With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

The classification of finiancial crisis interventions

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Financial Crisis and Statitical Classification

This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies.

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

One of the major duties the Bank of England (BoE) is tasked with is keeping inflation rates low and stable. The usual tactic for keeping inflation rates down, and therefore the price of goods and services stable by the Bank of England is through lowering the Bank Rate. Such a measure was used in 2008 during the global recession when the BoE lowered the bank base rate from **** percent to *** percent. Due to the economic fears surrounding the COVID-19 virus, as of the 19th of March 2020, the bank base rate was set to its lowest ever standing. The issue with lowering interest rates is that there is an end limit as to how low they can go. Quantitative easing Quantitative easing is a measure that central banks can use to inject money into the economy to hopefully boost spending and investment. Quantitative easing is the creation of digital money in order to purchase government bonds. By purchasing large amounts of government bonds, the interest rates on those bonds lower. This in turn means that the interest rates offered on loans for the purchasing of mortgages or business loans also lowers, encouraging spending and stimulating the economy. Large enterprises jump at the opportunity After the initial stimulus of *** billion British pounds through quantitative easing in March 2020, the Bank of England announced in June that they would increase the amount by a further 100 billion British pounds. In March of 2020, the headline flow of borrowing by non-financial industries including construction, transport, real estate and the manufacturing sectors increased significantly.

This statistic shows the responses that adults from the United Kingdom (UK) gave when asked "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The economic crisis has damaged my confidence in business as a whole'" as of June 2014. A large share of respondents (** percent) felt that the economic crisis had damaged their confidence in business as a whole, and a third of respondents felt neutral to the question.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "Fiscal Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis in the UK and the US".

This statistic shows the United Kingdom (UK) financial and insurance industries gross value added (GVA) as a share of the UK's total economic output. It can be seen that in the years running up to the global financial crisis the United Kingdoms finance and insurance industry became a major factor of its economic gross value added output. in 2009 (one year post financial crisis) the UK's finance and insurance industry accounted for nine percent of its GVA. Since then there has been a steady decrease amounting to 6.9 percent as of 2018. In 2017, London accounted for almost half of financial sectors GVA.

United States Recession Probability data was reported at 14.120 % in Oct 2019. This records a decrease from the previous number of 14.505 % for Sep 2019. United States Recession Probability data is updated monthly, averaging 7.668 % from Jan 1960 (Median) to Oct 2019, with 718 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 95.405 % in Dec 1981 and a record low of 0.080 % in Sep 1983. United States Recession Probability data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S021: Recession Probability.

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (GBRRECDM) from 1955-02-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and United Kingdom.

This spreadsheet contains weekly data on the Balance Sheets of the Issue and Banking Departments of the Bank of England between 1844 and 2006. This augments the annual data on the consolidated balance sheet of the Bank which is also available on the Bank's website. The weekly balance sheets allow higher frequency analysis of the movements in the assets and liabilities of the Bank which is important when looking at historical financial crises which may be concentrated in a particular week or month.

Real household disposable income per person in the United Kingdom is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024/25, with disposable income growth slowing from that point onwards. In 2022/23, disposable income fell by two percent, after falling by 0.1 percent in 2021/22, and 0.3 percent in 2020/21.

Probability of Recession: Euro Area data was reported at 1.506 % in Mar 2025. This records a decrease from the previous number of 1.828 % for Feb 2025. Probability of Recession: Euro Area data is updated monthly, averaging 5.278 % from Jan 1996 (Median) to Mar 2025, with 351 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 70.141 % in Mar 2009 and a record low of 0.016 % in Jul 2021. Probability of Recession: Euro Area data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by CEIC Data. The data is categorized under World Trend Plus’s CEIC Leading Indicator – Table EU.S002: Probability of Recession: Euro Area.

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.

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This study investigates the connection between network centrality and firm growth on a sample of 3224 financial services firms located in the UK in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The findings, based on a spatial econometric model of long-term firm growth, indicate that firms that span structural holes, engage in co-management appointments and have network connections to related companies in other financial centres grow faster. In contrast, such connections generate substantial negative indirect effects on proximate firms, leading to a divergence of growth rates between globally connected and locally embedded firms.