China Government Expenditure: Diplomacy: Aid to Foreign Countries data was reported at 21,350.000 RMB mn in 2023. This records an increase from the previous number of 20,977.000 RMB mn for 2022. China Government Expenditure: Diplomacy: Aid to Foreign Countries data is updated yearly, averaging 15,721.000 RMB mn from Dec 1999 (Median) to 2023, with 25 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 21,549.000 RMB mn in 2019 and a record low of 3,920.000 RMB mn in 1999. China Government Expenditure: Diplomacy: Aid to Foreign Countries data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Finance. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Government and Public Finance – Table CN.FAS: Final Account: General Public Budget Revenue & Expenditure: National.

This study investigates a novel dataset comprised of a universe of 537 donations in 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, between February 11 and June 20, 2020, which provides a high level of detail on China’s and Taiwan’s mask diplomacy. We describe who the main donors were, who the main recipients were, what was donated to each country, and which variables explain why some countries received more aid than the others. Drawing on previous literature, the article advances understanding about the political determinants of these donations. Our findings revealed that, although seemingly uncoordinated, donations made by China's central government, Chinese companies, cities, and foundations were strongly affected by two political determinants, namely the recipient’s partnership status with China and the One China Policy. Furthermore, aid provided by China’s Central Government was larger in autocracies than in democracies.

Replication for Honors Thesis for Dartmouth College Department of Government

Information on development assistance financed through the EU budget in China. The Directorate-General for International Partnerships is responsible for formulating the EU’s international partnership and development policy, with the ultimate goal to reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development, and promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across the world. Its main purpose is to implement most of the European Commission’s external assistance, through instruments such as the the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). This vital task requires DG INTPA to deliver the EU’s development assistance budget in an open and accountable fashion. For this reason, it publishes its data in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Registry since 2011.

Description Geospatial data of 53 African countries that have joined the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) up until August 2022. Found in 2000, FOCAC aims to promote diplomacy, trade, security, and investment relations between China and African countries. An interactive view of this dataset: Link Source Data were collected from the official website of FOCAC. The geospatial features, including polygons and boundaries of regions, are sourced from Natural Earth, Admin 0 – Countries version 5.1.1 (Published on 12 May 2022). For metadata, such as data description and available methods for geospatial data processing, please read the readme.pdf. Terms of use This dataset features in a collection of geospatial data "Geo-mapping databases for the Belt and Road Initiative". To cite this work, available citation styles can be found here: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.6076193

Review of Economics and Statistics: Forthcoming.

Due to its rapid economic growth and increasing demand for energy, China has engaged in numerous efforts to sustain its energy supplies and enhance its energy security. While existing literature argues that access to energy is oftentimes the driving force behind Beijing's foreign policy behavior, little work has been done to systemically examine the bilateral relationship between China and energy producing countries. This paper explores how China's foreign policy making is influenced by its energy security concern, focusing on three foreign policy instruments—partnerships, foreign aid, and leadership visits. Using a large-N, quantitative approach, this paper analyzes the effect of oil production on these three foreign policy indicators. The results show that Beijing is more likely to form partnerships with oil producing countries. Chinese top leaders are also more likely to travel to countries that produce a higher level of oil. China's aid allocation to Africa is driven by oil abundance as well, although the findings on aid are only valid in the cross-national analysis.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, commonly referred to as North Korea, suffered the devastation of its economy and society during the Korean War, which it fought from 1950 to 1953. While no precise numbers exist for the number of victims of war in North Korea, estimates conclude that between 12-15 percent may have been killed during the war. Along with the aerial bombardment of the North, which flattened entire cities and destroyed much of the economic infrastructure of the state, this left the communists with a massive task of reconstruction in the aftermath of the war. The countries which stepped in to assist the North Koreans were all communist allies, with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China making up the majority of aid. These two states would remain North Korea's two main allies for the rest of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the Koreans even managing to retain close ties to both countries in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split of 1961, when the Chinese communist leadership denounced the Soviets as "revisionists" for their abandonment of the legacy of their former leader, Joseph Stalin (1878-1953). Other countries which contributed to the rebuilding of North Korea came from the Eastern Bloc of communist states in Europe, including East Germany and Poland.

In this article we depart from the classic model of foreign direct investment (FDI) determinants and examine the effect of sociohistorical factors on FDI. We argue that past foreign aid projects confer social capital that constitutes specific resources available to investors in the present, increasing their preferences for host countries in which their home country has accumulated more social capital. We use new data on China's historical aid in Africa to test these contentions, uncovering a positive, significant connection between China's historical aid program in Africa (1956–1999) and contemporary (2000–2015) investments by Chinese companies. While China's historical aid may have been politically driven, it has had important long-term consequences for its commercial investors. More broadly, these findings suggest a sociohistorical explanation of the puzzle of why Chinese foreign investments deviate from conventional FDI patterns.

With China's emergence as a global power, it is commonly assumed that the Chinese leadership's influence in international politics has increased considerably. However, systematic studies of China's impact on the foreign policy behavior of other states are rare and generally limited to questions regarding economic capabilities and the use of coercive power. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on China's global political rise by taking a broader perspective. Drawing on voting data from the UN General Assembly for the last two decades, it explores the plausibility of different explanations for foreign policy similarity: economic, diplomatic and military linkages; domestic institutional similarities; and parallel problem-solving processes. The logistic regression analyses find that high levels of foreign policy similarity correlate with shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of political globalization. The results further indicate that foreign aid seems to help buy support in global politics.

Time series data for the data The Current Account and Its Components - Current USD, TTM for the country China. The Current Account and Its Components The current account is a component of a country's balance of payments that records the transactions of goods, services, income, and current transfers between residents of the country and the rest of the world. It consists of four main components:

a. Trade in Goods Balance

b. Trade in Services Balance

c. Primary Income Balance

d. Secondary Income Balance

1. Trade in Goods Balance Definition: This includes the export and import of physical items such as machinery, food, clothing, etc.

Credit Example: A German car manufacturer exports cars to the United States (value of exported cars).

Debit Example: A German electronics retailer imports smartphones from South Korea (value of imported smartphones).

1. Trade in Services Balance Definition: This includes the export and import of services such as tourism, financial services, consulting, transportation, etc.

Credit Example: A German IT company provides software development services to a client in Japan (value of exported services).

Debit Example: A German tourist books a hotel room in France (value of imported tourism services).

1. Primary Income Balance Definition: This includes earnings from the provision of factors of production such as labor, financial assets, land, and natural resources. It covers income from interest, profits, and dividends.

Credit Example: A German investor receives dividends from shares held in a U.S. company (value of received dividends).

Debit Example: Foreign investors receive interest payments on bonds issued by a German company (value of interest payments).

1. Secondary Income Balance Definition: This includes current transfers such as foreign aid, remittances, and other one-way payments that do not involve an exchange of goods or services.

Credit Example: Remittances sent by German residents working abroad to their families in Germany (value of received remittances).

Debit Example: Germany sends humanitarian aid to a developing country (value of sent aid). Secondary Income Balance (USD)The indicator "Secondary Income Balance (USD)" stands at 14.19 Billion United States Dollars as of 3/31/2025. Regarding the One-Year-Change of the series, the current value constitutes an increase of 0.6144 Billion United States Dollars compared to the value the year prior.The 1 year change is 0.6144 Billion United States Dollars.The 3 year change is -2.95 Billion United States Dollars.The 5 year change is 5.75 Billion United States Dollars.The 10 year change is 17.47 Billion United States Dollars.The Serie's long term average value is 12.42 Billion United States Dollars. It's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is 1.77 Billion United States Dollars higher, compared to it's long term average value.The Serie's change in United States Dollars from it's minimum value, on 9/30/2017, to it's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is +27.83 Billion.The Serie's change in United States Dollars from it's maximum value, on 9/30/2008, to it's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is -29.66 Billion.Trade in Services Balance (USD)The indicator "Trade in Services Balance (USD)" stands at -227.06 Billion United States Dollars as of 3/31/2025. Regarding the One-Year-Change of the series, the current value constitutes an decrease of -0.3885 Billion United States Dollars compared to the value the year prior.The 1 year change is -0.3885 Billion United States Dollars.The 3 year change is -141.70 Billion United States Dollars.The 5 year change is 23.05 Billion United States Dollars.The 10 year change is -17.70 Billion United States Dollars.The Serie's long term average value is -137.05 Billion United States Dollars. It's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is -90.01 Billion United States Dollars lower, compared to it's long term average value.The Serie's change in United States Dollars from it's minimum value, on 12/31/2018, to it's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is +65.52 Billion.The Serie's change in United States Dollars from it's maximum value, on 9/30/2007, to it's latest available value, on 3/31/2025, is -234.92 Billion.Trade in Goods Balance (USD)The indicator "Trade in Goods Balance (USD)" stands at 885.97 Billion United States Dollars as of 3/31/2025, the highest value at least since 6/30/2007, the period currently displayed. Regarding the One-Year-Change of the series, the current value constitutes an increase of 288.50 Billion United States Dollars compared to the value the year prior.The 1 year change is 288.50 Billion United States Dollars.The 3 year change is 301.62 Billion United States Dollars.The 5 year change is 553.89 Billion United States Dollars.The 10 year change is 376.42 Billion United States Dollars.The Serie's long term average value is 429.34 Billion United States Dollars. It's latest available value, on ...

This study explores whether and under what conditions foreign aid can help improve the donor country’s image in countries that did not receive aid. We identified a world heritage site restoration project that is visible and localized, has no political attachments, and deals with the global public good as the type of foreign aid most likely to generate this positive effect. In light of the literature suggesting that tensions with the target country undermine the effectiveness of public diplomacy, we expect the positive effect will be more pronounced in non-recipient countries with which the donor country has a more amicable relationship. To empirically investigate our argument, we conduct a survey experiment in Australia, which is a developed non-aid-receiving country. We provide information to the Australian public about an aid project to restore the Angkor Monument in Cambodia conducted either by China or South Korea. We find that information on Korea’s aid to Cambodia improves the image of Korea and the willingness to cooperate with the Korean government among Australians. No such effect, however, is observed for similar aid provided by China, whose relations with Australia have been strained in multiple domains. Our findings have policy implications for donor countries seeking to utilize the soft power element of foreign aid as a public diplomacy tool.

This dataset includes the replication code and supporting data files for the published piece in Foreign Policy Analysis, ID FPA-20-Nov-0237.R2, including the data, R script file, replication instructions, and a replication log.

This dataset contains results from AidData's "BRI Perceptions Survey," the first to systematically capture perceptions of China's Belt and Road Initiative from leaders who make and shape development policy across the Global South. It provides weighted aggregate results globally for selected questions and with limited disaggregation across 5 geographic regions and autocracies versus democracies.

China International Development Association: Grants data was reported at 0.000 USD mn in 2018. This stayed constant from the previous number of 0.000 USD mn for 2017. China International Development Association: Grants data is updated yearly, averaging 0.000 USD mn from Dec 1981 (Median) to 2018, with 38 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 0.000 USD mn in 2018 and a record low of 0.000 USD mn in 2018. China International Development Association: Grants data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s China – Table CN.World Bank.IDS: Defense and Official Development Assistance: Annual. IDA grants are net disbursements of grants from the International Development Association (IDA). Data are in current U.S. dollars. Regional allocations are included in aggregate data.

China Net Official Flows from UN Agencies: UNIDO data was reported at 0.037 USD mn in 2021. This records an increase from the previous number of 0.007 USD mn for 2020. China Net Official Flows from UN Agencies: UNIDO data is updated yearly, averaging 0.022 USD mn from Dec 2020 (Median) to 2021, with 2 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 0.037 USD mn in 2021 and a record low of 0.007 USD mn in 2020. China Net Official Flows from UN Agencies: UNIDO data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s China – Table CN.World Bank.WDI: Defense and Official Development Assistance. Net official flows from UN agencies are the net disbursements of total official flows from the UN agencies. Total official flows are the sum of Official Development Assistance (ODA) or official aid and Other Official Flows (OOF) and represent the total disbursements by the official sector at large to the recipient country. Net disbursements are gross disbursements of grants and loans minus repayments of principal on earlier loans. ODA consists of loans made on concessional terms (with a grant element of at least 25 percent, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) and grants made to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. Official aid refers to aid flows from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Part II of the DAC List was abolished in 2005. The collection of data on official aid and other resource flows to Part II countries ended with 2004 data. OOF are transactions by the official sector whose main objective is other than development-motivated, or, if development-motivated, whose grant element is below the 25 per cent threshold which would make them eligible to be recorded as ODA. The main classes of transactions included here are official export credits, official sector equity and portfolio investment, and debt reorganization undertaken by the official sector at nonconcessional terms (irrespective of the nature or the identity of the original creditor). UN agencies are United Nations includes the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), World Food Programme (WFP), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Regular Programme for Technical Assistance (UNTA), United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), WHO-Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP), United Nations Women (UNWOMEN), Covid-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNCOVID), Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund (SDGFUND), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), WTO-International Trade Centre (WTO-ITC), United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Data are in current U.S. dollars.;Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, and International Development Statistics database. Data are available online at: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.;Sum;

Live list of active aid activities for China, Macao Special Administrative Region shared via the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Includes both humanitarian and development activities. More information on each activity (including financial data) is available from http://www.d-portal.org

Financial overview and grant giving statistics of Chinese Mutual Aid International Network

Chinese “aid” is a lightning rod for criticism. Policy-makers, journalists, and public intellectuals claim that Beijing uses its largesse to cement alliances with political leaders, secure access to natural resources, and create exclusive commercial opportunities for Chinese firms—all at the expense of citizens living in developing countries. We argue that much of the controversy about Chinese “aid” stems from a failure to distinguish between China's Official Development Assistance (ODA) and more commercially oriented sources and types of state financing. Using a new database on China's official financing commitments to Africa from 2000 to 2013, we find that the allocation of Chinese ODA is driven primarily by foreign policy considerations, while economic interests better explain the distribution of less concessional flows. These results highlight the need for better measures of an increasingly diverse set of non-Western financial activities.