The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

This article identifies the root of the government debt crisis focusing on the role of hydropower in form of the provision of the new short term credit of china. Outlining the options as well as policy recommendations for Laos on the reform of the energy sector.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

The statistic shows Japan's national debt from 2020 to 2023 in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), with projections up until 2030. In 2024, the national debt of Japan amounted to about 236.1 percent of the gross domestic product. An eye on Japan’s national debt Japan’s national debt ranks first among countries with the highest debt levels in the world, far surpassing the debt levels of Greece - which ranks number two - whose financial crisis has been in the spotlight recently. Italy is third, followed by Jamaica, Lebanon and Enritrea. Currently, Japan’s national debt amounts more than a thousand trillion yen and the country’s debt is predicted to keep rising for the foreseeable future, albeit only slightly. Japan’s national debt is not without consequence for the global economy, because the country claims the fourth-largest share in global gross domestic product. Therefore, the effects on the global economy would and could have a much greater global impact than that of a country such as Greece - considering its share of the global economy adjusted for purchase power parity was less than 0.29 percent in 2011. The debt levels of China, the United States and India should also be watched closely as they together make up the largest share of global GDP. At the moment, Japan’s inflation rate is among the lowest in the world, but as Japan attempts to reduce its national debt, this could change.

The post-COVID-19 era presents a looming threat of global debt, elevating concerns regarding sovereign credit ratings worldwide. This study develops a new index system, divides the rating variables into long- and short-term factors, performs rating fitting and prediction, and investigates the fairness of China and relevant countries. Our findings reveal that sovereign credit ratings have a deterrent effect on the global financial market due to the ceiling effect and quasi-public goods characteristics. A high and stable credit rating demands long-term enhancements in economic fundamentals, budget balances, external surpluses, and overall solvency. Concurrently, effective short-term debt management strategies, including reduction, repayment, and swaps, are essential. Moreover, we introduce the concept of a "rating gap" to assess rating fairness, revealing both undervaluation and overvaluation among countries. Notably, China’s sovereign rating was underestimated between 2009 and 2011 and overestimated between 2013 and 2016. These findings underscore the criticality of government vigilance in monitoring sovereign debt and credit ratings to navigate potential post-COVID-19 sovereign debt crises.

Additional file 1: Spearman correlation matrix.

The global financial crisis, triggered by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, has severely affected financial systems and real economies worldwide, leading to the most serious economic recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Behind these two economic recessions, despite different historical contexts and approaches to problem-solving, there are common characteristics associated with the mutual impact of financial crises: the essence of a financial crisis lies in financial instability, reflecting the fluctuations in asset prices. In addition to these two severe financial crises, financial crises of varying scales have occurred intermittently internationally. Considering the past and present, people need to think deeper about how to prevent such crises from happening again, especially mainstream macroeconomic thinking that has far-reaching effects should be reassessed.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

The statistic shows the national debt of Japan from 2020 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The amount of Japan's national debt in 2024 amounted to about 1,436.5 trillion yen. In a ranking of debt to GDP per country, Japan is thus currently ranked first. Japan's economic power With one of the largest gross domestic products (GDP), Japan is among the largest economies in the world. However, ever since the global financial crisis, Japan's GDP - like many others - has been slightly unstable; Japan even reported a negative GDP growth in comparison to the previous year in 2011 and in 2014. Still, it is estimated that gross domestic product in Japan will continue to thrive over the next decade. One indicator is Japan's inflation rate: Despite the aforementioned economic slumps, Japan has managed to maintain one of the lowest inflation rates in the world, and it also reduced its unemployment rate. Between 2010 and 2013, the unemployment rate in Japan decreased by approximately one percent, and it is expected to drop even lower over the next years. Recently, Japan has been reporting a trade deficit, meaning the value of its imports exceeds the value of its exports. Most of these imports have come from China and the United States. The trade deficit is one of the causes for in an increase of the national debt. It is estimated that the national debt in relation to the GDP will increase further until 2020.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

data for financial development and emission

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "A Comparative Study on the Competitiveness of Major Shipping Ports in Korea and China after the Global Financial Crisis".

A survey of bank managers working in the operation and credit risk department at different hierarchical levels of individual commercial banks in China responsible for bank credit analyses and risk evaluations covering the procedure from loan application to final decision. The objective is to understand the internal organization arrangement of Chinese commercial banks in the provision of bank credit to SMEs. The focus is on the incentives and constraints faced by branch managers in the interaction with SMEs. The enquiry reflects the notion that the branch manager who directly interacts with the SME borrower plays a critical role in the information collection and processing in the lending decision. The incentives and constraints faced by branch manager are shaped by the type of organization of the bank: the degree of decision-making centralization, modes of communication between hierarchical levels, and the adoption of statistical techniques for risk evaluation.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilise imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector. These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

Revenue for the Residential Real Estate industry in China is expected to decrease at a CAGR of 9.8% over the five years through 2025. This trend includes an expected decrease of 9.6% in the current year.Since August 2020, the People's Bank of China and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission have proposed three debt indicators for real estate development and management companies through which the company's financial health can be rated. This new policy has exacerbated the company's debt pressure, making it unable to repay old debts by borrowing new debt. Some real estate companies faced a liquidity crisis.In 2022, the city's lockdown and laying-off caused by COVID-19 epidemic led to the pressure of delaying the delivery of houses. The industry's newly constructed and completed areas decreased significantly throughout the year. In addition, the epidemic has impacted sales in the industry, and some sales offices have been forced to close temporarily. In 2022, the residential sales area decreased by 26.8%, and the residential sales decreased by 31.2%.Industry revenue will recover at an annualized 0.7% over the five years through 2030. Over the next five years, the industry's drag on GDP will weaken, and industry growth will stabilize. However, high housing prices have become a major social problem in China. Under the measures on the principle that residential real estate is used for living, not speculation, the financial attributes of real estate will gradually weaken, and housing prices will tend to stabilize.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

The linkages between the US and China, the world’s two major agricultural powers, have brought great uncertainty to the global food markets. Inspired by these, this paper examines the extreme risk spillovers between US and Chinese agricultural futures markets during significant crises. We use a copula-conditional value at risk (CoVaR) model with Markov-switching regimes to capture the tail dependence in their pair markets. The study covers the period from January 2006 to December 2022 and identifies two distinct dependence regimes (stable and crisis periods). Moreover, we find significant and asymmetric upside/downside extreme risk spillovers between the US and Chinese markets, which are highly volatile in crises. Additionally, the impact of international capital flows (the financial channel) on risk spillovers is particularly pronounced during the global financial crisis. During the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, the impact of supply chain disruptions (the non-financial channel) is highlighted. Our findings provide a theoretical reference for monitoring the co-movements in agricultural futures markets and practical insights for managing investment portfolios and enhancing food market stability during crises.

In 2018, in China's asset-backed securitization (ABS) market, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) had the highest penetration rate at **** percent, which was much lower than that in the United States. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government relaunched the RMBS program four years later. Featured as a low-risk investment option, RMBS then became hugely popular among Chinese homebuyers and investors.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

On the 2025 Fortune China 500 ranking for real estate companies, China’s leading real estate developer Poly Real Estate ranked first with a total revenue of ************ U.S. dollars, followed by China Vanke and Country Garden. Real estate market in ChinaIn the last 20 years, China’s real estate market has experienced its most prosperous development. Land purchase has also become an important source of financial revenue for many local governments. The housing price increased so rapidly, especially in larger cities, that the government had to take measures to restrict investment. With the slowdown of China’s economic development and gradually saturated market, people are also afraid of the burst of the real estate bubble. While the real estate price in smaller cities tended to stay stable or even decrease, there is still growing potential for real estate prices in larger cities, especially the first-tier cities. China’s consumers are increasingly interested in the high-quality real estate products built by leading real estate developers. Leading real estate developers in ChinaCompared to the ranking in 2021, there were ***** new members entering the leading ten real estate developer club in 2022. The larger developers became stronger as they had advantages in land acquisitions, financing, marketing and pricing power which is difficult for smaller developers to catch up with. Thus, consolidation is also very common among China’s real estate developers. In 2022, *** real estate giants disappeared from the Fortune 500 ranking list, Evergrande and Sunac. Affected by the changing real estate market, they were facing cash flow problems and were affected heavily by the debt crisis.