Among countries with the highest number of overseas Chinese on each continent, the largest Chinese diaspora community is living in Indonesia, numbering more than ten million people. Most of these people are descendants from migrants born in China, who have moved to Indonesia a long time ago. On the contrary, a large part of overseas Chinese living in Canada and Australia have arrived in these countries only during the last two decades. China as an emigration country Many Chinese people have emigrated from their home country in search of better living conditions and educational chances. The increasing number of Chinese emigrants has benefited from loosened migration policies. On the one hand, the attitude of the Chinese government towards emigration has changed significantly. Overseas Chinese are considered to be strong supporters for the overall strength of Chinese culture and international influence. On the other hand, migration policies in the United States and Canada are changing with time, expanding migration opportunities for non-European immigrants. As a result, China has become one of the world’s largest emigration countries as well as the country with the highest outflows of high net worth individuals. However, the mass emigration is causing a severe loss of homegrown talents and assets. The problem of talent and wealth outflow has raised pressing questions to the Chinese government, and a solution to this issue is yet to be determined. Popular destinations among Chinese emigrants Over the last decades, English speaking developed countries have been popular destinations for Chinese emigrants. In 2022 alone, the number of people from China naturalized as U.S. citizens had amounted to over 27,000 people, while nearly 68,000 had obtained legal permanent resident status as “green card” recipients. Among other popular immigration destinations for Chinese riches are Canada, Australia, Europe, and Singapore.

China is a rising power on the world stage with growing economic and political influence. This influence is particularly felt in Australia and in New Zealand. United Front work is a key aspect of Chinese political influence abroad, particularly after Chinese president Xi Jinping’s rise to power. United Front work is difficult to track, and a survey over all countries is extremely challenging, but Chinese economic influence in each and every country can be measured easily using readily available trade and investment data. This paper finds a significant correlation between the economic influence of China and United Front work. It also highlights particular economic influence indicators that can predict particular United Front influence indicators. The paper thus provides a way to systematically predict United Front influence in many countries by analyzing commodity trade and Chinese investment data. More research can be done, however, in broadening the scope of this project and in improving data quality.

This statistic illustrates the ranking of China's culture among ** countries in the global soft power index list from 2015 to 2019. According to the Soft Power ** study results, China's greatest soft power assets are in culture. In 2019, China ranked number ***** in the cultural category among ** countries worldwide.

Opinion on questions concerning security policy. East-West comparison.

Topics: Satisfaction with the standard of living; attitude to France, Great Britain, Italy, USA, USSR, Red China and West Germany; preferred East-West-orientation of one´s own country and correspondence of national interests with the interests of selected countries; judgement on the American, Soviet and Red Chinese peace efforts; judgement on the foreign policy of the USA and the USSR; trust in the foreign policy capabilities of the USA; the most powerful country in the world, currently and in the future; comparison of the USA with the USSR concerning economic and military strength, nuclear weapons and the areas of culture, science, space research, education as well as the economic prospects for the average citizen; significance of a landing on the moon; Soviet citizen or American as first on the moon; assumed significance of space research for military development; attitude to a united Europe and Great Britain´s joining the Common Market; preferred relation of a united Europe to the United States; fair share of the pleasant things of life; lack of effort or fate as reasons for poverty; general contentment with life; perceived growth rate of the country´s population and preference for population growth; attitude to the growth of the population of the world; preferred measures against over-population; attitude to a birth control program in the developing countries and in one´s own country; present politician idols in Europe and in the rest of the world; attitude to disarmament; trust in the alliance partners; degree of familiarity with the NATO and assessment of its present strength; attitude to a European nuclear force; desired and estimated loyalty of the Americans to the NATO alliance partners; evaluation of the development of the UN; equal voice for all members of the UN; desired distribution of the UN financial burdens; attitude to an acceptance of Red China in the United Nations; knowledge about battles in Vietnam; attitude to the Vietnam war; attitude to the behavior of America, Red China and the Soviet Union in this conflict; attitude to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and preferred attitude of one´s own country in this conflict and in case of a conflict with Red China; opinion on the treatment of colored people in Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union; judgement on the American Federal Government and on the American population regarding the equality of Negros; degree of familiarity with the Chinese nuclear tests; effects of this test on the military strength of Red China; attitude to American private investments in the Federal Republic; the most influential groups and organizations in the country; party preference; religiousness.

Interviewer rating: social class of respondent.

Additionally encoded were: number of contact attempts; date of interview.

Although China’s economic statecraft in other regions is well-documented, little is known about how Beijing utilizes economic instruments, especially official financing (COF), in Southeast Asia. What accounts for the amount of official financing China commits to a Southeast Asian country in a given year? We argue that China’s economic statecraft in Southeast Asia is mainly driven by trade concerns. Statistical evidence from mixed-effects models using the most updated aid data between 2000 and 2021 suggests that COF in Southeast Asia is significantly influenced by the volume of imported Chinese goods into a country in the previous year. This country-year panel dataset spans from 2000 to 2021, encompassing eight formal ASEAN member states. These countries include Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The dataset contains approximately 200 observations. While this may seem like a modest sample size, it is adequate for our statistical analyses as it includes most stakeholders in the region. We use China's Official Financing (COF) as the Dependent Variable, aggregating annual Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), and Vague Official Financing (VOF) data for eight ASEAN countries from William and Mary College's AidData.

As of October 2025, China has the world’s largest online population, with approximately 1.3 billion internet users. India, currently the most populous nation, ranks second with about 1.03 billion users. The United States follows in third place. Worldwide internet usage As of October 2025, there are more than six billion internet users worldwide. However, user distribution varies significantly by region. In 2024, Eastern Asia alone accounted for 1.34 billion internet users, while Africa and the Middle East reported considerably lower figures. As expected, urban areas also exhibited higher rates of internet access compared to rural regions. Internet use in China It is no surprise that China ranks first among countries with the most internet users. Driven by rapid economic development and a strong cultural embrace of technology, 91.6 percent of China’s estimated 1.4 billion residents are online. As of the third quarter of 2024, about 91.8 percent of Chinese internet users were active on WeChat, the country’s most popular social platform. During the same period, Chinese internet users spent an average of five hours and 33 minutes online each day.

The One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) has been the subject of multitudinous studies from various angles. Most previous studies have focused on BRI’s economic, geopolitical, or commercial implications for China. However, the few studies that focused on BRI’s influence on the exportations or importations of Chinese products via the Chinese Cross-border Electronic Commerce Market (CCBECM) have been carried out based only on authors’ opinions rather than on empirical evidence. Therefore, the actual effect of BRI on the exportations of Chinese product brands via CCBECM in BRI countries still needs to be discovered. Utilizing B2C exportation data of Chinese smartphones and a Difference-in Difference Model (DIDM), we have first examined the actual and direct impact of BRI policy on Chinese smartphone brands exportations via the Chinese Cross-border Electronic Commerce Market (CCBECM) from 2012 to 2019 in BRI countries. Secondly, we assessed the moderating role of GDP per capita (GDP) and Internet Access Rate (IAR) between BRI policy and exportations of Chinese smartphone brands. The results showed that the impact of BRI remains insignificant on the exportations of Chinese smartphones via CCBECM in BRI countries. However, it could be significant if BRI includes more developed and economically strong countries. The study also highlighted a negative moderating role of GDP per capita between BRI policy and exportations, showing that the higher the BRI effect is, the less GDP per capita will influence Chinese smartphone exportations in BRI countries.

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic posed an unprecedented challenge to governments and societies worldwide, highlighting the complex relationship between state policies and public acceptance during crises. This study examines how regime types, political tendencies, and social culture influence citizen’s preferences for epidemic prevention policies in China and South Korea.Materials and methodsA cross-sectional online survey was operated in May 2020 to citizens aged ≥ 20 years in China and South Korea. Using the stratified quota sampling method, This study collected 2,254 valid responses from China and 1,783 from South Korea. Moderated mediation effect analysis were conducted to explore the factors shaping public attitudes toward epidemic control measures.ResultsThere are clear differences in policy preferences between the two countries. Chinese citizens were more likely to support strict, government-led measures, while South Korean respondents showed lower levels of support. Political tendency was the strongest predictor of policy preferences in both countries, with those favoring greater government authority more likely to support strict epidemic control measures. While government satisfaction significantly influenced policy acceptance in China, its impact was minimal in South Korea. Additionally, collectivism moderated the relationship between political tendency and policy preferences. In highly collectivist environments, social norms reinforced support for control measures, while in more individualist contexts, personal political beliefs had a stronger influence on policy acceptance.ConclusionThis study provides important evidence that citizen preferences for epidemic prevention are shaped by complex interaction between political institutions, cultural values, and individual beliefs. These findings can inform more effective communication strategies and policy design when governments prepare for future pandemic.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries like India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protest and other disruptive behavior has raised the salience of public opinion in FDI policy. As one of the first survey experiments of Chinese citizens’ attitudes toward FDI, this paper adopts a novel conjoint design to evaluate the impact of both individual characteristics and specific features of the proposed project on FDI preferences. Importantly, we find that low-skilled respondents are not necessarily more likely to support labor-intensive FDI, a result that challenges the conventional wisdom that individuals in developing countries abundantly endowed with labor should be more likely to support low-skilled FDI. Instead, citizens are more concerned about FDI projects’ country of origin and impact on the local job market when forming their preferences.

China's total Exports in 2024 were valued at US$3.58 Trillion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. China's main export partners were: the United States, Hong Kong and Vietnam. The top three export commodities were: Electrical, electronic equipment; Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers and Vehicles other than railway, tramway. Total Imports were valued at US$2.59 Trillion. In 2024, China had a trade surplus of US$991.41 Billion.

This study illuminates the multifaceted influence of Chinese in Africa, driven by the imperative to understand the strategic and economic ramifications of this rapidly evolving relationship. Motivated by the critical role Africa plays in global geopolitics and resource dynamics, alongside Chinese expanding international influences, the research aims to quantitatively and psychologically assess the decision-making processes underpinning this engagement. Adopting a regret theory-based Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) framework, the study evaluates Chinese impact across 49 African countries from 2018 to 2022, employing six economic indicators to capture the breadth of Chinese activities. Through meticulous normalization, regret utility computation, and total gap analysis, the methodology affords a systematic ranking that reflects the varying degrees of Chinese economic influence. The findings uncover pronounced variances in the level of Chinese engagement across the continent, with countries like Nigeria and Egypt showcasing substantial influence convergence with the theoretical model of ideal economic partnership, whereas others like Cape Verde indicate minimal influence. Contributing to academic and practical discourse, this study not only provides a methodological blueprint for analyzing geopolitical influences but also offers insights that policymakers can leverage to optimize their engagement strategies with Chinese. It foregrounds the interplay between empirical economic data and behavioral economics within international relations research. The study acknowledges limitations, primarily in data availability, which may not capture the full scope of informal economic interactions. It proposes further research to enrich the understanding of the Chinese-Africa nexus through longitudinal studies, integration of qualitative data, and expansion of the analytical model to encompass broader socio-economic impacts and more diverse indicators.

Due to its rapid economic growth and increasing demand for energy, China has engaged in numerous efforts to sustain its energy supplies and enhance its energy security. While existing literature argues that access to energy is oftentimes the driving force behind Beijing's foreign policy behavior, little work has been done to systemically examine the bilateral relationship between China and energy producing countries. This paper explores how China's foreign policy making is influenced by its energy security concern, focusing on three foreign policy instruments—partnerships, foreign aid, and leadership visits. Using a large-N, quantitative approach, this paper analyzes the effect of oil production on these three foreign policy indicators. The results show that Beijing is more likely to form partnerships with oil producing countries. Chinese top leaders are also more likely to travel to countries that produce a higher level of oil. China's aid allocation to Africa is driven by oil abundance as well, although the findings on aid are only valid in the cross-national analysis.

Background: China has been encouraged to learn from international innovations in the organization and management of health service delivery to achieve the national health reform objectives. However, the success and effectiveness of implementing innovations is affected by the interactions of innovations with the Chinese context. Our aim is to synthesize evidence on factors influencing the implementation of non-Chinese innovations in organization and management of health service delivery in mainland China.Methods: A systematic review was conducted according to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. We searched seven databases for peer-reviewed articles published between 2009 and 2020. Data were analyzed and combined to generate a list of factors influencing the implementation of foreign innovations in China. The factors were classified in the categories context, system, organization, innovation, users, resources, and implementation process.Results: The 110 studies meeting the inclusion criteria revealed 33 factors. Most supported by evidence is the factor integration in organizational policies, followed by the factors motivation & incentives and human resources. Some factors (e.g., governmental policies & regulations) were mentioned in multiple studies with little or no evidence.Conclusion: Evidence on factors influencing the implementation of foreign innovations in organization and management of health service delivery is scarce and of limited quality. Although many factors identified in this review have also been reported in reviews primarily considering Western literature, this review suggests that extrinsic motivation, financial incentives, governmental and organizational policies & regulations are more important while decentralization was found to be less important in China compare to Western countries. In addition, introducing innovations in rural China seems more challenging than in urban China, because of a lack of human resources and the more traditional rural culture.

NOTE: The included files cover the data and replication code for each of the three working papers that comprise this dissertation. By the time these files are available, it is likely that the author will have updated versions of each of these files. If you are interested in using these data, please contact the author directly or visit his website for the most updated versions. Concerns about domestic authority shape how governments conduct their foreign policies. However, this influence is often difficult to observe in highly opaque, non-democratic political systems. In the first part of the dissertation, I investigate the link between domestic authority and foreign policy in the context of diplomacy and trade in late imperial China, a period that spans the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. I argue that international diplomacy can serve leaders’ domestic political needs when it is highly visible to relevant audiences; conducted with counterparts held in relatively high esteem domestically; when certain diplomatic practices are historically associated with regime authority; or when diplomacy is wielded by leaders with relatively low levels of legitimacy. Using an original dataset of over 5,000 Ming and Qing tribute exchanges, I demonstrate that Chinese emperors newly in power conducted a disproportionately high volume of diplomatic activity. I find weaker evidence that this effect was more salient among low-legitimacy emperors. An accompanying case study illustrates how the Yongle Emperor deployed tribute diplomacy as a tool for domestic authority consolidation. Turning to the trade policies of the same period, I argue that beyond leaders, other autocratic elites who participate in foreign policy making are motivated by similar authority concerns. Extant research on non-democratic trade policy has largely neglected this group of actors. I develop a theory that predicts variation in elite policy preferences based on top-down and bottom-up authority relations with the leader and local trading communities, respectively. To assess these claims, I introduce a dataset on the maritime trade preferences of several hundred individual elite officials in late imperial China created through 10 months of archival work in Beijing and Taipei. The data suggest that coastal provincial officials became key pro-trade advocates during the Qing dynasty. The findings offer an example of how trade preferences can vary within a non-democratic regime, and how historical cases can be especially useful for empirically studying these preferences. In the third paper, the dissertation then flips the focus from the domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy to how other states’ internal politics shape their engagement with contemporary China. I argue that leaders of small developing countries can seek greater domestic authority by acquiring “prestige projects,” defined as highly visible, nationally salient international development projects. After identifying a set of Chinese government-financed prestige projects using a new dataset on Chinese development finance, I show that these projects are overwhelmingly concentrated in the world’s poorest and smallest countries, and that their implementation may be associated with higher public support for recipient governments. I also find that China’s government supplies more prestige projects to states that increase their support for Chinese diplomatic objectives.

This paper explores the factors influencing international students’ decisions to study in China, based on data from 2003 to 2018. Using a two-way fixed effect model and a comprehensive theoretical framework that integrates push-pull theory, human capital theory, and proximity theory, the study investigates the roles of economic, educational, national stability, and sociocultural determinants. The findings reveal that economic factors, particularly the trade relations between the home country and China, play a significant role in attracting international students. National stability, the number of Confucius Institutes, and language similarity also emerge as key influences. Moreover, educational factors such as Chinese university rankings and scholarships are crucial in drawing students. The study further shows that international students from B&R countries are more sensitive to economic and sociocultural factors than those from non-B&R countries. Postgraduate students are more focused on China’s economic development and educational strength, while undergraduates prioritize national stability and sociocultural aspects. These findings offer insights for policymakers and higher education institutions, providing strategic recommendations to effectively attract and support international students in a rapidly changing global landscape.

The region of present-day China has historically been the most populous region in the world; however, its population development has fluctuated throughout history. In 2022, China was overtaken as the most populous country in the world, and current projections suggest its population is heading for a rapid decline in the coming decades. Transitions of power lead to mortality The source suggests that conflict, and the diseases brought with it, were the major obstacles to population growth throughout most of the Common Era, particularly during transitions of power between various dynasties and rulers. It estimates that the total population fell by approximately 30 million people during the 14th century due to the impact of Mongol invasions, which inflicted heavy losses on the northern population through conflict, enslavement, food instability, and the introduction of bubonic plague. Between 1850 and 1870, the total population fell once more, by more than 50 million people, through further conflict, famine and disease; the most notable of these was the Taiping Rebellion, although the Miao an Panthay Rebellions, and the Dungan Revolt, also had large death tolls. The third plague pandemic also originated in Yunnan in 1855, which killed approximately two million people in China. 20th and 21st centuries There were additional conflicts at the turn of the 20th century, which had significant geopolitical consequences for China, but did not result in the same high levels of mortality seen previously. It was not until the overlapping Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) and Second World War (1937-1945) where the death tolls reached approximately 10 and 20 million respectively. Additionally, as China attempted to industrialize during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), economic and agricultural mismanagement resulted in the deaths of tens of millions (possibly as many as 55 million) in less than four years, during the Great Chinese Famine. This mortality is not observable on the given dataset, due to the rapidity of China's demographic transition over the entire period; this saw improvements in healthcare, sanitation, and infrastructure result in sweeping changes across the population. The early 2020s marked some significant milestones in China's demographics, where it was overtaken by India as the world's most populous country, and its population also went into decline. Current projections suggest that China is heading for a "demographic disaster", as its rapidly aging population is placing significant burdens on China's economy, government, and society. In stark contrast to the restrictive "one-child policy" of the past, the government has introduced a series of pro-fertility incentives for couples to have larger families, although the impact of these policies are yet to materialize. If these current projections come true, then China's population may be around half its current size by the end of the century.

This paper investigates the effects of United States sanctions on Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI). Using data for up to 112 developing countries from 2005-2015, we find that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to invest in countries threatened or targeted with U.S. sanctions relative to Chinese privately-owned enterprises (POEs) because they have the Chinese government’s backing and are larger in number and size, motivating them to invest in higher-risk states. The Chinese government also reaps political benefits by Chinese SOEs investing abroad, enhancing China’s economic strength and decreasing its rivals’ influence. We also obtain similar results for Chinese SOEs and POEs regardless of the investment sector and conduct additional robustness checks that further reinforce the main findings. Our study provides insights into how China’s overseas FDI increases its economic and political reach across the globe at the possible expense of the U.S.

Aim: Biodiversity hotspots often span international borders, thus conservation efforts must as well. China is one of the most biodiverse countries and the length of its international land borders is the longest in the world; thus, there is a strong need for transboundary conservation. We identify China’s transboundary conservation hotspots and analyze the potential effects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on them to provide recommendations for conservation actions. Location: China, Asia Methods: We compiled a species list of terrestrial vertebrates that span China’s borders. Using their distribution, we extracted the top 30% of the area with the highest richness value weighted by Red List category and considered these transboundary hotspots for conservation priority. Then we analyzed protected area (PA) coverage and connectivity to identify conservation gaps. To measure the potential impact of the BRI, we counted the species whose distribution range is traversed by the BRI and calculated the aggregation index, proportion of natural land, and night light index along its routes. Results: We identified 1,964 terrestrial vertebrate species living in the border region. We identified four transboundary hotspots and found insufficient PA coverage and low connectivity in three of them. The BRI routes intersected all four hotspots and traversed 82.4% (1,619/1,964) of the transboundary species, half of which (918) are sensitive to the potential risks brought by the BRI. Night light index increased generally along the BRI. However, the proportion of natural land and the aggregation index near the BRI showed different trends in hotspots. Main conclusions: There is an urgent need for conservation action in China’s transboundary region. The BRI should put biodiversity conservation at the core of its development strategy. Furthermore, we suggest using the planned BRI as a platform for dialogue and consultation, knowledge and data sharing, and joint planning to promote transboundary conservation. Methods Data summary: This is the dataset used in the Diversity and Distributions contribution article "Transboundary conservation hotspots in China and potential impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative". The dataset includes heat maps of the transboundary distribution of terrestrial vertebrates in China drawn by the authors, as well as selected hotspots in the top 30% by value. In addition, a rasterized 0-1 protected area layer for the study area is provided for research reproduction. The heatmap and hotspots of transboundary species distribution were created as follows: We compiled a list of transboundary terrestrial vertebrates in China from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List database (https://www.iucnredlist.org/). We downloaded data of all species of mammals, birds, amphibians and reptiles from the database and filtered those living in terrestrial ecosystems. We then filtered these species based on their geographic ranges, to retain species living both in China and other neighboring countries. Furthermore, we filtered the species by their distribution codes and retained those with codes of “Extant”, “Possibly Extant”, “Native”, and for birds we excluded “Passage”. The retained species were classified as transboundary terrestrial vertebrates in China. We downloaded distribution maps of transboundary species from the IUCN Red List (IUCN, 2021) and BirdLife International and the Handbook of the Birds of the World (BirdLife International, 2018). We then refined the distribution range (R 4.1.0, terra package)(Hijmans, 2022) for each species according to its suitable habitat types (i.e., land cover types) and elevation range, which were obtained from the IUCN Red List. Land cover data were obtained from (Jung et al., 2020), which is consistent with the IUCN habitat classification, and elevation data were obtained from WorldClim (https://worldclim.org/) (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). All raster layers were rescaled to a spatial resolution of 1 km and were under spatial reference coordinate system of WGS1984. We created 10 km, 50 km and 100 km buffer zones on both sides of China's border as border region (made in ArcGIS 10.2.2). We used this border region to crop the distribution maps of transboundary terrestrial species in China. Within the border region, each specie has a distribution layer with a value of 0 or 1 in each 1-km2 cell, where 1 represents presence and 0 represents absence. All species were then weighted by their Red List category, assuming Least Concern (LC) as 1, Near Threatened (NT) as 2, Vulnerable (VU) as 3, Endangered (EN) as 4 and Critically Endangered (CR) as 5 (Balaguru et al., 2006). We valued DD as 3 because DD species are often considered potentially at risk of extinction (Jaric et al., 2016). However, excluding the 65 DD species did not affect the main results. The weighted distribution layers were stacked to obtain a weighted-richness map. Finally, we extracted the top 30% of cells with highest values in the weighted-richness map as conservation hotspots. The 30% was chosen as the threshold because according to the 2030 action target 3 of the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15)(Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020), it is necessary to protect 30% of land and sea globally by 2030. The raster layer of protected area was created as follows: We obtained map layers of PAs in China’s neighboring countries from the World Database on Protected Areas (UNEP-WCMC, 2017) and supplemented China’s PAs from Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2018). For some PAs which are point data in the WDPA dataset, we constructed circles around the points with areas equal to the sizes listed in the attribute table. We rasterized this map and reassignment the value to 0(without PAs) and 1(with PAs). Finally, we used border regions to crop the raster map. References

Balaguru, B., Britto, S. J., Nagamurugan, N., Natarajan, D. and Soosairaj, S. (2006) 'Identifying conservation priority zones for effective management of tropical forests in Eastern Ghats of India', Biodiversity and Conservation, 15(4), pp. 1529-1543. BirdLife International (2018) 'BirdLife International and handbook of the birds of the world (2018) Bird species distribution maps of the world. Version 2018.1. Available at http://datazone.birdlife.org/.'. Convention on Biological Diversity (2020) 'Update of the zero draft of the post‐2020 global biodiversity framework'. Fick, S. E. and Hijmans, R. J. (2017) 'WorldClim 2: new 1-km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas', International Journal of Climatology, 37(12), pp. 4302-4315. Hijmans, R. J. (2022) 'terra: Spatial Data Analysis'. IUCN (2021) 'The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. 2021-3. https://www.iucnredlist.org. Downloaded on 20 june 2022.'. Jaric, I., Courchamp, F., Gessner, J. and Roberts, D. L. (2016) 'Potentially threatened: a Data Deficient flag for conservation management', Biodiversity and Conservation, 25(10), pp. 1995-2000. Jung, M., Dahal, P. R., Butchart, S. H. M., Donald, P. F., De Lamo, X., Lesiv, M., Kapos, V., Rondinini, C. and Visconti, P. (2020) 'A global map of terrestrial habitat types', Scientific Data, 7(1), pp. 256. UNEP-WCMC (2017) 'World Database on Protected Areas User Manual 1.5. UNEP-WCMC: Cambridge, UK. Available at: http://wcmc.io/WDPA_Manual'. Yang, L., Chen, M. H., Challender, D. W. S., Waterman, C., Zhang, C., Huo, Z. M., Liu, H. W. and Luan, X. F. (2018) 'Historical data for conservation: reconstructing range changes of Chinese pangolin (Manis pentadactyla) in eastern China (1970-2016)', Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 285(1885).

China is the most tea-consuming country in the world, with a rich history and culture surrounding this ancient beverage. Tea holds a special place in Chinese society, serving as a symbol of tradition, health, and hospitality.

The Central American and Panamanian Association of Chinese Organizations and Overseas Chinese Associations formed a joint association in El Salvador to enhance communication, promote unity, and hold collaborative activities. The organization, which is the most influential traditional Chinese association in Central America, holds its annual meetings in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. This information includes details about the dates and locations of past annual meetings.