The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

China boasts the fastest growing GDP of all developed nations. Neighboring regions will have the largest middle class in history. China is building transport infrastructure to take advantage. Companies that capture market share in this region will be the largest and best performing over the next decade.

Macro Tailwinds

1) China GDP is the fastest growing of any major country with expected 5-6% over the next decade. If businesses (Alibaba, Tencent, etc..) maintain flat market share, that alone will drive 5-6% over the next decade. This is already higher than JP Morgans expectation (from their 13f filings) that the US market will perform between -5% and +5% over this coming decade.

2) The Southeast Asia Region contains about 5 billion people. China is constructing the One Best One Road which will be completed by 2030. This will grant their businesses access to the fastest and largest growing middle class in human history. Over the next 10+ years this region will be home to the largest middle class in history, potentially over 10x that of North America and Europe, based on stock price in Google Sheets.

Increasing average Chinese income.

Chinese average income has more than doubled over the last decade. Having sustained the least economic damage from the virus, this trend is expected to continue. At this pace the average Chinese citizen salary will be at 50% of the average US by 2030 (with stock price in Excel provided by Finsheet via Finnhub Stock Api), with the difference being there are 4x more Chinese. Thus a market potential of almost 2x the US over the next decade.

The Southeast Asia Region now contains the largest total number of billionaires, this number is expected to increase at an increasing rate as the region continues to develop. Over the next 10 years the largest trading route ever assembled will be completed, and China will be the primary provider of goods to 5b+ people

2013 North America was home to the largest number of billionaires. This reversed with Asia over the following 5 years. This separation is expected to continue at an increasing rate. Why does this matter? Over the next 10 years the largest trading route ever assembled will be completed, and China will be the primary provider of goods to 5b+ people

Companies that can easily access all customers in the world will perform best. This is good news for Apple, Microsoft, and Disney. Disney stock price in Excel right now is $70. But not for Amazon or Google which at first may sound contrary as the expectation is that Amazon "will take over the world". However one cannot do that without first conquering China. Firms like Alibaba and Tencent will have easy access to the global infrastructure being built by China in an attempt to speed up and ease trade in that region. The following guide shows how to get stock price in Excel.

We will explore companies using a:

1) Past

2) Present (including financial statements)

3) Future

4) Story/Tailwind

Method to find investing ideas in these regions. The tailwind is currently largest in the Asia region with 6%+ GDP growth according to the latest SEC form 4 from Edgar Company Search. This is relevant as investments in this region have a greater margin of safety; investing in a company that maintains flat market share should increase about 6% per year as the market growth size is so significant. The next article I will explore Alibaba (NYSE: BABA), and why I recently purchased a large position during the recent Ant Financial Crisis.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

In 2024, China’s monetary authority, the People’s Bank of China, issued more than ** trillion yuan which was the highest amount issued in one year so far. Over the past years, the value of printed money increased steadily. The issuing of currency was one function of a central bank. Maintaining price stability One of the main policy objectives of the People’s Bank of China was to maintain price stability. Typically, countries set the desired inflation target and the central bank implements the necessary policies to achieve the said target. Usually, China keeps its inflation target at around ***** percent, but in 2021, the inflation rate dropped to under *** percent. If the inflation rate is too low, central banks can issue more currency and decrease the interest rate. In the opposite scenario, if the inflation rate is too high central banks try to reduce the amount of money in circulation by increasing the interest rate or decreasing bond prices. Managing the economy In capitalist market economies, economies usually undergo a boom and bust cycle. Central banks attempt to counteract this cyclical development to soften the impact for its citizens. For instance, the Chinese government aims to maintain an unemployment rate of around **** percent. However, crises such as the 2008 financial crisis and the outbreak of COVID-19 have an unforeseen impact on the economy. To lower the employment rate, the People’s Bank engaged specific monetary policies to stimulate the economy with the aim of increasing job creation.

A deep financial and economic crisis ravaged many Asian nations during 1997 and 1998. In this article, the authors examine the impact of the crisis on corporate risk for a subset of large United States firms that are included in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 stock market index. They find that the Asian crisis changed many of these firms' exposure to stock market movements -- that is, their "betas," or sensitivity to stock market risk. In particular, the extent of a firm's sales exposure to Asia appears to be an important link through which the crisis affected beta. This effect is amplified by greater financial leverage.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

The China home mortgage finance market, while experiencing a period of adjustment following recent regulatory changes, presents a compelling long-term investment opportunity. The market's size in 2025 is estimated at $4 trillion USD, reflecting a significant contribution from a large and growing population, ongoing urbanization, and government initiatives aimed at affordable housing. The historical period (2019-2024) likely saw robust growth, though fluctuating due to factors such as macroeconomic conditions and policy shifts. While precise figures for this period are unavailable, industry analysis suggests a CAGR in the high single digits to low double digits, considering the sustained growth in the overall real estate sector before the recent regulatory tightening. The forecast period (2025-2033) anticipates a more moderate, yet still positive, CAGR, influenced by government efforts to curb excessive speculation and promote sustainable growth in the housing market. This moderation reflects a shift towards a more balanced and controlled expansion of the mortgage finance sector. Despite recent regulatory interventions aimed at managing risk within the financial system, the underlying demand for housing in China remains substantial. Continued urbanization, a growing middle class seeking improved living standards, and government policies supporting affordable housing will contribute to the market's long-term resilience. The focus is now shifting towards a more sustainable model of growth, prioritizing responsible lending practices and minimizing systemic risks. This necessitates adaptation within the mortgage finance sector, leading to innovative lending models, enhanced risk management strategies, and increased technological adoption. The market’s future will depend on successfully navigating these challenges while continuing to meet the housing needs of a large and dynamic population. Recent developments include: October 2022: HSBC expands China's private banking network and launches in two new cities., September 2022: China Construction Bank Corp., one of the country's four largest state-owned lenders, will set up a 30-billion-yuan (USD 4.2 billion) fund to buy properties from developers. The move comes even as policymakers take steps to contain a real estate crisis weighing on the economy.. Notable trends are: Favorable Mortgage Rates is Expected to Drive the Market.

Annual data on the size of China Shadow Bank credit was taken from two sources. Moodys (China) produces data 2000-2012 and Goldman Sachs 2013-2018. The average growth rate 2000-2015 was applied to generate data prior to 2000. Annual data was interpolated to produce quarterly estimates using the cubic match last function in EViews so that the integrity of the annual stock data is maintained for the 4th quarter.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilize imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector.These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

Figure 3 depicts China-Africa trade from 2000 to 2013. It shows that China-Africa trade consistently grew since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000. As can be seen in the figure, the US trade with Africa declined after the 2008 global financial crisis, allowing China to take the lead as Africa's largest trading partner. Figure 7 shows trade between China and Africa from 2003 to 2021. Although with fluctuations, trade between the two sides has been increasing since the establishment of the FOCAC mechanism. It reached a first high of US$203 billion in 2015 and then declined significantly the following year. However, the trade increased again from 2017 and surged to US$254 billion in 2021, up by 35% from the previous year. The high trade volume in 2021 has been attributed to the additional Chinese exports of Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), such as masks and hazmat suits, as well as pharmaceutical products and testing equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic to Africa. However, Gu et al (2022: 11) indicated that the strong increase in China-Africa trade volume in 2021 is remarkable as data from China's customs agency shows that it is "made up of an increase in both Chinese exports to Africa (29.9% year-on-year) and African exports to China (43.7% year-on-year)". Figure 4 shows the number of countries around the world that have joined China's Belt and Road Initiatiative (BRI). As can be seen in the figure, China's BRI has attracted more than 140 countries. In Africa, the first countries that signed up for the BRI project were East and North African countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Egypt. In Figure 5, the map shows the number of African countries that have signed up for the BRI since 2015. As can be seen in the figure, 52 countries in Africa had signed some BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China by 2022.

Table 1 shows that studies that analysed the China-Africa relationship focusing on their 'strategic partnership' are very few, given the voluminous literature on China and Africa. A search of Sino-Africa studies conducted in English with the term 'strategic partnership' in their titles produced only ten papers (see table). Furthermore, as the table shows, studies investigating the increased security cooperation in China-Africa relations conducted in English are rare, although this part of the debate has also produced numerous research publications. The column titled 'Focus of study' in Table 1 above shows that majority of these studies concentrated on analysing economic cooperation, while a few also included political relations between China and Africa. Also, the column titled 'Definition of strategic partnership' shows that, all these studies, except Akpan and Onya (2018), made no attempts to define the concept of strategic partnership. Figure 8 shows the countries around the world in which the United Nations (UN) has deployed its peacekeepers. As shown in the figure, the UN has deployed several peacekeeping missions around the world since the late 1940s, with most of these operations taking place in the African continent. Figure 9 focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Africa. As can be seen in the figure, Chinese peacekeeping troops were deployed in five out of the seven UN-led missions on the African continent as of 2019. Figure 12 shows the foreign military bases that currently exist in African countries. As the figure shows, the African Continent is a host to 47 known foreign military bases, of which 34 are United States (US) bases. Figure 13 shows the foreign military bases in Djibouti. As seen in the figure, Djibouti hosts the US' Camp Lemonnier military base, just 13.4 kilometres away from the Chinese PLA's new navy facility, along with military bases of other major powers such as France, Germany and Japan in close proximity. Djibouti thus found itself in the middle of diplomatic tensions between China and the US over fears of a Chinese takeover of the Doraleh Container Terminal, Djibouti's main container port, in 2018, as China financed the development of the port. Figure 6 shows China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) commitments from 2006 to 2021. As can be seen in the figure, China's financial pledges to assist Africa increased from US$5 billion to US$60 in 2015. However, they dropped to US$40 billion in 2021. Further, drops in the number of activities, such as official development assistance (ODAs) and capacity building, including reductions in security collaborations, were also noted. However, a new development was China's reallocation of US$10 billion of its Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) towards Africa from the US$40 billion that it received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The linkages between the US and China, the world’s two major agricultural powers, have brought great uncertainty to the global food markets. Inspired by these, this paper examines the extreme risk spillovers between US and Chinese agricultural futures markets during significant crises. We use a copula-conditional value at risk (CoVaR) model with Markov-switching regimes to capture the tail dependence in their pair markets. The study covers the period from January 2006 to December 2022 and identifies two distinct dependence regimes (stable and crisis periods). Moreover, we find significant and asymmetric upside/downside extreme risk spillovers between the US and Chinese markets, which are highly volatile in crises. Additionally, the impact of international capital flows (the financial channel) on risk spillovers is particularly pronounced during the global financial crisis. During the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, the impact of supply chain disruptions (the non-financial channel) is highlighted. Our findings provide a theoretical reference for monitoring the co-movements in agricultural futures markets and practical insights for managing investment portfolios and enhancing food market stability during crises.

A survey of bank managers working in the operation and credit risk department at different hierarchical levels of individual commercial banks in China responsible for bank credit analyses and risk evaluations covering the procedure from loan application to final decision. The objective is to understand the internal organization arrangement of Chinese commercial banks in the provision of bank credit to SMEs. The focus is on the incentives and constraints faced by branch managers in the interaction with SMEs. The enquiry reflects the notion that the branch manager who directly interacts with the SME borrower plays a critical role in the information collection and processing in the lending decision. The incentives and constraints faced by branch manager are shaped by the type of organization of the bank: the degree of decision-making centralization, modes of communication between hierarchical levels, and the adoption of statistical techniques for risk evaluation.

The Chinese financial system has served the Chinese economy well in the early stages of development in channeling domestic savings to domestic investment. But, continued financial repression, along with a growing middle class and ageing population has created pressure on savings to 'search for yield'. At the same time, the dominance of lending to state-owned-enterprises, political constraints, inefficiencies and weak risk management practice by financial institutions (FI) have pushed SMEs to alternative sources of funding. The demand for yield from savers and funds from private investment has been met by the rapid growth in shadow banking.

This study encompasses two of the identified themes of the research call. The research theme 'alternative strategies for reform and liberalization' covers the role of the Shadow Bank system in the credit intermediation process. This research is of critical importance because it informs the macroeconomic research necessary for investigating 'the role of the Chinese financial system in sustaining economic growth'. Addressing the first research theme we take a dual track approach to better understand the role of the financial system in sustaining in economic growth. The first track examines the role of bank and non-bank finance in promoting long-term economic growth at the regional level. The second track is aimed at the more short-term issue of identifying the potential frequency of macro-economic crises generated by a banking crisis.

The finance-growth nexus is a well-established area of economic development, however the China experience questions the supposition that financial development is a necessary precondition. The empirical findings are mixed. Part of the reason for this could be the failure to distinguish between the quality of financial institutions across regions, and the openness of the local environment in terms of the balance between private and public enterprises. Our research would build on the existing literature in two ways. First, it would utilise imperfect but available data on informal finance to examine direct and spill-over effects on medium term growth from contiguous provinces. Second, primary data on the geographic dimension in shadow bank lending gleaned from Theme 2 research will be used to design a weighting system to adjust financial flows for the quality of the local financial environment. The second prong will develop a small macroeconomic model of a hybrid DSGE type that incorporates a banking sector including shadow banks.

Such models have been developed for China in recent times but only a few have attempted to incorporate a banking sector. These models are mostly calibrated versions and make no attempt to test the structure against the data. Recent attempts to test a hybrid New Keynesian-RBC DSGE type model for the Chinese economy using the method of indirect inference have been successful and inclusion of a shadow banks have shown some success. The results of the Theme 2 study will inform the development of a fuller shadow banking sector in the macroeconomic model that will be used to estimate the frequency of economic crises generated by bank crises. Theme 2 research will examine the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking system as complements or substitutes. It will aim to determine the variable interest rate on the P2P online lending platform on the basis of risk-return, the home bias in online investments, and the signaling and screening in the P2P online lending platform. Finally, it will aim to identify the impact of shadow banking on entrepreneurial activity, the industrial growth rate and regional housing investment and price differentials. These results would inform the theme 1 research on the interconnectedness of shadow banking with the mainstream and the fragility of the financial system to shocks and financial crises.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

In 2024, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Shanghai municipality in China increased by around *** percent from the previous year. Shanghai is the most populous city in China and has the largest GDP of all Chinese cities. It is located in Eastern China on the southern estuary at the mouth of the Yangtze river. Development of GDP growth in Shanghai As a bridgehead to global markets and a forerunner in market opening, Shanghai experienced a decades long economic boom, which massively changed the shape of the city. Economic growth rates had double digits for more than two decades since 1992 and were well above the Chinese national average. This changed fundamentally with the global financial crisis. In 2008, the growth rate fell below ten percent and gradually declined thereafter. Growth rates now got closer to the national average of GDP growth. While the economic development in Shanghai has already reached a high level, other regions in China are catching up, and growth rates in many inland regions of China are now higher than in Shanghai. This is especially true on a city level, with many lower-tier cities experiencing higher growth rates than Shanghai. Sector distribution of GDP growth Upon closer examination of the distribution of GDP across economic sectors, it becomes obvious that the service sector of the economy exhibited the highest growth rates in most of the recent years. In 2024, services already accounted for more than ** percent of the value added to the GDP, which is far above the national average. In contrast, the industrial sector, which had once been of great importance to Shanghai's economy, is losing momentum and its share in total economic output is shrinking constantly. Financial intermediation and information industries were branches in the service sector that displayed the fastest growth rates in recent years.

Background: The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis had a profound impact on the economies and governance of many Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia. The researcher therefore sought to examine the interaction between de jure and de facto political forces that shaped Indonesia & Malaysia's crisis management strategies and institutional reforms. The study highlights the entrenched power of authoritarian leaders with the influence of business elites determining policy responses and the level of public trust. Methods: This research model uses a comparative qualitative study method, analyzing secondary sources such as literature, policies, and historical records. The researcher identifies patterns and differences in governance, economic policies, and institutional responses in both countries, providing an in-depth understanding of the political dynamics and power structures that influence crisis outcomes and impacts. Findings: The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis was caused by liquidity issues, capital inflows, and institutional weaknesses. Indonesia and Malaysia's economic growth was based on fragile foundations, with crony capitalism and power imbalances contributing to the crisis. Addressing power structures, promoting openness, and adopting democratic values are crucial for long-term resilience and fairness. Malaysia implemented capital controls and maintained political stability under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad, Indonesia's dependence on International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance and widespread public discontent led to Soeharto's resignation and a shift towards democratization. In other words, the findings underscore the important role of political power dynamics in shaping economic and institutional resilience and provide valuable insights into the governance challenges of non-democratic regimes during crises. Conclusion: The study concludes that the contrasting crisis management strategies of Indonesia and Malaysia during the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis were significantly influenced by the interplay of authoritarian political power and business elite interests. Novelty/Originality of this article: This research offers new insights by exploring how authoritarian power dynamics and the influence of business elites affect the policy strategies adopted, the level of political stability and public trust in both countries.

In 2024, China exported approximately 3.58 trillion U.S. dollars worth of goods. This indicated an increase in export value of about 5.9 percent compared to the previous year. Export of goods from ChinaChina’s exports have been growing steadily over the past decade, with the exception of 2009 when financial crisis and global economic downturn slowed down global trade and 2016 witnessing another decrease in global demand. Apart from being the most populous country, China has also become the largest manufacturing economy and the largest exporter in the world. ASEAN, European Union, and United States were China's leading export partners in 2023. Machinery such as computers, broadcasting technology, and telephones as well as transport equipment make up the largest part of Chinese exports. This category amounted to approximately 1.65 trillion U.S. dollars in export value in 2023. When it comes to primary goods, food and live animals used for food are the main export products.

The Securities Exchanges industry in China has displayed extreme volatility over the past five years. The uncertainty brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, the international political geopolitical crisis and the fluctuation of the international financial market has led to the volatility of industry revenue.In the past five years, the total trading volume of stocks, futures and bonds has increased, which enables industry operators to obtain more transaction costs, which is the largest source of income of the exchange. Overall, industry revenue is expected to rise at an annualized 14.5% over the five years through 2025. This includes an anticipated revenue increase of 10.7% in the current year.With additional regulations and legislation, and further product innovation, China’s securities markets are forecast to continue developing. The comprehensive implementation of the registration system reform has led to the influx of new listed companies into the securities market, resulting in an increase in market activity. Industry revenue is forecast to grow at an annualized 9.1% over the five years through 2030. Since the establishment of new institutions needs to be approved by the State Council, the number of enterprises and establishment in the industry is almost unchanged. The number of enterprises and establishment will remain constant in the next five years. Although no new securities exchanges are anticipated to enter the market over the period, existing exchanges are projected to introduce more products. For example, more financial derivatives, such as treasury futures, will likely be available to trade on financial futures exchanges.

China's main stock market index, the SHANGHAI, fell to 3505 points on July 15, 2025, losing 0.42% from the previous session. Over the past month, the index has climbed 3.43% and is up 17.76% compared to the same time last year, according to trading on a contract for difference (CFD) that tracks this benchmark index from China. China Shanghai Composite Stock Market Index - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on July of 2025.

In 2023, the construction industry accounted for about *** percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP), representing a continuation of the figure from the previous year.

A vital industry for the economy Since the 1998 housing reform, China's real estate industry has expanded dramatically and has become one of the country's pillar industries. Similarly, China's infrastructure construction has also boomed since the early 2000s. To mitigate the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and maintain the country's economic output, the Chinese government launched a four trillion yuan stimulus plan and invested substantial resources in infrastructure development across the country, such as high-speed railway and highway projects. These developments have all made the construction industry one of the most important segments of the Chinese economy.

An important employer nationwide The construction industry also plays a key role in China's labor market, with more than ********** people employed in the sector in 2023. It is also one of the top sectors for China's migrant workers, with more than ** percent working in construction in 2023. However, due to the challenging working environment, more and more young migrant workers are choosing to work in other professions, such as couriers and food delivery. With China's real estate sector facing significant headwinds, infrastructure construction stagnating, and local governments now under substantial fiscal pressure, the future of China's construction industry is becoming increasingly uncertain.

This study is part of a quadrennial series designed to investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public and a select group of opinion leaders on matters relating to foreign policy, and to define the parameters of public opinion within which decision-makers must operate. Through telephone surveys, general public respondents (Part 2) were interviewed October 15-November 10, 1998, and opinion leaders (Part 1) were interviewed November 2-December 21, 1998. Respondents were asked to assess their level of interest in the news and specifically in foreign policy. Respondents were also asked whether concern for foreign policy is important in a presidential candidate, and their views were sought on the foreign policy records of President Bill Clinton and former presidents George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, John F. Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, and Harry Truman. Those queried were asked for their opinions on economic aid to foreign nations, including Egypt, Poland, Russia, Israel, and African nations. In addition, respondents were asked to rate the Clinton administration on foreign policy, trade policy, immigration policy, United States relations with China, Japan, and Russia, international terrorism, the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Arab-Israeli peace process, the situation in Iraq, nuclear proliferation, the situation in Northern Ireland, and the Asian financial crisis. Views were also sought on whether United States' vital interests were present in Egypt, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Israel, Canada, Brazil, Russia, Haiti, Bosnia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, China, France, the Baltic nations, South Korea, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Cuba, India, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. A series of questions addressed potential threats to those vital interests. Additional topics covered the foreign policy goals of the United States, bloodshed in the 21st century, measures to combat international terrorism, the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States' contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United States involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings toward Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, China, France, Taiwan, South Korea, Cuba, Argentina, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Italy, Russia, North Korea, Germany, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Israel, Iraq, India, Canada, and Brazil. Respondents were also asked for their opinions of President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Pope John Paul II, former President George Bush, former President Jimmy Carter, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, South African President Nelson Mandela, European Union President Jacques Santer, Cuban President Fidel Castro, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat, French President Jacques Chirac, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic. Further queries focused on whether United States troops should be used if North Korea invaded South Korea, if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, if Arab forces invaded Israel, if Russia invaded Poland, if the Cuban people attempted to overthrow the Castro regime, if China invaded Taiwan, or if Serbian forces killed large numbers of ethnic Albanians. Respondents were asked whether they supported the use of economic sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China. Additional topics covered the elimination of tariffs, globalization, the establishment of a Palestinian state, the United States' role as a world leader, United States federal government program spending, and whether the United States should pay the $1.6 billion owed to the United Nations. Opinion leaders were asked an additional question about the possible threat of the "euro" (the unified monetary system to be implemented in January 1999 by the European Union) to the United States dollar's supremacy as a reserve currency. Background information on general public respondents includes age, race, sex, political party, political orientation, religion, marital status, spouse's employment status, age of children in household, amount of time spent at home, employment status, occupation, position in hou

The linkages between the US and China, the world’s two major agricultural powers, have brought great uncertainty to the global food markets. Inspired by these, this paper examines the extreme risk spillovers between US and Chinese agricultural futures markets during significant crises. We use a copula-conditional value at risk (CoVaR) model with Markov-switching regimes to capture the tail dependence in their pair markets. The study covers the period from January 2006 to December 2022 and identifies two distinct dependence regimes (stable and crisis periods). Moreover, we find significant and asymmetric upside/downside extreme risk spillovers between the US and Chinese markets, which are highly volatile in crises. Additionally, the impact of international capital flows (the financial channel) on risk spillovers is particularly pronounced during the global financial crisis. During the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, the impact of supply chain disruptions (the non-financial channel) is highlighted. Our findings provide a theoretical reference for monitoring the co-movements in agricultural futures markets and practical insights for managing investment portfolios and enhancing food market stability during crises.