The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2023, with forecasts to 2029. In 2023, gross national debt ranged at around 84 percent of the national gross domestic product.

The debt-to-GDP ratio

In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2023, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 255 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate.

Development in China

China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

This dataset is about book subjects and is filtered where the books includes Chinese banking reform : from the pre-WTO period to the financial crisis and beyond, featuring 10 columns including authors, average publication date, book publishers, book subject, and books. The preview is ordered by number of books (descending).

Additional file 1: Spearman correlation matrix.

A survey of bank managers working in the operation and credit risk department at different hierarchical levels of individual commercial banks in China responsible for bank credit analyses and risk evaluations covering the procedure from loan application to final decision. The objective is to understand the internal organization arrangement of Chinese commercial banks in the provision of bank credit to SMEs. The focus is on the incentives and constraints faced by branch managers in the interaction with SMEs. The enquiry reflects the notion that the branch manager who directly interacts with the SME borrower plays a critical role in the information collection and processing in the lending decision. The incentives and constraints faced by branch manager are shaped by the type of organization of the bank: the degree of decision-making centralization, modes of communication between hierarchical levels, and the adoption of statistical techniques for risk evaluation.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilise imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector. These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

China’s export benefits from the significant fiscal stimulus in the United States. This paper analyzes the global spillover effect of the American economy on China’s macro-economy using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-Gibbs sampling approach, with the goal of improving the ability of China’s financial system to protect against foreign threats. This paper examines the theories of the consequences of uncertainty on macroeconomics first. Then, using medium-sized economic and financial data, the uncertainty index of the American and Chinese economies is built. In order to complete the test and analysis of the dynamic relationship between American economic uncertainty and China’s macro-economy, a Time Varying Parameter-Stochastic Volatility-Vector Autoregression (TVP- VAR) model with random volatility is constructed. The model is estimated using the Gibbs sampling method based on MCMC. For the empirical analysis, samples of China’s and the United States’ economic data from January 2001 to January 2022 were taken from the WIND database and the FRED database, respectively. The data reveal that there are typically fewer than 5 erroneous components in the most estimated parameters of the MCMC model, which suggests that the model’s sampling results are good. China’s pricing level reacted to the consequences of the unpredictability of the American economy by steadily declining, reaching its lowest point during the financial crisis in 2009, and then gradually diminishing. After 2012, the greatest probability density range of 68% is extremely wide and contains 0, indicating that the impact of economic uncertainty in the United States on China’s pricing level is no longer significant. China should therefore focus on creating a community of destiny by working with nations that have economic cooperation to lower systemic financial risks and guarantee the stability of the capital market.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

In 2022, China’s level of total investment reached around 43.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to decrease gradually to 41.7 percent until 2028. Final consumption accounted for only 53.2 percent in 2022.

International comparison of total investments

The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.

Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development.

Level of total investment in China

China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.

However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 300 percent of the GDP in 2022, up from only 139 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

Explore the historical trajectory of aluminum prices in China, influenced by global dynamics, trade policies, and economic conditions. Discover how events like the 2008 financial crisis, environmental regulations, and recent geopolitical tensions have shaped one of the world's largest aluminum markets.

This study is part of a quadrennial series designed to investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public on matters related to foreign policy, and to define the parameters of public opinion within which decision-makers must operate. This public opinion study of the United States focused on respondents' opinions of the United States leadership role in the world and the challenges the country faces internationally and is comprised of two parts, the July 2008 and the September 2008 surveys. In particular, the July 2008 survey covers United States foreign policy, globalization, trade and immigration, the rise of China, and the United States-Japan relationship. Regarding United States foreign policy, respondents were asked to give their views on whether the United States should take an active part in world affairs, threats to vital interests in the next ten years, foreign policy goals, treaties and agreements, the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council, conflict between Christians and Muslims, and combating terrorism. Additional questions included whether respondents favored the United States having military bases in other countries, their opinions about justifications for the use of United States troops abroad, the Iraq War, nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel, and participants' views on several countries and world organizations. Regarding globalization, trade, and immigration, respondents gave their opinions on whether globalization is good or bad for the United States, lowering trade barriers, the trade practices of various countries, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), economic competitiveness of the United States economy, and the future of United States power and the next generation of Americans. In addition, on the topic of globalization and immigration, queries included the importance of Asia and Europe, the pace of globalization, fairness of income distribution, foreign investments in American companies, the level of legal immigration into the United States and whether or not immigration is good. Concerning the rise of China, respondents were asked to compare the size and potential of the United States and China economies and their implications, loans between the countries, how to deal with China's increase in power, and whether China or Japan is more important to the United States. On the subject of the United States-Japan relationship, participants gave their opinions regarding the amending of Japan's constitution to allow for a wider range of military activities, Japan's development of nuclear weapons, and what factors contribute to Japan's global influence. Part 2, the September 2008 survey, commissioned to gauge whether any substantial changes in attitudes occurred due to the financial crisis, repeated a subset of questions from the July 2008 survey and focused on respondents' attitudes toward trade and globalization. Demographic and other background information includes age, race, gender, marital status, religious affiliation, political party affiliation, employment status, education, household composition, type of housing, state of residence, and access to the Internet.

In 2023, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Shanghai municipality in China increased by around 5.0 percent from the previous year. Shanghai is the most populous city in China and has the largest GDP of all Chinese cities. It is located in Eastern China on the southern estuary at the mouth of the Yangtze river.

Development of GDP growth in Shanghai

As a bridgehead to global markets and a forerunner in market opening, Shanghai experienced a decades long economic boom, which massively changed the shape of the city. Economic growth rates had double digits for more than two decades since 1992 and were well above the Chinese national average. This changed fundamentally with the global financial crisis. In 2008, the growth rate fell below ten percent and gradually declined thereafter. Growth rates now got closer to the national average of GDP growth. While the economic development in Shanghai has already reached a high level, other regions in China are catching up, and growth rates in many inland regions of China are now higher than in Shanghai. This is especially true on a city level, with many lower-tier cities experiencing higher growth rates than Shanghai.

Sector distribution of GDP growth

Upon closer examination of the distribution of GDP across economic sectors, it becomes obvious that the service sector of the economy exhibited the highest growth rates in most of the recent years. In 2023, services already accounted for more than 75 percent of the value added to the GDP, which is far above the national average. In contrast, the industrial sector, which had once been of great importance to Shanghai's economy, is losing momentum and its share in total economic output is shrinking constantly. Financial intermediation and information industries were branches in the service sector that displayed the fastest growth rates in recent years.

For most of the past two decades, China had the highest GDP growth of any of the BRICS countries, although it was overtaken by India in the mid-2010s, and India is predicted to have the highest growth in the 2020s. All five countries saw their GDP growth fall during the global financial crisis in 2008, and again during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020; China was the only economy that continued to grow during both crises, although India's economy also grew during the Great Recession. In 2014, Brazil experienced its own recession due to a combination of economic and political instability, while Russia also went into recession due to the drop in oil prices and the economic sanctions imposed following its annexation of Crimea.

The linkages between the US and China, the world’s two major agricultural powers, have brought great uncertainty to the global food markets. Inspired by these, this paper examines the extreme risk spillovers between US and Chinese agricultural futures markets during significant crises. We use a copula-conditional value at risk (CoVaR) model with Markov-switching regimes to capture the tail dependence in their pair markets. The study covers the period from January 2006 to December 2022 and identifies two distinct dependence regimes (stable and crisis periods). Moreover, we find significant and asymmetric upside/downside extreme risk spillovers between the US and Chinese markets, which are highly volatile in crises. Additionally, the impact of international capital flows (the financial channel) on risk spillovers is particularly pronounced during the global financial crisis. During the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, the impact of supply chain disruptions (the non-financial channel) is highlighted. Our findings provide a theoretical reference for monitoring the co-movements in agricultural futures markets and practical insights for managing investment portfolios and enhancing food market stability during crises.

In 2018, in China's asset-backed securitization (ABS) market, residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) had the highest penetration rate at 2.27 percent, which was much lower than that in the United States. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government relaunched the RMBS program four years later. Featured as a low-risk investment option, RMBS then became hugely popular among Chinese homebuyers and investors.

In 2024, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Shanghai municipality in China increased by around 5.0 percent from the previous year. Shanghai is the most populous city in China and has the largest GDP of all Chinese cities. It is located in Eastern China on the southern estuary at the mouth of the Yangtze river. Development of GDP growth in Shanghai As a bridgehead to global markets and a forerunner in market opening, Shanghai experienced a decades long economic boom, which massively changed the shape of the city. Economic growth rates had double digits for more than two decades since 1992 and were well above the Chinese national average. This changed fundamentally with the global financial crisis. In 2008, the growth rate fell below ten percent and gradually declined thereafter. Growth rates now got closer to the national average of GDP growth. While the economic development in Shanghai has already reached a high level, other regions in China are catching up, and growth rates in many inland regions of China are now higher than in Shanghai. This is especially true on a city level, with many lower-tier cities experiencing higher growth rates than Shanghai. Sector distribution of GDP growth Upon closer examination of the distribution of GDP across economic sectors, it becomes obvious that the service sector of the economy exhibited the highest growth rates in most of the recent years. In 2024, services already accounted for more than 78 percent of the value added to the GDP, which is far above the national average. In contrast, the industrial sector, which had once been of great importance to Shanghai's economy, is losing momentum and its share in total economic output is shrinking constantly. Financial intermediation and information industries were branches in the service sector that displayed the fastest growth rates in recent years.

In terms of revenue, Toyota and Volkswagen were the leading automakers worldwide as of May 2024. In terms of vehicle sales, Toyota and Volkswagen are also counted among the most successful automakers worldwide. The emergence of China as an exceptional market Before the coronavirus crisis of 2019-2020, the global automotive industry was hit hard by the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and General Motors declared its roughly 91 billion U.S. dollar bankruptcy following the crisis. In 2009, passenger car sales slumped in most markets, except for China, which emerged as the key sales market for passenger cars. The return of the crisis Chinese manufacturers cut the cord from their joint venture partners from other parts of Asia and the Western world a long time ago, and the global automotive industry has begun to feel the impact Chinese motor vehicles and parts manufacturers have. In 2020, the car market was in free-fall again. However, China was also affected this time. The global automotive chip shortage further impacted the industry in 2021 and 2022, leading to a slump in vehicle inventory despite rising demand. By 2023, some improvements were recorded on the global level.

This study is part of a quadrennial series designed to investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public and a select group of opinion leaders on matters relating to foreign policy, and to define the parameters of public opinion within which decision-makers must operate. Through telephone surveys, general public respondents (Part 2) were interviewed October 15-November 10, 1998, and opinion leaders (Part 1) were interviewed November 2-December 21, 1998. Respondents were asked to assess their level of interest in the news and specifically in foreign policy. Respondents were also asked whether concern for foreign policy is important in a presidential candidate, and their views were sought on the foreign policy records of President Bill Clinton and former presidents George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, John F. Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, and Harry Truman. Those queried were asked for their opinions on economic aid to foreign nations, including Egypt, Poland, Russia, Israel, and African nations. In addition, respondents were asked to rate the Clinton administration on foreign policy, trade policy, immigration policy, United States relations with China, Japan, and Russia, international terrorism, the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Arab-Israeli peace process, the situation in Iraq, nuclear proliferation, the situation in Northern Ireland, and the Asian financial crisis. Views were also sought on whether United States' vital interests were present in Egypt, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Israel, Canada, Brazil, Russia, Haiti, Bosnia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, China, France, the Baltic nations, South Korea, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Cuba, India, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. A series of questions addressed potential threats to those vital interests. Additional topics covered the foreign policy goals of the United States, bloodshed in the 21st century, measures to combat international terrorism, the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States' contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United States involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings toward Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, China, France, Taiwan, South Korea, Cuba, Argentina, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Italy, Russia, North Korea, Germany, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Israel, Iraq, India, Canada, and Brazil. Respondents were also asked for their opinions of President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Pope John Paul II, former President George Bush, former President Jimmy Carter, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, South African President Nelson Mandela, European Union President Jacques Santer, Cuban President Fidel Castro, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat, French President Jacques Chirac, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic. Further queries focused on whether United States troops should be used if North Korea invaded South Korea, if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, if Arab forces invaded Israel, if Russia invaded Poland, if the Cuban people attempted to overthrow the Castro regime, if China invaded Taiwan, or if Serbian forces killed large numbers of ethnic Albanians. Respondents were asked whether they supported the use of economic sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China. Additional topics covered the elimination of tariffs, globalization, the establishment of a Palestinian state, the United States' role as a world leader, United States federal government program spending, and whether the United States should pay the $1.6 billion owed to the United Nations. Opinion leaders were asked an additional question about the possible threat of the "euro" (the unified monetary system to be implemented in January 1999 by the European Union) to the United States dollar's supremacy as a reserve currency. Background information on general public respondents includes age, race, sex, political party, political orientation, religion, marital status, spouse's employment status, age of children in household, amount of time spent at home, employment status, occupation, position in hou

In 2023, the construction industry accounted for about 6.8 percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP), representing a slight increase of 0.1 percent from the previous year.

A vital industry for the economy Since the 1998 housing reform, China's real estate industry has expanded dramatically and has become one of the country's pillar industries. Similarly, China's infrastructure construction has also boomed since the early 2000s. To mitigate the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and maintain the country's economic output, the Chinese government launched a four trillion yuan stimulus plan and invested substantial resources in infrastructure development across the country, such as high-speed railway and highway projects. These developments have all made the construction industry one of the most important segments of the Chinese economy.

An important employer nationwide The construction industry also plays a key role in China's labor market, with more than 50 million people employed in the sector in 2023. It is also one of the top sectors for China's migrant workers, with more than 15 percent working in construction in 2023. However, due to the challenging working environment, more and more young migrant workers are choosing to work in other professions, such as couriers and food delivery. With China's real estate sector facing significant headwinds, infrastructure construction stagnating, and local governments now under substantial fiscal pressure, the future of China's construction industry is becoming increasingly uncertain.