Replication Files for Bank Lending and Deposit Crunches during the Great DepressionBank distress was a defining feature of the Great Depression in the United States.Most banks, however, weathered the storm and remained in operation throughout the contraction. We show that surviving banks cut lending when depositors withdrewfunds en masse during panics. This panic-induced decline in lending explains aboutone-third of the reduction in aggregate commercial bank lending between 1929 and1932, more than twice as much as attributed to the failure of banks.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

Abstract: During times of crisis and uncertainty, ideas can provide blueprints that enable stable political coalitions. However, political scientists have often focused on the ideas of traditional policymakers - e.g. elected officials and policy experts. We submit that crises create significant opportunities for attention entrepreneurs, those able to attract and maintain the attention of large audiences. Attention entrepreneurs do not only opine on crises, they imbue ideas about crisis resolution with identities of deep emotional resonance, stoking conflict and urgency to grab audiences. We submit that attention entrepreneurs materially impact the resolution of crises by shaping the beliefs of large segments of the public. As an illustrative case, we examine the impact of Father Coughlin’s radio broadcasts and bank failures in the United States during the Great Depression. We leverage data on exogenously determined radio signal strength of these broadcasts to provide causal evidence of the effect of conspiratorial messaging on institutional trust. We show that counties with increased exposure to Father Coughlin due to features of their geography experienced greater numbers of banking failures. In addition, we show that his broadcasts had a negative impact on the stock price of Detroit banks during the Detroit Banking Panic of 1933.