Unemployment Rate in the United States decreased to 4.10 percent in June from 4.20 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

In 2023, it was estimated that over 161 million Americans were in some form of employment, while 3.64 percent of the total workforce was unemployed. This was the lowest unemployment rate since the 1950s, although these figures are expected to rise in 2023 and beyond. 1980s-2010s Since the 1980s, the total United States labor force has generally risen as the population has grown, however, the annual average unemployment rate has fluctuated significantly, usually increasing in times of crisis, before falling more slowly during periods of recovery and economic stability. For example, unemployment peaked at 9.7 percent during the early 1980s recession, which was largely caused by the ripple effects of the Iranian Revolution on global oil prices and inflation. Other notable spikes came during the early 1990s; again, largely due to inflation caused by another oil shock, and during the early 2000s recession. The Great Recession then saw the U.S. unemployment rate soar to 9.6 percent, following the collapse of the U.S. housing market and its impact on the banking sector, and it was not until 2016 that unemployment returned to pre-recession levels. 2020s 2019 had marked a decade-long low in unemployment, before the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic saw the sharpest year-on-year increase in unemployment since the Great Depression, and the total number of workers fell by almost 10 million people. Despite the continuation of the pandemic in the years that followed, alongside the associated supply-chain issues and onset of the inflation crisis, unemployment reached just 3.67 percent in 2022 - current projections are for this figure to rise in 2023 and the years that follow, although these forecasts are subject to change if recent years are anything to go by.

The benchmark interest rate in the United States was last recorded at 4.50 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Fed Funds Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Unemployment Rate in Japan remained unchanged at 2.50 percent in May. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Japan Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

The inflation rate in the United States declined significantly between June 2022 and May 2025, despite rising inflationary pressures towards the end of 2024. The peak inflation rate was recorded in June 2022, at *** percent. In August 2023, the Federal Reserve's interest rate hit its highest level during the observed period, at **** percent, and remained unchanged until September 2024, when the Federal Reserve implemented its first rate cut since September 2021. By January 2025, the rate dropped to **** percent, signalling a shift in monetary policy. What is the Federal Reserve interest rate? The Federal Reserve interest rate, or the federal funds rate, is the rate at which banks and credit unions lend to and borrow from each other. It is one of the Federal Reserve's key tools for maintaining strong employment rates, stable prices, and reasonable interest rates. The rate is determined by the Federal Reserve and adjusted eight times a year, though it can be changed through emergency meetings during times of crisis. The Fed doesn't directly control the interest rate but sets a target rate. It then uses open market operations to influence rates toward this target. Ways of measuring inflation Inflation is typically measured using several methods, with the most common being the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI tracks the price of a fixed basket of goods and services over time, providing a measure of the price changes consumers face. At the end of 2023, the CPI in the United States was ****** percent, up from ****** a year earlier. A more business-focused measure is the producer price index (PPI), which represents the costs of firms.

Unemployment Rate in Germany remained unchanged at 6.30 percent in July. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Germany Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

The unemployment rate of the United Kingdom was 4.7 percent in May 2025, an increase from the previous month. Before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK had relatively low levels of unemployment, comparable with the mid-1970s. Between January 2000 and the most recent month, unemployment was highest in November 2011, when the unemployment rate hit 8.5 percent. Will unemployment continue to rise in 2025? Although low by historic standards, there has been a noticeable uptick in the UK's unemployment rate, with other labor market indicators also pointing to further loosening. In December 2024, the number of job vacancies in the UK fell to its lowest level since May 2021, while payrolled employment declined by 47,000 compared with November. Whether this is a continuation of a broader cooling of the labor market since 2022 or a reaction to more recent economic developments, such as upcoming tax rises for employers, remains to be seen. Forecasts made in late 2024 suggest that the unemployment rate will remain relatively stable in 2025, averaging out at 4.1 percent and falling again to four percent in 2026.
Demographics of the unemployed As of the third quarter of 2024, the unemployment rate for men was slightly higher than that of women, at 4.4 percent, compared to 4.1 percent. During the financial crisis at the end of the 2000s, the unemployment rate for women peaked at a quarterly rate of 7.7 percent, whereas for men, the rate was 9.1 percent. Unemployment is also heavily associated with age, and young people in general are far more vulnerable to unemployment than older age groups. In late 2011, for example, the unemployment rate for those aged between 16 and 24 reached 22.3 percent, compared with 8.2 percent for people aged 25 to 34, while older age groups had even lower peaks during this time.

The statistic reflects the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in member states of the European Union in November 2024. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Spain in November 2024 was 11.2 percent.The unemployment rate represents the share of the unemployed in all potential employees available to the job market. Unemployment rates in the EU The unemployment rate is an important measure of a country or region’s economic health, and despite unemployment levels in the European Union falling slightly from a peak in early 2013 , they remain high, especially in comparison to what the rates were before the worldwide recession started in 2008. This confirms the continuing stagnation in European markets, which hits young job seekers particularly hard as they struggle to compete against older, more experienced workers for a job, suffering under jobless rates twice as high as general unemployment. Some companies, such as Microsoft and Fujitsu, have created thousands of jobs in some of the countries which have particularly dire unemployment rates, creating a beacon of hope. However, some industries such as information technology, face the conundrum of a deficit of qualified workers in the local unemployed work force, and have to hire workers from abroad instead of helping decrease the local unemployment rates. This skills mismatch has no quick solution, as workers require time for retraining to fill the openings in the growing science-, technology-, or engineering-based jobs, and too few students choose degrees that would help them obtain these positions. Worldwide unemployment also remains high, with the rates being worst in the Middle East and North Africa. Estimates by the International Labour Organization predict that the problem will stabilize in coming years, but not improve until at least 2017.

Unemployment Rate in Brazil decreased to 5.80 percent in June from 6.20 percent in May of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Brazil Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Unemployment Rate in the United Kingdom increased to 4.70 percent in May from 4.60 percent in April of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United Kingdom Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Unemployment rate, participation rate, and employment rate by educational attainment, gender and age group, annual.

Construction machinery lessors play a crucial role by leasing heavy construction and transportation equipment to support downstream construction markets. The advantages of renting are particularly beneficial for contractors as it alleviates them from bearing the burdens of depreciation and maintenance costs, ultimately contributing to increased revenue for lessors. The appeal of renting is heightened because many contractors lack adequate space to store machinery. While the pandemic caused slumps among commercial and industrial markets, low-interest rates spurred an uptick in residential projects, providing a cushion for lessors. As the pandemic waned, interest rates spiked as inflationary concerns crept up, weakening residential construction. Even so, this prompted industrial and commercial sectors to resume projects that were held off. Overall, revenue for construction machinery lessors is set to swell at a CAGR of 1.3%, reaching $34.9 billion through the end of 2023, including a 1.6% hike in 2024 alone. Profitability has also remained steady as lessors can pass off equipment price hikes to renters. Increasing construction activity and continued government investment will aid performance through the end of 2029. The recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill, extending funding for highways, bridges, roads and infrastructure projects until 2026, is set to generate many new business opportunities for rental companies. Residential activity is set to bounce back amid expected interest rate cuts, which also lower the cost of borrowing, making rentals less expensive. With barriers to entry remaining low, an influx of new lessors will enter the mix. Even so, larger lessors will seek economies of scale and continue acquiring smaller businesses to expand their services. Revenue is set to expand at a CAGR of 1.6% to $37.8 billion through the end of 2029.

The industry is composed of non-depository institutions that conduct primary and secondary market lending. Operators in this industry include government agencies in addition to non-agency issuers of mortgage-related securities. Through 2025, rising per capita disposable income and low levels of unemployment helped fuel the increase in primary and secondary market sales of collateralized debt. Nonetheless, due to the pandemic and the sharp contraction in economic activity in 2020, revenue gains were limited, but have climbed as the economy has normalized and interest rates shot up to tackle rampant inflation. However, in 2024 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates as inflationary pressures eased and is expected to be cut further in 2025. Overall, these trends, along with volatility in the real estate market, have caused revenue to slump at a CAGR of 1.5% to $485.0 billion over the past five years, including an expected decline of 1.1% in 2025 alone. The high interest rate environment has hindered real estate loan demand and caused industry profit to shrink to 11.6% of revenue in 2025. Higher access to credit and higher disposable income have fueled primary market lending over much of the past five years, increasing the variety and volume of loans to be securitized and sold in secondary markets. An additional boon for institutions has been an increase in interest rates in the latter part of the period, which raised interest income as the spread between short- and long-term interest rates increased. These macroeconomic factors, combined with changing risk appetite and regulation in the secondary markets, have resurrected collateralized debt trading since the middle of the period. Although the FED cut interest rates in 2024, this will reduce interest income for the industry but increase loan demand. Although institutions are poised to benefit from a strong economic recovery as inflationary pressures ease, relatively steady rates of homeownership, coupled with declines in the 30-year mortgage rate, are expected to damage the primary market through 2030. Shaky demand from commercial banking and uncertainty surrounding inflationary pressures will influence institutions' decisions on whether or not to sell mortgage-backed securities and commercial loans to secondary markets. These trends are expected to cause revenue to decline at a CAGR of 0.8% to $466.9 billion over the five years to 2030.

In May 2025, the employment rate in the United Kingdom was 75.2 percent, up from 75.1 percent in the previous month. After almost dropping below 70 percent in 2011, the employment rate in the United Kingdom started to climb at a relatively fast pace, peaking in early 2020. Due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, employment declined to 74.6 percent by January 2021. Although not quite at pre-pandemic levels, the employment rate has since recovered. Labor market trouble in 2025? Although unemployment in the UK spiked at 5.3 percent in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, it fell throughout most of 2022, to just 3.6 percent in August 2022. Around that time, the number of job vacancies in the UK was also at quite high levels, reaching a peak of 1.3 million by May 2022. The strong labor market put employees in quite a strong position, perhaps encouraging the high number of resignations that took place around that time. Since 2023, however, the previously hot labor market has cooled, with unemployment reaching 4.6 percent in April 2025 and job vacancies falling to a four-year low of 736,000 in May 2025. Furthermore, the number of employees on UK payrolls has fallen by 227,500 in the first five months of the year, indicating that 2025 will be a tough one for the labor market. Headline economic measures revised in early 2025 Along with the unemployment rate, the UK's inflation rate is also expected to be higher than initially thought in 2025, reaching a rate of 3.2 percent for the year. The economy will also grow at a slower pace of one percent rather than the initial prediction of two percent. Though these negative trends are not expected to continue in the long term, the current government has already expended significant political capital on unpopular decisions, such as the cutting of Winter Fuel Payments to pensioners in 2024. As of June 2025, they are almost as unpopular as the previous government, with a net approval rating of -52 percent.

Unemployment Rate in Spain decreased to 10.29 percent in the second quarter of 2025 from 11.36 percent in the first quarter of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Spain Unemployment Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyse how a carbon tax and/or a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) would affect macroeconomic parameters in Turkey. The modelling work is based on three main policy options for the government by 2030, in the context of Turkey’s mitigation target under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), that is, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21% from its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030: (i) improving the productivity of renewable energy by 1% per annum, a target already included in the INDC, (ii) introducing a new flat rate tax of 15% per ton of CO2 (of a reference carbon price in world markets) imposed on emissions originating from carbon-intensive sectors, and (iii) introducing a new ETS with caps on emission permits. Our base path scenario projects that GHG emissions in 2030 will be much lower than Turkey’s BAU trajectory of growth from 430 Mt CO2-eq in 2013 to 1.175 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, implying that the government’s commitment is largely redundant. On the other hand, if the official target is assumed to be only a simple reduction percentage in 2030 (by 21%), but based on our more realistic base path, the government’s current renewable energy plans will not be sufficient to reach it. Turkey’s official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway;A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030;The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors’ shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options;Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs;Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation. Turkey’s official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway; A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030; The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors’ shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options; Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs; Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation.

Public sector employment in China has exhibited pronounced non-cyclical characteristics, with a recruiting scale and wage level showing limited responsiveness to economic fluctuations. The allure of civil service jobs in China has seen a significant resurgence post-COVID-19, with an observable increase in demand among educated job seekers for stable government positions amid growing economic uncertainties. This study investigates the implications of public sector employment rigidity on macroeconomic stability using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model integrated with search and matching (S&M) theory. Simulations incorporating alternative government job policies reveal that non-cyclical public employment exacerbates macroeconomic cyclical fluctuations. The low elasticity of public sector wages with respect to corporate wages fosters stable expectations among workers regarding the future value of government jobs, increasing the perceived value of the current state of unemployment. This leads job seekers to voluntarily remain unemployed, reducing labor supply to firms. Meantime, it preserves workers’ bargaining power with firms, reinforcing wage stickiness and undermining the stabilizing role of price adjustments in employment. Hypothetical scenario analyses indicate that adopting a pro-cyclical wage policy for the public sector can mitigate the obstacles of wage cuts for firms, stimulate the creation of new jobs during economic downturns, and consequently reduce the magnitude and duration of rising unemployment rates. In contrast, maintaining a non-cyclical public sector wage may not prevent a continuous rise in unemployment or a worsening economic situation, even with expanded sector recruitment. This finding holds significant relevance in the context of the post-COVID era characterized by an economic slump and employment tension, providing theoretical support for establishing a transparent and flexible wage adjustment mechanism in the public sector that is linked to market conditions.

In 2024, the unemployment rate in the United Arab Emirates was at 2.13 percent of the total labor force. The unemployment rate depicts the share of a country's labor force without jobs but available and actively seeking employment. The United Arab Emirates’ unemployment rate is quite low, and the region has one of lowest amounts of unemployed persons worldwide. Oil-based economyOne of the most important economic centers of Western Asia, the United Arab Emirates’ gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to around 424.64 billion U.S. dollars in 2018. The United Arab Emirates’ economy is particularly reliant on oil exports, and it holds the seventh-largest proved oil reserves. Most reserves are located in Abu Dhabi in a combination of offshore and onshore locations. UAE populationDue to the profitable nature of the petroleum industry and a relatively small population, the country has one of the highest GDP per capita rates in the world, at over 40,700 U.S. dollars in 2018. The country’s population is mostly comprised of expatriate workers, the majority of whom who have cultural backgrounds from South Asia, Egypt, and the Philippines. Most of the country’s population fall between the ages of 15 and 64 years.

This dissertation seeks to better understand poverty in the United States. The first two chapters examine the impacts of receiving unemployment insurance (UI) on low-wage, recently displaced workers. The third chapter documents earnings growth and migration across neighborhoods, focusing on high-poverty neighborhoods. Housing is a common theme throughout the dissertation. The first chapter suggests that reducing housing insecurity may be a mechanism by which UI reduces crime, the second chapter explores how UI may prevent homelessness, and the third chapter examines individuals' neighborhood choices that vary with earnings and over the life cycle.

The first chapter examines the impact of UI on subsequent criminal justice system involvement using linked UI and jail administrative data. I estimate this effect using a regression discontinuity design that exploits the minimum earnings requirements for UI. I provide evidence indicating that being barely eligible for UI decreases arrest probability. Most of this overall reduction is driven by reducing assault arrests. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this crime reduction generates large public benefits approximately equal to the fiscal cost of loosening monetary eligibility requirements.

The second chapter, joint work with Robert Collinson, examines the impact of UI on extreme material distress, particularly stays in New York City homeless shelters. We estimate the impact of UI eligibility on homelessness using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits a cutoff based on workers' highest quarterly earnings in the past year. We find that UI eligibility reduces homelessness. Not accounting for how UI prevents extreme distress undervalues the benefits of UI.

The third chapter, joint work with coauthors, uses administrative data to document a high degree of migration across neighborhoods and neighborhood types defined in terms of poverty rate and median income. Neighborhood quality increases over an individual's life cycle, and people also move to better neighborhoods in response to earnings improvements. Poor neighborhoods tend to remain poor because of a dynamic process in which initial residents experience high earnings growth but disproportionately out-migrate when earnings improve, contrasting with a pure ``poverty trap” understanding of persistent concentrated poverty.