The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

This article identifies the root of the government debt crisis focusing on the role of hydropower in form of the provision of the new short term credit of china. Outlining the options as well as policy recommendations for Laos on the reform of the energy sector.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

Annual data on the size of China Shadow Bank credit was taken from two sources. Moodys (China) produces data 2000-2012 and Goldman Sachs 2013-2018. The average growth rate 2000-2015 was applied to generate data prior to 2000. Annual data was interpolated to produce quarterly estimates using the cubic match last function in EViews so that the integrity of the annual stock data is maintained for the 4th quarter.The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking. This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis. The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilize imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks. Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector.These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises. Secondary data was taken from multiple Reports on China Shadow Banking published by Goldman Sachs (china) and Moodys (China). The data 2000-2018 corresponds to the annual data obtained from the reports. The quarterly data was obtained by interpolation. Data prior to 2000 was generated using the assumed average growth rate of shadow bank credit for 2000-2015.

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "The Global Financial Crisis and Labor Law in China".

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

Additional file 1: Spearman correlation matrix.

The post-COVID-19 era presents a looming threat of global debt, elevating concerns regarding sovereign credit ratings worldwide. This study develops a new index system, divides the rating variables into long- and short-term factors, performs rating fitting and prediction, and investigates the fairness of China and relevant countries. Our findings reveal that sovereign credit ratings have a deterrent effect on the global financial market due to the ceiling effect and quasi-public goods characteristics. A high and stable credit rating demands long-term enhancements in economic fundamentals, budget balances, external surpluses, and overall solvency. Concurrently, effective short-term debt management strategies, including reduction, repayment, and swaps, are essential. Moreover, we introduce the concept of a "rating gap" to assess rating fairness, revealing both undervaluation and overvaluation among countries. Notably, China’s sovereign rating was underestimated between 2009 and 2011 and overestimated between 2013 and 2016. These findings underscore the criticality of government vigilance in monitoring sovereign debt and credit ratings to navigate potential post-COVID-19 sovereign debt crises.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

data for financial development and emission

The post-COVID-19 era presents a looming threat of global debt, elevating concerns regarding sovereign credit ratings worldwide. This study develops a new index system, divides the rating variables into long- and short-term factors, performs rating fitting and prediction, and investigates the fairness of China and relevant countries. Our findings reveal that sovereign credit ratings have a deterrent effect on the global financial market due to the ceiling effect and quasi-public goods characteristics. A high and stable credit rating demands long-term enhancements in economic fundamentals, budget balances, external surpluses, and overall solvency. Concurrently, effective short-term debt management strategies, including reduction, repayment, and swaps, are essential. Moreover, we introduce the concept of a "rating gap" to assess rating fairness, revealing both undervaluation and overvaluation among countries. Notably, China’s sovereign rating was underestimated between 2009 and 2011 and overestimated between 2013 and 2016. These findings underscore the criticality of government vigilance in monitoring sovereign debt and credit ratings to navigate potential post-COVID-19 sovereign debt crises.

In 2018, in China's asset-backed securitization (ABS) market, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) had the highest penetration rate at **** percent, which was much lower than that in the United States. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government relaunched the RMBS program four years later. Featured as a low-risk investment option, RMBS then became hugely popular among Chinese homebuyers and investors.

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "A Comparative Study on the Competitiveness of Major Shipping Ports in Korea and China after the Global Financial Crisis".

In 2024, China’s monetary authority, the People’s Bank of China, issued more than ** trillion yuan which was the highest amount issued in one year so far. Over the past years, the value of printed money increased steadily. The issuing of currency was one function of a central bank. Maintaining price stability One of the main policy objectives of the People’s Bank of China was to maintain price stability. Typically, countries set the desired inflation target and the central bank implements the necessary policies to achieve the said target. Usually, China keeps its inflation target at around ***** percent, but in 2021, the inflation rate dropped to under *** percent. If the inflation rate is too low, central banks can issue more currency and decrease the interest rate. In the opposite scenario, if the inflation rate is too high central banks try to reduce the amount of money in circulation by increasing the interest rate or decreasing bond prices. Managing the economy In capitalist market economies, economies usually undergo a boom and bust cycle. Central banks attempt to counteract this cyclical development to soften the impact for its citizens. For instance, the Chinese government aims to maintain an unemployment rate of around **** percent. However, crises such as the 2008 financial crisis and the outbreak of COVID-19 have an unforeseen impact on the economy. To lower the employment rate, the People’s Bank engaged specific monetary policies to stimulate the economy with the aim of increasing job creation.

Figure 3 depicts China-Africa trade from 2000 to 2013. It shows that China-Africa trade consistently grew since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000. As can be seen in the figure, the US trade with Africa declined after the 2008 global financial crisis, allowing China to take the lead as Africa's largest trading partner. Figure 7 shows trade between China and Africa from 2003 to 2021. Although with fluctuations, trade between the two sides has been increasing since the establishment of the FOCAC mechanism. It reached a first high of US$203 billion in 2015 and then declined significantly the following year. However, the trade increased again from 2017 and surged to US$254 billion in 2021, up by 35% from the previous year. The high trade volume in 2021 has been attributed to the additional Chinese exports of Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), such as masks and hazmat suits, as well as pharmaceutical products and testing equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic to Africa. However, Gu et al (2022: 11) indicated that the strong increase in China-Africa trade volume in 2021 is remarkable as data from China's customs agency shows that it is "made up of an increase in both Chinese exports to Africa (29.9% year-on-year) and African exports to China (43.7% year-on-year)". Figure 4 shows the number of countries around the world that have joined China's Belt and Road Initiatiative (BRI). As can be seen in the figure, China's BRI has attracted more than 140 countries. In Africa, the first countries that signed up for the BRI project were East and North African countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Egypt. In Figure 5, the map shows the number of African countries that have signed up for the BRI since 2015. As can be seen in the figure, 52 countries in Africa had signed some BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China by 2022.

Table 1 shows that studies that analysed the China-Africa relationship focusing on their 'strategic partnership' are very few, given the voluminous literature on China and Africa. A search of Sino-Africa studies conducted in English with the term 'strategic partnership' in their titles produced only ten papers (see table). Furthermore, as the table shows, studies investigating the increased security cooperation in China-Africa relations conducted in English are rare, although this part of the debate has also produced numerous research publications. The column titled 'Focus of study' in Table 1 above shows that majority of these studies concentrated on analysing economic cooperation, while a few also included political relations between China and Africa. Also, the column titled 'Definition of strategic partnership' shows that, all these studies, except Akpan and Onya (2018), made no attempts to define the concept of strategic partnership. Figure 8 shows the countries around the world in which the United Nations (UN) has deployed its peacekeepers. As shown in the figure, the UN has deployed several peacekeeping missions around the world since the late 1940s, with most of these operations taking place in the African continent. Figure 9 focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Africa. As can be seen in the figure, Chinese peacekeeping troops were deployed in five out of the seven UN-led missions on the African continent as of 2019. Figure 12 shows the foreign military bases that currently exist in African countries. As the figure shows, the African Continent is a host to 47 known foreign military bases, of which 34 are United States (US) bases. Figure 13 shows the foreign military bases in Djibouti. As seen in the figure, Djibouti hosts the US' Camp Lemonnier military base, just 13.4 kilometres away from the Chinese PLA's new navy facility, along with military bases of other major powers such as France, Germany and Japan in close proximity. Djibouti thus found itself in the middle of diplomatic tensions between China and the US over fears of a Chinese takeover of the Doraleh Container Terminal, Djibouti's main container port, in 2018, as China financed the development of the port. Figure 6 shows China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) commitments from 2006 to 2021. As can be seen in the figure, China's financial pledges to assist Africa increased from US$5 billion to US$60 in 2015. However, they dropped to US$40 billion in 2021. Further, drops in the number of activities, such as official development assistance (ODAs) and capacity building, including reductions in security collaborations, were also noted. However, a new development was China's reallocation of US$10 billion of its Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) towards Africa from the US$40 billion that it received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

China’s export benefits from the significant fiscal stimulus in the United States. This paper analyzes the global spillover effect of the American economy on China’s macro-economy using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-Gibbs sampling approach, with the goal of improving the ability of China’s financial system to protect against foreign threats. This paper examines the theories of the consequences of uncertainty on macroeconomics first. Then, using medium-sized economic and financial data, the uncertainty index of the American and Chinese economies is built. In order to complete the test and analysis of the dynamic relationship between American economic uncertainty and China’s macro-economy, a Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility-Vector Autoregression (TVP- VAR) model with random volatility is constructed. The model is estimated using the Gibbs sampling method based on MCMC. For the empirical analysis, samples of China’s and the United States’ economic data from January 2001 to January 2022 were taken from the WIND database and the FRED database, respectively. The data reveal that there are typically fewer than 5 erroneous components in the most estimated parameters of the MCMC model, which suggests that the model’s sampling results are good. China’s pricing level reacted to the consequences of the unpredictability of the American economy by steadily declining, reaching its lowest point during the financial crisis in 2009, and then gradually diminishing. After 2012, the greatest probability density range of 68% is extremely wide and contains 0, indicating that the impact of economic uncertainty in the United States on China’s pricing level is no longer significant. China should therefore focus on creating a community of destiny by working with nations that have economic cooperation to lower systemic financial risks and guarantee the stability of the capital market.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

The Scientific Instrument Manufacturing industry is a supporting industry to many important upstream industries in the Chinese economy. Scientific instruments have a variety of applications in agriculture, traffic, science, environmental protection, national defense, education and other fields. The industry also plays an essential role in the continued development of China into a technologically advanced society. Industry revenue is expected to grow at an annualized 2.6% over the five years through 2025, to total $39.1 billion. As output of automobile instrument and environmental monitoring instruments decline, industry revenue decreased by 2.4% in 2019. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected market demand both domestically and internationally. Industry revenue is therefore expected to have declined by 3.2% in 2020. In 2021, as the COVID-19 pandemic has been gradually controlled, participants in the industry have returned to normal production. Industry revenue is therefore expected to rise by 1.9% during the current year.In 2011, the industry was negatively affected by the European debt crisis. That year, exports decreased by 4.0%. As the European debt crisis continued, exports in 2012 increased by just 2.1%. In 2012 and 2013, industry revenue grew by 6.3% and 14.8%, respectively. As a result, China's automobile market rebounded, driving downstream demand for automotive instruments. China's 2016 automobile output increased by 13.1% to a historical high of 28.2 million units. At the same time, the increasing air pollution in China drove demand for environmental monitoring instruments during the year. Industry revenue increased by 13.8% to $29.1 billion in 2016.Industry revenue is projected to grow at an annualized 3.6% over the five years through 2030, to total $46.7 billion. The main drivers of industry growth will be rising demand for new energy automobile and environmental control instruments, as well as the industry's exports.

In 2023, the construction industry accounted for about *** percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP), representing a continuation of the figure from the previous year.

A vital industry for the economy Since the 1998 housing reform, China's real estate industry has expanded dramatically and has become one of the country's pillar industries. Similarly, China's infrastructure construction has also boomed since the early 2000s. To mitigate the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and maintain the country's economic output, the Chinese government launched a four trillion yuan stimulus plan and invested substantial resources in infrastructure development across the country, such as high-speed railway and highway projects. These developments have all made the construction industry one of the most important segments of the Chinese economy.

An important employer nationwide The construction industry also plays a key role in China's labor market, with more than ********** people employed in the sector in 2023. It is also one of the top sectors for China's migrant workers, with more than ** percent working in construction in 2023. However, due to the challenging working environment, more and more young migrant workers are choosing to work in other professions, such as couriers and food delivery. With China's real estate sector facing significant headwinds, infrastructure construction stagnating, and local governments now under substantial fiscal pressure, the future of China's construction industry is becoming increasingly uncertain.

The linkages between the US and China, the world’s two major agricultural powers, have brought great uncertainty to the global food markets. Inspired by these, this paper examines the extreme risk spillovers between US and Chinese agricultural futures markets during significant crises. We use a copula-conditional value at risk (CoVaR) model with Markov-switching regimes to capture the tail dependence in their pair markets. The study covers the period from January 2006 to December 2022 and identifies two distinct dependence regimes (stable and crisis periods). Moreover, we find significant and asymmetric upside/downside extreme risk spillovers between the US and Chinese markets, which are highly volatile in crises. Additionally, the impact of international capital flows (the financial channel) on risk spillovers is particularly pronounced during the global financial crisis. During the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, the impact of supply chain disruptions (the non-financial channel) is highlighted. Our findings provide a theoretical reference for monitoring the co-movements in agricultural futures markets and practical insights for managing investment portfolios and enhancing food market stability during crises.