Facebook
TwitterReal household disposable income per person in the United Kingdom is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024/25, with disposable income growth slowing from that point onwards. In 2022/23, disposable income fell by two percent, after falling by 0.1 percent in 2021/22, and 0.3 percent in 2020/21.
Facebook
TwitterIn October 2025, 63 percent of households in Great Britain reported that their cost of living had increased in the previous month, compared with 72 percent in April. Although the share of people reporting a cost of living increase has generally been falling since August 2022, when 91 percent of households reported an increase, the most recent figures indicate that the Cost of Living Crisis is still ongoing for many households in the UK. Crisis ligers even as inflation falls Although various factors have been driving the Cost of Living Crisis in Britain, high inflation has undoubtedly been one of the main factors. After several years of relatively low inflation, the CPI inflation rate shot up from 2021 onwards, hitting a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022. In the months since that peak, inflation has fallen to more usual levels, and was 2.5 percent in December 2024, slightly up from 1.7 percent in September. Since June 2023, wages have also started to grow at a faster rate than inflation, albeit after a long period where average wages were falling relative to overall price increases. Economy continues to be the main issue for voters Ahead of the last UK general election, the economy was consistently selected as the main issue for voters for several months. Although the Conservative Party was seen by voters as the best party for handling the economy before October 2022, this perception collapsed following the market's reaction to Liz Truss' mini-budget. Even after changing their leader from Truss to Rishi Sunak, the Conservatives continued to fall in the polls, and would go onto lose the election decisively. Since the election, the economy remains the most important issue in the UK, although it was only slightly ahead of immigration and health as of January 2025.
Facebook
TwitterOpen Government Licence 3.0http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/
License information was derived automatically
People in Great Britain's experiences of and actions following increases in their costs of living, and how these differed by a range of personal characteristics.
Facebook
TwitterThe UK inflation rate was 3.8 percent in September 2025, unchanged from the previous two months, and the fastest rate of inflation since January 2024. Between September 2022 and March 2023, the UK experienced seven months of double-digit inflation, which peaked at 11.1 percent in October 2022. Due to this long period of high inflation, UK consumer prices have increased by over 20 percent in the last three years. As of the most recent month, prices were rising fastest in the education sector, at 7.5 percent, with prices increasing at the slowest rate in the clothing and footwear sector. The Cost of Living Crisis High inflation is one of the main factors behind the ongoing Cost of Living Crisis in the UK, which, despite subsiding somewhat in 2024, is still impacting households going into 2025. In December 2024, for example, 56 percent of UK households reported their cost of living was increasing compared with the previous month, up from 45 percent in July, but far lower than at the height of the crisis in 2022. After global energy prices spiraled that year, the UK's energy price cap increased substantially. The cap, which limits what suppliers can charge consumers, reached 3,549 British pounds per year in October 2022, compared with 1,277 pounds a year earlier. Along with soaring food costs, high-energy bills have hit UK households hard, especially lower income ones that spend more of their earnings on housing costs. As a result of these factors, UK households experienced their biggest fall in living standards in decades in 2022/23. Global inflation crisis causes rapid surge in prices The UK's high inflation, and cost of living crisis in 2022 had its origins in the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the initial waves of the virus, global supply chains struggled to meet the renewed demand for goods and services. Food and energy prices, which were already high, increased further in 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought an end to the era of cheap gas flowing to European markets from Russia. The war also disrupted global food markets, as both Russia and Ukraine are major exporters of cereal crops. As a result of these factors, inflation surged across Europe and in other parts of the world, but typically declined in 2023, and approached more usual levels by 2024.
Facebook
TwitterIn May 2022, 49 percent of people in the United Kingdom advised that they were highly dissatisfied with the government's response to the cost of living crisis. High inflation has caused an economic crisis in the UK, with 87 percent of people reporting an increase in their cost of living as of March 2022.
Facebook
TwitterThe inflation rate in United Kingdom reached a 41-year record high in October 2022. High energy bills, soaring food costs, and various other issues have caused the UK inflation rates to remain in double-digits ever since September last year. This has forced people to look for new ways to deal with the ongoing cost of living crisis, and social media seems to be one of them. Which social media platforms have the most relevant content for consumers to deal with the ongoing situation? According to a survey by We Are Social and Statista Q, around 57 percent of UK TikTok users find helpful content there. Claiming the joint second spot on this list are YouTube and Facebook. Instagram comes on number five on this list, as 41 percent of Instagram users find helpful content there to deal with this crisis.
Facebook
TwitterIn response to the cost of living crisis, the government of the United Kingdom announced a series of measures to help households in the country. The most widespread of these packages was a 400 British pound energy bill grant announced in 2022, which was allocated to all households in the country. The measure with the highest overall value was the cost of living payment, which will saw approximately eight million UK households on low income receive 650 pounds in two separate payments in 2022, and a further 900 pounds paid in three installments throughout the 2023/24 financial year.
Facebook
TwitterDescription and Purpose This data companion pack is a resource intended to frame and be read alongside the linked rapid review of evidence for interventions to address the cost of living crisis (available on the Institute of Health Equity website) . The resource provides intelligence and context on the cost of living crisis in London only, while the accompanying rapid review of evidence for interventions to mitigate the impacts of the rising cost of living on London, contains the recommendations for action. This pack is intended to provide a high-level overview of the impacts of the costs of living crisis on London and the need Londoners have for support to deal with the cost of living crisis through intelligence available in the public domain. This pack identifies how certain groups in the population already experiencing health inequalities are at greatest risk of poverty and worsening health due to the cost of living crisis. Given there are significant gaps in intelligence available, this pack also highlights these gaps and limitations in our understanding. Audience It will be useful for health leaders, analysts, officers, and policy makers from local and regional government, integrated care systems, NHS, academia, VCS organisations and partners across London to support their work to address the costs of living crisis by Advocating for the need for action to address the rising cost of living given impacts on health and health inequalities Framing the context for the interventions highlighted in the linked rapid review of interventions Engaging communities Development of this resource The Institute of Health Equity (IHE), Greater London Authority (GLA) Health, GLA City Intelligence Unit, Office for Health Improvement and Disparities London (OHID), Association of Directors of Public Health London (ADPH), and NHSE have collaboratively produced this report, as part of the Building the Evidence (BTE) programme of work The sources of data available and topics included have been identified from existing published data, working in partnership through iterative discussion The resource is provided in PDF and PowerPoint format to support colleagues in their work to There is no current plan for periodic updates of this resource, though this will be discussed on completion of this programme of work
Facebook
TwitterIn July 2025, 95 percent of households in Great Britain that reported a cost of living increase in the previous month advised that that their food bills had increased, with 57 percent reporting increased gas or electricity bills.
Facebook
TwitterIn 2023/24 households in the United Kingdom spent approximately 113.3 British pounds a week on housing, fuel & power, making it the category which the average household spent the most on in that year, with transport being the second-highest spending category at 88.2 pounds a week.
Facebook
TwitterRequests to Citizen's Advice Calderdale including types of requests and local and national trends. For more information, advice and support, see Citizens Advice Calderdale Also see reports on national data trends about the cost of living crisis from Citizens Advice.
Facebook
TwitterAccording to an April 2023 survey conducted by We Are Social and Statista Q, about 68 percent of UK consumers spend less on non-essentials in reaction to the cost of living crisis, whereas 63 percent pay more attention to bargains, good deals, or offers (when shopping). Similarly, more than half of respondents use less gas and electricity in their homes to deal with the situation.
Facebook
Twitterhttps://www.ibisworld.com/about/termsofuse/https://www.ibisworld.com/about/termsofuse/
Unlike many other health services, the majority of the UK population has to pay for dental treatment. Dental insurance policies cover treatment provided by both NHS and private dentists. The propensity to purchase dental insurance is greater when people wish to receive treatment from private dentists, as the costs associated with private treatment are much higher. Dental Insurance revenue is anticipated to grow at a compound annual rate of 1.4% over the five years through 2024-25 to £1.1 billion, including estimated growth of 5% in the current year. Regulatory reforms have ramped up the use of reinsurance as a capital risk reduction tool in the industry. The average profit margin has narrowed as a result of intensifying competition and cost pressures associated with the FCA's fair pricing reforms introduced in January 2022. The cost-of-living crisis and spiralling inflation in the two years through 2023-24 hurt demand for dental insurance, as people reined in spending to afford essential goods. However, hefty waiting times for the NHS following the COVID-19 outbreak resulted in many shifting to private dental care, lifting demand for dental coverage and contributing to revenue growth in recent years. In 2024-25, subsiding cost of living pressures and improving economic growth prospects will support demand from individual customers and make businesses more willing to splash out on employee benefits. Dental Insurance revenue is forecast to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.3% over the five years through 2029-30 to reach £1.4 billion. In the coming years, the higher interest rate environment will support investment income, with insurers that typically have high exposure to bonds receiving greater coupon payments, lifting reserves and allowing for more policies to be written. A growing UK workforce and the ageing population will boost demand as dental insurance consumers are more likely to be policyholders through workplace schemes. The average industry profit margin is set to remain constrained due to further competitive pressures and cost increases related to dental service price inflation and increased claims.
Facebook
TwitterIn July 2025, 60 percent of households in Great Britain said that they had started to spend less on non-essentials in response to their cost of living increasing.
Facebook
TwitterIn 2018-19 the GLA first undertook a Survey of Londoners. At the time it provided vital evidence on Londoners that had never been collected before in such detail. In 2021-22, the GLA conducted another Survey of Londoners, following the same methodology as the Survey of Londoners 2018-19, an online and paper self-completion survey of adults aged 16 and over in London. The survey, which received responses from 8,630 Londoners, aimed to assess the impact of COVID-19 and associated restrictions on key social outcomes for Londoners, not available from other data sources. It is important to understand the context in which the Survey of Londoners 2021-22 took place. Survey fieldwork began in November 2021; so, up to that point, it had been four months since most legal limits on social contact had been removed. However, after fieldwork had started, some restrictions due to the emergence of the Omicron variant were introduced. This may or may not have had some effect on the data. Given these changing circumstances, caution should be applied when interpreting the results. The Survey of Londoners 2021-22 also took place just before the full effects of the cost-of-living crisis began to set in. It is highly likely that the situations of Londoners have changed while analysis was taking place. On this page there is a headline findings report, published on 30 September 2022, which provides descriptive results for the key headline measures and supporting demographic data collected by the survey. Accompanying this report are more detailed tables documenting the key results of the survey by a range of demographic and other characteristics, a short summary document presenting key findings from the survey, and a technical report for those interested in the survey’s methodology. Further to these, a series of pen portraits, providing snapshots of particular groups of Londoners, as captured at the time of the Survey of Londoners 2021-22, were first added on 31 October 2022. Also on this page, there is an initial findings report, that was published on 2 September 2022. This was published to provide timely evidence from the survey to support the case for further targeted support to help low-income Londoners with the cost-of-living crisis. We have launched an online explorer where users can interrogate the data collected from the two surveys, conducted in 2018-19 and 2021-22. This is the first iteration, so we welcome any feedback on it - GO TO THE EXPLORER The record-level Survey of Londoners dataset can be accessed via the UK Data Service, University of Essex. The dataset is available for not-for-profit educational and research purposes only. Finally, as the North East London (NEL) NHS funded a 'boost' in their sub-region to enable a more detailed analysis to be conducted within, they produced an analytical report in September 2022. This is also available for download from this page.
Facebook
TwitterThis dataset will be published as Open DataThis dataset was created by joining Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation Datazone geographies and The Priority Places for Food Index which was developed by the CDRC at the University of Leeds in collaboration with Which?.A composite index formed of data compiled across seven different dimensions relating to food insecurity risk for the four nations in the UK. This version (Version 2.1, July 2024) reflects changes to the data and policy landscape which are detailed in the user guide below.The Priority Places for Food Index (https://priorityplaces.cdrc.ac.uk/) is constructed using open data to capture complex and multidimensional aspects of food insecurity risk. The index was initially developed in response to the 2022 cost of living crisis which has put many of our communities under severe financial pressure and at an increased risk of food insecurity. Building on the CDRC e-food desert index (EFDI), but with additional domains relating to fuel poverty and family food support, the goal of the Priority Places for Food Index is to identify neighbourhoods that are most vulnerable to increases in the cost of living and which have a lack of accessibility to cheap, healthy, and sustainable sources of food.From version 1 to version 2, data have been updated across several of the seven PPFI domains. This includes new area socio-demographics, foodbank, and food retailer location data. Data relating to Free School Meal eligibility has also been updated to reflect the changing policy landscape and to address regional inconsistencies in policies. Areas may look different to version one as a result of the new data incorporated or changes to neighbourhood boundaries. Because of these data changes we recommend that you don’t make comparisons between the versions.The index can be used to inform supermarket location analytics, improve the availability of budget food lines, and to ensure scare resources are targeted effectively.Note: Subject to the Department of Health and Social Care making a statement highlighting inaccuracies in the Healthy Start Uptake data between July 2023-February 2024, we have updated Version 2 of the Priority Places for Food Index (PPFI). Version 2.1 of the PPFI replaces the October 2023 uptake of Healthy Start Vouchers values with the average voucher uptake between January and June 2023 to minimise the impact on the Priority Places for Food Index insights.
Facebook
Twitterhttps://www.ibisworld.com/about/termsofuse/https://www.ibisworld.com/about/termsofuse/
A weak spending environment amid economic headwinds casts a shadow over industry performance. Squeezed budgets amid the cost-of-living crisis were a double-edged sword for takeaways and fast-food restaurants over the two years through 2023-24: some consumers cut back on takeaways, while others traded down from full-service restaurants to takeaways and fast food. Inflationary pressures resulted in hikes in labour, energy and sourcing costs, straining profitability. Those with higher disposable incomes have been less impacted, demanding higher quality and healthier options, typically with a higher price tag. Persisting inflation and economic uncertainty weaken consumer confidence and spending in the two years through 2025-26. Revenue is projected to inch upward at a compound annual rate of 0.6% over the five years through 2025-26, including a 0.2% hike in 2025-26. The subdued rate of growth reflects ongoing challenges. The surge of online food ordering has fuelled revenue growth. While online sales peaked during the pandemic, consumers drawn to convenience have become accustomed to ordering takeaways and fast food online. The development of state-of-the-art online platforms and third-party online ordering platforms like Deliveroo and Uber Eats are becoming the bread and butter for takeaway and fast-food outlets, encouraging new players into the industry. Britons' growing health and sustainability consciousness presents an opportunity for takeaway and fast-food businesses to introduce more expensive organic and meat-free menu items to boost revenue and profit. Britons’ tastes for healthy and sustainable takeaway options will continue to climb. Stricter legislation regarding the adverse effects of consuming junk food will promote product development innovation and healthy fast-food alternatives, driving additional revenue streams. As workers return to the office more permanently, demand for takeaway lunch options will swell. Fast food chains will invest heavily in aggressive expansion plans to secure market share and reduce costs. Investment in marketing is likely to increase as operators turn to social media and online advertising to attract younger consumers and secure long-term revenue. Spending on innovation will persist as major players leverage AI and technological advancements to differentiate themselves from competitors and meet growing demand. Revenue is forecast to climb at a compound annual rate of 3.1% to £27.5 billion over the years through 2030-31.
Facebook
TwitterOur data takes the form of in-depth interview transcripts discussing the relationship between local independent businesses and Cambridge as a place. The first round of data collection took place in 2017 to discover, explore and evaluate the relationship between small and medium-sized businesses and community development within Cambridge. At the time of rapid change and a turbulent economic environment it was important to understand how local independent businesses interact with, and rely on, the locale and community in which they are based.
Leading on from the first phase, this project and a second round of data collection was employed to return to Cambridge in 2022 to further investigate how the implementation of Brexit and the arrival of the pandemic has impacted upon local independent businesses and the original issues uncovered. The aim is to drive debate and discussion towards a more diverse local business environment. This is of key significance given micro, small, and medium sized firms (SMEs) are most at risk of failure post-pandemic and in the escalating energy crisis. Such SMEs are not just important local employers but are also the main way to increase regional resilience and make Cambridge feel like a ‘home town’ with distinctive independent retailers as opposed to how the New Economics Foundation refers to the city as a ‘clone town’ full of national chain stores and devoid of local character. Topics covered included local networking, local enterprise support, belonging, power, community development and inequality.
Our recent research found that such businesses agreed that without the University of Cambridge, its unique communication channel and supply of labour, the city would be much less successful as it finds itself today. However, many businesses also felt the increased growth has led to increased pressures within the city due to constrained land supply and a tightly-drawn green belt. This, coupled with the current cost of living crisis, has seen business costs rise excessively increasing demands on already stretched independent businesses.
A recurring theme throughout our study, therefore, was ‘them versus us’ regarding the power dynamic between local independent businesses (who form an integral part of the local economy) and the key stakeholders and policy makers within Cambridge. While some firms may find they succeed, it appears to be the smaller independent businesses who struggle the most within the city as they may not have sufficient footfall, nor the capital reserves required to loudly market themselves and/or overcome the high costs associated with being located within Cambridge. As such, many of these independent businesses felt unappreciated, overlooked, and under-supported.
Is entrepreneurship a matter of place? This was the question that my PhD research undertaken across four case studies in East Anglia, UK (Cambridge, Great Yarmouth, Ipswich, Norwich) answered, showing how, when and where everyday entrepreneurship occurs and the different mechanisms of entrepreneurial attachment to place in terms of individual entrepreneurs' temporal orientations: place as it was, place as it is, and place as it could be. It is the notion of 'evolving places' that goes hand-in-hand with the societal struggles for power and the distribution of resources and opportunities in shaping the policy need to think about maintenance of entrepreneurial attachment if we want places to be cared for by their people and to influence change, bridging the gaps between 'unequal' stakeholders. This has become increasingly pertinent within a post-Brexit, Covid-19, reduced migratory context - the emphasis is now firmly placed on local contexts and how they perform, driving the proposed PDF.
Drawing on my PhD's work and returning to one of my case studies with the PDF objectives in mind, I plan to publish about entrepreneurial (im)mobility in both prosperous and depleted places, whilst arguing towards a 'place-based' understanding of policy and more contextually relevant use of public spending. This counters mounting criticism of scholarly work paying insufficient attention to spatial and contextual factors when examining entrepreneurial phenomena (Welter et al 2019) and is particularly fitting in Covid-19 times with the pandemic unfolding unevenly across different socioeconomic groups, geographical areas and localities in the UK (Dorling 2020). Indeed, with reports in a surge of would-be homebuyers moving out of cities to smaller places as people conclude that home working is here to stay (Jones 2020), spatially discriminatory inequalities come to the forefront especially when the pandemic itself can be considered racist (Channel 4 Documentary 2020). Empirically examining evolving places for everyday entrepreneurship in this manner is crucial from a policy perspective to mitigate the uneven spatial impact of the crisis on the economy and create (or sustain) local jobs. Given that the UK is already one of the most inter-regionally unequal countries in the developed world (McCann 2020) and the 'levelling-up' mantra is now even harder to achieve due to Covid-19 (Brown and Cowling 2021), there is increased need for targeted, contextualised regional policy (less spatially blind) to alleviate the territorial dimensions of inequality and social exclusion and overcome the pandemic's scarring socioeconomic effects.
Complementing the academic impact of publishing, presenting and disseminating the above research with non-academic audiences is a key feature of the PDF. High impact value initiatives such as a stakeholder workshop generating debate about the spatial dimension of social exclusion, patterns of spatial segregation, and how urban disadvantage can impact localised (self)employability extends the reach of the proposed body of work, ensuring an accessible way for important local stakeholder groups to connect anew and benefit from the PDF's impact as the starting point for a wider, less power-driven, conversation. Redressing the, now increasingly severe, spatially expressed inequalities heeds recommendations to map social exclusion at a lower level to tailor the need for political counter action (Talbot et al 2015). Invited stakeholders will include business associations, tourism boards, chambers of commerce, HAs, guilds, business forums, business support organisations, Cambridge [University] Hub and local councils amongst others. In doing so, this can turn potentially negative personal relationships with place into a positive; countering the frequently made claim 'there's nothing here for us' instead giving hope through bridging societal struggles for power and embracing the positive available aspects of 'evolving places'.
Facebook
TwitterThe Poverty in Scotland study was commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) to fill knowledge gaps in our understanding of poverty, economic security and the cost of living crisis (2022) in Scotland. Phase 1 of the survey was undertaken online with participants by Savanta ComRes between 11 July - 2 August 2022 with adults aged 18+. Phase 2 was also conducted online, between 19-29 March 2023.
The study explores a range of financial factors and economic security indicators as well as people’s reactions to the cost of living crisis. It captures a range of personal and economic characteristics and includes derived variables related to the Scottish Government’s Priority Families. Data are weighted to be representative of Scotland by age, gender, region, ethnicity and social grade.
Further information can be found in the latest JRF Poverty in Scotland report.
Latest edition information
For the second edition (July 2023), data and documentation from the Phase 2 survey were added to the study.
Facebook
TwitterAccording to a survey conducted by Voxburner in 2022, approximately ** percent of students in the UK, that were planning on cutting costs due to the Cost of Living crisis, would cut back on eating out.
Facebook
TwitterReal household disposable income per person in the United Kingdom is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024/25, with disposable income growth slowing from that point onwards. In 2022/23, disposable income fell by two percent, after falling by 0.1 percent in 2021/22, and 0.3 percent in 2020/21.