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Official books for the board of directors

This dataset describes and provides examples of data collection, directors’ data treatment, and the use of these data to map and measure network structural properties using an open-source tool -– R statistical software.

This paper analyzes the influence of female participation on the performance and financial risk considering a sample of 218 public companies traded on B3 (Bovespa) from 2010 a 2016. The study also analyzes the influence of female participation on family control companies. Using a random effects methodology and family control dummy and percentage of female presence in boards of director, the study sought to analyze how theses variables and their interactions affect the financial performance of companies. Although the female representation has grown more than 50% in recent years, this share, however, in the board of directors of Brazilian companies is still a minority, close to 9% of the total surveyed. The ownership structure in the family firms is very relevant, with the percentage of 63%. The results suggest a positive relation between female participation and the Tobin-Q, used by value’s proxy, however, this relationship is weaker for firms with a family control. Another result found is that volatility, taken here as a risk’s proxy, is reduced in family run-business.

ABSTRACT Purpose: We analyzed the impact of board directors with foreign experience on the accounting and market performance of companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3). Originality/value: We show unpublished empirical evidence about the relationship between the foreign experience of board directors and the performance of Brazilian firms. Knowing this relationship better contributes to the formulation of internal policies for the qualification of senior management, in addition to being valuable to shareholders, especially in a context of weak legal protection, as it is in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach: We collected data from 230 companies between 2010 and 2016, submitted it to unbalanced panel data regressions using the Systemic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-Sys). Findings: The results suggest that the higher the proportion of board members with academic and professional foreign experience, the lower their accounting and market performance. This finding can be justified by institutional isomorphism, in which having an experience abroad would be a myth, a status institutionalized by the Brazilian society. In addition, foreign owners and directors face cultural barriers and would have less knowledge of the local environment, which would increase information asymmetries, impacting negatively in firms’ performance. On the other hand, an increase in the number of foreigners on the board positively influences the market value of companies, since, by having weaker local power networks and, consequently, less possibility to obtain private benefits, the investors could value companies with this characteristic.

Board of Directors List...........................

Bipartite graph of directors and companies. Generated from information on the Financial Times website (https://markets.ft.com/data/equities/results), retrieved on 17 September 2016.

Blank fields are used for missing data.

comp_nodes.csv:

• id: unique identifier
• ft_country: name of the country
• ft_sector: segment of the economy in which a company operates
• ft_industry: specific business (i.e., subset of sector) in which a company operates
• ft_employees_num: number of company's employees. "NA" if the vertex represents a person or if the company's number of employees is unknown.

comp_people_edges.csv:

• person_id:
• comp_id: company identifier. It matches the identifier in comp_nodes.csv

people_one_mode_edges.csv:

Edges in the one-mode projection, in which two directors are connected if and only if they sit together on at least one board. Numbers correspond to the identifiers in unique_people_nodes.csv.

unique_people_nodes.csv:

• ID: unique identifier
• age: years of age
• gender_base: "Male" or "Female"

Average percentage of board of director positions in designated groups for non-profit organizations by region, size, International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations (ICNPO) and organization type, Canada, 2023.

ABSTRACT This article investigates, in the Brazilian capital market, the effect of the composition of the board of directors on executive compensation sensitivity to market performance, known as pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Due to potential agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and managers, members of the board of directors of the executive board or those appointed by the controlling shareholder might have less independence, something which may compromise monitoring effectiveness and, consequently, reduce the PPS. The purpose is contributing to understand the agency conflicts that have taken place in the Brazilian capital market and to define the configuration of the monitoring and compensation mechanisms that minimize total agency costs, maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The research results have implications for understanding the agency relations and for corporate governance in the Brazilian capital market. It is concluded that the relation between the monitoring exercised by the board of directors and executive compensation is a condition for its effectiveness as a governance mechanism in the Brazilian capital market. Data within the period 2013-2015 from 92 companies that participate in the Brazil 100 Index (IBRX 100) of the São Paulo Stock, Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) were analyzed. In addition to tests of difference between mean values and correlation, estimates were processed through feasible generalized least squares modeling. The independence of the board of directors vis-à-vis the controlling shareholder and the executive board may work as a corporate governance mechanism supplementing executive compensation. The results of this study indicate that the proportion of executives and independent members in the board of directors reduces the PPS, a measurement for executive compensation effectiveness made operational by the contemporary relation between increased managers’ compensation and increased company’s market value.

Procedure Manual for the Secretary of the Board of Directors Data and Resources دليل اجراءات امين سر مجلس الادارةPDF دليل اجراءات امين سر مجلس الادارة Explore More information Download

Abstract

This dataset includes data of previous executives, boards of directors and boards of supervisors of listed companies in China. Data available up to 2022.

Methodology

The raw data were wrangled for inclusion in Data Farm. For more information, please see CnOpenData GitLab.

The list of members of the board of state-owned companies includes the name of the company, the name and surname of the member of the board.

ABSTRACT Understanding the dynamics of agency conflicts in Brazilian firms requires investigating the influence of shareholder concentration and board structure in the remuneration level of executives. Based on a sample of 232 firms traded on B3 between 2014 and 2016, we found shareholder concentration to have a negative effect on executive remuneration, as predicted by the agency theory. The characteristics of the board structure also have repercussions on executive compensation. Some of these characteristics affect the sensitivity of compensation to shareholder concentration, which, contrary to the managerial power approach, highlights the predominance of the principal-principal conflict in Brazil.

Details of the business expenses of the FSA's Directors, its Chair and Board members.

The Government is committed to setting new standards for transparency so that the public can more easily see how and where taxpayers’ money is being spent and hold politicians, Government departments and public bodies to account.

On this page we are publishing details of the business expenses incurred by the FSA’s Chair, Board members and senior staff.

Absract The study aims to evaluate the interconnection structures by members of the Board of Directors with political and financial expertise of companies listed in the Brazilian stock market B3. The sample consisted of 2,474 observations in the period from 2010 to 2015. It is suggested by the Agency Theory that board interlocking (BI) for financial expertise can help in corporate monitoring and mitigates the agency’s conflicts. On the other hand, BI by political expertise can maximize opportunistic behavior. In the view of Resource Dependency Theory, BI for financial expertise can assist companies in attracting financial resources, while BI for policy expertise can maximize results through more lucrative contracts and advantages offered by policymakers. It is concluded that the systematization of BI by different expertise can be used in future research to explain corporate strategies, decisions, and phenomena, as well as to evaluate the causes and effects of such structures in the management of organizations.

Smart Insider monitors new director changes at listed companies, allowing our clients to view the compositions of boardrooms and monitor changes as they occur for the stocks that matter to them.

We track internal movement in company for director changes as they move positions within a firm or transition to a new one as well as monitor key dates and biographical information. Insights derived from aggregated share transactions across multiple boards can expose patterns and activity that might otherwise remain below the radar.

In addition to key dates for director and board changes, our people profiles go beyond by including biographies and pictures. This comprehensive visual profile provides clients with a holistic understanding of the characteristics of directors and senior officers.

We provide tailored data delivery to meet client needs, including scheduled desktop reports, nightly updates via FTP, API or Snowflake.

Investor Relations and HR departments can receive concise boardroom personnel changes across peer companies. Fund managers can get portfolio/watchlist updates and sector-specific information.

Sample dataset can be provided upon request.

Tags: Corporate Actions Data, Management Changes, Director Insights, Internal Movement in Companies, Board Changes, Stock Holdings Data, Salary Data, Insider Score.

Research data used in the paper entitled "Composition of the Board of Directors and the Probability of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports" published in Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (RBGN) V25, n4 (2023) Acess: https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN

This archive contains data on the political giving patterns of board members and CEOs of Fortune 500 companies used in "Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives." Abstract: The literature on corporate political influence has primarily focused on expenditures made by corporations and their PACs but has largely ignored the political activities of the individuals who lead these firms. To better understand the role of corporate elites in political advocacy, I introduce a new database of campaign contributions made by corporate directors and executives of Fortune 500 firms. Donating to political campaigns is nearly universal among corporate elites. When compared to corporate PACs, corporate elites are more ideological, more willing to support non-incumbents, and less likely to target powerful legislators. The results also reveal substantial heterogeneity in the political preferences of directors both across and within firms. In addition to challenging widely held beliefs about the political leanings of corporate elites, the prevalence of bipartisan boardrooms has important implications for how the preferences of key decision-makers within a firm shape its political activities.

Number of persons on boards of directors that are operating in Canada, by gender and type of corporation, by province and territory, by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and by selected country of control, annual.