As of June 2025, 56 percent of people in Great Britain thought that it was wrong to leave the European Union, compared with 31 percent who thought it was the right decision. During this time period, the share of people who regret Brexit has been slightly higher than those who support it, except for some polls in Spring 2021, which showed higher levels of support for Brexit. Is Bregret setting in? Since late July 2022, the share of people who regret Brexit in these surveys has consistently been above 50 percent. Additionally, a survey from January 2025 highlighted that most people in the UK thought that Brexit had had a mainly negative impact, especially on the cost of living and the economy. Despite there being a clear majority of voters who now regret Brexit, there is as yet no particular future relationship with the EU that has overwhelming support. As of late 2023, 31 percent of Britons wanted to rejoin the EU, while 30 percent merely wanted to improve trade relations and not rejoin either the EU or the single market. Leave victory in 2016 defied the polls In the actual referendum, which took place on June 23, 2016, Leave won 51.9 percent of the votes and Remain 48.1 percent, after several polls in the run-up to the referendum put Remain slightly ahead. Remain were anticipated to win until early results from North East England suggested that Leave had performed far better than expected, with this pattern replicated throughout the country. This event was repeated somewhat in the U.S. election of that year, which saw Donald Trump win several key swing states such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, despite predictions that these states would vote for Hillary Clinton.

This statistic shows the British public's perceived likelihood of increased security threats post Brexit. ** percent of respondents who voted for the UK to remain within the EU predict that this will in fact occur, whereas ** percent of respondents who voted in favor of the "Brexit" predict that this won’t happen.

This statistic illustrates the likelihood of international travelers to visit Britain following the decision of the EU referendum ('brexit') in 2016, according to a survey conducted across nine international markets in March 2018. The results are broken down by age. Across all the age groups, the majority responded that the referendum result made no difference to their likelihood to visit Britain, with a higher share of those over the age of 45 agreeing so. Of 18 to 24 year olds, a net of 18 percent said they would be less likely to visit Britain compared to 22 percent who said they would be more likely to visit.

On June 23rd 2016 the UK voted to leave the European Union. The period leading up to the referendum was characterized by a significant volume of misinformation and disinformation. Existing literature has established the importance of cognitive ability in processing and discounting (mis/dis) information in decision making. We use a dataset of couples within households from a nationally representative UK survey to investigate the relationship between cognitive ability and the propensity to vote Leave / Remain in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership. We find that a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability, all else being equal, increases the likelihood of a Remain vote by 9.7%. Similarly, we find that an increase in partner’s cognitive ability further increases the respondent’s likelihood of a Remain vote (7.6%). In a final test, restricting our analysis to couples who voted in a conflicting manner, we find that having a cognitive ability advantage over one’s partner increases the likelihood of voting Remain (10.9%). An important question then becomes how to improve individual and household decision making in the face of increasing amounts of (mis/dis) information.

This statistic shows the British public's view on the perceived likelihood of the *************** weekly contribution to the EU actually being saved and spent in Britain after leaving the EU. During the survey period it was found that ** percent of respondents who voted for the UK to remain within the EU predict that this won't occur, ** percent of respondents who voted for the "Brexit" agree with them.

These data include three nationally representative internet panel surveys conducted in Greece (n=3071), Germany (n=2074) and the UK (n=2106) between 24 and 31 May 2019. There is only one wave. The questionnaire is the same in all three countries. It covered a variety of issues including attitudes towards the European Union, vote in a potential European Union referendum, European identity, political trust, political responsibility, European solidarity and freedom of movement. It also asked questions that tap into psychological processes, including emotions about the European Union/immigration/economy/how things are going, social dominance orientation and system justification. The surveys also include various demographic measures.

The outbreak of the financial crisis has signalled a new period in the process of European integration. It has -more than ever before- brought to the forefront issues of transnational economic redistribution and has increased political contestation in and about the European Union (EU). Contrary to the pre-crisis era when Euroscepticism was mostly an expression of public protest limited to parties in the margins of their political systems, it has now developed into a widespread phenomenon with far-reaching implications for democracy in the EU and its members. However, we know surprisingly little about the nature of politicisation of European integration and the ways in which the structure of political conflict has changed as a result of the crisis. Seeking to build on the literature examining democratic contestation and the politicisation of European integration, and to contribute towards an improved understanding of the nature of Euroscepticism in times of crisis, this project offers an original contribution to the study of Euroscepticism by integrating three research objectives, which aim at (1) mapping and identifying the different dimensions of Euroscepticism and understanding whether these have changed as a result of the crisis; (2) exploring the underlying causes of Euroscepticism and explaining variation in levels of Euroscepticism at the country, party and individual levels; and (3) assessing the ways in which Euroscepticism feeds back into national politics by testing its consequences on domestic political behaviour. In answering these questions, this project relies on a novel interdisciplinary longitudinal and comparative research design and applies an original multi-method approach through the complementary use of quantitative and experimental methods. The project will examine the dimensions and causes of Euroscepticism through an analysis of cross-sectional and time series data in all EU member states. The longitudinal design enables us to compare Euroscepticism in the periods prior to and during the crisis. The project will study the consequences of Euroscepticism on domestic political behaviour by focusing on three countries, namely Britain, Germany and Greece, which are non-Eurozone members, creditor and debtor countries, respectively. Building on my work on Euroscepticism, this study makes a significant theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution to our understanding of the politics of opposition in Europe and the literature on the EU's democratic deficit. The project's findings will provide evidence-based knowledge about elite and citizen attitudes towards European integration, allowing for effective policy responses to the rise of Eurosceptic sentiment across Europe. The three-year length of the project (2016-2018) will enable me to become a research leader at the forefront of political analysis, linking the project's findings to the debate over the possible 2017 referendum on British EU membership, the possibility of Greek exit and the upcoming 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections. Through its insights on the changing nature of Euroscepticism, the project has the potential to stir debate regarding institutional reform, accountability and representation in the EU. An advisory board consisting of academics and policy-makers will be consulted through the duration of the project. In order to ensure the co-production of knowledge with relevant policy communities, I have established official partnership with two think tanks, the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the London-based Policy Network. Research outputs will include dissemination to practitioners and the wider public through three policy-related workshops, executive summaries, policy publications, media articles and a dedicated project website; and academic dissemination through conference participation, journal articles and a monograph.

This statistic displays the public opinion in the United Kingdom (UK) on the possibility of Scotland leaving the United Kingdom once the country leaves the European Union (EU) as of October 2016. From the respondents, ** percent believed that Scottish independence is more likely after Brexit.

The EU Profiler is a Voting Advice Application (VAA) running during the European Elections of 2009. Respondents are situated in a political spectrum, according to their positioning with regard to 30 statements on: (a) Welfare, family and health: welfare programmes maintained even if taxes increase, privatization of healthcare services, increase in subsidies for childcare; (b) Migration and immigration: encourage immigration of skilled workers, restrict immigration; (c) Society, religion and culture: legalisation of same sex marriages, greater respect for religious values in politics, decriminalisation of soft drugs, legalisation of euthanasia; (d) Finances and taxes: reduction of government spending, tax-raising powers for EU, bail out failing banks with public money; (e) Economy and work: reduction of workers´ protection regulation, reduction of EU subsidies to farmers; (f) Environment, transport and energy: support for renewable sources of energy, promotion of public transport, fighting global warming; (g) Law and order: restrictions of civil liberties, more severe punishment for criminals; (h) Foreign policy: EU should speak with one voice, EU should strengthen security and defence policy; (i) European integration; EU integration is good, England is better off in the EU, accession of Turkey, more power to EP, less veto power for individual member states, referendum on treaty in England; (j) Country specific items: all residents of the UK should have a national ID card, expansion of airports in England. Respondents could rate subjective salience for all issues.

An additional questionnaire asks about: quality of results from EU-Profiler; help to decide about vote; change of vote decision; increase interest in EP election; increase interest in politics; increase motivation to participate in EP election; refrains from participating in EP election; no change of intention to vote; left indifferent; compass useful; previous use of profiler; media use for political information; political information before EP election; political efficacy; political interest; vote intention EP elections; vote at last election EP; vote intention national parliament; importance for democracy: equal chances to access courts, free and fair elections, referenda, governments do what is right, new technologies for participation; satisfaction with national democracy; satisfaction with european democracy; attitude towards further integration of EU; trust in: national parliament, European parliament, national Government, European Commission, political parties; national government of experts; european government of experts; approval of national government´s record; participation to elections; self-placement on a left-right continuum.

Demography: gender; place of birth; nationality; country of residence; marital status; highest level of education; occupational status; sector of employment; place of residence; duration of residence; denomination; church attendance; self-assessment of religiousness; number of children; number of people in household; household income.

Also encoded was: language user selected; spectrum position x-axis; spectrum position y-axis; nearest party in country spectrum; furthest party in country spectrum; nearest party in EU spectrum; furthest party in EU spectrum; scores on liberal society, expanded welfare axis, economic liberalisation axis, restrictive financial policy axis, law and order axis, immigration policy axis, environmental protection axis.

This chart shows results from an online survey on whether Brexit supporters would still be in favor of Brexit if that means Scotland left the European Union (EU). The overwhelming majority would still insist on leaving the EU, whereas only * percent of those surveyed would oppose Brexit under such circumstances.

The data collection consists of 40 qualitative interviews with Polish migrant essential workers living in the UK and 10 in-depth expert interviews with key stakeholders providing information and support to migrant workers in the UK. All migrant interviews are in Polish. Six of the expert interviews with key stakeholders are in English and four are in Polish. Fieldwork was conducted fully online during the Covid-19 pandemic between March and August 2021, following the third UK-wide Covid-19 lockdown. Restrictions were still in place in some localities. Interviews took place shortly after the end of the transition period concluding the UK’s European Union exit on 1 January 2021. All Polish migrant worker interviewees entered the UK before 1 January 2021 and had the option to apply to the EU Settlement Scheme.

The objectives of the qualitative fieldwork were to: 1. To synthesise empirical and theoretical knowledge on the short- and long-term impacts of COVID-19 on migrant essential workers. 2. To establish how the pandemic affected Polish migrant essential worker's lives; and expert interviews with stakeholders in the public and third/voluntary sector to investigate how to best support and retain migrant essential workers in COVID-19 recovery strategies. The project also involved: - co-producing policy outputs with partner organisations in England and Scotland; and - an online survey to measure how Polish migrant essential workers across different roles and sectors were impacted by COVID-19 in regard to health, social, economic and cultural aspects, and intentions to stay in the UK/return to Poland (deposited separately to University of Sheffield). Key findings included significant new knowledge about the health, social, economic and cultural impacts of Covid-19 on migrant essential workers. Polish essential workers were severely impacted by the pandemic with major mental health impacts. Mental health support was insufficient throughout the UK. Those seeking support typically turned to private (online) services from Poland as they felt they could not access them in the UK because of language or cultural barriers, lack of understanding of the healthcare system and pathways to mental health support, support being offered during working hours only, or fear of the negative impact of using mental health services on work opportunities. Some participants were in extreme financial hardship, especially those with pre-settled status or those who arrived in the UK during the pandemic. The reasons for financial strain varied but there were strong patterns linked to increased pressure at work, greater exposure to Covid-19 as well as redundancies, pay cuts and rejected benefit applications. There was a tendency to avoid applying for state financial support. These impacts were compounded by the sense of isolation, helplessness, or long-distance grief due to inability to visit loved ones in Poland. Covid-19 impacted most detrimentally on women with caring responsibilities, single parents and people in the health and teaching sectors. The most vulnerable Polish migrant essential workers - e.g. those on lower income, with pre-existing health conditions, restricted access to support and limited English proficiency - were at most risk. Discrimination was reported, including not feeling treated equally in the workplace. The sense of discrimination two-fold: as essential workers (low-paid, low-status, unsafe jobs) and as Eastern Europeans (frequent disciplining practices, treated as threat, assumed to be less qualified). In terms of future plans, some essential workers intended to leave the UK or were unsure about their future place of residence. Brexit was a major reason for uncertain settlement plans. Vaccine hesitancy was identified, based on doubts about vaccination, especially amongst younger respondents who perceived low risks of Covid-19 for their own health, including women of childbearing age, who may have worries over unknown vaccine side-effects for fertility. Interview participants largely turned to Polish language sources for vaccination information, especially social media, and family and friends in Poland. This promoted the spread of misinformation as Poland has a strong anti-vaccination movement.

COVID-19 has exposed the UK's socio-economic dependence on a chronically insecure migrant essential workforce. While risking their lives to offset the devastating effects of the pandemic, migrant workers reportedly find themselves in precarious professional and personal circumstances (temporary zero-hours contracts, work exploitation, overcrowded accommodation, limited access to adequate health/social services including Universal Credit). This project will investigate the health, social, economic and cultural impacts of COVID-19 on the migrant essential workforce and how these might impact on their continued stay in the UK. It will focus on the largest non-British nationality in the UK, the Polish community, who - while employed across a range of roles and sectors - are overrepresented in lower-paid essential work. We will use this group as an illustrative case study to make wider claims and policy recommendations about migrant work during the pandemic. Using a mixed-methods approach, we will conduct: an online survey to map COVID-19 impacts; in-depth qualitative interviews to establish how the pandemic has affected worker's lives; and expert interviews with stakeholders to investigate how to best support and retain migrant essential workers in COVID-19 recovery strategies. The results will generate the first comprehensive UK-wide dataset on the experiences of migrant essential workers against the backdrop of COVID-19. The research, co-produced with partner organisations (Polish Expats Associations, Fife Migrants Forum, PKAVS Minority Communities Hub and Polish Social and Cultural Association), will generate a policy briefing, a toolkit for employers in the essential work sectors, information resources for migrant workers, alongside media and academic outputs.

In the Brexit referendum of 2016, 73 percent of people aged between 18 and 24 voted to Remain in the European Union, compared with just 40 percent of people aged over 65. In fact, the propensity to have voted Leave increases with age, with the three oldest age groups here voting leave and the three youngest voting to Remain. Overall, 17.4 million people voted to Leave the European Union in 2016, compared with 16.1 million who voted Remain, or 51.9 percent of the vote to 48.1 percent.

Der EU-Profiler ist eine Webanwendung (britisch: Voting Advise Application), die Bürger bei der Auswahl von Parteien zur Stimmabgabe bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament im Jahr 2009 unterstützt hat. Die Teilnehmer bewerten 30 politische Aussagen und werden entsprechend ihrer Antworten in einem mehrdimensionalen politischen Raum verortet. Die Aussagen betreffen: (a) Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit: Beibehaltung wohlfahrtstaatlicher Programme, auch wenn Steuern steigen, Privatisierung der Gesundheitsversorgung, Erhöhung der Subventionen für Kinderbetreuung; (b) Migration und Immigration: Einwanderung qualifizierter Arbeitskräfte, Einschränkung von Einwanderung; (c) Gesellschaft, Religion und Kultur: Legalisierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Eheschließungen, größerer Respekt für religiöse Werte in Politik, Dekriminalisierung weicher Drogen, Legalisierung von Sterbehilfe; (d) Finanzen und Steuern: Verringerung der Staatsausgaben, eigene Steuern für EU, Bankenrettung mit öffentlichen Mitteln; (e) Wirtschaft und Arbeit: Verringerung Kündigungsschutz für Arbeitnehmer, Verringerung von Subventionen für Landwirte; (f) Umwelt, Transport und Energie: Regenerative Energien unterstützen, öffentliche Verkehrsmittel fördern, Erderwärmung bekämpfen; (g) Recht und Ordnung: Einschränkungen ziviler Freiheiten, härtere Strafen für Straftäter; (h) Außenpolitik: EU sollte mit einheitlicher Stimme sprechen, gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sollte gestärkt werden; (i) Europäische Integration: Europäische Integration ist gut für England, Zustimmung zum EU-Beitritt der Türkei, mehr Macht für EP, weniger Veto-macht für Mitgliedstaaten, Referendum über Vertrag in England. (j) Länderspezifische Fragen: alle Einwohner des Vereinigten Königreichs sollten zum Besitz einer nationalen ID-Karte verpflichtet werden, Flughafenausbau in England. Alle Befragten konnten die subjektive Wichtigkeit der Themen bewerten. Über einen zusätzlichen Fragebogen wurden erhoben: Einschätzung der Qualität der Ergebnisse des EU-Profiler; Hilfe bei der Wahlentscheidung; Veränderung der Wahlentscheidung; Vergrößerung des Interesses an den Wahlen zum EP; Vergrößerung des politischen Interesses; größere Motivation an Wahlen zum EP teilzunehmen; geringere Motivation an Wahlen zum EP teilzunehmen; keine Veränderung der Wahlentscheidung; weiterhin indifferent gegenüber Wahlen zum EP; vorherige Nutzung des EU-Profiler; Mediennutzung zur politischen Information; politische Information für Europawahlen; political efficacy; politisches Interesse; Wahlabsicht bei Europawahlen; Wahlbeteiligung bei den letzten Europawahlen; Wahlabsicht für nationales Parlament; wichtig für Demokratie: gleicher Zugang zu Gerichten, freie und gerechte Wahlen, Referenden, Regierungen, die das Richtige tun, neue Technologien für politische Partizipation; Zufriedenheit mit nationaler Demokratie; Zufriedenheit mit europäischer Demokratie; Einstellung zur weiteren europäischen Integration; Vertrauen in: nationales Parlament, Europäisches Parlament, Europäische Kommission, politische Parteien; Befürwortung nationaler Expertenregierung; Befürwortung europäischer Expertenregierung; Beurteilung der Leistung der nationalen Regierung; Selbsteinstufung auf einem Links-Rechts-Kontinuum. Demographie: Geschlecht, Geburtsort; Staatsbürgerschaft; Wohnsitzland; Familienstand; Bildungsabschluss; Beschäftigungsstatus; Beschäftigungssektor; Wohnort; Dauer am Wohnort; Konfession; Kirchgangshäufigkeit; religiöse Selbstbeschreibung; Anzahl der Kinder; Anzahl von Personen im Haushalt; Haushaltseinkommen. Zusätzlich verkodet wurden: vom Nutzer gewählte Sprache; Position auf der x-Achse des Spektrums; Position auf der y-Achse des Spektrums; nächste Partei national; weiteste Partei national; nächste Partei EU; weiteste Partei EU; Werte auf den Dimensionen: gesellschaftlicher Liberalismus, Wohlfahrtsstaat, ökonomische Liberalisierung, restriktive Finanzpolitik, Recht und Ordnung, Migrationspolitik, Umweltpolitik. The EU Profiler is a Voting Advice Application (VAA) running during the European Elections of 2009. Respondents are situated in a political spectrum, according to their positioning with regard to 30 statements on: (a) Welfare, family and health: welfare programmes maintained even if taxes increase, privatization of healthcare services, increase in subsidies for childcare; (b) Migration and immigration: encourage immigration of skilled workers, restrict immigration; (c) Society, religion and culture: legalisation of same sex marriages, greater respect for religious values in politics, decriminalisation of soft drugs, legalisation of euthanasia; (d) Finances and taxes: reduction of government spending, tax-raising powers for EU, bail out failing banks with public money; (e) Economy and work: reduction of workers´ protection regulation, reduction of EU subsidies to farmers; (f) Environment, transport and energy: support for renewable sources of energy, promotion of public transport, fighting global warming; (g) Law and order: restrictions of civil liberties, more severe punishment for criminals; (h) Foreign policy: EU should speak with one voice, EU should strengthen security and defence policy; (i) European integration; EU integration is good, England is better off in the EU, accession of Turkey, more power to EP, less veto power for individual member states, referendum on treaty in England; (j) Country specific items: all residents of the UK should have a national ID card, expansion of airports in England. Respondents could rate subjective salience for all issues. An additional questionnaire asks about: quality of results from EU-Profiler; help to decide about vote; change of vote decision; increase interest in EP election; increase interest in politics; increase motivation to participate in EP election; refrains from participating in EP election; no change of intention to vote; left indifferent; compass useful; previous use of profiler; media use for political information; political information before EP election; political efficacy; political interest; vote intention EP elections; vote at last election EP; vote intention national parliament; importance for democracy: equal chances to access courts, free and fair elections, referenda, governments do what is right, new technologies for participation; satisfaction with national democracy; satisfaction with european democracy; attitude towards further integration of EU; trust in: national parliament, European parliament, national Government, European Commission, political parties; national government of experts; european government of experts; approval of national government´s record; participation to elections; self-placement on a left-right continuum. Demography: gender; place of birth; nationality; country of residence; marital status; highest level of education; occupational status; sector of employment; place of residence; duration of residence; denomination; church attendance; self-assessment of religiousness; number of children; number of people in household; household income. Also encoded was: language user selected; spectrum position x-axis; spectrum position y-axis; nearest party in country spectrum; furthest party in country spectrum; nearest party in EU spectrum; furthest party in EU spectrum; scores on liberal society, expanded welfare axis, economic liberalisation axis, restrictive financial policy axis, law and order axis, immigration policy axis, environmental protection axis.

This statistic illustrates results from an online survey conducted in Great Britain in 2016 on whether the prospect of Scottish independence will become more likely now that Britain is leaving the EU. While ** percent of respondents did indeed think it will be more likely that Scotland leaves the UK, ** percent believed the probability of Scottish independence is unchanged.

This statistic shows the results of a survey conducted with British holidaymakers in 2017 regarding travel concerns they have (if any) about the UK's decision to leave the European Union ('Brexit') following a referendum in 2016. Of respondents, ** percent were concerned about the Pound/Euro exchange rate worsening and making it more expensive to travel. Other concerns include risk of holidays becoming more expensive, the potential of losing the European Health Card and increased queues at EU passport controls.

As of November 2025, 51 percent of adults in Scotland said they would not support Scotland being independent from the United Kingdom, compared with 49 percent who would support it. Support for Scottish independence reached 53 percent in August 2020, the highest level of support for independence in the provided time period. The highest opposition to independence was in January 2018, when 57 percent of people in Scotland advised they would vote no in a hypothetical referendum. Independence rejected in the 2014 referendum The last referendum on Scottish independence took place in September 2014, with 55 percent of Scotland voting 'No' to independence, compared to 45.5 percent who voted 'Yes'. An optimistic 'Yes' campaign was led by Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) at the time; who had overseen his party increase their vote share in Westminster and achieve an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011. The following year, the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, granted the Scottish Parliament the authority to hold the independence referendum, which would be held in 2014. Cameron, and various other UK politicians such as Gordon Brown, led the ultimately successful 'No' campaign, painting independence as too much of an economic risk for Scotland. Scotland and Brexit In the aftermath of the referendum, Alex Salmond resigned as First Minister of Scotland. Although he was on the winning side of the Scottish independence referendum, David Cameron’s would share Salmond’s fate less than two years later when he campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU and end up on the losing side of the Brexit referendum. For Scotland, Brexit gave renewed impetus to the question of Scottish independence. Except for London, all regions of England, along with Wales had voted to take the UK out of Europe, while Scotland, along with Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU. While this represented a significant change in Scotland’s relationship with the rest of the UK, advocates for Scottish independence have been unable to obtain consent from Westminster to hold a second referendum.