov 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

The statistic shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The gross domestic product of the United States in 2024 amounted to around 29.18 trillion U.S. dollars. The United States and the economy The United States’ economy is by far the largest in the world; a status which can be determined by several key factors, one being gross domestic product: A look at the GDP of the main industrialized and emerging countries shows a significant difference between US GDP and the GDP of China, the runner-up in the ranking, as well as the followers Japan, Germany and France. Interestingly, it is assumed that China will have surpassed the States in terms of GDP by 2030, but for now, the United States is among the leading countries in almost all other relevant rankings and statistics, trade and employment for example. See the U.S. GDP growth rate here. Just like in other countries, the American economy suffered a severe setback when the economic crisis occurred in 2008. The American economy entered a recession caused by the collapsing real estate market and increasing unemployment. Despite this, the standard of living is considered quite high; life expectancy in the United States has been continually increasing slightly over the past decade, the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily recovering and decreasing since the crisis, and the Big Mac Index, which represents the global prices for a Big Mac, a popular indicator for the purchasing power of an economy, shows that the United States’ purchasing power in particular is only slightly lower than that of the euro area.

We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)

This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and Its Long-Term Impact: An Interrupted Time-Series Natural Experimental Analysis" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.

In 2022, the regional gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America and the Caribbean grew more than four percent compared to the previous year. In 2020, the GDP of all the subregion shrunk, with Central America being the worst hit by the economic crisis spawned from the coronavirus pandemic, with a real GDP decrease of seven percent. This was the first time that this part of Latin America experiences a GDP fall since at least 2016. Forecasts for 2023 are fairly optimistic as well.

Abstract The paper aims to analyze the wide range of unconventional monetary policies adopted in the U.S. since the 2007-2008 financial crises, focusing on conceptual aspects, the implementation of different programs and measures adopted by FED, and their effectiveness. It is argued that the use of credit and quasi-debt policies had significant effects on the financial conditions and on a set of macroeconomic variables in the US, such as output and employment. This result raises questions about the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy and the forward guidance, both of which were key elements in the New Macroeconomics Consensus view that preceded the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

Do international lenders of last resort create financial instability by generating moral hazard? The evidence is thin and plagued with measurement error. We use the number of American troops hosted by third countries to measure the strength of American commitment to ensuring the countries’ economic health. We test several hypotheses against a dataset covering about sixty-eight countries between 1960 and 2009. Using evidence from fixed-effects and instrumental-variable models, we find that increasing the number of US troops by one standard deviation above the mean raises the probability of a financial crisis in the host country by up to 13 percentage points. We also investigate the channels through which moral hazard materializes. Countries with more US troops conduct more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, implement riskier financial regulations, and receive more capital, especially from US banks. While many scholars of international relations view the American overseas military presence as a source of stability, we identify an underexplored mechanism by which it generates instability.

Countries become more politically polarized and fractionalized following financial crises, reducing the likelihood of major financial reforms precisely when they might have especially large benefits. The evidence from a large sample of countries provides strong support for the hypotheses that following a financial crisis, voters become more ideologically extreme and ruling coalitions become weaker, independently of whether they were initially in power. The evidence that increased polarization and weaker governments reduce the chances of financial reform and that financial crises lead to legislative gridlock and anemic reform is less clear-cut. The US debt overhang resolution is discussed as an illustration.

Abstract This paper discusses elements that contribute to financial instability in developing countries, evaluating incentive mechanisms that condition the behavior of different economic sectors over the cycles. Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis is used as a theoretical reference, in addition to an analysis of structural constraints that accentuate the fragility of this group of countries, related to their position in global commercial and financial systems, in an environment marked by freedom of capital movements. From the stylized balance and main financial intersectoral relations in an open economy, it is observed that different domestic sectors tend to present procyclical behavior, increasing their vulnerability in periods of growth, despite the different objectives of the public and private sectors. We highlight the relevance of instruments that provide the State with margins of maneuver for countercyclical policy actions, in order to reduce collateral effects from fluctuations in international capital flows.

The financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 brought a sharp increase in the number of bank failures in the United States. This article investigates characteristics of banks that failed and regional patterns in bank failure rates during 2007-2010. The article compares the recent experience with that of 1987-1992, when the United States last experienced a high number of bank failures.

ABSTRACT This paper aims to evaluate the profitability of the major North-american banks after the crisis of 2007-2008, as well as to seek preliminary explanations to the results found. To do so, it assesses the historical data from 1932 until 2015. The results show that the share of total profits in the North-american economy captured by the financial sector has reduced compared to the peak of the last decade but is still at a higher level than the post-war baseline. The evidence points to the decrease of leverage by regulatory pressure as the main cause of the reduction.