The Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) dataset identifies whether a state-party and rival non-state armed group is in the formal negotiation phase of a peace process. The PNCC goes beyond recording instances of peace talks by offering a conceptual framework to identify when a government-rebel group dyad is at risk of formal negotiations. It explicitly considers issues central in event-history modelling, including censoring and the observation period. The PNCC also provides detailed information on negotiations, including the date and location of peace talks, and whether negotiations were bilateral or through mediation. The PNCC is the first source to distinguish mediated and non-mediated civil conflict negotiations under a single framework. Structured over the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset with global coverage for 1975-2013, the PNCC is integrable to commonly used civil war datasets.

This data collection describes international and civil wars for the years 1816-1992. Part 1, the International Wars file, describes the experience of each interstate member in each war. The unit of analysis is the participant in a particular conflict. When and where each interstate member fought is coded, along with battle and total deaths, pre-war population and armed forces, and whether the member in question initiated the conflict. Each war is characterized as interstate, colonial, or imperial, and major power status and/or central system membership of the warring parties is noted. Part 2, the Civil Wars file, describes when and where fighting took place, whether the war was fought within the boundaries of a major power or central system member, whether there was outside intervention and, if so, whether the intervening state was a major power, on what side they intervened, who won the war, number of battle deaths, total population, and total number of pre-war armed forces.

These data contain daily and sub-daily coded data on historical civil wars. The data are interval. The date, day, action type, location, each sides' action, captures, injuries and deaths are shown, and there is a description of each event with the identification of the original source, which in these data is typically a history book.

This graph shows the total number of soldiers who were enlisted in the Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War, between 1861 and 1865. The total population of the Union states was 18.9 million in 1860, and the Confederate states in the south had a population of 8.6 million. The Border States, who primarily supported the Union but sent troops to both sides, had a population of 3.5 million. From the graph we can see that over the course of the war a total of 2.1 million men enlisted for the Union Army, and 1.1 million enlisted for the Confederate Army. The Union Army had roughly double the number of soldiers of the Confederacy, and although the Confederacy won more major battles than the Union in the early stages of the war, the strength of numbers in the Union forces was a decisive factor in their overall victory as the war progressed.

The graph shows the number of articles published in the discipline of ^.

This data collection was designed to compare the heights of southern whites with those of slaves and northern white males between 1863 and 1866. Information provided includes month, day, and year of amnesty, county and state, age, color of skin, eyes, and hair, occupation, last name, first name, oath administrators, feet component in height, inch component in height, and height in inches.

In recent years scholars have begun to focus on the consequences of individuals' exposure to civil war, including its severe health and psychological consequences. Our innovation is to move beyond the survey methodology that is widespread in this literature to analyze the actual behavior of individuals with varying degrees of exposure to civil war in a common institutional setting. We exploit the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players with different exposures to civil conflict in the European professional leagues, and find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g. rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g. age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate the effect of civil war exposure rather than simple rule breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between our measure of exposure to civil war and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct. The result is also robust to controlling for civil wars before a player's birth, suggesting that it is not driven by factors from the distant historical past.

The dataset is a compilation of three different datasets: 1) Incidence of Civil War 1960-2006 (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset) 2) GDP 1960-2006 (World Bank's World Development Indicators Dataset) 3) Population 1960-2006 (World Bank's World Development Indicators Dataset)

A monthly dataset covering civil wars on the African continent from 1997-2012. Variables of interest include civilian targeting and battlefield outcomes (both from ACLED) during civil was as defined by the UCDP/PRIO dyadic armed conflict data. Used to test whether one-sided violence tends to follow battlefield victories or defeats.

This graph shows the total length of railroad tracks in each of the home fronts in 1861, at the outbreak of the American Civil War. From the data we can see that the Union States had over double the amount of railroad than the Confederacy, and well over ten time that of the Border states. This is was a significant advantage for the Union forces as they had a much better infrastructure for transporting men and supplies throughout the war.

Of the ten deadliest battles of the American Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg in early July, 1863, was by far the most devastating battle of the war, claiming over 51 thousand casualties, of which 7 thousand were battle deaths. The Battles of Shiloh, Bull Run (Second), Antietam, Stones River and Chancellorsville all have very similar casualty counts, between 22.5 and 24 thousand casualties each, although it should be noted that the Battle of Antietam took place in a single day, and with 22,717 casualties it is the bloodiest day in U.S. history. The Battles of Chickamauga, the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, all had approximately 30 to 35 thousand casualties each, whereas the Siege of Vicksburg is the only entry on this list with less than 20 thousand casualties.

Previous work has suggested that civil wars can increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. This research note examines the severity of different suggested linkages between civil war and international conflict using data from 1946 to 2001. The results show that instances of direct intervention and interstate coercion are associated with more severe interstate disputes, comparable in magnitude to the severity of territorial disputes. By contrast, disputes that entail pursuit of rebels across international borders, efforts to deter externalization and spillover events tend to have lower severity. The results underscore the important potential role of internal war for interstate conflicts as well as what types of conflict linkages seem to go together with more severe disputes.

These data were collected to study the trends and changes in the frequency, magnitude, severity, and intensity of international wars, civil wars, and international disputes. The data collection consists of two separate datasets. For each dataset, the unit of analysis is the participant in a particular conflict. While the two datasets are related, they are mutually exclusive in that each describes a particular type of war (interstate or civil) or a dispute. Part 1, Experience of Each Interstate System Member in Each War, provides information on each member's experience in each war. To be considered a nation participant, certain minimal criteria of population and diplomatic recognition were used. Qualifying nation participants are classified as to whether they were members of the European central system at the time of the war and, therefore, active and influential in European diplomacy. The geographical location of the war is coded as well as the severity of the war, as determined by its duration and the number of deaths resulting from battle. The pre-war population of each nation participant is also coded. Part 2, Major Civil Wars Between 1816 and 1980, is a study of 106 major civil wars involving 139 participants between 1816 and 1980. An internal war is classified as a major civil war if (1) military action was involved, (2) the national government at the time was actively involved, (3) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (4) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war. The geographical area in which the war was fought is also coded as well as whether nations outside the civil war actively and overtly participated on one side or the other. The duration, beginning, and ending dates of the civil war, and the pre-war population and number in the armed forces of each participant, are also included. (Source: downloaded from ICPSR 7/13/10)

Please Note: This dataset is part of the historical CISER Data Archive Collection and is also available at ICPSR -- https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09905.v1. We highly recommend using the ICPSR version as they made this dataset available in multiple data formats and for additional years of data,

Replication data for Reyko Huang, "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War," International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89–126.

Dataset on inequality and civil war

Dataset outlining the changes in factional strength (combatants under arms), based on the 21st Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOMIL, S/1997/90.

In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do governments contain their militia allies while also fighting a rebellion? I argue that variation in militia containment during a civil war is the outcome of a bargaining process over future bargaining power between security or profit-seeking militias and states with time-inconsistent preferences. Strong states and states facing weak rebellions cannot credibly commit to not suppressing their militias, and militias with sufficient capabilities to act independently cannot credibly commit to not betraying the state. States with limited political reach and those facing strong rebellions, however, must retain militia support, which opens a “window of opportunity” for militias to augment their independent capabilities and future bargaining power. Using new data on pro-government militia containment and case illustrations of the Janjaweed in Sudan and Civil Defense Patrols in Guatemala, I find evidence consistent with these claims. Future work must continue to incorporate the agency of militias when studying armed politics, since these bargaining interactions constitute a fundamental yet undertheorized characteristic of war-torn states.

This collection contains interviews concerning the period of the civil war and is not included in other themes. Includes interviews on Democratic Army recruitment and the Armed Forces, as well as the meeting of two rival camps in Niyala.

This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.

Project Summary:The Interstate War Initiation and Termination (I-WIT) data set was created to enable study of macro-historical change in war initiation and termination. I-WIT is based on the Correlates of War (COW) version 4 list of interstate wars, and contains most of the interstate wars in the COW list; those excluded were wars the researchers believe do not meet the COW criteria for interstate wars. For each war, research assistants (RAs) coded a host of variables relating to war initiation and termination, including whether each side issued a declaration of war, the political and military outcomes of the war (which are coded separately), and the nature of any agreement that concluded the war. One argument made in several publications based on these data (also part of a larger book project) is that the proliferation of codified international humanitarian law has created disincentives for states to admit that they are in a state of war. Declaring war or concluding a peace treaty would constitute an admission of being in a state of war. As international humanitarian law has proliferated and changed in character over the past 100 years or so, it has set the costs of compliance – and also the costs of finding a state to be out of compliance – very high. Thus, states avoid declaring war and concluding peace treaties to try to perpetrate a type of legal fiction – that they are not at war – to limit their liability for any violations of the laws of war. Data Abstract: The data cover the period from 1816 to 2007 and span the entire world. Dozens of graduate and undergraduate RAs working between 2004 and 2010 compiled existing data from secondary sources and, when available online, primary sources to code variables listed and described in the coding instrument. RAs were given a coding instrument with a description and rules for coding each variable. Typically, they consulted both secondary and primary sources, although off-site archival sources were not consulted. They filled in a spreadsheet for each war with variable values, and produced a narrative report (henceforward, “narrative”) of 5-10 pages that gave background information on the war and also justified their coding. Each war was assigned to at least two RAs to check for inter-coder reliability. If there was disagreement between the first two RAs, a third RA was brought in to code discrepant variables for that war. Where possible, a 2/3 rule was followed in resolving discrepancies. Remaining discrepancies are addressed in the “discrepancy narrative,” which lists the discrepancies and documents final coding decisions. Files Description: Some sources were scanned (e.g., declarations of war or peace treaties) but for the most part, RAs took notes on their assigned cases and produced their coding and narratives based on these notes. The coding instrument and the discrepancy narrative are included in the data documentation files, and all data files produced – including original codings that were discrepant with later codings – are included in the interest of allowing other researchers to make their own judgments as to the final coding decisions. A companion data set – C-WIT (Civil War Initiation and Termination) – is still under construction and thus not shared at this time.