With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies.

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.

The classification of finiancial crisis interventions

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Financial Crisis and Statitical Classification

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "Fiscal Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis in the UK and the US".

This release looks at the increase in unemployment during the recent economic downturn. Increases in unemployment will be compared across regions in the UK, age groups, gender and other characteristics. Claimant count data will also be included. Source agency: Office for National Statistics Designation: National Statistics Language: English Alternative title: Unemployment during the economic downturn

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

Real household disposable income per person in the United Kingdom is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024/25, with disposable income growth slowing from that point onwards. In 2022/23, disposable income fell by two percent, after falling by 0.1 percent in 2021/22, and 0.3 percent in 2020/21.

This statistic shows the responses that adults from the United Kingdom (UK) gave when asked "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The economic crisis has damaged my confidence in business as a whole'" as of June 2014. A large share of respondents (** percent) felt that the economic crisis had damaged their confidence in business as a whole, and a third of respondents felt neutral to the question.

Extensive research has been conducted on the concept of jobless recoveries and their potential causes, primarily focused on the United States from the 1990s. This paper finds that the prolonged employment downturn following the brief 1980-1981 recession in Britain qualifies as a jobless recovery and then investigates possible contributing factors: labor reallocation across industries, regional employment changes, and job polarization. The United States, which did not have a jobless recovery from the early 1980s recession, is taken as a comparison case. I find that the leading candidate explanation for this jobless recovery was the reallocation of labor across industries. This suggests an important role for structural change in the early 1980s recession and in jobless recoveries more generally.

Massenarbeitslosigkeit und soziales Elend prägten Anfang der dreißiger Jahre das Leben breiter Bevölkerungsschichten in den von der Weltwirtschaftskrise betroffenen Industriegesellschaften. Den zeitgenössischen Politikern und staatlichen Institutionen stellte sich die Lösung dieser Probleme als innenpolitische Hauptaufgabe. Dabei waren sie auf die Mitarbeit der großen wirtschaftlichen Interessenverbände der Arbeitgeber und der Arbeitnehmer angewiesen. Dies galt im europäischen Kontext auf Arbeitnehmerseite insbesondere für die deutsche und britische Gewerkschaftsbewegung, die die mit Abstand stärksten Organisationen im Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbund (IGB) stellten. Die deutschen und britischen Gewerkschaften entwickelten eine Vielzahl an Vorschlägen und Forderungen zur Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit, die in der vorliegenden Studie vergleichend dargestellt werden. Dabei steht der jeweilige Dachverband – auf der einen Seite der Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), auf der anderen Seite der Trade Union Congress (TUC) – im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. Die vergleichende Analyse der gewerkschaftlichen Arbeitslosenpolitik fragt darüber hinaus nach dem jeweiligen Beitrag der beiden Organisationen zum Erhalt der politischen Stabilität in ihrem Land. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zur gewerkschaftlichen Arbeitslosenpolitik in der Weltwirtschaftskrise lässt sich in zwei größere, thematische Teilbereiche aufspalten. Der eine umfasst die politische und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, die Frage nach Radikalisierungstendenzen in der Bevölkerung, den Machtverhältnissen in Staat und Gesellschaft, der Repräsentation gesellschaftlicher Interessen im politischen Bereich, der Veränderung der demokratischen Institutionen. Den zweiten Bereich bilden die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräume von Staat und Gewerkschaften und insbesondere die Frage nach den Durchsetzungs- und Erfolgsmöglichkeiten einer alternativen Konjunkturpolitik.In dem ersten Abschnitt stellt Claudia Kaiser die Strukturen und die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit in ausgewählten Statistiken für das Deutschland und Großbritannien dar. Der zweite Abschnitt zeichnet zunächst ein Gesamtbild der ökonomischen Entwicklung und widmet sich daran anschließend der staatlichen Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Sozialpolitik. Der dritte Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den organisatorischen Handlungsspielräumen des ADGB und des TUC in der Weltwirtschaftskrise. Hier werden insbesondere auch die Mitgliederentwicklung und der Organisationsgrad der gewerkschaftlichen Dachverbände berücksichtigt. In dem vierten Abschnitt werden die deutschen und britischen Arbeitsbeziehungen diskutiert. Die Auseinandersetzung der Gewerkschaften mit dem politischen Extremismus folgt im fünften Abschnitt. Der sechste Abschnitt umfasst die programmatischen Reaktionen auf die Weltwirtschaftskrise (Konjunkturpolitik und Planung). Themen Datentabellen in HISTAT (Thema: Erwerbstätigkeit): Tab. 1 Arbeitslosigkeit im Deutschen Reich und im Vereinigten Königreich (1921-1928)Tab. 2 Arbeitslosigkeit als Anteil an der gesamten Erwerbsbevölkerung: Deutsches Reich, Vereinigtes Königreich, USA (1920-1938)Tab. 3 Entwicklung der Bruttoanlageinvestitionen im Deutschen Reich und im Vereinigten Königreich (1925-1932)Tab. 4 Öffentliche Ausgaben im Vereinigten Königreich und im Deutschen Reich (1925-1939)Tab. 5 Bruttoanlageinvestitionen des privaten, öffentlichen und halböffentlichen Sektors zu konstanten Preisen von 1930 in Großbritannien (1920-1938)Tab. 6 Wohnwirtschaftliche Bruttoanlageinvestitionen des privaten, öffentlichen Sektors in Deutschland (1925-1934)Tab. 7 Mitgliederentwicklung, Organisationsgrad und Parteimitgliedschaft im Trade Union Congress (1918-1939)Tab. 8 Mitgliederentwicklung und Organisationsgrad in den Freien Gewerkschaften (1918-1932)

The government of the United Kingdom borrowed approximately 2.6 percent worth of its GDP in the 2024/25 financial year, compared with 2.3 percent in 2023/24. In 2020/21, government borrowing reached 11.6 percent of GDP, due to increased financial support to public services during the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with reduced revenue because of societal lockdowns.

Impact of economic downturn on cultural and leisure activities and events Source agency: Culture, Arts and Leisure (Northern Ireland) Designation: Official Statistics not designated as National Statistics Language: English Alternative title: Cultural and leisure activities and events: Impact of economic downturn

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (GBRRECDM) from 1955-02-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and United Kingdom.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

Article on the labour market across the UK in the current recession

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: National Statistics

Language: English

Alternative title: The labour market across the UK in the current recession

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.