With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 0.9 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.4 percent in 2023, 4.8 percent in 2022, 8.6 percent in 2021, and a record 10.3 percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak through the Trough (GBRRECDM) from 1955-02-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and United Kingdom.

The economy of the United Kingdom shrank by 0.1 percent in January 2025, after growing by 0.4 percent in December. As of the most recent month, the UK economy is around 3.4 percent larger than it was in February 2020, just before the start of COVID-19 lockdowns. After a record 19.6 percent decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy quickly returned to growth in the following months, and grew through most of 2021. Cost of living crisis lingers into 2025 As of December 2024, just over half of people in the UK reported that their cost of living was higher than it was in the previous month. Although this is a decline from the peak of the crisis in 2022 when over 90 percent of people reported a higher cost of living, households are evidently still under severe pressure. While wage growth has outpaced inflation since July 2023, overall consumer prices were 20 percent higher in late 2024 than they were in late 2021. For food and energy, which lower income households spend more on, late 2024 prices were almost 30 percent higher when compared with late 2021. According to recent estimates, living standards, as measured by changes in disposable income fell by 2.1 percent in 2022/23, but did start to grow again in 2023/24. Late 2023 recession followed by growth in 2024 In December 2023, the UK economy was approximately the same size as it was a year earlier, and struggled to achieve modest growth throughout that year. Going into 2023, a surge in energy costs, as well as high interest rates, created an unfavorable environment for UK consumers and businesses. The inflationary pressures that drove these problems did start to subside, however, with inflation falling to 3.9 percent in November 2023, down from a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022. Although relatively strong economic growth occurred in the first half of 2024, with GDP growing by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent in the first two quarters of the year, zero growth was reported in the third quarter of the year. Long-term issues, such as low business investment, weak productivity growth, and regional inequality, will likely continue to hamper the economy going forward.

The classification of finiancial crisis interventions

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Financial Crisis and Statitical Classification

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

The project adopted a broad approach, employing quantitative as well as qualitative methods. It covered both public and private forms of risk protection, and it analysed attitudes as well as actual behavior. First, we reviewed Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in the aforementioned five key areas. We mapped the social programmes, occupational schemes and private options that have been available since the early 1990s. The second phase was based on quantitative data analysis, making use of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the ABI Risk and Protection Survey. We analysed the take-up of insurances and how it was influenced by attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. Third, we conducted 61 qualitative interviews, where we explored personal risk management strategies of middle-income households from Scotland and England. The main result was a typology of risk management rationales that guide household economies. This stage also explored the ramifications of the recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

Comparing England and Scotland, the purpose was to review Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in key areas: unemployment, sickness, costs of higher education for children, retirement and infirmity in old age. The aim was to map the types of statutory protection against such risks and contingencies and examine changes in the scope of public provision. In parallel, we will examine the scope of non-statutory (occupational and personal) provision, investigating how 'private welfare markets' have developed since the early 1990s. The second phase is based on quantitative data analysis of household savings and investment behaviour in insurances and private market-based contracts for risk protection. Finally, via qualitative interviews, we explore personal risk management of socially and economically similar families from Scotland and England. This stage will also explore the potential ramifications of the most recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

The project investigated risk management strategies of above average income households in England and Scotland. In the UK especially those with above average incomes are often assumed to have access to or seek private forms of risk protection, partly based on company provision or private voluntary protection complementing or substituting public social protection. The project investigated how households protect themselves against income loss due to unemployment, sickness or retirement and plan for expenses like long term care and higher education costs. We focused our analysis on how households balance these risks between public, occupational and private forms of protection. Moreover, we explored how the recent financial crisis has influenced the attitudes and behavior of households regarding their personal protection. The project sought to answer how and why some middle class households plan for contingencies and engage in private risk management strategies while others do not.

Approximately one quarter of the UK population have a migration background (first- or second-generation immigrants). Some ethnic minority groups are more likely to be in atypical or flexible employment than the White British majority. In particular during a time of health and economic crisis, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, those ethnic groups were expected to be economically more vulnerable than other groups. This study shows the increased vulnerability of some ethnic minority groups during COVID–19 by looking at their labour market outcomes compared to White British. Specifically, we ask whether it was their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we aim to show that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group. The collection consists of the Stata Do-File which can be used to reproduce the study.

Was it their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we conclude that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group.

The economy of the United Kingdom grew by 0.4 percent in December 2024, after growing by 0.1 percent in November. As of the most recent month, the UK economy is around 3.5 percent larger than it was in February 2020, just before the start of COVID-19 lockdowns. After a record 19.6 percent decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy quickly returned to growth in the following months, and grew through most of 2021. Cost of living crisis lingers into 2025 As of December 2024, just over half of people in the UK reported that their cost of living was higher than it was in the previous month. Although this is a decline from the peak of the crisis in 2022 when over 90 percent of people reported a higher cost of living, households are evidently still under severe pressure. While wage growth has outpaced inflation since July 2023, overall consumer prices were 20 percent higher in late 2024 than they were in late 2021. For food and energy, which lower income households spend more on, late 2024 prices were almost 30 percent higher when compared with late 2021. According to recent estimates, living standards, as measured by changes in disposable income fell by 2.1 percent in 2022/23, but did start to grow again in 2023/24. Late 2023 recession followed by growth in 2024 In December 2023, the UK economy was approximately the same size as it was a year earlier, and struggled to achieve modest growth throughout that year. Going into 2023, a surge in energy costs, as well as high interest rates, created an unfavorable environment for UK consumers and businesses. The inflationary pressures that drove these problems did start to subside, however, with inflation falling to 3.9 percent in November 2023, down from a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022. Although relatively strong economic growth occurred in the first half of 2024, with GDP growing by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent in the first two quarters of the year, zero growth was reported in the third quarter of the year. Long-term issues, such as low business investment, weak productivity growth, and regional inequality, will likely continue to hamper the economy going forward.

In May 2022, 49 percent of people in the United Kingdom advised that they were highly dissatisfied with the government's response to the cost of living crisis. High inflation has caused an economic crisis in the UK, with 87 percent of people reporting an increase in their cost of living as of March 2022.

Uk banks and the lessons of the great financial crisis is a book. It was written by Adam Barber and published by PalgraveMacmillan in 2021.

The statistic shows the growth rate in the real GDP in the United Kingdom from 2019 to 2023, with projections up until 2029. In 2023, the rate of GDP growth in the United Kingdom was at around 0.34 percent compared to the previous year.The economy of the United KingdomGDP is used an indicator as to the shape of a national economy. It is one of the most regularly called upon measurements regarding the economic fitness of a country. GDP is the total market value of all final goods and services that have been produced in a country within a given period of time, usually a year. Inflation adjusted real GDP figures serve as an even more telling indication of a country’s economic state in that they act as a more reliable and clear tool as to a nation’s economic health. The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the United Kingdom has started to level in recent years after taking a huge body blow in the financial collapse of 2008. The UK managed to rise from the state of dark desperation it was in between 2009 and 2010, from -3.97 to 1.8 percent. The country suffered acutely from the collapse of the banking industry, raising a number of questions within the UK with regards to the country’s heavy reliance on revenues coming from London's financial sector, arguably the most important in the world and one of the globe’s financial command centers. Since the collapse of the post-war consensus and the rise of Thatcherism, the United Kingdom has been swept along in a wave of individualism - collective ideals have been abandoned and the mass privatisation of the heavy industries was unveiled - opening them up to market competition and shifting the economic focus to that of service.The Big Bang policy, one of the cornerstones of the Thatcher government programs of reform, involved mass and sudden deregulation of financial markets. This led to huge changes in the way the financial markets in London work, and saw the many old firms being absorbed by big banks. This, one could argue, strengthened the UK financial sector greatly and while frivolous and dangerous practices brought the sector into great disrepute, the city of London alone brings in around one fifth of the countries national income making it a very prominent contributor to wealth in the UK.

This release looks at the increase in unemployment during the recent economic downturn. Increases in unemployment will be compared across regions in the UK, age groups, gender and other characteristics. Claimant count data will also be included.

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: National Statistics

Language: English

Alternative title: Unemployment during the economic downturn

The statistic shows the GDP of the United Kingdom between 1987 and 2023, with projections up until 2029, in US dollars.Private-sector-led economic recoveryGDP is counted among the primary indicators that are used to gauge the state of health of a national economy. GDP is the total value of all completed goods and services that have been produced within a country in a given period of time, usually a year. GDP figures allow us to gain a broader understanding of a country’s economy in a clear way. Real GDP, in a similar way, is also a rather useful indicator; this is a measurement that takes prices changes (inflation and deflation) into account, thereby acting as a key indicator for economic growth.The gross domestic product of the United Kingdom is beginning to show signs of recovery since seeing a sharp decline in the wake of the financial crisis. The decreasing unemployment rate in the United Kingdom is also indicating that the worst could be over for the country. However, some concerns have arisen about what forms of employment are being represented, how stable the jobs are, and whether or not they are simply being cited by officials in government as validation for reforms that are criticized by opponents as being ‘ideologically motivated’. Whatever the political motivation, the coalition government’s efforts to let the private sector lead the economic recovery through increasing employment in the UK in the private sector appear, for now at least, to be working.

Economic crisis management has concerned governments and other responsible authorities from 2008. Yet crises are complex and subject to many attempts to interpret and explain them, to identify causes, attribute responsibility, assess their scale, scope, and significance, the need for minor changes or major reforms, and translate proposed solutions into feasible policies. This trans-disciplinary research project focuses on the complex and multi-faceted economic crisis that became evident in 2007 and will explore these issues through to 2011. Its key research questions are:

have accounts of the 'crisis' changed from 2007 and which interpretations have become dominant; do the main varieties of capitalism have different forms of crisis within this context and/or do they favour different interpretations and solutions; what new approaches to crisis-management have been proposed and how are they evaluated; have crisis dynamics prompted new forms of multi-level governance and meta-governance.

Different literatures and methodologies are used to answer these questions, respectively: corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis; actor-centred institutional analysis of varieties of capitalism and their place in the world market; studies of governance and governmentality; and studies on the EU's open method of coordination as sources of insight into global crisis-management. Further information CPECM contact: Prof Robert Jessop

Email: r.jessop@lancaster.ac.uk

ESRC contact: Rachael Tyrrell

Email:rachael.tyrrell@esrc.ac.uk Telephone: 01793 444518

Cultural Political Economy Research Centre website: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/cperc/index.htm

The project ‘Truth, Accountability or Impunity? Transitional Justice and the Economic Crisis’ completed a repository of policies of accountability in response to the post-2008 Great Recession in six European countries (Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal & Spain). The repository included recorded prosecutions of bank executives, office holders and politicians on charges related to white collar crimes and/or corruption in the lead up to the economic crisis. It also includes fact finding commissions (i.e. independent commissions of inquiry and/or parliamentary commissions of inquiry) designed to document patterns of policy and institutional failures that led to the economic meltdown, in the period between 2010-2018. The rationale for developing the repository was, first, to map the range of policies deployed and, second, to investigate potential variations in the national policies. In parallel with the development of the repository, the project included the conduct of approximately 133 confidential semi-structured interviews in Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Washington D.C. (IMF) and Brussels (EU). These included interviews with prosecutors, judges, elected officials (e.g. former Prime Ministers, Ministers, MPs), unelected officials (e.g. policymakers at central banks, relevant ministries, EU bodies, senior IMF executives etc), NGO members, journalists, academics, defense lawyers and other informed stakeholders to understand the rationale and their attitudes towards policies of accountability. There is little emphasis in the extant literature on the role and impact of different mechanisms of accountability in post-crisis settings, so these interviews were expected to shed useful analytical light. Finally, with regards to the case selection six European countries with similar background conditions and exposure to the crisis but different policy responses, each representing a different approach to accountability.

This statistic shows the United Kingdom (UK) financial and insurance industries gross value added (GVA) as a share of the UK's total economic output. It can be seen that in the years running up to the global financial crisis the United Kingdoms finance and insurance industry became a major factor of its economic gross value added output. in 2009 (one year post financial crisis) the UK's finance and insurance industry accounted for nine percent of its GVA. Since then there has been a steady decrease amounting to 6.9 percent as of 2018. In 2017, London accounted for almost half of financial sectors GVA.

GlobalData, the industry analysis specialist, has released its new view point, “Impact of Eurozone Crisis on Healthcare Economics”. The report is an essential source of information for the analysis on the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the healthcare economics. The report reviews various measures employed in the healthcare sector in order to avert the crisis Read More

Investment trusts have experienced strong revenue volatility recently, driven by rapidly changing global market conditions. The COVID-19 outbreak shocked stock exchanges around the world and hit equity performance hard in the early months of 2020. However, a strong recovery helped trusts bounce back. While demand for investment trusts has stayed fairly strong, alternative investment vehicles like open-ended investment companies have put pressure with their competitive prices, encouraging investment trusts to band together through consolidation to drive down fees charged thanks to economies of scale. Revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 3% over the five years through 2023-24 to £1.5 billion, including estimated growth of 5.5% in 2023-24, while the average industry profit margin is anticipated to be 28.2%. After the financial crisis in 2008, Ultra-low interest rates supported equity growth as investors sought attractive returns from companies supported by cheap lending rates. This environment came to an end in 2022, as interest rates picked up rapidly amid spiralling inflation. As a result, bond values plummeted, and stock markets recorded lacklustre growth, hurting investment income. Although the rising base rate environment persisted into 2023-24, investors priced in rate cuts near the end of 2023, triggering a rally in stock markets. Capital also flowed into bonds as investors sought to lock in higher yields before they would potentially decline in 2024-25. Investment trust revenue is expected to grow at a compound annual rate of 7% over the five years through 2028-29 to £2.1 billion, while the average industry profit margin is forecast to reach 30.2%. Depsite economic growth set to remain muted in the coming years, central banks are taking a higher for longer approach to monetary policy as inflation proves stubborn. This will weigh on stock market activity, but make sovereign fixed income a welcome alternative thanks to their attractive yields and low levels of risk. Investment trusts will continue to seek acquisitive growth, using mergers and acquisitions to minimise fixed costs through scale. Despite expected growth, the loss of passporting rights and equivalence means that investment in the industry from the EU is likely to be somewhat dampened.