Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank, Upper Bound of 90% Confidence Interval in Brazil was reported at 43.13 % in 2023, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. Brazil - Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank, Upper Bound of 90% Confidence Interval - actual values, historical data, forecasts and projections were sourced from the World Bank on July of 2025.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Standard Error in Brazil was reported at 0.2081 in 2023, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. Brazil - Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Standard Error - actual values, historical data, forecasts and projections were sourced from the World Bank on June of 2025.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank in Brazil was reported at 28.44 % in 2023, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. Brazil - Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank - actual values, historical data, forecasts and projections were sourced from the World Bank on June of 2025.

The average for 2023 based on 193 countries was -0.07 points. The highest value was in Liechtenstein: 1.61 points and the lowest value was in Syria: -2.75 points. The indicator is available from 1996 to 2023. Below is a chart for all countries where data are available.

BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate data was reported at -0.405 NA in 2017. This records a decrease from the previous number of -0.377 NA for 2016. BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate data is updated yearly, averaging -0.259 NA from Dec 1996 (Median) to 2017, with 19 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 0.330 NA in 2002 and a record low of -0.405 NA in 2017. BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Brazil – Table BR.World Bank.WGI: Country Governance Indicators. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.

巴西 BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate在2017达-0.405 NA，相较于2016的-0.377 NA有所下降。巴西 BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate数据按每年更新，1996至2017期间平均值为-0.259 NA，共19份观测结果。该数据的历史最高值出现于2002，达0.330 NA，而历史最低值则出现于2017，为-0.405 NA。CEIC提供的巴西 BR: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate数据处于定期更新的状态，数据来源于World Bank，数据归类于Global Database的巴西 – Table BR.World Bank.WGI: Country Governance Indicators。

Attached, you can find the do-files and databases produced using STATA from the PNAD and PNS databases for the years 1998 to 2019, freely provided by the Brazilian Federal Government.

This article investigates the impact of political and electoral institutions on party system stability in 40 democracies, including Brazil. Party stability is analyzed using the Electoral Party Variation (EPV) indicator, based on the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP). The political and electoral institutions of interest include electoral magnitude, electoral formula, and an approach derived from Sartori (strong, feeble, and moderate electoral systems). The analysis employs four models using the generalized estimating equation (GEE) method for panel data (40 cases, seven periods). It is observed that the electoral system is efficient in explaining party stability. High average district magnitude, proportional electoral formula, and feeble electoral systems are permissive factors for party system instability. The case of Brazil is not an exception, as the instability of the party system in the country is appropriately interpreted in light of the prevailing political institutions.

The history of modern Brazil begins in the year 1500 when Pedro Álvares Cabral arrived with a small fleet and claimed the land for the Portuguese Empire. With the Treaty of Torsedillas in 1494, Spain and Portugal agreed to split the New World peacefully, thus allowing Portugal to take control of the area with little competition from other European powers. As the Portuguese did not arrive with large numbers, and the indigenous population was overwhelmed with disease, large numbers of African slaves were transported across the Atlantic and forced to harvest or mine Brazil's wealth of natural resources. These slaves were forced to work in sugar, coffee and rubber plantations and gold and diamond mines, which helped fund Portuguese expansion across the globe. In modern history, transatlantic slavery brought more Africans to Brazil than any other country in the world. This combination of European, African and indigenous peoples set the foundation for what has become one of the most ethnically diverse countries across the globe.

Independence and Monarchy By the early eighteenth century, Portugal had established control over most of modern-day Brazil, and the population more than doubled in each half of the 1800s. The capital of the Portuguese empire was moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 (as Napoleon's forces moved closer towards Lisbon), making this the only time in European history where a capital was moved to another continent. The United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves was established in 1815, and when the Portuguese monarchy and capital returned to Lisbon in 1821, the King's son, Dom Pedro, remained in Brazil as regent. The following year, Dom Pedro declared Brazil's independence, and within three years, most other major powers (including Portugal) recognized the Empire of Brazil as an independent monarchy and formed economic relations with it; this was a much more peaceful transition to independence than many of the ex-Spanish colonies in the Americas. Under the reign of Dom Pedro II, Brazil's political stability remained relatively intact, and the economy grew through its exportation of raw materials and economic alliances with Portugal and Britain. Despite pressure from political opponents, Pedro II abolished slavery in 1850 (as part of a trade agreement with Britain), and Brazil remained a powerful, stable and progressive nation under Pedro II's leadership, in stark contrast to its South American neighbors. The booming economy also attracted millions of migrants from Europe and Asia around the turn of the twentieth century, which has had a profound impact on Brazil's demography and culture to this day.

The New Republic

Despite his popularity, King Pedro II was overthrown in a military coup in 1889, ending his 58 year reign and initiating six decades of political instability and economic difficulties. A series of military coups, failed attempts to restore stability, and the decline of Brazil's overseas influence contributed greatly to a weakened economy in the early 1900s. The 1930s saw the emergence of Getúlio Vargas, who ruled as a fascist dictator for two decades. Despite a growing economy and Brazil's alliance with the Allied Powers in the Second World War, the end of fascism in Europe weakened Vargas' position in Brazil, and he was eventually overthrown by the military, who then re-introduced democracy to Brazil in 1945. Vargas was then elected to power in 1951, and remained popular among the general public, however political opposition to his beliefs and methods led to his suicide in 1954. Further political instability ensued and a brutal, yet prosperous, military dictatorship took control in the 1960s and 1970s, but Brazil gradually returned to a democratic nation in the 1980s. Brazil's economic and political stability fluctuated over the subsequent four decades, and a corruption scandal in the 2010s saw the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Despite all of this economic instability and political turmoil, Brazil is one of the world's largest economies and is sometimes seen as a potential superpower. The World Bank classifies it as a upper-middle income country and it has the largest share of global wealth in Latin America. It is the largest Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking), and sixth most populous country in the world, with a population of more than 210 million people.

These surveys were conducted as part of the AmericasBarometers series sponsored by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The sample represents the adult population from all geographic regions and both urban and rural areas. The surveys measure the perception of democracy’s stability in Brazil, opinions of economic well being, attitudes toward crime and corruption, confidence in electoral and political reforms, trust in government, the role of involvement and social capital in public life, and other topics related to political values and behaviors.

Abstract The article presents a theory of political information demand, and its model is applied to the analysis of the seven Brazilian presidential elections following the transition to democracy. The initial goal of the theory is to posit the potential of the political and electoral influence of the mass media on the choices not only of so-called ordinary citizens, but also of militants, depending on the political and institutional context. In other words, why does intervention on the part of the mass media in certain circumstances seem to have a decisive influence on the choices of some individuals but not in others? How does one discern such variations without the known limits of political information supply analyses, which either do not account for the reception’s polysemy, or, which cannot be generalized when they do, on a smaller scale and with more depth. According to this theory, media influence is a function of the utility attributed to political information, which depends on the stability and intensity of voter preferences and the risk margins with which they make their decisions, which in turn depend on the overall stability and degree of political polarization of the political system. Some of the other potentials of the theory are also briefly indicated.

ABSTRACT By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetary authority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study of monetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Beginning from the premise central banks constitute a special mode of political authority, we examine trade-offs between questions of transparency, democratic accountability, and public sector efficiency. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Brazilian case, the paper inverts a commonly held assumption within the study of central banks. Rather than argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian case demonstrate nearly the opposite can take place.

The statistic presents the factors which can negatively affect investment progress according to investors in Brazil as of August 2018. It was found that 56 percent of respondents in Brazil considered political instability in their own country to be a factor with possible adverse effect on their investment returns.

An exploratory study of leaders of industrial enterprises, in Recife, a Northeast Brazilian city which has witnessed increasing poverty, unemployment, and political instability. Its industry has been one of the main targets of a regional development program (SUDENE) which subsidized and encouraged new enterprises. A representative sample of heads of enterprises (employing 50 or more persons) founded prior to SUDENE (the old elite) and heads of enterprises founded after 1960 (the new elite) are the source of the data. In-depth interview were conducted in order to determine the role of this industrial elite in the economic growth of Recife. Particular attention is devoted to the relations of this elite and their enterprises to key institutions in the developmental process such as labour, banks, education and government agencies. A prime goal of this study is to measure the effects of this unique regional development program on the industrial structure and to determine whether entrepreneurial activity is fostered. The major research instrument is a detailed questionnaire covering biographical background, values and attitudes, the extent of foreign investment and control, industrial relations, financial institutions, government agencies, recruitment, succession and expansion. 1 data file (96 logical records) & accompanying documentation.

ABSTRACT The author begins by asking why Brazilian policymakers opted to target the exchange rate to stabilize inflation when this strategy had already failed in Mexico. The answer: it was no longer possible to accommodate the country’s high inflation rate through the pervasive use of price indexation and a competitive exchange rate policy. Under conditions of high inflation, the anchoring of the exchange rate within the Real Plan was the quickest route toward price stability. However, policy success also required deep fiscal adjustment, and traditional Brazilian politics stubbornly resisted the necessary tax reforms. In contrast to Mexico, where the peso crash was fueled by reckless private sector spending and borrowing, Brazil’s January 1999 devaluation was triggered by chronically high fiscal deficits. Brazil’s rapid recovery under a flexible currency regime suggests that the macroeconomic fundamentals are back on track; the challenge now lies in the crafting of a viable pro-reform political coalition that can cut through the numerous parochial interests that converged to provoke the 1999 devaluation.