The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

China’s export benefits from the significant fiscal stimulus in the United States. This paper analyzes the global spillover effect of the American economy on China’s macro-economy using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-Gibbs sampling approach, with the goal of improving the ability of China’s financial system to protect against foreign threats. This paper examines the theories of the consequences of uncertainty on macroeconomics first. Then, using medium-sized economic and financial data, the uncertainty index of the American and Chinese economies is built. In order to complete the test and analysis of the dynamic relationship between American economic uncertainty and China’s macro-economy, a Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility-Vector Autoregression (TVP- VAR) model with random volatility is constructed. The model is estimated using the Gibbs sampling method based on MCMC. For the empirical analysis, samples of China’s and the United States’ economic data from January 2001 to January 2022 were taken from the WIND database and the FRED database, respectively. The data reveal that there are typically fewer than 5 erroneous components in the most estimated parameters of the MCMC model, which suggests that the model’s sampling results are good. China’s pricing level reacted to the consequences of the unpredictability of the American economy by steadily declining, reaching its lowest point during the financial crisis in 2009, and then gradually diminishing. After 2012, the greatest probability density range of 68% is extremely wide and contains 0, indicating that the impact of economic uncertainty in the United States on China’s pricing level is no longer significant. China should therefore focus on creating a community of destiny by working with nations that have economic cooperation to lower systemic financial risks and guarantee the stability of the capital market.

The authors investigate how the Global South’s gross domestic product (GDP) is impacted by trade with China. While the current literature on the growth impacts of trade (by leading partner countries) often neglects the properties of macro panel data, such as cross-sectional dependence, heterogeneity and structural breaks, their models take these features into account. Their empirical results based on 22 major developing countries from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4 identify positive contributions of imports from China to GDP in the studied sample, although these effects are smaller compared to imports from other emerging and developing economies (excluding China) (EME) and advanced economies (AdE). The authors also show that, in contrast with considerable impacts of exports to EME and AdE, exports to China have limited effects on the growth of its partners. However, the global financial crisis marks a turning point of China’s role as a major driver of growth in the South. Namely, while the positive growth effects of trade with China after the global crisis are on the rise, the opposite is true for EME and AdE. Examining the effects by individual countries, the authors present that the distance between China and its partners, economic and institutional development levels of its partners are almost irrelevant to the contributions of imports from China to its partners’ growth. Based on these findings they provide some important policy recommendations for the economies of the Global South.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "The Global Financial Crisis and Labor Law in China".

This dataset includes the replication dataset and code (do file for stata) for a forthcoming article in Foreign Policy Analysis, titled "The Crisis of COVID-19 and the Political Economy of China’s Vaccine Diplomacy"

Additional file 1: Spearman correlation matrix.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

Brazilian and Indian share prices became the highest performing of the major developed and emerging economies as of June 2023, with index values of 235.25 and 230.91 respectively in that month. Conversely, the lowest-performing were China and the Germany, both with index values of 86.98 and 113.04 respectively at this time. The index value is calculated with 2015 values as the baseline (i.e. 2015 = 100).

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

This paper focuses on firms in which insiders pledge their shares as collateral for loans. By investigating a natural experiment—China’s enactment of provisions on share reductions that restrict pledge creditors’ cashing-out behavior—we find that pledging firms exhibited more conservative financial reporting after the implementation than non-pledging firms. This effect was pronounced in firms with a higher ratio of pledged shares, a longer maturation period of the pledged shares, and more concentrated pledge creditors. Additionally, we show that pledging firms increased their accounting conservatism after the shock, leading to a lower risk of margin calls and stock price crashes. The effect on accounting conservatism was stronger in firms with controlling pledgers or when the pledge creditors were banks. Our results remained consistent after we performed several robustness tests. These behaviors are economically logical because the provisions heighten creditors’ liquidity risk and the potential losses of loan default. Pledging shareholders embrace more accounting conservatism to mitigate creditors’ concerns about agency costs and avoid triggering margin calls. Our findings provide direct support that creditors have a real demand for accounting conservatism and highlight the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on the financial reporting policies of pledging firms.

Housing markets are often characterized by price bubbles, and governments have instituted policies to stabilize them. Under this circumstance, this study addresses the following questions. (1) Does policy tightening change expectations in housing prices, revealing a regime change? (2) If so, what determines the housing market’s reaction to policy tightening? To answer these questions, we examine the effects of policy tightening that occurred in 2016 on the Chinese housing market where a price boom persisted in the post-2000 period. Using a log-periodic power law model and employing a modified multi-population genetic algorithm for parameter estimation, we find that tightening policy in China did not cause a market crash; instead, shifting the Chinese housing market from faster-than-exponential growth to a soft landing. We attribute this regime shift to low sensitivity in the Chinese housing market to global perturbations. Our findings suggest that government policies can help stabilize housing prices and improve market conditions when implemented expediently. Moreover, policymakers should consider preparedness for the possibility of an economic crisis and other social needs (e.g., housing affordability) for overall social welfare when managing housing price bubbles.

This paper focuses on firms in which insiders pledge their shares as collateral for loans. By investigating a natural experiment—China’s enactment of provisions on share reductions that restrict pledge creditors’ cashing-out behavior—we find that pledging firms exhibited more conservative financial reporting after the implementation than non-pledging firms. This effect was pronounced in firms with a higher ratio of pledged shares, a longer maturation period of the pledged shares, and more concentrated pledge creditors. Additionally, we show that pledging firms increased their accounting conservatism after the shock, leading to a lower risk of margin calls and stock price crashes. The effect on accounting conservatism was stronger in firms with controlling pledgers or when the pledge creditors were banks. Our results remained consistent after we performed several robustness tests. These behaviors are economically logical because the provisions heighten creditors’ liquidity risk and the potential losses of loan default. Pledging shareholders embrace more accounting conservatism to mitigate creditors’ concerns about agency costs and avoid triggering margin calls. Our findings provide direct support that creditors have a real demand for accounting conservatism and highlight the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on the financial reporting policies of pledging firms.

The global rigid crash barrier market is experiencing robust growth, driven by increasing infrastructure development, stringent road safety regulations, and rising government investments in transportation infrastructure improvements worldwide. The market size in 2025 is estimated at $8 billion, exhibiting a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7% from 2025 to 2033. This growth is fueled by several key factors. Firstly, the expansion of highway networks and the construction of new roads, particularly in developing economies, creates significant demand for crash barriers. Secondly, the increasing awareness of road safety and the implementation of stricter regulations mandating the installation of these barriers are boosting market expansion. Furthermore, technological advancements leading to the development of more durable, cost-effective, and aesthetically pleasing barrier systems are driving adoption. Different material types, such as metal and concrete, cater to various application needs and budget considerations, contributing to the market's diversity. The market segmentation reveals strong growth across various applications, with highways and mountain roads representing significant segments. While metal crash barriers currently dominate the market due to their versatility and cost-effectiveness, concrete barriers are gaining traction owing to their superior strength and durability in high-impact scenarios. Geographic analysis indicates strong growth potential in Asia-Pacific, particularly in rapidly developing economies like India and China, driven by large-scale infrastructure projects. North America and Europe maintain substantial market shares due to established infrastructure and stringent safety standards. However, competitive pressures from numerous established and emerging players are shaping the market landscape. Companies like YNM Safety, G R Infraprojects, and others are actively involved in innovation and strategic partnerships to enhance their market presence and meet the growing demand for high-performance rigid crash barriers. The forecast period of 2025-2033 anticipates continued expansion, with market growth further influenced by evolving safety regulations, advancements in barrier design, and overall economic growth in key regions.

This paper uses the test proposed by Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey-Fuller to identify whether there are multiple bubbles in copper price. The empirical results show that base on market fundamentals, there are seven bubbles existed from January 1980 to March 2023. Through analyses, the first two bubbles can be explained by the demand from Japan by the industry concentration and persistent supply constraint. The third to sixth bubbles are mainly negatively impacted by the global financial crisis and growing demand of China. The last bubble is caused by the economic recovery from Covid-19. The logit regression has stated that aluminum price, copper production, all metals index and GDP have a positive impact on copper bubbles, while China’s copper imports and precious metals price negatively explains copper bubbles. The main contributions are the investigation of the copper price bubbles, its determinants and the different technique of GSADF to detect copper price bubbles. Furthermore, it provides helpful information for those investors to make reasonable investment decisions and thus, avoid potential price risk.

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

In June 2025, the index for consumer confidence in China ranged at **** points, down from ** points in the previous month. The index dropped considerably in the first half of 2022 and performed a sideways movement during 2023 and 2024. Consumer confidence Index The consumer confidence index (CCI), also called Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) is a commonly used indicator to measure the degree of economic optimism among consumers. Based on information about saving and spending activities of consumers, changes in business climate and future spending behavior are being projected. The CCI plays an important role for investors, retailers, and manufacturers in their decision-making processes. However, measurement of consumer confidence varies strongly from country to country. As consumers need time to react to economic changes, the CCI tends to lag behind other indicators like the consumer price index (CPI) and the producer price index (PPI). Development in China As shown by the graph at hand, confidence among Chinese consumers picked up since mid of 2016. In October 2017, the CCI hit a record value of 127.6 index points and entered into a sideward movement. Owing to a relative stability in GDP growth, a low unemployment rate, and a steady development of disposable household income, Chinese consumers gained more confidence in the state of the national economy. Those factors also contribute to the consumers’ spending power, which was reflected by a larger share of consumption in China’s GDP. After the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, consumer confidence dropped quickly in the beginning of 2020, but started to recover in the second half of the year, leading to a v-shaped movement of the index in 2020.

For most of the past two decades, China had the highest GDP growth of any of the BRICS countries, although it was overtaken by India in the mid-2010s, and India is predicted to have the highest growth in the 2020s. All five countries saw their GDP growth fall during the global financial crisis in 2008, and again during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020; China was the only economy that continued to grow during both crises, although India's economy also grew during the Great Recession. In 2014, Brazil experienced its own recession due to a combination of economic and political instability, while Russia also went into recession due to the drop in oil prices and the economic sanctions imposed following its annexation of Crimea.