Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q1 2025 about domestic offices, delinquencies, 1-unit structures, mortgage, family, residential, commercial, domestic, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.

Following the drastic increase directly after the COVID-19 pandemic, the delinquency rate started to gradually decline, falling below *** percent in the second quarter of 2023. In the second half of 2023, the delinquency rate picked up, but remained stable throughout 2024. In the first quarter of 2025, **** percent of mortgage loans were delinquent. That was significantly lower than the **** percent during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the peak of *** percent during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. What does the mortgage delinquency rate tell us? The mortgage delinquency rate is the share of the total number of mortgaged home loans in the U.S. where payment is overdue by 30 days or more. Many borrowers eventually manage to service their loan, though, as indicated by the markedly lower foreclosure rates. Total home mortgage debt in the U.S. stood at almost ** trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Not all mortgage loans are made equal ‘Subprime’ loans, being targeted at high-risk borrowers and generally coupled with higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. These loans have far higher delinquency rates than conventional loans. Defaulting on such loans was one of the triggers for the 2007-2010 financial crisis, with subprime delinquency rates reaching almost ** percent around this time. These higher delinquency rates translate into higher foreclosure rates, which peaked at just under ** percent of all subprime mortgages in 2011.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

These tables provide additional detail on the loan assets of U.S. depository institutions by reporting mortgage and consumer loan portfolios broken down by the banks' estimates of the probability of default, as defined below. This information facilitates analysis of the potential concentration of risk in specific loan categories. The institutions reporting this information are generally those with $10 billion or more of assets.

The S&P/Experian first mortgage default index stood at **** as of May 2022, meaning that based on data from the most recent three months, the annualized share of default first mortgages was **** percent. This was lower than the default rate index of second mortgages and home equity loans. Although the index rose in 2022, it remained below the levels observed in the first two months of 2020 when it amounted to approximately *** percent.

The S&P/Experian second mortgage default index stood at **** as of May 2022, meaning that based on data from the most recent three months, the annualized share of default second mortgages and home equity loans was **** percent. This was higher than the first mortgage default rate for the same period. Although the index rose in 2022, it remained below the levels observed in December 2017, when it spiked at **** percent.

United States - Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks was 1.82% in October of 2024, according to the United States Federal Reserve. Historically, United States - Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks reached a record high of 11.36 in January of 2010 and a record low of 1.40 in January of 2005. Trading Economics provides the current actual value, an historical data chart and related indicators for United States - Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks - last updated from the United States Federal Reserve on August of 2025.

Since the start of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis, many businesses have had to close their doors or have struggled to pay rent. As a result, commercial property landlords suffered loss of income, leading to failure to repay mortgage loans. In 2020, the default rate of commercial real estate mortgages rose to *** percent, which is the highest value observed since the global financial crisis.

Homeowners in financial distress can use bankruptcy to avoid defaulting on their mortgages, since filing loosens their budget constraints. But the 2005 bankruptcy reform made bankruptcy less favorable to homeowners and therefore caused mortgage defaults to rise. We test this relationship and find that the reform caused prime and subprime mortgage default rates to rise by 23% and 14%, respectively. Default rates rose even more for homeowners who were particularly negatively affected by the reform. We calculate that bankruptcy reform caused mortgage default rates to rise by one percentage point even before the start of the financial crisis. (JEL D14, G01, G21, K35)

We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)

Abstract (en): Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. This paper exploits this policy discontinuity around Texas' interstate borders and uses a multidimensional regression discontinuity design framework to find that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 1.5 percentage points for all mortgages and 4–5 percentage points for non-prime mortgages. Estimated non-prime mortgage default hazards within 25 to 100 miles on either side of the Texas border are about 20 percent smaller when crossing into Texas.

Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans had the highest delinquency rate in the United States in 2024. As of the second quarter of the year, **** percent of one-to-four family housing mortgage loans were ** days or more delinquent. This percentage was lower for conventional loans and Veterans Administration loans. Despite a slight increase, the delinquency rate for all mortgages was one of the lowest on record.

In Hong Kong's banking sector, the default rate on mortgages is very low. In 2024, the delinquency ratio of residential mortgage lending by authorized banking institutions stood at ****. The value of issued mortgages exceeded **** trillion Hong Kong dollars.

Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Commercial Real Estate Loans (Excluding Farmland), Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRCRELEXFACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q1 2025 about farmland, domestic offices, delinquencies, real estate, commercial, domestic, loans, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.

The programs replicate tables and figures from "Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?", by Ganong and Noel. Please see the README file for additional details.

This is replication code for the paper "What Triggers Mortgage Default? New Evidence from Linked Administrative and Survey Data"

Replication for "Consumer Bankruptcy, Mortgage Default and Labor Supply", forthcoming in the International Economic Review (2025)

The mortgage delinquency rate for Veterans Administration (VA) loans in the United States has decreased since 2020. Under the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, the mortgage delinquency rate for VA loans spiked from **** percent in the first quarter of 2020 to **** percent in the second quarter of the year. In the second quarter of 2024, the delinquency rate amounted to **** percent. Historically, VA mortgages have significantly lower delinquency rate than conventional mortgages.

Company Information:

The data set is based upon https://www.kaggle.com/prateikmahendra/loan-data"> Lending Club Information . - TheIrish Dummy Banks is a peer to peer lending bank based in the ireland, in which bank provide funds for potential borrowers and bank earn a profit depending on the risk they take (the borrowers credit score). Irish Fake bank provides loan to their loyal customers. The complete data set is borrowed from Lending Club For more basic information about the company please check out the wikipedia article about the company. This dataset is copied and clean from kaggle but it has been changed. The any kind of similarity is just for learning purposes. I dont have any intention for Plagiarism I just like to be clear myself.

<a src="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lending_Club"> Lending Club Information </a>

The central idea and coding is abstract from Kevin mark ham youtube video series, Introduction to machine learning with scikit-learn video series. You can find link under resources section.

Data Description

• LoanStatNew Description

• addr_state The state provided by the borrower in the loan application

• annual_inc The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower during registration.

• annual_inc_joint The combined self-reported annual income provided by the co-borrowers during registration

• application_type Indicates whether the loan is an individual application or a joint application with two co-borrowers

• collection_recovery_fee post charge off collection fee

• collections_12_mths_ex_med Number of collections in 12 months excluding medical collections

• delinq_2yrs The number of 30+ days past-due incidences of delinquency in the borrower's credit file for the past 2 years

• desc Loan description provided by the borrower

• dti A ratio calculated using the borrower’s total monthly debt payments on the total debt obligations, - - - excluding mortgage and the requested LC loan, divided by the borrower’s self-reported monthly income.

• dti_joint A ratio calculated using the co-borrowers' total monthly payments on the total debt obligations, - excluding mortgages and the requested LC loan, divided by the co-borrowers' combined self-reported monthly income

• earliest_cr_line The month the borrower's earliest reported credit line was opened

• emp_length Employment length in years. Possible values are between 0 and 10 where 0 means less than one year

• and 10 means ten or more years.

• emp_title The job title supplied by the Borrower when applying for the loan.*

• fico_range_high The upper boundary range the borrower’s FICO at loan origination belongs to.

• fico_range_low The lower boundary range the borrower’s FICO at loan origination belongs to.

• funded_amnt The total amount committed to that loan at that point in time.

• funded_amnt_inv The total amount committed by investors for that loan at that point in time.

• grade LC assigned loan grade

• home_ownership The home ownership status provided by the borrower during registration. Our values are: RENT, OWN, MORTGAGE, OTHER.

The FHA Office of Housing last conducted a series of mortgage loan sales under the Single Family Loan Sale (SFLS) Initiative in 2016. The current sales structure consisted of whole loan, competitive auctions, offering for purchase defaulted single family mortgages provided by FHA-approved loan servicers. The loans sold contained specified representations and warranties and may be sold with post-sale restrictions and/or reporting requirements. FHA sold loans in large national pools, as well as loan pools in designated geographical areas that are aimed at a neighborhood stabilization outcome (“NSO pools”).