The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

Since the 2011 financial sector assessment program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Although longer-term objectives are clear, policymakers continue to face challenges in balancing short-term growth concerns with long-term financial stability and sustainability. The slow pace of state-owned enterprise (SOEs) reform and limited exit of weak firms have resulted in efficiency losses and reinforced the perception of implicit guarantees. Contingent fiscal liabilities have also grown rapidly. Addressing these tensions is challenging in the context of the strong presence of the state in the financial sector. Maintaining financial stability will also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources.

The post-COVID-19 era presents a looming threat of global debt, elevating concerns regarding sovereign credit ratings worldwide. This study develops a new index system, divides the rating variables into long- and short-term factors, performs rating fitting and prediction, and investigates the fairness of China and relevant countries. Our findings reveal that sovereign credit ratings have a deterrent effect on the global financial market due to the ceiling effect and quasi-public goods characteristics. A high and stable credit rating demands long-term enhancements in economic fundamentals, budget balances, external surpluses, and overall solvency. Concurrently, effective short-term debt management strategies, including reduction, repayment, and swaps, are essential. Moreover, we introduce the concept of a "rating gap" to assess rating fairness, revealing both undervaluation and overvaluation among countries. Notably, China’s sovereign rating was underestimated between 2009 and 2011 and overestimated between 2013 and 2016. These findings underscore the criticality of government vigilance in monitoring sovereign debt and credit ratings to navigate potential post-COVID-19 sovereign debt crises.

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

data for financial development and emission

The statistic shows Japan's national debt from 2020 to 2023 in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), with projections up until 2030. In 2023, the national debt of Japan amounted to about 239.97 percent of the gross domestic product. An eye on Japan’s national debt Japan’s national debt ranks first among countries with the highest debt levels in the world, far surpassing the debt levels of Greece - which ranks number two - whose financial crisis has been in the spotlight recently. Italy is third, followed by Jamaica, Lebanon and Enritrea. Currently, Japan’s national debt amounts more than a thousand trillion yen and the country’s debt is predicted to keep rising for the foreseeable future, albeit only slightly. Japan’s national debt is not without consequence for the global economy, because the country claims the fourth-largest share in global gross domestic product. Therefore, the effects on the global economy would and could have a much greater global impact than that of a country such as Greece - considering its share of the global economy adjusted for purchase power parity was less than 0.29 percent in 2011. The debt levels of China, the United States and India should also be watched closely as they together make up the largest share of global GDP. At the moment, Japan’s inflation rate is among the lowest in the world, but as Japan attempts to reduce its national debt, this could change.

A survey of bank managers working in the operation and credit risk department at different hierarchical levels of individual commercial banks in China responsible for bank credit analyses and risk evaluations covering the procedure from loan application to final decision. The objective is to understand the internal organization arrangement of Chinese commercial banks in the provision of bank credit to SMEs. The focus is on the incentives and constraints faced by branch managers in the interaction with SMEs. The enquiry reflects the notion that the branch manager who directly interacts with the SME borrower plays a critical role in the information collection and processing in the lending decision. The incentives and constraints faced by branch manager are shaped by the type of organization of the bank: the degree of decision-making centralization, modes of communication between hierarchical levels, and the adoption of statistical techniques for risk evaluation.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilise imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector. These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

The statistic shows the national debt of Japan from 2020 to 2023, with projections up until 2030. The amount of Japan's national debt in 2023 amounted to about 9.91 trillion U.S. dollar. In a ranking of debt to GDP per country, Japan is thus currently ranked first. Japan's economic power With one of the largest gross domestic products (GDP), Japan is among the largest economies in the world. However, ever since the global financial crisis, Japan's GDP - like many others - has been slightly unstable; Japan even reported a negative GDP growth in comparison to the previous year in 2011 and in 2014. Still, it is estimated that gross domestic product in Japan will continue to thrive over the next decade. One indicator is Japan's inflation rate: Despite the aforementioned economic slumps, Japan has managed to maintain one of the lowest inflation rates in the world, and it also reduced its unemployment rate. Between 2010 and 2013, the unemployment rate in Japan decreased by approximately one percent, and it is expected to drop even lower over the next years. Recently, Japan has been reporting a trade deficit, meaning the value of its imports exceeds the value of its exports. Most of these imports have come from China and the United States. The trade deficit is one of the causes for in an increase of the national debt. It is estimated that the national debt in relation to the GDP will increase further until 2020.

The post-COVID-19 era presents a looming threat of global debt, elevating concerns regarding sovereign credit ratings worldwide. This study develops a new index system, divides the rating variables into long- and short-term factors, performs rating fitting and prediction, and investigates the fairness of China and relevant countries. Our findings reveal that sovereign credit ratings have a deterrent effect on the global financial market due to the ceiling effect and quasi-public goods characteristics. A high and stable credit rating demands long-term enhancements in economic fundamentals, budget balances, external surpluses, and overall solvency. Concurrently, effective short-term debt management strategies, including reduction, repayment, and swaps, are essential. Moreover, we introduce the concept of a "rating gap" to assess rating fairness, revealing both undervaluation and overvaluation among countries. Notably, China’s sovereign rating was underestimated between 2009 and 2011 and overestimated between 2013 and 2016. These findings underscore the criticality of government vigilance in monitoring sovereign debt and credit ratings to navigate potential post-COVID-19 sovereign debt crises.

China’s export benefits from the significant fiscal stimulus in the United States. This paper analyzes the global spillover effect of the American economy on China’s macro-economy using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-Gibbs sampling approach, with the goal of improving the ability of China’s financial system to protect against foreign threats. This paper examines the theories of the consequences of uncertainty on macroeconomics first. Then, using medium-sized economic and financial data, the uncertainty index of the American and Chinese economies is built. In order to complete the test and analysis of the dynamic relationship between American economic uncertainty and China’s macro-economy, a Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility-Vector Autoregression (TVP- VAR) model with random volatility is constructed. The model is estimated using the Gibbs sampling method based on MCMC. For the empirical analysis, samples of China’s and the United States’ economic data from January 2001 to January 2022 were taken from the WIND database and the FRED database, respectively. The data reveal that there are typically fewer than 5 erroneous components in the most estimated parameters of the MCMC model, which suggests that the model’s sampling results are good. China’s pricing level reacted to the consequences of the unpredictability of the American economy by steadily declining, reaching its lowest point during the financial crisis in 2009, and then gradually diminishing. After 2012, the greatest probability density range of 68% is extremely wide and contains 0, indicating that the impact of economic uncertainty in the United States on China’s pricing level is no longer significant. China should therefore focus on creating a community of destiny by working with nations that have economic cooperation to lower systemic financial risks and guarantee the stability of the capital market.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

In 2024, China’s monetary authority, the People’s Bank of China, issued more than 13 trillion yuan which was the highest amount issued in one year so far. Over the past years, the value of printed money increased steadily. The issuing of currency was one function of a central bank. Maintaining price stability One of the main policy objectives of the People’s Bank of China was to maintain price stability. Typically, countries set the desired inflation target and the central bank implements the necessary policies to achieve the said target. Usually, China keeps its inflation target at around three percent, but in 2021, the inflation rate dropped to under one percent. If the inflation rate is too low, central banks can issue more currency and decrease the interest rate. In the opposite scenario, if the inflation rate is too high central banks try to reduce the amount of money in circulation by increasing the interest rate or decreasing bond prices. Managing the economy In capitalist market economies, economies usually undergo a boom and bust cycle. Central banks attempt to counteract this cyclical development to soften the impact for its citizens. For instance, the Chinese government aims to maintain an unemployment rate of around four percent. However, crises such as the 2008 financial crisis and the outbreak of COVID-19 have an unforseen impact on the economy. To lower the employment rate, the People’s Bank engaged specific monetary policies to stimulate the economy with the aim of increasing job creation.

The regression results during the US-China trade war (only including the period before the COVID-19 pandemic).

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

For most of the past two decades, China had the highest GDP growth of any of the BRICS countries, although it was overtaken by India in the mid-2010s, and India is predicted to have the highest growth in the 2020s. All five countries saw their GDP growth fall during the global financial crisis in 2008, and again during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020; China was the only economy that continued to grow during both crises, although India's economy also grew during the Great Recession. In 2014, Brazil experienced its own recession due to a combination of economic and political instability, while Russia also went into recession due to the drop in oil prices and the economic sanctions imposed following its annexation of Crimea.

In 2018, in China's asset-backed securitization (ABS) market, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) had the highest penetration rate at 2.27 percent, which was much lower than that in the United States. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government relaunched the RMBS program four years later. Featured as a low-risk investment option, RMBS then became hugely popular among Chinese homebuyers and investors.

In 2024, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Shanghai municipality in China increased by around 5.0 percent from the previous year. Shanghai is the most populous city in China and has the largest GDP of all Chinese cities. It is located in Eastern China on the southern estuary at the mouth of the Yangtze river. Development of GDP growth in Shanghai As a bridgehead to global markets and a forerunner in market opening, Shanghai experienced a decades long economic boom, which massively changed the shape of the city. Economic growth rates had double digits for more than two decades since 1992 and were well above the Chinese national average. This changed fundamentally with the global financial crisis. In 2008, the growth rate fell below ten percent and gradually declined thereafter. Growth rates now got closer to the national average of GDP growth. While the economic development in Shanghai has already reached a high level, other regions in China are catching up, and growth rates in many inland regions of China are now higher than in Shanghai. This is especially true on a city level, with many lower-tier cities experiencing higher growth rates than Shanghai. Sector distribution of GDP growth Upon closer examination of the distribution of GDP across economic sectors, it becomes obvious that the service sector of the economy exhibited the highest growth rates in most of the recent years. In 2024, services already accounted for more than 78 percent of the value added to the GDP, which is far above the national average. In contrast, the industrial sector, which had once been of great importance to Shanghai's economy, is losing momentum and its share in total economic output is shrinking constantly. Financial intermediation and information industries were branches in the service sector that displayed the fastest growth rates in recent years.