The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for China from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (CHNRECM) from Jan 1978 to Sep 2022 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and China.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 5.20 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

Annual data on the size of China Shadow Bank credit was taken from two sources. Moodys (China) produces data 2000-2012 and Goldman Sachs 2013-2018. The average growth rate 2000-2015 was applied to generate data prior to 2000. Annual data was interpolated to produce quarterly estimates using the cubic match last function in EViews so that the integrity of the annual stock data is maintained for the 4th quarter.The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking. This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis. The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilize imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks. Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector.These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises. Secondary data was taken from multiple Reports on China Shadow Banking published by Goldman Sachs (china) and Moodys (China). The data 2000-2018 corresponds to the annual data obtained from the reports. The quarterly data was obtained by interpolation. Data prior to 2000 was generated using the assumed average growth rate of shadow bank credit for 2000-2015.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

The authors investigate how the Global South’s gross domestic product (GDP) is impacted by trade with China. While the current literature on the growth impacts of trade (by leading partner countries) often neglects the properties of macro panel data, such as cross-sectional dependence, heterogeneity and structural breaks, their models take these features into account. Their empirical results based on 22 major developing countries from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4 identify positive contributions of imports from China to GDP in the studied sample, although these effects are smaller compared to imports from other emerging and developing economies (excluding China) (EME) and advanced economies (AdE). The authors also show that, in contrast with considerable impacts of exports to EME and AdE, exports to China have limited effects on the growth of its partners. However, the global financial crisis marks a turning point of China’s role as a major driver of growth in the South. Namely, while the positive growth effects of trade with China after the global crisis are on the rise, the opposite is true for EME and AdE. Examining the effects by individual countries, the authors present that the distance between China and its partners, economic and institutional development levels of its partners are almost irrelevant to the contributions of imports from China to its partners’ growth. Based on these findings they provide some important policy recommendations for the economies of the Global South.

This is the supplementary data for the article "Estimating stranded coal assets in China's power sector" published in Utilities Policy.

China has suffered overcapacity in coal power since 2016. With growing electricity demand and an economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic, China faces a dilemma between easing restrictive policies for short-term growth in coal-fired power production and keeping restrictions in place for long-term sustainability. In this paper, we measure the risks faced by China's coal power units to become stranded in the next decade and estimate the associated economic costs for different shareholders. By implementing restrictive policies on coal power expansion, China can avoid 90% of stranded coal assets by 2025.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The statistic shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The gross domestic product of the United States in 2024 amounted to around 29.18 trillion U.S. dollars. The United States and the economy The United States’ economy is by far the largest in the world; a status which can be determined by several key factors, one being gross domestic product: A look at the GDP of the main industrialized and emerging countries shows a significant difference between US GDP and the GDP of China, the runner-up in the ranking, as well as the followers Japan, Germany and France. Interestingly, it is assumed that China will have surpassed the States in terms of GDP by 2030, but for now, the United States is among the leading countries in almost all other relevant rankings and statistics, trade and employment for example. See the U.S. GDP growth rate here. Just like in other countries, the American economy suffered a severe setback when the economic crisis occurred in 2008. The American economy entered a recession caused by the collapsing real estate market and increasing unemployment. Despite this, the standard of living is considered quite high; life expectancy in the United States has been continually increasing slightly over the past decade, the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily recovering and decreasing since the crisis, and the Big Mac Index, which represents the global prices for a Big Mac, a popular indicator for the purchasing power of an economy, shows that the United States’ purchasing power in particular is only slightly lower than that of the euro area.

According to a survey conducted by Statista Consumer Insights among Generation Z in China, ** percent of respondents were trying to spend less money in light of the economic circumstances as of September 2024. In addition, ** percent of respondents felt that their cost of living has increased notably, and ** percent had been experiencing stress and anxiety. However, ** percent of respondents shared none of the worries mentioned in the survey.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The repeated outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic has brought a heavy blow to the world economy. Fiscal policy is one of the important macro-control measures to pull the economy out of the quagmire, and it is necessary to study the implementation of fiscal policy under the epidemic. Due to the relatively abundant resources of the Chinese government, this study uses China as the research object to study the orientation of fiscal policy under COVID-19 epidemic. We use fiscal policies and a large amount of macroeconomic data to identify fiscal policy and macroeconomic regulation's dynamic mechanism in China. Our findings indicate a dynamic feedback relationship between expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal policy tools, output gaps, and deficit scales. Before the global economic crisis, fiscal policy can play a good role in adversely regulating the economy, and the difficulty of adjustment after the crisis has increased significantly. During COVID-19 epidemic, the interaction time between variables related to fiscal policy increased, suggesting that the implementation of fiscal policy during the epidemic should be particularly cautious.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

President Trump's tariffs on China have disrupted American businesses, causing price hikes and economic uncertainty. Learn about the impact on the promotional products market and broader economic indicators.

In 2024, the employment rate in China decreased to around 62.4 percent, from 62.8 percent in the previous year. China is the world’s most populous country and its rapid economic development over the past decades has profited greatly from its large labor market. While the overall working conditions for the Chinese people are improving, the actual size of the working-age population in China has been shrinking steadily in recent years. This is mainly due to a low birth rate in the country. Economic slowdown – impact on labor market After decades of rapid development, the world’s second largest economy now seems to have difficulties to boost its economy further. The GDP growth rate indicated a declining trend over the last decade and the number of employed people decreased for the first time since decades in 2015. Under the influence of the global economic downturn, the coronavirus pandemic, and the US-China tensions, many Chinese enterprises are having tough times, which leads to a recession in China’s labor market. Chances for better employment situation The long-lasting Sino-U.S. trade war has caused China great loss on its international trade sector, which has been driving China’s economic growth for decades. However, there is also a lot China could improve. First, the potential of domestic demands could be further developed and satisfied with high-quality products. Second, it’s a good timing to eliminate backward industries with low value added, and the high-tech and environment-friendly industries should be further promoted. In addition, China’s market could be more open to services, especially in the financial sector and IT services, to attract more foreign investors. Highly skilled talents should be better valued in the labor market. Efficient vocational education and further education could also help change the structure of China’s labor market.