Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for China from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (CHNRECM) from Jan 1978 to Sep 2022 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and China.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 4.80 percent in the third quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2024, with forecasts to 2030. In 2024, gross national debt ranged at around 88 percent of the national gross domestic product. The debt-to-GDP ratio In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2024, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 250 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate. Development in China China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. China's real estate crisis and a difficult global economic environment require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

In 2024, the employment rate in China decreased to around 62.4 percent, from 62.8 percent in the previous year. China is the world’s most populous country and its rapid economic development over the past decades has profited greatly from its large labor market. While the overall working conditions for the Chinese people are improving, the actual size of the working-age population in China has been shrinking steadily in recent years. This is mainly due to a low birth rate in the country. Economic slowdown – impact on labor market After decades of rapid development, the world’s second largest economy now seems to have difficulties to boost its economy further. The GDP growth rate indicated a declining trend over the last decade and the number of employed people decreased for the first time since decades in 2015. Under the influence of the global economic downturn, the coronavirus pandemic, and the US-China tensions, many Chinese enterprises are having tough times, which leads to a recession in China’s labor market. Chances for better employment situation The long-lasting Sino-U.S. trade war has caused China great loss on its international trade sector, which has been driving China’s economic growth for decades. However, there is also a lot China could improve. First, the potential of domestic demands could be further developed and satisfied with high-quality products. Second, it’s a good timing to eliminate backward industries with low value added, and the high-tech and environment-friendly industries should be further promoted. In addition, China’s market could be more open to services, especially in the financial sector and IT services, to attract more foreign investors. Highly skilled talents should be better valued in the labor market. Efficient vocational education and further education could also help change the structure of China’s labor market.

We analyze China’s interindustry connections and show that China’s housing activity has become increasingly important to its GDP growth. Our results suggest that a 10 percent decline in final demand for real estate and housing-related construction would lead to a decline in total output of 2.2 percent, an effect more than two times larger than it would have been 10 years ago.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

According to a median projection in July 2025, China's GDP was expected to grow by *** percent in 2025. In the first quarter of 2020, the second-largest economy recorded the first contraction in decades due to the epidemic.  A root-to-branch shutdown of factories To curb the spread of the virus, the Chinese government imposed a lockdown in Wuhan, the epicenter, and other cities in Hubei province on January 23, 2020. A strict nationwide lockdown soon followed. Many factories remained closed in February, resulting in a plunge in manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI). The shutdown of the “world’s factory” had severely disrupted global supply chains, especially automobile production. In March 2020, very few industrial sectors reported positive production growth.  The pharmaceuticals sector recorded a production increase, which was mainly driven by the global demand for vital medical supplies. China had exported over seven billion yuan worth of face masks. Ripple effects on global tourism Apart from the manufacturing industry, the prolonged closures of business had caused significant losses in various sectors in China. The travel and tourism sector was massively affected by a drastic decline in flight ticket sales  and hotel occupancy rates. The domestic tourism market expects a loss of 20 percent in revenues for 2020. Industry experts predicted that the global travel and tourism industry could lose about *** trillion U.S. dollars in that year. 

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the end of 2024, the M2 broad money supply in China amounted to over *** trillion yuan. Broad money supply had been growing consistently over the years. However, the overall growth rate of all money supply had been decreasing. Money is not money? In economic theory, the money supply describes the volume of currency that exists in a country. Even though it might sound counterintuitive, there are different types of money. For example, cash, saving deposits, or other liquid assets are then divided into tiers from M1 to M3. Thereby, M2 money or broad money comprised of cash and assets that can easily be converted into cash. The main application of M2 money is making payments and economic transactions. For mainstream economists, the volume of M1 and M2 money can indicate inflation. The mysterious case of money expansion in China The post-pandemic economic recovery has not materialized as the growth in the M2 money supply would have indicated in China. As a consequence of global anti-COVID-19 measures, China’s economic growth fell far below the country’s development targets. After another underperforming year in 2022, the M2 money supply grew by almost ** percent in the first quarter of 2023, but the GDP increased only by *** percent, which indicated that the money does not reach the real economy. Therefore, the Chinese economy could be in a liquidity trap or a balance sheet recession.

The authors investigate how the Global South’s gross domestic product (GDP) is impacted by trade with China. While the current literature on the growth impacts of trade (by leading partner countries) often neglects the properties of macro panel data, such as cross-sectional dependence, heterogeneity and structural breaks, their models take these features into account. Their empirical results based on 22 major developing countries from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4 identify positive contributions of imports from China to GDP in the studied sample, although these effects are smaller compared to imports from other emerging and developing economies (excluding China) (EME) and advanced economies (AdE). The authors also show that, in contrast with considerable impacts of exports to EME and AdE, exports to China have limited effects on the growth of its partners. However, the global financial crisis marks a turning point of China’s role as a major driver of growth in the South. Namely, while the positive growth effects of trade with China after the global crisis are on the rise, the opposite is true for EME and AdE. Examining the effects by individual countries, the authors present that the distance between China and its partners, economic and institutional development levels of its partners are almost irrelevant to the contributions of imports from China to its partners’ growth. Based on these findings they provide some important policy recommendations for the economies of the Global South.

In 2023, final consumption of the economy in China accounted for about 55.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The share of final consumption in the total GDP of China is expected to increase gradually in the upcoming years. Level of consumption in China Final consumption refers to the part of the GDP that is consumed, in contrast to what is invested or exported. In matured economies, final consumption often accounts for 70 or more percent of the total GDP. In developing countries, however, a significantly larger share may be spent on investments in infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacities.Since its economic opening up, China was among the countries with the highest ratio of spending on investment and the lowest on consumption. Especially since 2000, China spent increasing amounts of money on infrastructure and housing, while the share spent on consumption dropped to an all-time low. This was not only related to China’s rapid economic ascendence, but also to a large working-age population and a low dependency ratio. Recent developments and outlook As the rate of returns on investment has dropped gradually since the global financial crisis in 2008, China is trying to shift to a more consumption-driven growth model. Accordingly, the share of final consumption has increased since 2010. Although this trend was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, it will most probably continue in the future. Lower demand for new infrastructure and housing, as well as an aging population, are the main drivers of this development.

This SAM was constructed for the China CGE model to assess the impact of the 2008-09 global recession shocks and the Chinese government's stimulus policy on China's economic growth. The SAM is constructed using data from various sources including an existing input-output table, national accounts, government budgets, balance of payments, commodity exports and imports, labor employment and wage statistics, household expenditure surveys and agricultural production statistics. Cross-entropy estimation techniques are used to balance the SAM. This SAM is a detailed representation of China’s economy in 2007. It covers 61 production activities and commodity sectors, 4 types of factors (low skilled labor, skilled labor, capital, and land), and 2 representative household (rural and urban) groups. The structural characteristics of China’s economy presented in the SAM would be helpful to better understand the economic linkages. And the SAM also provides an ideal tool for economy-wide impact assessments, such as a SAM-based multiplier analysis and computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling.

The repeated outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic has brought a heavy blow to the world economy. Fiscal policy is one of the important macro-control measures to pull the economy out of the quagmire, and it is necessary to study the implementation of fiscal policy under the epidemic. Due to the relatively abundant resources of the Chinese government, this study uses China as the research object to study the orientation of fiscal policy under COVID-19 epidemic. We use fiscal policies and a large amount of macroeconomic data to identify fiscal policy and macroeconomic regulation's dynamic mechanism in China. Our findings indicate a dynamic feedback relationship between expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal policy tools, output gaps, and deficit scales. Before the global economic crisis, fiscal policy can play a good role in adversely regulating the economy, and the difficulty of adjustment after the crisis has increased significantly. During COVID-19 epidemic, the interaction time between variables related to fiscal policy increased, suggesting that the implementation of fiscal policy during the epidemic should be particularly cautious.

replication data for the paper titled "The Public Opinion Effects of Crisis Propaganda in China"

China's declining corn imports signal economic challenges, with reduced purchases and strategic shifts reflecting broader financial constraints.

CWT plots comparison of the COVID-19 and the GFC.

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "The Global Financial Crisis and Labor Law in China".

President Trump's tariffs on China have disrupted American businesses, causing price hikes and economic uncertainty. Learn about the impact on the promotional products market and broader economic indicators.

The statistic shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The gross domestic product of the United States in 2024 amounted to around 29.18 trillion U.S. dollars. The United States and the economy The United States’ economy is by far the largest in the world; a status which can be determined by several key factors, one being gross domestic product: A look at the GDP of the main industrialized and emerging countries shows a significant difference between US GDP and the GDP of China, the runner-up in the ranking, as well as the followers Japan, Germany and France. Interestingly, it is assumed that China will have surpassed the States in terms of GDP by 2030, but for now, the United States is among the leading countries in almost all other relevant rankings and statistics, trade and employment for example. See the U.S. GDP growth rate here. Just like in other countries, the American economy suffered a severe setback when the economic crisis occurred in 2008. The American economy entered a recession caused by the collapsing real estate market and increasing unemployment. Despite this, the standard of living is considered quite high; life expectancy in the United States has been continually increasing slightly over the past decade, the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily recovering and decreasing since the crisis, and the Big Mac Index, which represents the global prices for a Big Mac, a popular indicator for the purchasing power of an economy, shows that the United States’ purchasing power in particular is only slightly lower than that of the euro area.

Figure 3 depicts China-Africa trade from 2000 to 2013. It shows that China-Africa trade consistently grew since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000. As can be seen in the figure, the US trade with Africa declined after the 2008 global financial crisis, allowing China to take the lead as Africa's largest trading partner. Figure 7 shows trade between China and Africa from 2003 to 2021. Although with fluctuations, trade between the two sides has been increasing since the establishment of the FOCAC mechanism. It reached a first high of US$203 billion in 2015 and then declined significantly the following year. However, the trade increased again from 2017 and surged to US$254 billion in 2021, up by 35% from the previous year. The high trade volume in 2021 has been attributed to the additional Chinese exports of Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), such as masks and hazmat suits, as well as pharmaceutical products and testing equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic to Africa. However, Gu et al (2022: 11) indicated that the strong increase in China-Africa trade volume in 2021 is remarkable as data from China's customs agency shows that it is "made up of an increase in both Chinese exports to Africa (29.9% year-on-year) and African exports to China (43.7% year-on-year)". Figure 4 shows the number of countries around the world that have joined China's Belt and Road Initiatiative (BRI). As can be seen in the figure, China's BRI has attracted more than 140 countries. In Africa, the first countries that signed up for the BRI project were East and North African countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Egypt. In Figure 5, the map shows the number of African countries that have signed up for the BRI since 2015. As can be seen in the figure, 52 countries in Africa had signed some BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China by 2022.

Table 1 shows that studies that analysed the China-Africa relationship focusing on their 'strategic partnership' are very few, given the voluminous literature on China and Africa. A search of Sino-Africa studies conducted in English with the term 'strategic partnership' in their titles produced only ten papers (see table). Furthermore, as the table shows, studies investigating the increased security cooperation in China-Africa relations conducted in English are rare, although this part of the debate has also produced numerous research publications. The column titled 'Focus of study' in Table 1 above shows that majority of these studies concentrated on analysing economic cooperation, while a few also included political relations between China and Africa. Also, the column titled 'Definition of strategic partnership' shows that, all these studies, except Akpan and Onya (2018), made no attempts to define the concept of strategic partnership. Figure 8 shows the countries around the world in which the United Nations (UN) has deployed its peacekeepers. As shown in the figure, the UN has deployed several peacekeeping missions around the world since the late 1940s, with most of these operations taking place in the African continent. Figure 9 focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Africa. As can be seen in the figure, Chinese peacekeeping troops were deployed in five out of the seven UN-led missions on the African continent as of 2019. Figure 12 shows the foreign military bases that currently exist in African countries. As the figure shows, the African Continent is a host to 47 known foreign military bases, of which 34 are United States (US) bases. Figure 13 shows the foreign military bases in Djibouti. As seen in the figure, Djibouti hosts the US' Camp Lemonnier military base, just 13.4 kilometres away from the Chinese PLA's new navy facility, along with military bases of other major powers such as France, Germany and Japan in close proximity. Djibouti thus found itself in the middle of diplomatic tensions between China and the US over fears of a Chinese takeover of the Doraleh Container Terminal, Djibouti's main container port, in 2018, as China financed the development of the port. Figure 6 shows China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) commitments from 2006 to 2021. As can be seen in the figure, China's financial pledges to assist Africa increased from US$5 billion to US$60 in 2015. However, they dropped to US$40 billion in 2021. Further, drops in the number of activities, such as official development assistance (ODAs) and capacity building, including reductions in security collaborations, were also noted. However, a new development was China's reallocation of US$10 billion of its Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) towards Africa from the US$40 billion that it received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).