With state courts facing record-breaking caseloads and tightening budgets, jurisdictions around the country have begun to seek alternatives to traditional case processing as early as possible in the criminal justice process. One existing alternative is prosecutor-led diversion, a model which allows jurisdictions to reroute low-level offenders from traditional case-processing at the front-end of the justice process, in many cases prior to formal charge or arraignment. Although prosecutor-led diversion programs (PDPs) have been a part of the American legal landscape for several decades, there is little to no descriptive literature of the model and only sporadic impact evaluations of specific programs. In response, the Center for Court Innovation, the RAND Corporation, and the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys conducted a national, multi-method study with the following goals: (1) to synthesize existing knowledge of PDPs, (2) to produce a rich understanding of existing programs through in-depth case studies of programs in 11 sites nationwide, including program goals, target populations, and policies, and (3) to test PDP effectiveness in reducing recidivism, incarceration, psychosocial problems, and costs to the society and the economy through a prospective impact evaluation of 5 programs at 3 sites. Phase 1 consisted of in-depth interviews with key stakeholders at the 11 sites. Phase 2 consisted of focus groups with program participants, and an impact study of the effects of PDPs on case disposition, use of jail, re-arrest, and cost effectiveness. This collection includes data from the Phase 2 impact study. Five programs from 3 of the 11 sites (Cook County, Illinois, Chittenden County, Vermont, and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin) were selected for quasi-experimental impact evaluations. For each program, the research team obtained a de-identified dataset containing demographics, criminal histories, and instant case outcomes.

The American Bar Association’s annual Survey on Lawyer Discipline (SOLD) reports complaints and charges regarding lawyer misconduct, the caseload per disciplinary attorney, and each state’s budget for attorney discipline. From these reports, we develop five measures of attorney discipline: 1. COMPLAINTS – the percent of attorneys in the state who receive complaints from the public. 2. CHARGED – the percent of attorneys that are charged with some form of misconduct during the year; 3. CHARGED/ COMPLAINTS – the percent of the attorneys receiving COMPLAINTS that are eventually CHARGED with malpractice; 4. BUDGET (in dollars) – the state’s annual budget for implementing attorney discipline relative to the number of attorneys; and 5. CASELOAD – the number of AD cases per state disciplinary attorney per year.

In our study "ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE, THE QUALITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WITHIN THE UNITED STATES" we use these measures to examine the quality of legal systems within the United States and the relation between this quality and state economic growth. The panel data set, included here, contains the values of the 5 attorney discipline measures for each state from 2000-2017. We use these data in our study.

Data is collected because of public interest in how the City’s budget is being spent on salary and overtime pay for all municipal employees. Data is input into the City's Personnel Management System (“PMS”) by the respective user Agencies. Each record represents the following statistics for every city employee: Agency, Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial, Agency Start Date, Work Location Borough, Job Title Description, Leave Status as of the close of the FY (June 30th), Base Salary, Pay Basis, Regular Hours Paid, Regular Gross Paid, Overtime Hours worked, Total Overtime Paid, and Total Other Compensation (i.e. lump sum and/or retro payments). This data can be used to analyze how the City's financial resources are allocated and how much of the City's budget is being devoted to overtime. The reader of this data should be aware that increments of salary increases received over the course of any one fiscal year will not be reflected. All that is captured, is the employee's final base and gross salary at the end of the fiscal year. In very limited cases, a check replacement and subsequent refund may reflect both the original check as well as the re-issued check in employee pay totals. NOTE 1: To further improve the visibility into the number of employee OT hours worked, beginning with the FY 2023 report, an updated methodology will be used which will eliminate redundant reporting of OT hours in some specific instances. In the previous calculation, hours associated with both overtime pay as well as an accompanying overtime “companion code” pay were included in the employee total even though they represented pay for the same period of time. With the updated methodology, the dollars shown on the Open Data site will continue to be inclusive of both types of overtime, but the OT hours will now reflect a singular block of time, which will result in a more representative total of employee OT hours worked. The updated methodology will primarily impact the OT hours associated with City employees in uniformed civil service titles. The updated methodology will be applied to the Open Data posting for Fiscal Year 2023 and cannot be applied to prior postings and, as a result, the reader of this data should not compare OT hours prior to the 2023 report against OT hours published starting Fiscal Year 2023. The reader of this data may continue to compare OT dollars across all published Fiscal Years on Open Data. NOTE 2: As a part of FISA-OPA’s routine process for reviewing and releasing Citywide Payroll Data, data for some agencies (specifically NYC Police Department (NYPD) and the District Attorneys’ Offices (Manhattan, Kings, Queens, Richmond, Bronx, and Special Narcotics)) have been redacted since they are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law, POL § 87(2)(f), on the ground that disclosure of the information could endanger the life and safety of the public servants listed thereon. They are further exempt from disclosure pursuant to POL § 87(2)(e)(iii), on the ground that any release of the information would identify confidential sources or disclose confidential information relating to a criminal investigation, and POL § 87(2)(e)(iv), on the ground that disclosure would reveal non-routine criminal investigative techniques or procedures. Some of these redactions will appear as XXX in the name columns.