A survey of bank managers working in the operation and credit risk department at different hierarchical levels of individual commercial banks in China responsible for bank credit analyses and risk evaluations covering the procedure from loan application to final decision. The objective is to understand the internal organization arrangement of Chinese commercial banks in the provision of bank credit to SMEs. The focus is on the incentives and constraints faced by branch managers in the interaction with SMEs. The enquiry reflects the notion that the branch manager who directly interacts with the SME borrower plays a critical role in the information collection and processing in the lending decision. The incentives and constraints faced by branch manager are shaped by the type of organization of the bank: the degree of decision-making centralization, modes of communication between hierarchical levels, and the adoption of statistical techniques for risk evaluation.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilise imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector. These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

The global financial crisis, triggered by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, has severely affected financial systems and real economies worldwide, leading to the most serious economic recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Behind these two economic recessions, despite different historical contexts and approaches to problem-solving, there are common characteristics associated with the mutual impact of financial crises: the essence of a financial crisis lies in financial instability, reflecting the fluctuations in asset prices. In addition to these two severe financial crises, financial crises of varying scales have occurred intermittently internationally. Considering the past and present, people need to think deeper about how to prevent such crises from happening again, especially mainstream macroeconomic thinking that has far-reaching effects should be reassessed.

In the second quarter of 2025, TD Bank's U.S. operations distinguished itself with the highest common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio among major U.S. banks by total assets. The bank's CET1 ratio of 17.38 percent significantly surpassed the regulatory minimum of 4.5 percent. By comparison, JPMorgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank, recorded a CET1 ratio of 15.08 percent during the same period. What is CET1 capital ratio? The Basel III framework, established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, sets international standards for bank capital requirements to ensure global financial stability. Developed in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, these regulations require banks to maintain adequate capital to withstand unexpected losses and economic downturns. The framework mandates a total capital requirement of eight percent of risk-weighted assets, with Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)—the highest quality capital—comprising at least 4.5 percent of that total. In 2024, JPMorgan Chase had the highest Tier 1 capital among all banks in the United States. Worldwide Tier 1 capital levels of banks JPMorgan Chase, while leading U.S. banks in Tier 1 capital, ranked fifth globally in 2024. Four Chinese banks outperformed it: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China. Among these, ICBC emerged as the world's top bank in Tier 1 capital.

The database used includes annual frequency data for 43 countries, defined by the IMF as 24 advanced countries and 19 emerging countries, for the years 1992-2018.The database contains the fiscal stress variable and a set of variables that can be classified as follows: macroeconomic and global economy (interest rates in the US, OECD; real GDP in the US, y-o-y, OECD; real GDP in China, y-o-y, World Bank; oil price, y-o-y, BP p.l.c.; VIX, CBOE; real GDP, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD, IMF WEO; GDP per capita in PPS, World Bank); financial (nominal USD exchange rate, y-o-y, IMF IFS; private credit to GDP, change in p.p., IMF IFS, World Bank and OECD); fiscal (general government balance, % GDP, IMF WEO; general government debt, % GDP, IMF WEO, effective interest rate on the g.g. debt, IMF WEO); competitiveness and domestic demand (currency overvaluation, IMF WEO; current account balance, % GDP, IMF WEO; share in global exports, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD; gross fixed capital formation, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD; CPI, IMF IFS, IMF WEO; real consumption, y-o-y, World Bank, OECD); labor market (unemployment rate, change in p.p., IMF WEO; labor productivity, y-o-y, ILO).In line with the convention adopted in the literature, the fiscal stress variable is a binary variable equal to 1 in the case of a fiscal stress event and 0 otherwise. In more recent literature in this field, the dependent variable tends to be defined broadly, reflecting not only outright default or debt restructuring, but also less extreme events. Therefore, following Baldacci et al. (2011), the definition used in the present database is broad, and the focus is on signalling fiscal stress events, in contrast to the narrower event of a fiscal crisis related to outright default or debt restructuring. Fiscal problems can take many forms; in particular, some of the outright defaults can be avoided through timely, targeted responses, like support programs of international institutions. The fiscal stress variable is shifted with regard to the other variables: crisis_next_year – binary variable shifted by 1 year, all years of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_next_period – binary variable shifted by 2 years, all years of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_first_year1 – binary variable shifted by 1 year, only the first year of a fiscal stress coded as 1; crisis_first_year2 - binary variable shifted by 2 years, only the first year of a fiscal stress coded as 1.

Revenue for the Residential Real Estate industry in China is expected to decrease at a CAGR of 9.8% over the five years through 2025. This trend includes an expected decrease of 9.6% in the current year.Since August 2020, the People's Bank of China and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission have proposed three debt indicators for real estate development and management companies through which the company's financial health can be rated. This new policy has exacerbated the company's debt pressure, making it unable to repay old debts by borrowing new debt. Some real estate companies faced a liquidity crisis.In 2022, the city's lockdown and laying-off caused by COVID-19 epidemic led to the pressure of delaying the delivery of houses. The industry's newly constructed and completed areas decreased significantly throughout the year. In addition, the epidemic has impacted sales in the industry, and some sales offices have been forced to close temporarily. In 2022, the residential sales area decreased by 26.8%, and the residential sales decreased by 31.2%.Industry revenue will recover at an annualized 0.7% over the five years through 2030. Over the next five years, the industry's drag on GDP will weaken, and industry growth will stabilize. However, high housing prices have become a major social problem in China. Under the measures on the principle that residential real estate is used for living, not speculation, the financial attributes of real estate will gradually weaken, and housing prices will tend to stabilize.

A decade after the global financial crisis, the U.S. banking sector has not only resurrected, but also stands more resilient with an all-time high equity to assets ratio and return on average assets since 2000. In addition, the continuous decline in non-performing loans by the U.S. banks from more than *% during the financial crisis to the current level of *% is nothing but a testimony of good times. Thus, Statista’s forecast on the industry revenue surpassing the *** billion mark by 2021 comes as no surprise. Technology adoption is changing industry dynamics The global banking sector has been one of the most aggressive adopters of digital technologies, with investments in the Fintech industry having registered an almost ***% increase over the period 2013-2018. Notably, the U.S. stands next to China in terms of adopting fintech in banking and payments sector. Interestingly, banks have also begun teaming up with Fintech startups to improve and expand their service offerings. In retail banking, online lending platforms and mobile banking usage is on the rise. Robo advisors opened wealth management to mass market Fintech pioneers such as PayPal have transformed the way payments are made globally. At the same time, robo advisory services have transformed the wealth management segment and opened new business avenues to attract mass-market customers who have limited assets to invest.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

Robustness check of excluding the extreme impacts from stock market crises.

In 2023, the average price of real estate in China was approximately ****** yuan per square meter, representing a decrease from the previous year. Rising prices in the real estate market Since the 1998 housing reform, property prices in China have been rising continuously. Housing in the country is now often unaffordable, especially considering the modest per capita income of Chinese households. Shanghai and Beijing even have some of the most competitive real estate markets in the world. The rapid growth in housing prices has increased wealth among homeowners, while it also led to a culture of speculation among buyers and real estate developers. Housing was treated as investments, with owners expecting the prices to grow further every year. Risk factors The expectation of a steadily growing real estate market has created a property bubble and a potential debt crisis. As Chinese real estate giants, such as China Evergrande and Country Garden, operate by continuously acquiring land plots and initiating new projects, which often require substantial loans and investments, a slowdown in property demands or a decline in home prices can significantly affect the financial situation of these companies, putting China’s banks in a vulnerable position. In addition, due to a lack of regulations and monetary constraints, the long-term maintenance issues of high-rise apartments are also a concern to the sustainable development of China’s cities.

The data reflects the conditions related to the antibiotic resistance and pathogenicity of foodborne Thompson Salmonella.