Chinese buyers comprise one of the largest groups of foreign buyers of residential property in the United States. In 2017, a record number of residential properties were bought by Chinese nationals, but since then, both the sales volume and percentage of all foreign-bought properties has declined. In 2025, Chinese buyers were responsible for ** percent of all sales to foreigners. Who is the biggest buyer of U.S. residential property? During the coronavirus pandemic, buyers from Canadian and Mexican origin dominated international transactions. In 2025 Chinese nationals were the largest buyers of U.S. residential property. They were also responsible for the largest share of the aggregate value of properties purchased. On average, Chinese bought properties were also substantially more expensive than the ones purchased by other buyer groups, such as Canadians. How has the market developed? The total property sales to foreign buyers peaked at *** U.S. dollars in 2017, followed by a period of declining transaction value. The coronavirus pandemic has significantly contributed to cross-border transactions remaining subdued. In 2024, the value of property sales to foreigners was the lowest observed since recording began.

This statistic shows the capital stock of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) in Latin America from 2014 to 2024. In 2024, China's FDI capital stock in Latin American countries amounted to around ****** billion U.S. dollars.

China Outward Investment: Latin America: Ecuador data was reported at 100.400 USD mn in 2023. This records an increase from the previous number of 16.800 USD mn for 2022. China Outward Investment: Latin America: Ecuador data is updated yearly, averaging 16.800 USD mn from Dec 2003 (Median) to 2023, with 21 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 470.600 USD mn in 2013 and a record low of -131.100 USD mn in 2017. China Outward Investment: Latin America: Ecuador data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Commerce. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Investment – Table CN.OB: Outward Direct Investment: by Country.

Despite the increasing globalization of housing markets, little is known about its political implications. This study investigates whether rising Chinese investments in US homes influenced local voting in recent US presidential elections. Building on pocketbook/sociotropic voting and nativism theories, I develop hypotheses on the electoral consequences of foreign real estate investment through greater home demand and equity, improved local economies, and changing neighborhoods. Using difference-in-differences designs that combine a unique shock to Chinese capital outflows in 2013 with county-level measures of local attractiveness to Chinese investments, I find that greater exposure reduced Democratic vote shares in both the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. Furthermore, an initially larger white population strengthened this effect, while a larger college-educated population weakened it. In contrast, local equity gains, housing competition, or economic strength did not systematically influence the effect. Together, the results appear more consistent with the pro-conservative effects of nativism.

China Outward Investment: Latin America: Mexico data was reported at 1.079 USD bn in 2023. This records an increase from the previous number of 488.520 USD mn for 2022. China Outward Investment: Latin America: Mexico data is updated yearly, averaging 49.730 USD mn from Dec 2003 (Median) to 2023, with 21 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 1.079 USD bn in 2023 and a record low of -6.276 USD mn in 2015. China Outward Investment: Latin America: Mexico data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Commerce. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Investment – Table CN.OB: Outward Direct Investment: by Country.

Key information about China Foreign Direct Investment

• China Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased by 8.5 USD bn in Sep 2025, compared with an increase of 17.4 USD bn in the previous quarter.
• China Foreign Direct Investment: USD mn net flows data is updated quarterly, available from Mar 1998 to Sep 2025.
• The data reached an all-time high of 107.2 USD bn in Mar 2022 and a record low of -15.0 USD bn in Jun 2024.

• In the latest reports of China, Current Account recorded a surplus of 195.6 USD bn in Sep 2025.
• China Direct Investment Abroad expanded by 39.9 USD bn in Sep 2025.
• Its Foreign Portfolio Investment increased by 8.3 USD bn in Jun 2025.
• The country's Nominal GDP was reported at 4,953.4 USD bn in Sep 2025.

China Outward Investment: North America: Bermuda data was reported at 515.120 USD mn in 2023. This records an increase from the previous number of -167.650 USD mn for 2022. China Outward Investment: North America: Bermuda data is updated yearly, averaging 47.785 USD mn from Dec 2004 (Median) to 2023, with 20 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 1.127 USD bn in 2015 and a record low of -316.830 USD mn in 2018. China Outward Investment: North America: Bermuda data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Commerce. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Investment – Table CN.OB: Outward Direct Investment: by Country.

China Outward Investment: United States: accum: Other data was reported at 638.530 USD mn in 2022. This records an increase from the previous number of 520.390 USD mn for 2021. China Outward Investment: United States: accum: Other data is updated yearly, averaging 28.530 USD mn from Dec 2007 (Median) to 2022, with 14 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 638.530 USD mn in 2022 and a record low of 0.340 USD mn in 2013. China Outward Investment: United States: accum: Other data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Commerce. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Investment – Table CN.OB: Outward Direct Investment: United States by Industry.

In 2022, *** Chinese companies listed their shares on the Nasdaq with a combined market capitalization of over *** billion U.S. dollars. Overseas stock markets had been a popular destination for enterprises from Mainland China who were looking to raise capital. However, in recent years, the Chinese government and the U.S. government have made it harder for companies from Mainland China to list in the United States.

As a bridge between Chinese mainland and international financial markets, the Stock Connect program allows investors on both sides to gain mutual access. By analyzing how cross-border flows respond to macro-related shocks, we show that compared with possibly homemade foreign investors, genuine foreign investors are more likely affected by the U.S. monetary shocks, the exchange rate risk, the U.S. market performance as well as the cross-market valuation disparity. The paper highlights the importance of profiling different groups of cross-border participants over market integration.

This paper investigates the effects of United States sanctions on Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI). Using data for up to 112 developing countries from 2005-2015, we find that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to invest in countries threatened or targeted with U.S. sanctions relative to Chinese privately-owned enterprises (POEs) because they have the Chinese government’s backing and are larger in number and size, motivating them to invest in higher-risk states. The Chinese government also reaps political benefits by Chinese SOEs investing abroad, enhancing China’s economic strength and decreasing its rivals’ influence. We also obtain similar results for Chinese SOEs and POEs regardless of the investment sector and conduct additional robustness checks that further reinforce the main findings. Our study provides insights into how China’s overseas FDI increases its economic and political reach across the globe at the possible expense of the U.S.

China Retail Investor Sentiment Analytics provides sentiment analytics of Chinese retail investors based on 2 stock forums, Guba (GACRIS dataset) and Xueqiu (XACRIS dataset), the most popular stock forums in China from 2007.

By utilizing in-house NLP models which are dedicatedly optimized for Chinese stock forum posts and trained on a proprietary manually labeled and cross-checked training data, the dataset provides accurate text analytics of post content, including but not limited to quality, sentiment, and relevant stocks with relevance score. In addition to the aggregated statistics of stock sentiment and popularity, the dataset also provides rich and fine-grained information for each user/post in record level. For example, it reports the registration time, number of followers for each user, and also the replies/readings and province being published for each post. Moreover, these meta data are processed in point-in-Time (PIT) manner since 2019.

The dataset could help clients easily capture the sentiment and popularity among millions of Chinese retail investors. On the other hand, it also offers flexibility for clients to customize novel analytics, such as studying the sentiment (conformity/divergence) of users of different level of influence or posts of different hotness, or simply filtering the posts published by users which are too active/positive/negative in a time window when aggregating the statistics.

Coverage: All A-share and Hong Kong stocks, 300+ popular US stocks Update Frequency: Daily or intra-day

China’s National Oil Companies (NOCs) have been increasing investments in unconventional oil and gas projects in the US and Canada since 2009. So far, China’s NOCs have made a total investment of about $12.4 billion in North America’s unconventional oil and gas projects. The investments are driven by China’s will to gain energy security amidst its increasing dependence on oil and gas imports. Besides this, Chinese companies are also striving to gain the technology needed to develop their domestic unconventional oil and gas resources. Read More

Chinese gold ETFs see record inflows in April, surpassing U.S.-listed funds, amid rising gold prices and economic uncertainties.

According to a survey among Chinese companies operating in the United States conducted in March and April 2022, about **** percent of respondents were very unsatisfactory with the investment and business environment in the U.S., lower than the year before. In that year, about ** percent of surveyed Chinese enterprises said they were satisfied or very satisfied about the business environment in the U.S..

Survey of 149 Chinese manufacturing firms in four African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania) conducted in 2016 and 2017. Firms were surveyed on their investment value, employment, and on the reasons why they invested, and their linkages with local, non-Chinese firms. The survey questionnaire contains approximately 50 questions allowing analysis of the firms’ provincial origins, the role played by incentives from sending and receiving countries, backward and forward linkages, employee training, and so on.

For the past decade, Sub-Saharan Africa has been growing, yet growth is not the same as structural transformation. China's development trajectory since 1980 provides an example of how a government focused on modernization can marshal foreign capital and technology to assist in the reduction of poverty and economic transformation in manufacturing and agriculture. In Africa, China is largely seen as a competitor for local firms, primarily through imports. This competition can be devastating in some countries and some sectors, driving local firms out of business. Yet on the other hand, growing Chinese investment in African manufacturing and contract farming can also offer opportunities for joint ventures with local firms, training, and diffusion of more productive technologies. If this were to follow Asian experience, Chinese firms could be catalysts for local firms to move into manufactured exports, although they might also be footloose investors, moving on with only fleeting impact on local knowledge. In agriculture, Chinese investment might also be enclave, with little connection to local farmers - the picture presented in fears of "land grabbing" - or it might follow the pattern laid out by foreign investors in China, with out-growers, demonstration farms, and technology and skills transfers. Our earlier research suggested that Chinese firms are thinking strategically about backward linkages. For example, at least five Chinese shoe manufacturers we interviewed in 2009 had moved their shoe-making assembly lines to Nigeria, while still importing uppers and soles from China. In 2012, one company was in discussions with their Chinese supplier about moving to Nigeria to produce soles locally from Nigerian rubber. Similarly, we have identified Chinese contract farming investments and commercial agriculture projects with demonstration farms, advisers, and input supplies in places like Mali, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. This project will enable a more refined picture of the actual scope and impact of Chinese investment and the potential and experience of technology transfer in commercial agriculture and agro-industry. We will combine multiple methods: database construction, scoping studies, cluster surveys, a national survey, and eight paired, comparative case studies, following an approach tested in our earlier research on Chinese agro-industrial and commercial agriculture engagement in Ethiopia (2011-2014), and Chinese commercial agricultural investment in Zambia and Zimbabwe (2013). The scoping studies will allow us to better map existing Chinese (and other) investment in agro-industry and commercial agriculture, while the cluster surveys will provide an overview of existing linkages and opportunities for technology transfer. A further level of depth will be obtained through adding a technology-transfer module to two national surveys of manufacturers. Finally, eight in-depth, paired case studies will complement the survey research by using process-tracing to compare specific experiences of agro-industrial FDI and technology transfer in China, with Chinese and a similar non-Chinese experience in Africa. For example, we will study the institutional framework and approach that allowed the Thai firm CP Group to become China's largest foreign investor in the Chinese poultry industry, with significant technology spinoffs, and compare this with the spinoffs and technology transfer from significant Chinese and South African investors in Zambia's poultry industry (Zhongken Farm and Astral Foods). The output of the research will be a far more robust basis for analysis of the current and future possibilities for technology transfer in China's African investment, and guidelines for governments and development partners to derive maximum benefit from these opportunities.

China Outward Investment: United States: Mining data was reported at 358.410 USD mn in 2022. This records an increase from the previous number of 63.210 USD mn for 2021. China Outward Investment: United States: Mining data is updated yearly, averaging 255.570 USD mn from Dec 2008 (Median) to 2022, with 15 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 1.595 USD bn in 2013 and a record low of -1.556 USD bn in 2015. China Outward Investment: United States: Mining data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Ministry of Commerce. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Investment – Table CN.OB: Outward Direct Investment: United States by Industry.

Actual value and historical data chart for China Foreign Direct Investment Net Outflows Bop Current Us$

Conditional logit estimation for CODI in the United States.

This statistic shows the value of Chinese direct investments in the United States from 2010 to 2020. In 2020, Chinese direct investments in the United States amounted to approximately *** billion U.S. dollars, slightly up from the previous year.