With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

One of the major duties the Bank of England (BoE) is tasked with is keeping inflation rates low and stable. The usual tactic for keeping inflation rates down, and therefore the price of goods and services stable by the Bank of England is through lowering the Bank Rate. Such a measure was used in 2008 during the global recession when the BoE lowered the bank base rate from **** percent to *** percent. Due to the economic fears surrounding the COVID-19 virus, as of the 19th of March 2020, the bank base rate was set to its lowest ever standing. The issue with lowering interest rates is that there is an end limit as to how low they can go. Quantitative easing Quantitative easing is a measure that central banks can use to inject money into the economy to hopefully boost spending and investment. Quantitative easing is the creation of digital money in order to purchase government bonds. By purchasing large amounts of government bonds, the interest rates on those bonds lower. This in turn means that the interest rates offered on loans for the purchasing of mortgages or business loans also lowers, encouraging spending and stimulating the economy. Large enterprises jump at the opportunity After the initial stimulus of *** billion British pounds through quantitative easing in March 2020, the Bank of England announced in June that they would increase the amount by a further 100 billion British pounds. In March of 2020, the headline flow of borrowing by non-financial industries including construction, transport, real estate and the manufacturing sectors increased significantly.

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.

This dataset provides information on the three macroeconomic sectoral balances, covering 195 countries over 45 years.

Macroeconomic analysis often focuses on the 'twin deficits' - the government deficit and the current account deficit. This is an incomplete view which leaves out the private sector balance.

The three sectoral balances must sum up to zero, by accounting identity (UN System of National Accounts 2008):

(S – I) + (T – G) + (M – X) = 0

Economists using the two-dimensional view have famously missed the global financial crisis, while those using accounting models covering all three sectoral balances were able to predict it (Bezemer 2010, Galbraith 2012). However, data on private sector deficits/surpluses is not readily available. Only the public and current account balances are published regularly by the IMF's World Economic Outlook.

Beyond developed countries, looking at the private sector balance is critical for analyzing and crafting policies in developing countries. The frequently recommended policy of 'fiscal consolidation', i.e. reducing public deficits, is revealed in the sectoral balances to also reduce, ceteris paribus, the private sector surplus (or increase its deficit), slowing down or even reversing development and poverty reduction (Assa and Morgan 2025).

The dataset was calculated based on two publicly available series from the IMF World Economic Outlook (downloaded October 2025): General government net lending/borrowing (coded as GOV) and Current account balance (coded as CAB). From this we calculated the private sector balance as PRV = CAB - GOV. We converted CAB to ROW (ROW = -CAB), the rest of the world balance, and made sure that ROW, GOV and PRV add up to zero as required by the national accounting identity. All years containing IMF forecasts were removed.

References:

Assa, J., & Morgan, M. (2025). The General Relativity of Fiscal Space: Theory and Applications. Review of Political Economy, 1-35.

Bezemer, D. J. (2010). Understanding financial crisis through accounting models. Accounting, organizations and society, 35(7), 676-688.

Galbraith, J. K. (2012). Who are these economists, anyway?. In Contributions in Stock-flow Modeling: Essays in Honor of Wynne Godley (pp. 63-75). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

United Nations (2008). System of National Accounts 2008. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2008.asp

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

Objectives: Government spending on social care in England reduced substantially in real terms following the economic crisis in 2008, meanwhile emergency admissions to hospitals have increased. We aimed to assess the extent to which reductions in social care spend on older people have led to increases in emergency hospital admissions. Design: We used negative binomial regression for panel data to assess the relationship between emergency hospital admissions and government spend on social care for older people. We adjusted for population size and for levels of deprivation and health. Setting: Hospitals and adult social care services in England between April 2005 And March 2016. Participants: People aged 65 years and over resident in 132 local councils. Outcome measures: Primary outcome variable - emergency hospital admissions of adults aged 65 years and over. Secondary outcome measure - emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions of adults aged 65 years and over. Results: We found no significant relationship between the changes in the rate of government spend (£’000s) on social care for older people within councils and our primary outcome variable, emergency hospital admissions (IRR 1.009, 95% CI 0.965-1.056) or our secondary outcome measure, admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (IRR 0.975, 95% CI 0.917-1.038). Conclusions: We found no evidence to support the view that reductions in government spend on social care since 2008 have led to increases in emergency hospital admissions in older people. Policy makers may wish to review schemes, such as the Better Care Fund, which are predicated on a relationship between social care provision and emergency hospital admissions of older people.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomic policy returned to the political agenda, and the influence of Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus rose (and then fell) in expert circles. Much less is known, however, about whether and when Keynesian prescriptions for countercyclical spending have any support among the general public. We use a survey experiment, fielded twice, to recover the extent to which UK respondents hold such countercyclical attitudes. Our results indicate that public opinion was countercyclical -- Keynesian -- in 2016. We then use Eurobarometer data to estimate the same basic parameter for the population for the period 2010-2017. The observational results validate our experimental findings for the later period, but also provide evidence that the UK population held procyclical views at the start of the period. Thus, there appear to be important dynamics in public opinion on a key macroeconomic policy issue.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

This is a qualitative data collection. To understand the processes and motivations behind changes in labour market behaviour during periods of economic recession, this research project recorded the experiences and views of couple-households exposed to job loss in the Great Recession. Conducted as part of a larger ESRC-funded quantitative project, qualitative interviews were carried out with a purposive sample derived from the Understanding Society Innovation Panel. (The Understanding Society Innovation Panel is an annual panel survey that collects a wide range of information about the economic and social circumstances of those living in 1500 households across Britain.) Using the wealth of longitudinal information in the Understanding Society Innovation Panel, a sampling frame of approximately 150 couple households was identified where someone had either lost their job or was working reduced hours in the period 2008 to 2011. A carefully selected sample of 17 households were followed up and in-depth interviews were conducted with the couple-member who had experienced job loss and, where possible, their partner. The selection process was designed to assemble a sample reflecting a diverse range of household and family profiles; namely, couples with and without children, older and younger children; the pre-retirement phase; a range of incomes; and labour market areas across England more and less affected by the recession. Wherever feasible, partners were interviewed separately to allow each participant the opportunity to express their personal views most freely. Overall this led to 30 interviews, each of about 45 minutes in length. Fieldwork took place between October 2012 and February 2013 and consent was obtained verbally. The research design incorporates the ability to link the interview transcripts to Understanding Society Innovation Panel survey data for future combined analysis of qualitative and quantitative material, subject to Special Licence.

Data collection consists of 40 semi-structured in-depth interviews (10 in the first stage and 30 in the second) and 2 focus groups. The research presented here is a case study of the sociopolitical transformations of Barcelona in the years of the economic crisis that began in 2008, with a special emphasis on the period 2011-2017. The study was developed in two stages in order to grasp the evolution of an object of study that is very recent and that has gone through importance breaking points over the last years: a first exploratory stage between October and November 2015 and a second stage between July and December 2016. Austerity governance, defined as a sustained agenda for reducing public spending, poses new challenges for the organisation of relationships between government, business and citizens in many parts of the world. This project compares how these challenges are addressed in eight countries: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, the UK and the USA. Governments have long sought effective ways of engaging citizen activists and business leaders in decision making, through many formal and informal mechanisms - what we term collaborative governance. The focus of our research is how collaboration contributes to the governance of austerity. Governments and public service leaders argue that collaboration with businesses, voluntary organisations and active citizens is essential for addressing the many challenges posed by austerity. The challenges include transforming public services to cope with cuts, changing citizen expectations and managing demand for services and enhancing the legitimacy of difficult policy decisions by involving people outside government in making them. But at the same time, collaboration can be exclusionary. For example, if there are high levels of protest, governmental and business elites may collaborate in ways that marginalise ordinary citizens to push through unpopular policies. Our challenge is to explore different ways in which collaboration works or fails in governing austerity and whether it is becoming more or less important in doing so.

Austerity governance, defined as a sustained agenda for reducing public spending, poses new challenges for the organisation of relationships between government, business and citizens in many parts of the world. This project compares how these challenges are addressed in eight countries: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, the UK and the USA. Governments have long sought effective ways of engaging citizen activists and business leaders in decision making, through many formal and informal mechanisms - what we term collaborative governance. The focus of our research is how collaboration contributes to the governance of austerity. Governments and public service leaders argue that collaboration with businesses, voluntary organisations and active citizens is essential for addressing the many challenges posed by austerity. The challenges include transforming public services to cope with cuts, changing citizen expectations and managing demand for services and enhancing the legitimacy of difficult policy decisions by involving people outside government in making them. But at the same time, collaboration can be exclusionary. For example, if there are high levels of protest, governmental and business elites may collaborate in ways that marginalise ordinary citizens to push through unpopular policies. Our challenge is to explore different ways in which collaboration works or fails in governing austerity and whether it is becoming more or less important in doing so. We propose to compare the role of collaboration in governing austerity in eight cities of the aforementioned countries: Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal and Nantes. It is in towns and cities that government has the most immediate and closest day-to-day engagement with citizens and it is for this reason that we chose to locate our research at the urban scale. Our primary objective is to understand whether, and if so how, collaboration among public officials, citizens, business leaders and other actors contributes to austerity governance. For example is there more collaboration, less or are we seeing different kinds of collaboration emerging? Who, if anyone, refuses to collaborate and with what implications for governing austerity? Might collaboration be a way to subvert or resist aspects of austerity? The research is comparative, meaning that it is looking for patterns and to see what lessons and insights countries in different parts of the world might draw from one another. Finding ways to collaborate with citizens has always been important for central and local governments, although collaboration has been a higher political priority in the past 20 years than before. Our study will tell politicians and public officials much about how collaboration works as a way of governing austerity. However we are not trying to 'sell' collaboration, or suggest that those suffering from cuts and wanting to resist them should collaborate if they do not wish to. For citizen activists our research will highlight different strategies and options for speaking truth to power - by engaging with city government and local business elites, or refusing to do so and perhaps focusing on protest instead. We will discover when collaboration serves the ends of community groups and when it does not. Participants in our study, and others, will have the opportunity to discuss these issues at a series of local events, at which we will discuss our findings. The research will also engage with important academic debates about the changing nature of governance. In gathering and comparing a large body of data we will learn about the changing role of government under austerity and whether governing is becoming more elite-focused, remote and hierarchical, or perhaps even more inclusive despite the challenging times in which we live.

The Direct Real Estate Activities industry have come up against numerous headwinds in recent years, ranging from the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 to the high base rate environment in the years since, which has inflated borrowing costs for potential buyers. This is a sharp contrast to the ultra-low interest environment seen over the decade following the 2008 financial crisis. Still, revenue is forecast to edge upwards at a compound annual rate of 0.6% over the five years through 2025 to €622.9 billion, including an anticipated rise of 0.8% in 2025. Despite weak revenue growth, profitability remains strong, with the average industry profit margin standing at an estimated 18.9% in 2025. Central banks across Europe adopted aggressive monetary policy in the two years through 2023 in an effort to curb spiralling inflation. This ratcheted up borrowing costs and hit the real estate sector. In the residential property market, mortgage rates picked up and hit housing transaction levels. However, the level of mortgage rate hikes has varied across Europe, with the UK experiencing the largest rise, meaning the dent to UK real estate demand was more pronounced. Commercial real estate has also struggled due to inflationary pressures, supply chain disruptions and rising rates. Alongside this, the market’s stock of office space isn’t able to satisfy business demand, with companies placing a greater emphasis on high-quality space and environmental impact. Properties in many areas haven't been suitable due to their lack of green credentials. Nevertheless, things are looking up, as interest rates have been falling across Europe over the two years through 2025, reducing borrowing costs and boosting the number of property transactions, which is aiding revenue growth for estate agents. Revenue is slated to grow at a compound annual rate of 4.5% over the five years through 2030 to €777.6 billion. Economic conditions are set to improve in the short term, which will boost consumer and business confidence, ramping up the number of property transactions in both the residential and commercial real estate markets. However, estate agents may look to adjust their offerings to align with the data centre boom to soak up the demand from this market, while also adhering to sustainability commitments.

Investment trusts have navigated a turbulent environment over recent years, characterised by regulatory changes and uncertain economic conditions. While demand for investment trusts has stayed fairly strong, alternative investment vehicles like open-ended investment companies have put pressure with their competitive prices, encouraging investment trusts to band together through consolidation to drive down fees charged thanks to economies of scale. Revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 2.9% over the five years through 2025-26 to £1.7 billion, including estimated growth of 6.5% in 2025-26, while the average industry profit margin is anticipated to be 27.4%. After the financial crisis in 2008, ultra-low interest rates supported equity growth as investors sought attractive returns from companies supported by cheap lending rates. This environment came to an end in 2022, as interest rates picked up rapidly amid spiralling inflation. As a result, bond values plummeted, and stock markets recorded lacklustre growth, hurting investment income. Although the rising base rate environment persisted into 2023-24, investors priced in rate cuts near the end of 2023, triggering a rally in stock markets. Capital also flowed into bonds as investors sought to lock in higher yields before they would potentially decline in 2024-25. In 2025-26, trusts will likely limit their exposure to US markets despite healthy growth seen from big tech firms in 2024-25, cautious of US fiscal policy, rising debt and the risk that trade tariffs will trigger a recession. Bond markets will also remain volatile, with markets unsure about the speed of rate cuts amid trade tensions. However, a declining base rate environment will drive prices up and support returns for investment trusts. Investment trust revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 4.6% over the five years through 2029-30 to £2.1 billion. Investors will continue to reduce their exposure to the dollar, with the European Stoxx index positioned for healthy growth in the short term, being seen as an effective safe haven in uncertain times. However, regulatory changes proposed by the Financial Conduct Authority have been contentious, putting investment trusts at a disadvantage to alternative investment vehicles like OEICs. Investment trusts will seek acquisitive growth, using mergers and acquisitions to minimise fixed costs through scale and ramp up competitiveness.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

Regtech is making its way into insurance. Regulation governing financial services providers has expanded substantially since the outbreak of the global economic crisis of 2008. Keeping pace with changes has become extremely burdensome to financial institutions and insurers alike, while the cost of complying with such requirements has hiked. Regtech can improve data management capabilities and provide insurers with increased automation and data-driven insights in areas such as reporting, regulatory compliance, and financial risk management. In the past few years, investments in regtech startups have been on the rise, reaching a record high in 2018. Insurers are waking up to the potential benefits of regtech, triggering an increase in the number of partnerships. Despite the hype, regtech is still in its infancy and its potential remains untapped. Read More

The statistic shows the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom from 1999 to 2024. The UK's unemployment rate decreased to 4.11 percent in 2024. Unemployment and the economy of the United Kingdom The global financial crisis of 2008 left many nations with high inflation and increasing unemployment rates. The United Kingdom, however, has attempted and successfully lowered the unemployment rate since 2009. The UK is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe, the G7, the G8, the G20, NATO, and World Trade Organization. It is therefore one of the biggest and most important economic powers in the world. It consists of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in 2014, the UK population amounted to over 64 million people. The same year, it reported the sixth largest gross domestic product in the world, reaching more than 2.8 billion U.S. dollars - and with a prospering economy, its GDP is on the upswing: It is estimated that the GDP in the United Kingdom will grow by approximately 3 percent in 2015 in comparison to the previous year. Regarding unemployment, the UK has never been "typically European". Europe's unemployment rate has been relatively high in comparison to other world regions; the unemployment rate in developed countries and the European Union in 2014 was around 7.8 percent. Meanwhile, the global unemployment rate in 2014 was an estimated 5.9 percent. Despite reporting the third highest unemployment rate in major industrial and emerging countries, behind France and India, the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom is much lower than the European Union rate.

This research draws on interview-based research that took place between May and June 2021 to capture the experience of staff and volunteers at a London food co-op that set up a shopping service for vulnerable people at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. As well as reflecting on the food co-op, what it is and their relationship to it, participants discuss the foundation of the shopping (shop and drop) service and their relationship to it. They also explore broader topics such as the wider impacts of COVID-19 on their own lives and life in the UK, their opinion on the governmental response to COVID-19, and their understanding of concepts such as mutual aid, cooperation and community, which became so prevalent during the pandemic.

The financial crisis of 2008 and resultant period of austerity have had a significant impact on the nature of politics, the economy and the lives of everyday citizens in Britain. These political-economic shifts have informed and adjusted the ideals, practices and structures of community organising, raising questions about the nature of citizenship, grassroots political action and the structures of society in Britain today. The COVID-19 pandemic is further highlighting issues of inequality, while catalysing more community organising and network building. In the wake of Brexit, tensions around issues such as welfare, immigration and identity have also become increasingly polarising. This research takes an ethnographic approach to experiences of social and political-economic change, community-building and collective organising to offer a nuanced representation of life in contemporary Britain and the impacts of increasingly neoliberal policies on food and housing.

Despite the fact that Britain is one of the richest countries in the world, more than 8 million people are suffering from food insecurity today (Lambie-Mumford 2017). Where food has historically been one of the biggest income expenditures, it now averages just 10-16% for the lowest income households in the UK (DEFRA 2017). The fact that many people in Britain are unable to afford to eat despite this reduction, highlights one of the stark realities of life in Britain. The country is also undergoing a severe housing crisis, which is felt most acutely in cities such as London (Minton 2017). While housing used to be more affordable than food, by the 1990s this had become the main cost for the average household (Hickman 2008; Cribb et al. 2012). This raises questions about how the social and financial value of food and housing and the levels of urgency attached to each impact on how people mobilise and organise around them today, whether as activists or humanitarians; and what structures, practices and ideologies they draw on.

As part of my doctoral work I conducted two years of ethnographic research with grassroots, retail food co-ops in London. This focused on practices of politics, aid and care in the face of austerity and the growing humanitarian crisis around food. The Politics of Food and Housing in Changing Times aims to consolidate and disseminate my PhD findings, and draw out the issues around housing which were already present in the thesis. In order to further my understanding of housing issues and the forms of collective organising used in relation to them, I will build on my established networks and contacts in London to do two months of fieldwork with housing activists. I will develop a research funding proposal from this work which makes a theoretical contribution to the social sciences on food, housing, political economy, and creates impact for the groups involved. In addition to the production of this new research and proposal, key outputs for the fellowship will include: A monograph based on the PhD thesis that engages with public and social scientific debates on austerity, food and activism, therefore appealing to both academics and practitioners. Three research participant workshops for people and organisations that contributed to my doctoral work. A practitioner workshop on food access and sustainability. I will also present at two international conferences. The fellowship activities are designed to build on each other, benefitting my career progression, while also creating pathways to impact. Drawing on my existing networks in London, the South West and mainland Europe, they will engage academics and practitioners across a range of disciplinary and professional backgrounds to share experiences and findings and develop tools in relation to the politics of food and housing, sustainability, poverty alleviation, community-building and social cohesion; and to build on local and international networks in order to share resources and findings.

We examine the effect of the 2008 economic recession on consumers’ observed expenditures for eco-labelled grocery products. Traditional price theory predicts that consumers change their spending during an economic downturn and we would expect the sales share of eco-labelled products to fall since these are relatively more expensive than non-labelled products. We use supermarket loyalty card data from the UK and show that the recession had widely different effects on the expenditure share of different eco-labelled grocery products. We confirm, empirically, that expenditure shares on organic products declined over the time period under study but the expenditures share for fair-trade products increased over the same period. We evaluate alternative models of decision making to explain our results, viz., a salience model and a model of reputation signalling. We find that both of these models give a plausible explanation of our empirical results.