Profiling of individuals based on inborn, acquired, and assigned characteristics is central for decision making in health care. In the era of omics and big smart data, it becomes urgent to differentiate between different data governance affordances for different profiling activities. Typically, diagnostic profiling is in the focus of researchers and physicians, and other types are regarded as undesired side-effects; for example, in the connection of health care insurance risk calculations. Profiling in a legal sense is addressed, for example, by the EU data protection law. It is defined in the General Data Protection Regulation as automated decision making. This term does not correspond fully with profiling in biomedical research and healthcare, and the impact on privacy has hardly ever been examined. But profiling is also an issue concerning the fundamental right of non-discrimination, whenever profiles are used in a way that has a discriminatory effect on individuals. Here, we will focus on genetic profiling, define related notions as legal and subject-matter definitions frequently differ, and discuss the ethical and legal challenges.

Section 4.2 of the Department of Justice Act requires the Minister of Justice to prepare a Charter Statement for every government bill to help inform public and Parliamentary debate on government bills. One of the Minister of Justice’s most important responsibilities is to examine legislation for inconsistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [“the Charter”]. By tabling a Charter Statement, the Minister is sharing some of the key considerations that informed the review of a bill for inconsistency with the Charter. A Statement identifies Charter rights and freedoms that may potentially be engaged by a bill and provides a brief explanation of the nature of any engagement, in light of the measures being proposed. A Charter Statement also identifies potential justifications for any limits a bill may impose on Charter rights and freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter provides that rights and freedoms may be subject to reasonable limits if those limits are prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This means that Parliament may enact laws that limit Charter rights and freedoms. The Charter will be violated only where a limit is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. A Charter Statement is intended to provide legal information to the public and Parliament on a bill’s potential effects on rights and freedoms that are neither trivial nor too speculative. It is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all conceivable Charter considerations. Additional considerations relevant to the constitutionality of a bill may also arise in the course of Parliamentary study and amendment of a bill. A Statement is not a legal opinion on the constitutionality of a bill.

Profiling of individuals based on inborn, acquired, and assigned characteristics is central for decision making in health care. In the era of omics and big smart data, it becomes urgent to differentiate between different data governance affordances for different profiling activities. Typically, diagnostic profiling is in the focus of researchers and physicians, and other types are regarded as undesired side-effects; for example, in the connection of health care insurance risk calculations. Profiling in a legal sense is addressed, for example, by the EU data protection law. It is defined in the General Data Protection Regulation as automated decision making. This term does not correspond fully with profiling in biomedical research and healthcare, and the impact on privacy has hardly ever been examined. But profiling is also an issue concerning the fundamental right of non-discrimination, whenever profiles are used in a way that has a discriminatory effect on individuals. Here, we will focus on genetic profiling, define related notions as legal and subject-matter definitions frequently differ, and discuss the ethical and legal challenges.

This data is a statewide compilation of California's Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA) Study Regions. As part of a comprehensive effort to sustain marine habitats and fisheries, the Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA) of 1999 directed the State to redesign California’s system of marine protected areas (MPAs) to function as a network. To facilitate planning, the MLPA Initiative, a public-private partnership, was formed and the state was divided into five planning regions (four coastal and the San Francisco Bay), each with its own MPA planning process. All four coastal regions have now completed their individual planning processes, leading to the statewide implementation of California's MPA network along the coast. Options for a planning process in the fifth and final region, the San Francisco Bay, have been developed for consideration at a future date. Twenty MPAs and six special closures were implemented in the north coast region, from the California/Oregon border to Alder Creek (near Point Arena), on December 19, 2012. Twenty-five MPAs and six special closures were implemented in the north central coast region, from Alder Creek (near Point Arena) to Pigeon Point, on May 1, 2010. Twenty-nine MPAs were implemented in the central coast region, from Pigeon Point to Point Conception, on September 21, 2007. Fifty MPAs and two special closures were implemented in the south coast region, from Point Conception to the California-Mexico border, on January 1, 2012. The shoreline provided in this feature is a general approximation of the mean high tide line at the time of implementation. However, it is important to note that it is not based on any elevation (tidal) data and was hand drawn based on best available aerial imagery at the time. Due to the dynamic nature of coastal environments, these boundaries may not accurately reflect the current condition or exact demarcations of the coastline. The offshore boundary is based on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) three nautical mile maritime limit published on charts at that time.

Information received in response to notices published in the Canada Gazette under sections 46 and 71 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999 (CEPA). These notices target certain substances under the Chemicals Management Plan. Supplemental Information To increase transparency and to facilitate access to information on substances in commerce in Canada, these documents provide the non-confidential information collected by the Government of Canada under the respective notices. Important information about these summaries: Some information gathered under these initiatives was considered Confidential Business Information (CBI) by the submitters. While these summaries and the Excel compilations were prepared using the full dataset (including CBI), CBI and protected information were masked in both documents prior to publication. Masking refers to the process whereby the information is used in such a manner so that CBI and protected information are not revealed. This can be done by, for example, aggregating data or by providing quantity ranges. For instances when masking could not adequately provide protection, data was removed. Protected information, such as names of submitters, names of their customers and suppliers, or any information that could identify a submitter, was also removed. The section 46 and 71 notices targeted information to address data needs identified for the substances. As such, the information gathered and reported here does not represent the entire range of commercial activities in Canada with the substances. The specific reporting requirements, exclusions and definitions can be found in each applicable notice. It should be noted that these documents do not include an assessment of the potential risks these substances may represent for the environment or the health of Canadians.

Data De-identification and Pseudonymity Software Market Outlook

The global data de-identification and pseudonymity software market is projected to grow significantly, reaching approximately USD 4.2 billion by 2032, driven primarily by increasing data privacy concerns and stringent regulatory requirements worldwide.

The primary growth factor in the data de-identification and pseudonymity software market is the surge in data breaches and cyber-attacks. With the exponential increase in data generation, organizations are more vulnerable to data breaches and unauthorized access. These security concerns have prompted businesses and governments to invest heavily in robust data protection solutions. Data de-identification and pseudonymity software provide a secure way to anonymize sensitive information, making it less susceptible to malicious activities. As data protection laws become more rigorous, the demand for such technologies will continue to rise, further propelling market growth.

Another significant factor contributing to market growth is the growing awareness and emphasis on data privacy among consumers. In recent years, consumers have become increasingly aware of how their data is being used and the potential risks associated with data misuse. This heightened awareness has put pressure on organizations to adopt comprehensive data protection measures. Data de-identification and pseudonymity software offer a means to protect personal information while still allowing organizations to utilize data for analytics and decision-making. This dual benefit is a key driver for the adoption of these technologies across various sectors.

Moreover, regulatory compliance is a crucial driver for the market. Regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States, and various other data protection laws worldwide mandate stringent measures for data protection. Non-compliance can result in hefty fines and legal repercussions. Therefore, organizations are increasingly adopting data de-identification and pseudonymity software to ensure compliance with these regulations. The need for regulatory compliance is expected to sustain market growth in the foreseeable future.

Regionally, North America currently dominates the global data de-identification and pseudonymity software market, accounting for the largest market share. This is attributed to the presence of major technology players, stringent data protection regulations, and high adoption rates of advanced technologies in the region. Europe follows closely, with significant market contributions from countries such as Germany, France, and the UK, driven by robust regulatory frameworks like GDPR. The Asia Pacific region is also expected to witness substantial growth, fueled by rapid digitalization, increasing cybersecurity threats, and growing awareness about data privacy in countries like China, India, and Japan.

Data Masking Tools play a pivotal role in enhancing the security framework of organizations by providing an additional layer of protection for sensitive information. These tools are designed to obscure specific data within a dataset, ensuring that unauthorized users cannot access or decipher the original information. As businesses increasingly rely on data-driven insights, the need for robust data masking solutions becomes more critical. By employing data masking tools, organizations can safely share data across departments or with third-party vendors without compromising privacy. This capability is especially beneficial in industries such as healthcare and finance, where data privacy is paramount. The integration of data masking tools with existing data protection strategies can significantly reduce the risk of data breaches and ensure compliance with regulatory standards.

Component Analysis

The data de-identification and pseudonymity software market can be segmented by component into software and services. The software segment is anticipated to hold the lion's share due to the increasing adoption of data protection solutions across various industries. Software solutions provide automated tools for anonymizing and pseudonymizing data, ensuring compliance with regulatory standards. These solutions are essential for organizations aiming to mitigate the risks associated with data breaches and unauthorized access. As cyber threats continue to evolve, the demand for advanced software solutions is exp

I can confirm that we do hold the requested information however, we consider the name and General Medical Council (GMC) number to be personal data under section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018. Disclosure of the medical assessor’s name or GMC number would result in the identification of the medical assessor when entered into the GMC public register. As the requested information would allow a medical assessor to be identified, I consider this information is exempt under section 40(2) and 40(3A)(a) of the FOIA (personal information). This is because it would breach the first data protection principle as: a) it is not fair to disclose medical assessors’ personal details to the world and is likely to cause damage or distress. b) these details are not of sufficient interest to the public to warrant an intrusion into the privacy of the medical assessor. For disclosure to comply with the lawfulness, fairness, and transparency principle, we either need the consent of the medical assessor or there must be a legitimate interest in disclosure. In addition, the disclosure must be necessary to meet that interest and finally, the disclosure must not cause unwarranted harm. In this case we do not have the consent of the medical assessor to disclose their personal information. This means that the NHSBSA is therefore required to conduct a balancing exercise between the legitimate interest in disclosing the information against the rights and freedoms of the medical assessor. Having reviewed the information you have provided I acknowledge that you have a legitimate interest in disclosure of the information. However, I agree with the previous decision that disclosure of the requested information would cause unwarranted harm. Whilst I acknowledge your comments on this, disclosure under FOIA is to the world and therefore the NHSBSA has to consider the overall impact of the disclosure and its duty of care. The expectation of the medical assessors is that they will remain anonymous and will therefore not be subject to contact or pressure from claimants or campaigning groups. Given the certainty that the name and/or GMC number will identify the medical assessor there is a reasonable expectation that this information would not be disclosed under the FOIA. Disclosing this information would be unfair and as such this would breach the UK General Data Protection Regulation first data protection principle. Please see the following link to view the section 40 exemption in full - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/40

Data on approximately 2 million births occurring in NJ, OH, and PA from 2000 - 2005. Linked to PM2.5 and ozone concentration estimates from EPA CMAQ fused model. This dataset is not publicly accessible because: EPA cannot release personally identifiable information regarding living individuals, according to the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This dataset contains information about human research subjects. Because there is potential to identify individual participants and disclose personal information, either alone or in combination with other datasets, individual level data are not appropriate to post for public access. Restricted access may be granted to authorized persons by contacting the party listed. It can be accessed through the following means: Birth data can be acquired through application to the state health statistics departments of NJ, OH, and PA. Contact author for code. rappazzo.kristen@epa.gov. Format: No data included. This dataset is associated with the following publication: Rappazzo, K., D. Lobdell, L. Messer, C. Poole, and J. Daniels. Comparison of gestational dating methods and implications for exposure-outcome associations: an example with PM2.5 and preterm birth. JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 74(2): 138-143, (2017).

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information: The number of individuals of all ages who were prescribed contraceptives in the financial years 2019-2020, 2021-2020, 2020-2021, 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 in community settings (GP surgeries and pharmacies) broken down by contraceptive method. I would also like the proportion these represent of contraception users. For example, X proportion of those on contraception are using the Mirena coil. If possible, I would also appreciate if this were broken down by age of those prescriptions too. To clarify, I mean patients. I also mean both contraceptive drugs and appliances/devices Response A copy of the information is attached. Please read the following information to ensure correct understanding of the data. Fewer than five Please be aware that I have decided not to release the full details where the total number of individuals falls below five. This is because the individuals could be identified, when combined with other information that may be in the public domain or reasonably available. This information falls under the exemption in section 40 subsections 2 and 3 (a) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This is because it would breach the first data protection principle as: a - It is not fair to disclose individual’s personal details to the world and is likely to cause damage or distress. b - These details are not of sufficient interest to the public to warrant an intrusion into the privacy of the individual. Please click the weblink to see the exemption in full: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/40 NHS Business Services Authority (NHSBSA) - NHS Prescription Services process prescriptions for Pharmacy Contractors, Appliance Contractors, Dispensing Doctors, and Personal Administration with information then used to make payments to pharmacists and appliance contractors in England for prescriptions dispensed in primary care settings (other arrangements are in place for making payments to Dispensing Doctors and Personal Administration). This involves processing over one billion prescription items and payments totalling over £9 billion each year. The information gathered from this process is then used to provide information on costs and trends in prescribing in England and Wales to over 25,000 registered NHS and Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) users. Data Source: ePACT2 - Data in ePACT2 is sourced from the NHSBSA Data Warehouse and is derived from products prescribed on prescriptions and dispensed in the Community. The data captured from prescription processing is used to calculate reimbursement and remuneration. It includes items prescribed in England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Guernsey/Alderney, Jersey, and Isle of Man which have been dispensed in the community in England. English prescribing that has been dispensed in Wales, Scotland, Guernsey/Alderney, Jersey, and Isle of Man is also included. The data excludes: • Items not dispensed, disallowed and those returned to the contractor for further clarification. • Prescriptions prescribed and dispensed in prisons, hospitals, and private prescriptions. • Items prescribed but not presented for dispensing or not submitted to NHS Prescription Services by the dispenser. Dataset - The data is limited to presentations prescribed in BNF sections 0703 Contraceptives and BNF section 2104 Contraceptive Devices. Data is presented at BNF Sub Paragraph and BNF Presentation level. Time Period - Financial years 2019/20, 2020/21, 2021/22, 2022/23 and 2023/24 (April 2023 - January 2024). Data is currently available up to and including January 2024. Organisation Data - The data is for prescribing in England regardless of where dispensed in the community. British National Formulary (BNF) Sub Paragraph and Presentation Code – The BNF Code is a 15-digit code in which the first seven digits are allocated according to the categories in the BNF, and the last eight digits represent the medicinal product, form, strength and the link to the generic equivalent product. NHS Prescription Services has created pseudo BNF chapters, which are not published, for items not included in BNF chapters 1 to 15. Most of such items are dressings and appliances which NHS Prescription Services has classified into four pseudo BNF chapters (20 to 23). Patient Identification - Where patient identifiable figures have been reported they are based on the information captured during the prescription processing activities. Please note, patient details cannot be captured from every prescription form and based on the criteria used for this analysis, patient information (NHS number) was only available for 98.28% of prescription items. The unique patient count figures are based on a distinct count of NHS number as captured from the prescription image. Patient ages are based on the age as captured from the prescription image and relates to the patient's age at the time of prescribing/dispensing. Please note it is possible that a single patient may be included in the results for more than one age band where a patient has received prescribing at different ages during a financial year. The figures for the number of identifiable patients should not be combined and reported at any other level than provided as this may result in the double counting of patients. For example, a single patient could appear in the results for multiple presentations or both financial years. Patient Age - Shows the age of the patient, if recorded. Data Quality for patient age - NHSBSA stores information on the age of the recipient of each prescription as it was read by computer from images of paper prescriptions or as attached to messages sent through the electronic prescription system. The NHSBSA does not validate, verify or manually check the resulting information as part of the routine prescription processing. There are some data quality issues with the ages of patients prescribed the products. The NHSBSA holds prescription images for 18 months. A sample of the data was compared to the images of the paper prescription forms from which the data was generated where these images are still available. These checks revealed issues in the reliability of age data, in particular the quality of the stored age data was poor for patients recorded as aged two years and under. When considering the accuracy of age data, it is expected that a small number of prescriptions may be allocated against any given patient age incorrectly. Application of Disclosure Control to information services (prescriptions) products- ePACT 2 data is not published statistics - it is available to authorised NHS users who are subject to Caldicott Guardian approval. We have no plans to apply disclosure control to data released to ePACT 2 users. These users are under an obligation to protect the anonymity of any patients when reusing this data or releasing derived information publicly. All requests that fall under the FOI process are subject to the NHSBSA Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation Standard. The application of the techniques described in the standard is judged on a case-by-case basis (by NHSBSA Information Governance) in respect of what techniques should be applied. The ICO typically rules on a case-by-case basis too so each case or challenge or appeal is judged on its own merits. FOI rules apply to data that we hold as part of our normal course of business.

Coastal Legislative Layer [Polyline]. The Coastal Overview data layers identifies the lead authority for the management of discrete stretches of the English coast as defined by the Seaward of the Schedule 4 boundary of the Coastal Protection Act 1949. The data are intended as a reference for GIS users and Coastal Engineers with GIS capability to identify the responsible authority or whether the coast is privately owned. The information has been assigned from the following sources, listed in by preference: Shoreline Management Plans 1. Environment Agency’s RACE database. Consultation with Coastal Business User Group and Local Authority Maritime records where possible. A confidence rating is attributed based on where the data has been attributed from and the entry derived from the source data. The following data is intended as a reference document for GIS users and Coastal Engineers with GIS capability to identify the responsible authority and the assigned EA Coastal Engineer so as to effectively manage the coast for erosion and flooding. The product comprises 3 GIS layers that are based on the OS MasterMap Mean High Watermark, this layers is: Coastal Legislative Layer Polyline represents the predominant risk; flooding or erosion, which are assigned to each section of the coastline. Attribution statement: © Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2016. All rights reserved. © Crown copyright and database rights 2009 Ordnance Survey 100024198

This tool lists the Data-Subject rights under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).It has 2 main objectives:1. To make a contribution to the knowledge of GDPR Data-subject rights using an original methodology.2. To provide GDPR controllers and processors with a general overview of data-subject rights. This includes: their meaning; who can exercice them; how to handle them; a legal framework; relevant caselaw and restrictions on rights.File formats available:ExcelPDFLanguages available:EnglishSpanish

The name of the medical assessor for VDPS claim. Response I can confirm that we do hold this information relating to medical assessors; however, we are issuing a refusal notice under section 17 of the FOIA as we consider the name and General Medical Council (GMC) number to be personal data as defined under section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018. Disclosure of the medical assessor’s name or GMC number would result in the identification of the medical assessor when entered into the GMC public register. Please be aware that I have decided not to release the names and GMC numbers of the medical assessors as this information falls under the exemption in section 40 subsections 2 and 3(A)(a) of the FOIA. As the requested information would allow a medical assessor to be identified, I consider this information is exempt. This is because it would breach the first data protection principle as: a. it is not fair to disclose medical assessors’ personal details to the world and is likely to cause damage or distress. b. these details are not of sufficient interest to the public to warrant an intrusion into the privacy of the medical assessor. The requested information is exempt if disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. For disclosure to comply with the lawfulness, fairness, and transparency principle, we either need the consent of the data subject(s) or there must be a legitimate interest in disclosure. In addition, the disclosure must be necessary to meet the legitimate interest and finally, the disclosure must not cause unwarranted harm. This means that the NHSBSA is therefore required to conduct a balancing exercise between the legitimate interest of the applicant in disclosure against the rights and freedoms of the medical assessor. While I acknowledge that you have a legitimate interest in disclosure of the information, the disclosure of the requested information would cause unwarranted harm. Disclosure under FOIA is to the world and therefore the NHSBSA must consider the overall impact of the disclosure and its duty of care. The expectation of the medical assessors is that they will remain anonymous and will therefore not be subject to contact or pressure from claimants or campaigning groups. Given the certainty that the name and/or GMC number will identify the medical assessor there is a reasonable expectation that this information will not be disclosed under the FOIA. Disclosing this information would be unfair and as such this would breach the UK General Data Protection Regulation first data protection principle.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solutions Market Outlook

The Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions market is rapidly expanding, with a global market size valued at approximately USD 2.5 billion in 2023. It is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 21.5% over the forecast period, reaching around USD 9.4 billion by 2032. This substantial growth is driven by the increasing demand for data protection and privacy measures due to the rising incidents of data breaches and stringent regulatory requirements. The evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats has necessitated businesses to prioritize the implementation of robust data protection mechanisms, thereby driving the DLP solutions market forward. Additionally, the integration of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning in DLP solutions to enhance data monitoring and threat detection capabilities is further propelling market growth.

One of the major growth factors in the DLP solutions market is the increasing awareness and emphasis on data security among organizations of all sizes. The upsurge in data breaches and cyberattacks has heightened the need for effective data protection strategies, prompting businesses to invest in comprehensive DLP solutions. Moreover, with the proliferation of digitalization and cloud computing, there is a growing need to secure sensitive data from unauthorized access, data leaks, and inadvertent sharing. This awareness and need for data security have led to a surge in the adoption of DLP solutions across various industry verticals, including BFSI, healthcare, and retail, where data protection is paramount.

Another significant factor contributing to the growth of the DLP solutions market is the implementation of stringent data protection regulations and compliance requirements worldwide. Regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States, and other similar legislations have mandated organizations to enforce adequate measures for data protection and privacy. Companies are increasingly adopting DLP solutions to comply with these regulations, mitigate potential risks, and avoid hefty fines and reputational damage. The regulatory landscape has become a major driver for the adoption of DLP solutions as organizations strive to align their data protection strategies with compliance requirements.

The increasing adoption of cloud-based solutions and the trend of remote working are also significant growth drivers for the DLP solutions market. As more businesses migrate their operations to the cloud, ensuring the security of data in transit and at rest has become a critical concern. Cloud-based DLP solutions offer scalable and cost-effective means of monitoring and protecting sensitive data across cloud environments. Furthermore, the rise in remote working due to the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the vulnerability of data breaches, necessitating robust DLP solutions to protect sensitive corporate data accessed from remote locations. This shift towards cloud computing and remote working environments has therefore accelerated the demand for advanced DLP solutions.

From a regional perspective, North America currently holds the largest share in the DLP solutions market, owing to the presence of technologically advanced infrastructures, early adoption of innovative technologies, and stringent data protection regulations. However, the Asia Pacific region is expected to witness the highest growth during the forecast period. The growing digitalization, increasing internet penetration, and rising awareness about data security in emerging economies such as India and China are driving the demand for DLP solutions in the region. The rapid pace of industrialization and urbanization in Asia Pacific, coupled with the expansion of IT and telecommunications, BFSI, and healthcare industries, is further contributing to the market growth.

Component Analysis

The Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions market is segmented by component into software, hardware, and services, with software being the dominant segment. DLP software solutions are designed to identify, monitor, and protect sensitive data throughout its lifecycle, leveraging advanced algorithms and threat detection technologies. The software segment's dominance is primarily due to the increasing demand for customizable and scalable software solutions that can be easily integrated with existing IT infrastructures. Moreover, the continuous advancements in software capabilities, such as real-time data monitoring, automatic classification, and incident response, are e

Collection of definitions of terms in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish extracted from the following data-related European laws:

1. Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2007 establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community (INSPIRE)

2. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance)

3. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/790 of 25 April 2018 on access to and preservation of scientific information

4. Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union (Text with EEA relevance)

5. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (Text with EEA relevance)

6. Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast) (Open Data Directive)

7. Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (Text with EEA relevance)

8. Regulation (EU) 2022/868 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (Data Governance Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

9. Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

10. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

11. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/138 of 21 December 2022 laying down a list of specific high-value datasets and the arrangements for their publication and re-use (Text with EEA relevance)

12. Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Data Act)

13. Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (Interoperable Europe Act)

14. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) Text with EEA relevance.

15. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) provides emergency assistance to state and local governments for the acquisition and redevelopment of foreclosed properties that might otherwise become sources of abandonment and blight within their communities. Section 1497 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, also known as the Dodd-Frank Act, provided a third round of funding in 2010. NSP3 provides grants to states, local governments, nonprofits and a consortium of nonprofit entities on a competitive basis. Grantee target area data provided through this service was created from user generated areas drawn by grantees using the NSP3 online map tool at available at http://www.huduser.org/NSP/NSP3.html. .

To learn more about the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) visit: https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/nsp/

Data Dictionary: DD_NSP3 Grantee Target Areas

Date of Coverage: 12/2014 Data Updated: Current; No longer updated

🇬🇧 영국 English This report contains all Right of Access (Data Protection Act 2018) requests received by the Metropolitan Police Service and logged on our corporate logging system since May 2018. In addition, there is information on Subject Access Requests (Data Protection Act 1998) received after 01/01/2015 up to the introduction of the 2018 Act. There is also information on Appeals and complaints from January 2015 onwards covering both the 1998 and 2018 legislation. The Information Commissioners Office (ICO) recommend that organisations publish their own performance in answering Subject Access/Right of Access Requests on a quarterly basis. This report is our response to that recommendation. Counting Rules One submission from a member of the public will count as one request. Multiple submissions from the same person on different dates for different data will be counted as multiple requests. The data used in the MPS Right of Access Performance Dashboard is available here Right of access performance dashboard | Metropolitan Police , along with the related data definitions. Please note that, this data set running quarterly behind with quarterly update. Due to an internal IT deployment, from 27th February these datasets may be temporarily disrupted. Work is ongoing to rebuild these datasets.

Data-Loss Prevention (DLP) Market Outlook

The global Data-Loss Prevention (DLP) market size was valued at approximately USD 1.5 billion in 2023 and is projected to reach around USD 4.2 billion by 2032, advancing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 12.1% during the forecast period. The significant growth of the DLP market can be attributed to the increasing incidences of data breaches and stringent regulations mandating the protection of data across various sectors. With organizations placing a premium on data security, the adoption of DLP solutions is rapidly becoming a standard practice to safeguard sensitive information and ensure compliance with data protection frameworks.

The growth of the DLP market is predominantly driven by the escalating volume and sophistication of cyber threats. Cybercriminals are continuously evolving their tactics, making it essential for businesses to adopt robust data protection measures. DLP solutions play a critical role in preventing unauthorized access and data leaks, which can have detrimental impacts on a company’s reputation and financial standing. Additionally, the growing emphasis on data privacy by governments worldwide, with regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), is compelling organizations to implement comprehensive DLP strategies to avoid substantial fines and penalties.

Another pivotal factor contributing to market growth is the exponential increase in data generation across industries, propelled by the proliferation of IoT devices, cloud computing, and digital transformation initiatives. As businesses become more data-centric, the need to protect intellectual property and customer data from loss or theft is becoming paramount. DLP solutions offer a means to monitor, detect, and respond to data vulnerabilities, thereby ensuring that organizations can maintain the integrity and confidentiality of their data assets. As a result, industries such as healthcare, banking, and retail are increasingly investing in advanced DLP technologies to safeguard their information.

The rise of remote work culture serves as an additional growth catalyst for the DLP market. With more employees accessing corporate networks from varied locations, the risk of data breaches has amplified, creating a pressing need for effective data protection solutions. DLP technologies enable businesses to enforce data security policies consistently across various endpoints, regardless of their physical location. This capability is crucial for maintaining business continuity and ensuring that sensitive information remains protected amidst the changing dynamics of workplace environments.

Regionally, North America holds the largest share of the DLP market, attributed to the substantial presence of key players and early adoption of advanced data security technologies. The region's regulatory environment and the high incidence of cyber-attacks further fuel the demand for DLP solutions. Meanwhile, the Asia Pacific region is expected to witness the highest growth rate due to increasing digitalization, a burgeoning IT sector, and rising awareness surrounding data protection. Countries like China and India are notable contributors to this growth, as businesses in these regions increasingly recognize the importance of securing their data assets against potential breaches.

Component Analysis

The DLP market, segmented by components, includes solutions and services, both of which are integral to a comprehensive data protection strategy. Solutions, which encompass software and hardware designed to detect and prevent data breaches, represent the core of DLP offerings. These solutions are tailored to meet the diverse needs of various industries, providing capabilities such as encryption, data masking, and real-time monitoring. The growing demand for integrated DLP solutions that can operate across multiple environments—be it on-premises or in the cloud—emphasizes the necessity for scalable and flexible technologies that can adapt to an organization's evolving data security landscape.

Services, on the other hand, complement DLP solutions by providing the expertise and support needed to effectively implement and manage these technologies. Services range from consulting, which helps organizations assess their data protection needs, to managed services, where third-party providers oversee the deployment and maintenance of DLP systems. As organizations grapple with the complexities of data security, the demand for professional services that offer guidance on regulatory compliance and ri

I can confirm that we do hold information on the names and General Medical Council (GMC) numbers for independent medical assessors. Please note that this response does not relate to a specific claim or claimant. The request is being answered more generally given requests under FOIA are requester-blind, that is to say the identity of the requester is not taken into account when considering a request for information under FOIA. We consider the name and GMC number to be personal data under the Data Protection Act 2018. Disclosure of their names or GMC numbers would result in their identification when entered into the GMC public register. Please be aware that I have decided not to release the names and GMC numbers of the independent medical assessors as this information falls under the exemption in section 40 subsections 2 and 3(A)(a) of the FOIA. As the requested information would allow an independent medical assessor to be identified, I consider this information is exempt. This is because it would breach the first data protection principle as: A. it is not fair to disclose their personal details to the world and is likely to cause damage or distress. B. these details are not of sufficient interest to the public to warrant an intrusion into their privacy. The requested information is exempt if disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. For disclosure to comply with the lawfulness, fairness, and transparency principle, we either need the consent of the data subject(s) or there must be a legitimate interest in disclosure. In addition, the disclosure must be necessary to meet the legitimate interest and finally, the disclosure must not cause unwarranted harm. This means that the NHSBSA is therefore required to conduct a balancing exercise between the legitimate interest of the applicant in disclosure against the rights and freedoms of the independent medical assessor. While I acknowledge that you have a legitimate interest in disclosure of the information, the disclosure of the requested information would cause unwarranted harm. Disclosure under FOIA is to the world and therefore the NHSBSA has to consider the overall impact of the disclosure and its duty of care. The expectation of the independent medical assessors is that they will remain anonymous and will therefore not be subject to contact or pressure from claimants or campaigning groups. Given the certainty that the name and/or GMC number will identify them, there is a reasonable expectation that this information will not be disclosed under the FOIA. Disclosing this information would be unfair and as such this would breach the UK General Data Protection Regulation first data protection principle. Please see the following link to view the section 40 exemption in full: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/40 Qualifications and experience The NHSBSA does not hold information on the independent medical assessors' qualifications. This is because their medical qualifications and experience are the responsibility of the third-party medical assessment supplier. I hope, however, that the following information provides reassurance on this point: All claims are assessed by the independent medical assessment company with a consistent approach. Each case is considered on its own merits, by an experienced independent medical assessor. The contract with our supplier does not require them to tell us details of their qualifications or their experience.

Received 17 February 2025: ‘may I have details of your independent doctor so I can check them out.’ Received 25 February 2025: ‘Please could you arrange for me to receive the Freedom of Information Act so that I can check the qualifications of your independent doctors.’ Our response I can confirm that the NHS Business Services Authority (NHSBSA) holds some of the information you have requested. Question 1 I can confirm that we do hold information on the names and General Medical Council numbers for independent medical assessors. Please note that this response does not relate to a specific claim or claimant. The request is being answered more generally given requests under FOIA are requester-blind, that is to say the identity of the requester is not taken into account when considering a request for information under FOIA. We consider the name and GMC number to be personal data under the Data Protection Act 2018. Disclosure of medical assessors’ names or GMC numbers would result in the identification of the medical assessors when entered into the GMC public register. Please be aware that I have decided not to release the names and GMC numbers of the medical assessors as this information falls under the exemption in section 40 subsections 2 and 3(A)(a) of the FOIA. As the requested information would allow a medical assessor to be identified, I consider this information is exempt. This is because it would breach the first data protection principle as: A. it is not fair to disclose medical assessors’ personal details to the world and is likely to cause damage or distress. B. these details are not of sufficient interest to the public to warrant an intrusion into the privacy of the medical assessor. The requested information is exempt if disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. For disclosure to comply with the lawfulness, fairness, and transparency principle, we either need the consent of the data subject(s) or there must be a legitimate interest in disclosure. In addition, the disclosure must be necessary to meet the legitimate interest and finally, the disclosure must not cause unwarranted harm. This means that the NHSBSA is therefore required to conduct a balancing exercise between the legitimate interest of the applicant in disclosure against the rights and freedoms of the medical assessor. While I acknowledge that you have a legitimate interest in disclosure of the information, the disclosure of the requested information would cause unwarranted harm. Disclosure under FOIA is to the world and therefore the NHSBSA has to consider the overall impact of the disclosure and its duty of care. The expectation of the medical assessors is that they will remain anonymous and will therefore not be subject to contact or pressure from claimants or campaigning groups. Given the certainty that the name and/or GMC number will identify the medical assessor there is a reasonable expectation that this information will not be disclosed under the FOIA. Disclosing this information would be unfair and as such this would breach the UK General Data Protection Regulation first data protection principle. Please see the following link to view the section 40 exemption in full: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/40 Question 2 I have established that the NHSBSA does not hold this information. This is because the medical qualifications and experience of the medical assessors are the responsibility of the third-party medical assessment supplier. I hope, however, that the following information provides reassurance on this point. All claims are assessed by the independent medical assessment supplier with a consistent approach. Each case is considered on its own merits, by an experienced independent medical assessor. The contract with our supplier does not require them to tell us details of the qualifications of the medical assessors or their experience. The contract requires that all assessments carried out are undertaken by suitably qualified and experienced registered medical practitioners. This includes being registered on the UK General Medical Council register, with a licence to practise and meet or exceed the following requirements: • they are a registered medical practitioner with at least five years’ post graduate experience; and • they have experience of the performance of medical and/ or disability assessment, addressing questions of causation and impact in the context of legislative or policy requirements to assist the decision maker

The data set INSPIRE Protected Areas in North Rhine-Westphalia contains regional spatial data on protected areas within the meaning of the INSPIRE Annex I topic “protected areas”. The data shows the delimitations of different protected area categories from federal and state laws. The object metadata contains all the details of the “simple profile” from the data specification for “INSPIRE Protected Sites”. The data show the boundaries of the protected areas for North Rhine-Westphalia. The data is freely accessible. The data must be collected in North Rhine-Westphalia on the basis of § 3 of the Land Nature Protection Act. The data has been digitised for regulations and landscape plans. The data must be made public on the Internet in North Rhine-Westphalia on the basis of § 3 of the Land Nature Protection Act.