The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.4 percent in 2023, 4.8 percent in 2022, 8.6 percent in 2021, and a record 10.3 percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

The UK inflation rate was 3.5 percent in April 2025, up from 2.6 percent in the previous month, and the fastest rate of inflation since February 2024. Between September 2022 and March 2023, the UK experienced seven months of double-digit inflation, which peaked at 11.1 percent in October 2022. Due to this long period of high inflation, UK consumer prices have increased by over 20 percent in the last three years. As of the most recent month, prices were rising fastest in the communications sector, at 6.1 percent, but were falling in both the furniture and transport sectors, at -0.3 percent and -0.6 percent respectively.
The Cost of Living Crisis High inflation is one of the main factors behind the ongoing Cost of Living Crisis in the UK, which, despite subsiding somewhat in 2024, is still impacting households going into 2025. In December 2024, for example, 56 percent of UK households reported their cost of living was increasing compared with the previous month, up from 45 percent in July, but far lower than at the height of the crisis in 2022. After global energy prices spiraled that year, the UK's energy price cap increased substantially. The cap, which limits what suppliers can charge consumers, reached 3,549 British pounds per year in October 2022, compared with 1,277 pounds a year earlier. Along with soaring food costs, high-energy bills have hit UK households hard, especially lower income ones that spend more of their earnings on housing costs. As a result of these factors, UK households experienced their biggest fall in living standards in decades in 2022/23. Global inflation crisis causes rapid surge in prices The UK's high inflation, and cost of living crisis in 2022 had its origins in the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the initial waves of the virus, global supply chains struggled to meet the renewed demand for goods and services. Food and energy prices, which were already high, increased further in 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought an end to the era of cheap gas flowing to European markets from Russia. The war also disrupted global food markets, as both Russia and Ukraine are major exporters of cereal crops. As a result of these factors, inflation surged across Europe and in other parts of the world, but typically declined in 2023, and approached more usual levels by 2024.

The statistic shows the GDP of the United Kingdom between 1987 and 2024, with projections up until 2030, in US dollars.Private-sector-led economic recoveryGDP is counted among the primary indicators that are used to gauge the state of health of a national economy. GDP is the total value of all completed goods and services that have been produced within a country in a given period of time, usually a year. GDP figures allow us to gain a broader understanding of a country’s economy in a clear way. Real GDP, in a similar way, is also a rather useful indicator; this is a measurement that takes prices changes (inflation and deflation) into account, thereby acting as a key indicator for economic growth.The gross domestic product of the United Kingdom is beginning to show signs of recovery since seeing a sharp decline in the wake of the financial crisis. The decreasing unemployment rate in the United Kingdom is also indicating that the worst could be over for the country. However, some concerns have arisen about what forms of employment are being represented, how stable the jobs are, and whether or not they are simply being cited by officials in government as validation for reforms that are criticized by opponents as being ‘ideologically motivated’. Whatever the political motivation, the coalition government’s efforts to let the private sector lead the economic recovery through increasing employment in the UK in the private sector appear, for now at least, to be working.

Explore UK banking and the financial crisis : what lessons have we learned? through data • Key facts: author, publication date, book publisher, book series, book subjects • Real-time news, visualizations and datasets

In 2025, the annual unemployment rate of the United Kingdom is expected to be 4.5 percent, compared with 4.3 percent in 2024. Unemployment is forecast to fall to 4.3 percent in 2026, gradually declining to 4.1 percent by 2028. In the UK's last government budget in October 2024, the country's unemployment rate for 2025 was forecast to average out at 4.1 percent, but this was increased to 4.5 percent in the "Spring Statement" on public finances in March 2025. Uptick in unemployment after falling to historic lows A common indicator of an economy’s relative health, the unemployment rate in the UK generally fell throughout most of the 2010s, after reaching 8.5 percent in late 2011. After a sudden increase in unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a steep decline that lasted until August 2022, when the unemployment rate was just 3.5 percent. There was then a rise in unemployment from 2023 onwards, which continued throughout 2024 and into 2025. This has been matched by a fall in UK job vacancies, which peaked at 1.3 million in May 2022, but has been falling in most months since then, with approximately 816,000 vacancies in February 2025. Revisions to GDP and inflation for 2025 Since the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK's economic growth has been poor, with the UK alternating between weak growth and slight contractions. For 2025, the UK economy is set to grow by just one percent, a downgrade from two percent predicted in late 2024. Inflation, which skyrocketed from late 2021 onwards, reached a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022, and although down to more usual levels by 2024, is expected to rise in 2025, reaching around 3.7 percent by the second half of the year.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (GBRRECDM) from 1955-02-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and United Kingdom.

Approximately one quarter of the UK population have a migration background (first- or second-generation immigrants). Some ethnic minority groups are more likely to be in atypical or flexible employment than the White British majority. In particular during a time of health and economic crisis, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, those ethnic groups were expected to be economically more vulnerable than other groups. This study shows the increased vulnerability of some ethnic minority groups during COVID–19 by looking at their labour market outcomes compared to White British. Specifically, we ask whether it was their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we aim to show that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group. The collection consists of the Stata Do-File which can be used to reproduce the study.

The project adopted a broad approach, employing quantitative as well as qualitative methods. It covered both public and private forms of risk protection, and it analysed attitudes as well as actual behavior. First, we reviewed Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in the aforementioned five key areas. We mapped the social programmes, occupational schemes and private options that have been available since the early 1990s. The second phase was based on quantitative data analysis, making use of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the ABI Risk and Protection Survey. We analysed the take-up of insurances and how it was influenced by attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. Third, we conducted 61 qualitative interviews, where we explored personal risk management strategies of middle-income households from Scotland and England. The main result was a typology of risk management rationales that guide household economies. This stage also explored the ramifications of the recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

Comparing England and Scotland, the purpose was to review Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in key areas: unemployment, sickness, costs of higher education for children, retirement and infirmity in old age. The aim was to map the types of statutory protection against such risks and contingencies and examine changes in the scope of public provision. In parallel, we will examine the scope of non-statutory (occupational and personal) provision, investigating how 'private welfare markets' have developed since the early 1990s. The second phase is based on quantitative data analysis of household savings and investment behaviour in insurances and private market-based contracts for risk protection. Finally, via qualitative interviews, we explore personal risk management of socially and economically similar families from Scotland and England. This stage will also explore the potential ramifications of the most recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

The project investigated risk management strategies of above average income households in England and Scotland. In the UK especially those with above average incomes are often assumed to have access to or seek private forms of risk protection, partly based on company provision or private voluntary protection complementing or substituting public social protection. The project investigated how households protect themselves against income loss due to unemployment, sickness or retirement and plan for expenses like long term care and higher education costs. We focused our analysis on how households balance these risks between public, occupational and private forms of protection. Moreover, we explored how the recent financial crisis has influenced the attitudes and behavior of households regarding their personal protection. The project sought to answer how and why some middle class households plan for contingencies and engage in private risk management strategies while others do not.

The project ‘Truth, Accountability or Impunity? Transitional Justice and the Economic Crisis’ completed a repository of policies of accountability in response to the post-2008 Great Recession in six European countries (Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal & Spain). The repository included recorded prosecutions of bank executives, office holders and politicians on charges related to white collar crimes and/or corruption in the lead up to the economic crisis. It also includes fact finding commissions (i.e. independent commissions of inquiry and/or parliamentary commissions of inquiry) designed to document patterns of policy and institutional failures that led to the economic meltdown, in the period between 2010-2018. The rationale for developing the repository was, first, to map the range of policies deployed and, second, to investigate potential variations in the national policies. In parallel with the development of the repository, the project included the conduct of approximately 133 confidential semi-structured interviews in Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Washington D.C. (IMF) and Brussels (EU). These included interviews with prosecutors, judges, elected officials (e.g. former Prime Ministers, Ministers, MPs), unelected officials (e.g. policymakers at central banks, relevant ministries, EU bodies, senior IMF executives etc), NGO members, journalists, academics, defense lawyers and other informed stakeholders to understand the rationale and their attitudes towards policies of accountability. There is little emphasis in the extant literature on the role and impact of different mechanisms of accountability in post-crisis settings, so these interviews were expected to shed useful analytical light. Finally, with regards to the case selection six European countries with similar background conditions and exposure to the crisis but different policy responses, each representing a different approach to accountability.

The UK economy grew by 0.2 percent in March 2025 after reporting 0.5 percent growth in February. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now around four percent larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since January 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.

The statistic shows the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom from 1999 to 2023. The UK's unemployment rate decreased to 3.98 percent in 2023. Unemployment and the economy of the United Kingdom The global financial crisis of 2008 left many nations with high inflation and increasing unemployment rates. The United Kingdom, however, has attempted and successfully lowered the unemployment rate since 2009. The UK is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe, the G7, the G8, the G20, NATO, and World Trade Organization. It is therefore one of the biggest and most important economic powers in the world. It consists of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in 2014, the UK population amounted to over 64 million people. The same year, it reported the sixth largest gross domestic product in the world, reaching more than 2.8 billion U.S. dollars - and with a prospering economy, its GDP is on the upswing: It is estimated that the GDP in the United Kingdom will grow by approximately 3 percent in 2015 in comparison to the previous year. Regarding unemployment, the UK has never been "typically European". Europe's unemployment rate has been relatively high in comparison to other world regions; the unemployment rate in developed countries and the European Union in 2014 was around 7.8 percent. Meanwhile, the global unemployment rate in 2014 was an estimated 5.9 percent. Despite reporting the third highest unemployment rate in major industrial and emerging countries, behind France and India, the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom is much lower than the European Union rate.

Over the five years through 2024-25, the Financial Management industry's revenue is set to dip at a compound annual rate of 0.2% to £13.7 billion, caused by unfavourable demand conditions following the cost-of-living crisis and the COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemic damaged mergers and acquisitions, dropping from £55.6 billion in 2019 to £16.3 billion in 2020 according to the ONS. The cost-of-living crisis further reduced consumer spending, extending economic difficulties into winter 2023 and triggering a recession. These factors decreased business investments in financial management services as companies focused on cutting costs. Despite these obstacles, the industry maintained stability by offering countercyclical services, aiding businesses in efficient cost management while maintaining operations. Since the EU's 2016 Audit Regulation and Directive limited non-audit fees, financial managers have expanded client bases and explored new income sources to balance these caps. With a 2026 deadline to separate audits from non-audit services, pressure is high, particularly for top companies like the Big Four. Technological advancements are also enabling companies to perform tasks internally that were traditionally outsourced to consultants, tightening the market, especially for smaller clients. Intensified competition and decreased demand are driving the financial management sector towards greater innovation. Following a five-year downturn, business spending has begun to recover in 2024-25, driven by increased M&A activity. Business confidence reached an 11-month high in March 2024, according to S&P Global Flash UK PMI. With inflation cooling to 3.2% in March 2024 from 10.1% the previous year, more resources have been available for financial management and M&A efforts. Revenue is expected to grow by 4.9% in 2024-25. Over the five years through 2029-30, industry revenue is forecast to swell at a compound annual rate of 3.3% to reach £16.1 billion. Improving economic conditions and continued business confidence will push more businesses to increase their spending and invest in M&A activity, increasing demand for advice on managing their finances. In addition, continued low inflation will aid costs for both financial managers and their clients, bolstering profit.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

These data show consumption-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of UK households from 2001-2020. As demographic variables, income decile and age group are attached. Emissions are shown in two different ways. First, emissions are shown for each year individually. Second, emissions are shown as a 2007 equivalent. These second data show the emissions that consumption from the different years would have caused assuming the economic structure and emission coefficients from 2007. Data are reported as a carbon equivalent, meaning that all GHGs are converted into their carbon equivalent. The GHGs included are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and nitrogen trifluoride.

Economic crisis management has concerned governments and other responsible authorities from 2008. Yet crises are complex and subject to many attempts to interpret and explain them, to identify causes, attribute responsibility, assess their scale, scope, and significance, the need for minor changes or major reforms, and translate proposed solutions into feasible policies. This trans-disciplinary research project focuses on the complex and multi-faceted economic crisis that became evident in 2007 and will explore these issues through to 2011. Its key research questions are:

have accounts of the 'crisis' changed from 2007 and which interpretations have become dominant; do the main varieties of capitalism have different forms of crisis within this context and/or do they favour different interpretations and solutions; what new approaches to crisis-management have been proposed and how are they evaluated; have crisis dynamics prompted new forms of multi-level governance and meta-governance.

Different literatures and methodologies are used to answer these questions, respectively: corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis; actor-centred institutional analysis of varieties of capitalism and their place in the world market; studies of governance and governmentality; and studies on the EU's open method of coordination as sources of insight into global crisis-management. Further information CPECM contact: Prof Robert Jessop

Email: r.jessop@lancaster.ac.uk

ESRC contact: Rachael Tyrrell

Email:rachael.tyrrell@esrc.ac.uk Telephone: 01793 444518

Cultural Political Economy Research Centre website: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/cperc/index.htm

From 2003 to 2025, the central banks of the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union exhibited remarkably similar interest rate patterns, reflecting shared global economic conditions. In the early 2000s, rates were initially low to stimulate growth, then increased as economies showed signs of overheating prior to 2008. The financial crisis that year prompted sharp rate cuts to near-zero levels, which persisted for an extended period to support economic recovery. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 led to further rate reductions to historic lows, aiming to mitigate economic fallout. However, surging inflation in 2022 triggered a dramatic policy shift, with the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank significantly raising rates to curb price pressures. As inflation stabilized in late 2023 and early 2024, the ECB and Bank of England initiated rate cuts by mid-2024, and the Federal Reserve also implemented its first cut in three years, with forecasts suggesting a gradual decrease in all major interest rates between 2025 and 2026. Divergent approaches within the European Union While the ECB sets a benchmark rate for the Eurozone, individual EU countries have adopted diverse strategies to address their unique economic circumstances. For instance, Hungary set the highest rate in the EU at 13 percent in September 2023, gradually reducing it to 6.5 percent by October 2024. In contrast, Sweden implemented more aggressive cuts, lowering its rate to 2.25 percent by February 2025, the lowest among EU members. These variations highlight the complex economic landscape that European central banks must navigate, balancing inflation control with economic growth support. Global context and future outlook The interest rate changes in major economies have had far-reaching effects on global financial markets. Government bond yields, for example, reflect these policy shifts and investor sentiment. As of December 2024, the United States had the highest 10-year government bond yield among developed economies at 4.59 percent, while Switzerland had the lowest at 0.27 percent. These rates serve as important benchmarks for borrowing costs and economic expectations worldwide.

The economy of the United Kingdom grew by 0.2 percent in March 2025, after growing by 0.5 percent in February 2025. As of the most recent month, the UK economy is around four percent larger than it was in February 2020, just before the start of COVID-19 lockdowns. After a record 19.6 percent decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy quickly returned to growth in the following months, and grew through most of 2021. Cost of living crisis lingers into 2025 As of December 2024, just over half of people in the UK reported that their cost of living was higher than it was in the previous month. Although this is a decline from the peak of the crisis in 2022 when over 90 percent of people reported a higher cost of living, households are evidently still under severe pressure. While wage growth has outpaced inflation since July 2023, overall consumer prices were 20 percent higher in late 2024 than they were in late 2021. For food and energy, which lower income households spend more on, late 2024 prices were almost 30 percent higher when compared with late 2021. According to recent estimates, living standards, as measured by changes in disposable income fell by 2.1 percent in 2022/23, but did start to grow again in 2023/24. Late 2023 recession followed by growth in 2024 In December 2023, the UK economy was approximately the same size as it was a year earlier, and struggled to achieve modest growth throughout that year. Going into 2023, a surge in energy costs, as well as high interest rates, created an unfavorable environment for UK consumers and businesses. The inflationary pressures that drove these problems did start to subside, however, with inflation falling to 3.9 percent in November 2023, down from a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022. Although relatively strong economic growth occurred in the first half of 2024, with GDP growing by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent in the first two quarters of the year, zero growth was reported in the third quarter of the year. Long-term issues, such as low business investment, weak productivity growth, and regional inequality, will likely continue to hamper the economy going forward.

Out of the world's seven largest economies, the United Kingdom was the most negatively affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. During the third quarter of 2020, the GDP growth rate of the UK stood at minus 7.7 percent compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the GDPs of India and Japan were contracted by minus 5.3 percent. Only China experienced a positive GDP growth rate of 4.9 percent during that same period. However, in 2021, all the largest economies worldwide started to recover, with growth rates varying from 1.2 percent (Japan) to over nine percent (India).

Consumer lending, excluding student loans, in the United Kingdom (UK) reached nearly 33.51 billion British pounds in March 2025. These figures have thus recovered from the stark decline suffered in April 2020. The value of new consumer credit granted also decreased during the economic crisis of 2007, although more gradually. The category consumer lending includes loans and advances to individuals through credit cards and personal loans. The majority of consumer credit is through credit card lending. Mortgage lending The value of outstanding mortgage lending in the UK is far higher than that of consumer credit. Additionally, the outstanding volume of consumer credit has fluctuated more in the past, while mortgages have had a more consistent growth. In the second quarter of 2024, the value of gross new mortgage lending in the UK amounted to over 60 billion British pounds. Credit card payments With billions of British pounds in gross consumer lending through credit cards, it’s unsurprising that the number of credit cards in circulation in 2022 was nearly as high as the number of people in the UK. The number of credit cards peaked in 2005, and it slightly decreased in the following months. However, there were still nearly 56 million credit cards in issue in the UK in 2023. The average amount spent per purchase on credit cards in the UK was roughly 59 British pounds in November 2024. This figure is much lower than the spending limit of most credit cards.