With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

Pawn shops have faltered in recent years, as economic stabilization following the pandemic curtailed their appeal in the broader market. Prior to 2020, strong performance in the broader economy reduced demand for pawn loans from low-income consumers that experienced improvements in their financial positions. Consumers who fall below the poverty line represent the primary source of demand for pawn loans and when their number is reduced, pawn loan demand declines. While merchandise sales grew in line with rising consumers, large-scale fiscal programs by the federal government amid the pandemic curtailed demand for pawn loans by low income consumers who lost their jobs or experienced reduced incomes otherwise. In recent years, however, higher inflationary pressures did boost some pawn shops, as low-income consumers hardest hit by inflation looked to pawn shops to raise money quickly. Despite this trend, revenue fell at a CAGR of 2.4% to an estimated $3.0 billion over the past five years, including an estimated 0.1% boost in 2024. Pawn shops have endured countervailing trends. Improving economic performance outside of the pandemic-era recession resulted in reduced demand for pawn loans, but increased demand for merchandise sales. However, as inflation has risen, prices on valuable commodities such as gold spiked, resulting in greater consumer interest to sell physical goods and commodities in exchange for cash, which also stabilized profit. Moving forward, pawn shops face an uncertain future. Tighter labor markets and rising per capita disposable income will constrain pawn lending and reduce revenue generated among pawn loans, particularly as credit becomes more accessible with the anticipated declines in interest rates. However, these trends will continue supporting development in the retail merchandise segment, keeping revenue from falling dramatically. Also, lower-income consumers, particularly in larger cities, will continue to depend on pawn loans, providing a relatively stable market for the industry. The proliferation of technology and new concepts like online pawn shops will enable sales and pawn agreements digitally, boosting servicer efficiency and cutting operational expenses. Over the next five years, revenue is expected to slip at a CAGR of 0.7% to an estimated $2.9 billion.