The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for China from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (CHNRECM) from Jan 1978 to Sep 2022 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and China.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 4.80 percent in the third quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

According to a survey conducted by Statista Consumer Insights among Generation Z in China, ** percent of respondents were trying to spend less money in light of the economic circumstances as of September 2024. In addition, ** percent of respondents felt that their cost of living has increased notably, and ** percent had been experiencing stress and anxiety. However, ** percent of respondents shared none of the worries mentioned in the survey.

In 2024, China’s level of total investment reached around 40.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This value is expected to remain stable in 2025 and increase slightly in the following years. Final consumption accounted for 55.7 percent in 2023. International comparison of total investments The GDP of a country can be calculated by the expenditure approach, which sums up final consumption (private and public), total investment, and net exports. The ratio of consumption to investment may vary greatly between different countries.Matured economies normally consume a larger share of their economic output. In the U.S. and many European countries, total investment ranges roughly at only 20 to 25 percent of the GDP. In comparison, some emerging economies reached levels of 30 to 40 percent of investment during times of rapid economic development. Level of total investment in China China is among the countries that spend the highest share of their GDP on investments. Between 1980 and 2000, 30 to 40 percent of its economic output were invested, roughly on par with South Korea or Japan. While the latter’s investment spending ratio decreased in later years, China’s even grew, especially after the global financial crisis, peaking at staggering 47 percent of GDP in 2011.However, returns on those investments declined year by year, indicated by lower GDP growth rates. This resulted in a quickly growing debt burden, which reached nearly 285 percent of the GDP in 2023, up from only 135 percent in 2008. The Chinese government defined the goal to shift to consumption driven growth, but the transformation takes longer than expected.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

The repeated outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic has brought a heavy blow to the world economy. Fiscal policy is one of the important macro-control measures to pull the economy out of the quagmire, and it is necessary to study the implementation of fiscal policy under the epidemic. Due to the relatively abundant resources of the Chinese government, this study uses China as the research object to study the orientation of fiscal policy under COVID-19 epidemic. We use fiscal policies and a large amount of macroeconomic data to identify fiscal policy and macroeconomic regulation's dynamic mechanism in China. Our findings indicate a dynamic feedback relationship between expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal policy tools, output gaps, and deficit scales. Before the global economic crisis, fiscal policy can play a good role in adversely regulating the economy, and the difficulty of adjustment after the crisis has increased significantly. During COVID-19 epidemic, the interaction time between variables related to fiscal policy increased, suggesting that the implementation of fiscal policy during the epidemic should be particularly cautious.

Data and data sources.

The global financial crisis, triggered by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, has severely affected financial systems and real economies worldwide, leading to the most serious economic recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Behind these two economic recessions, despite different historical contexts and approaches to problem-solving, there are common characteristics associated with the mutual impact of financial crises: the essence of a financial crisis lies in financial instability, reflecting the fluctuations in asset prices. In addition to these two severe financial crises, financial crises of varying scales have occurred intermittently internationally. Considering the past and present, people need to think deeper about how to prevent such crises from happening again, especially mainstream macroeconomic thinking that has far-reaching effects should be reassessed.

Since the 2011 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), China’s economic growth has remained strong, although a necessary economic transformation is underway. China now has the world’s largest GDP in PPP terms, and poverty rates have fallen. However, medium-term growth prospects have moderated. The limits to the investment-driven growth strategy, combined with an aging population, waning dividends from past reforms, and a challenging external environment, have necessitated a transformation towards a more market-oriented economy that is more consumption-based, more services-driven, less credit-dependent and, especially, more efficient. This transformation has already started, as the Chinese authorities are increasingly emphasizing the quality of growth and have pushed structural reforms. The economic transformation requires a fundamental change in the role of the financial system. Historically its role was to channel China’s high savings at low cost to strategic sectors. China’s economic rebalancing is multi-dimensional, and there is a need to significantly improve the financial sector’s capital allocation to promote the rebalancing from investment to consumption; from heavy manufacturing to services; and from large to small enterprises. Looking ahead, the financial system will need to become more balanced, sustainable and inclusive, to facilitate China’s economic transformation, where markets play an increasingly dominant role in resource allocation and where consequences of risk-taking are well-understood and accepted. Maintaining financial stability would also require that remaining gaps in regulatory frameworks be addressed. The standard assessments for the banking, insurance, and securities sectors show a high degree of compliance with international standards, but also point to critical gaps. Themes that cut across China’s regulatory agencies include a lack of independence, insufficient resources for supervising a large and increasingly complex financial sector, and inadequate interagency coordination and systemic risk analysis. The remaining priorities for financial market infrastructure oversight include the adoption of full delivery-versus-payment and a stronger legal basis for settlement finality. Further enhancements to crisis management frameworks are needed to allow financial institutions to fail in a manner that minimizes the impact on financial stability and public resources. This would require amongst others greater emphasis on financial stability rather than social concerns in dealing with real and potential crisis situations, the introduction of a special resolution regime for failing banks, and a streamlining of the current system of financial safety nets.

In 2024, the employment rate in China decreased to around 62.4 percent, from 62.8 percent in the previous year. China is the world’s most populous country and its rapid economic development over the past decades has profited greatly from its large labor market. While the overall working conditions for the Chinese people are improving, the actual size of the working-age population in China has been shrinking steadily in recent years. This is mainly due to a low birth rate in the country. Economic slowdown – impact on labor market After decades of rapid development, the world’s second largest economy now seems to have difficulties to boost its economy further. The GDP growth rate indicated a declining trend over the last decade and the number of employed people decreased for the first time since decades in 2015. Under the influence of the global economic downturn, the coronavirus pandemic, and the US-China tensions, many Chinese enterprises are having tough times, which leads to a recession in China’s labor market. Chances for better employment situation The long-lasting Sino-U.S. trade war has caused China great loss on its international trade sector, which has been driving China’s economic growth for decades. However, there is also a lot China could improve. First, the potential of domestic demands could be further developed and satisfied with high-quality products. Second, it’s a good timing to eliminate backward industries with low value added, and the high-tech and environment-friendly industries should be further promoted. In addition, China’s market could be more open to services, especially in the financial sector and IT services, to attract more foreign investors. Highly skilled talents should be better valued in the labor market. Efficient vocational education and further education could also help change the structure of China’s labor market.

In 2024, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Shanghai municipality in China increased by around *** percent from the previous year. Shanghai is the most populous city in China and has the largest GDP of all Chinese cities. It is located in Eastern China on the southern estuary at the mouth of the Yangtze river. Development of GDP growth in Shanghai As a bridgehead to global markets and a forerunner in market opening, Shanghai experienced a decades long economic boom, which massively changed the shape of the city. Economic growth rates had double digits for more than two decades since 1992 and were well above the Chinese national average. This changed fundamentally with the global financial crisis. In 2008, the growth rate fell below ten percent and gradually declined thereafter. Growth rates now got closer to the national average of GDP growth. While the economic development in Shanghai has already reached a high level, other regions in China are catching up, and growth rates in many inland regions of China are now higher than in Shanghai. This is especially true on a city level, with many lower-tier cities experiencing higher growth rates than Shanghai. Sector distribution of GDP growth Upon closer examination of the distribution of GDP across economic sectors, it becomes obvious that the service sector of the economy exhibited the highest growth rates in most of the recent years. In 2024, services already accounted for more than ** percent of the value added to the GDP, which is far above the national average. In contrast, the industrial sector, which had once been of great importance to Shanghai's economy, is losing momentum and its share in total economic output is shrinking constantly. Financial intermediation and information industries were branches in the service sector that displayed the fastest growth rates in recent years.

Figure 3 depicts China-Africa trade from 2000 to 2013. It shows that China-Africa trade consistently grew since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000. As can be seen in the figure, the US trade with Africa declined after the 2008 global financial crisis, allowing China to take the lead as Africa's largest trading partner. Figure 7 shows trade between China and Africa from 2003 to 2021. Although with fluctuations, trade between the two sides has been increasing since the establishment of the FOCAC mechanism. It reached a first high of US$203 billion in 2015 and then declined significantly the following year. However, the trade increased again from 2017 and surged to US$254 billion in 2021, up by 35% from the previous year. The high trade volume in 2021 has been attributed to the additional Chinese exports of Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), such as masks and hazmat suits, as well as pharmaceutical products and testing equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic to Africa. However, Gu et al (2022: 11) indicated that the strong increase in China-Africa trade volume in 2021 is remarkable as data from China's customs agency shows that it is "made up of an increase in both Chinese exports to Africa (29.9% year-on-year) and African exports to China (43.7% year-on-year)". Figure 4 shows the number of countries around the world that have joined China's Belt and Road Initiatiative (BRI). As can be seen in the figure, China's BRI has attracted more than 140 countries. In Africa, the first countries that signed up for the BRI project were East and North African countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Egypt. In Figure 5, the map shows the number of African countries that have signed up for the BRI since 2015. As can be seen in the figure, 52 countries in Africa had signed some BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China by 2022.

Table 1 shows that studies that analysed the China-Africa relationship focusing on their 'strategic partnership' are very few, given the voluminous literature on China and Africa. A search of Sino-Africa studies conducted in English with the term 'strategic partnership' in their titles produced only ten papers (see table). Furthermore, as the table shows, studies investigating the increased security cooperation in China-Africa relations conducted in English are rare, although this part of the debate has also produced numerous research publications. The column titled 'Focus of study' in Table 1 above shows that majority of these studies concentrated on analysing economic cooperation, while a few also included political relations between China and Africa. Also, the column titled 'Definition of strategic partnership' shows that, all these studies, except Akpan and Onya (2018), made no attempts to define the concept of strategic partnership. Figure 8 shows the countries around the world in which the United Nations (UN) has deployed its peacekeepers. As shown in the figure, the UN has deployed several peacekeeping missions around the world since the late 1940s, with most of these operations taking place in the African continent. Figure 9 focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Africa. As can be seen in the figure, Chinese peacekeeping troops were deployed in five out of the seven UN-led missions on the African continent as of 2019. Figure 12 shows the foreign military bases that currently exist in African countries. As the figure shows, the African Continent is a host to 47 known foreign military bases, of which 34 are United States (US) bases. Figure 13 shows the foreign military bases in Djibouti. As seen in the figure, Djibouti hosts the US' Camp Lemonnier military base, just 13.4 kilometres away from the Chinese PLA's new navy facility, along with military bases of other major powers such as France, Germany and Japan in close proximity. Djibouti thus found itself in the middle of diplomatic tensions between China and the US over fears of a Chinese takeover of the Doraleh Container Terminal, Djibouti's main container port, in 2018, as China financed the development of the port. Figure 6 shows China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) commitments from 2006 to 2021. As can be seen in the figure, China's financial pledges to assist Africa increased from US$5 billion to US$60 in 2015. However, they dropped to US$40 billion in 2021. Further, drops in the number of activities, such as official development assistance (ODAs) and capacity building, including reductions in security collaborations, were also noted. However, a new development was China's reallocation of US$10 billion of its Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) towards Africa from the US$40 billion that it received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

China is an emerging country, and government intervention is always considered as an important part of the solutions when people facing challenges in China. Under the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic and the global economic downturn, the Chinese government quickly brought the epidemic under control and restored the positive economic growth through strong intervention. Based on the panel data of provincial level in China and the government intervention as the threshold variable, this paper empirically analyzed the non-linear effect of business cycle on population health by using the panel threshold regression model. The empirical results show that the impact of the business cycle on population health is significantly negative, and government intervention has a single threshold effect on the relationship between business cycle and population health. When the government intervention is below the threshold value, the business cycle has a significant negative effect on the improvement of the population health level; when the level of government intervention exceeds the threshold value, the relationship between business cycle and population health becomes significantly positive. To some extent, the conclusions of this paper can guide the formulation and revision of government health policy and help to adjust the direction and intensity of government intervention. The Chinese government and other governments of emerging countries should do more to harness the power of state intervention in their response to the business cycle.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is the supplementary data for the article "Estimating stranded coal assets in China's power sector" published in Utilities Policy. China has suffered overcapacity in coal power since 2016. With growing electricity demand and an economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic, China faces a dilemma between easing restrictive policies for short-term growth in coal-fired power production and keeping restrictions in place for long-term sustainability. In this paper, we measure the risks faced by China's coal power units to become stranded in the next decade and estimate the associated economic costs for different shareholders. By implementing restrictive policies on coal power expansion, China can avoid 90% of stranded coal assets by 2025.