The Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) dataset contains an ethnic fractionalization index for 165 countries across all continents. The dataset covers annually the period 1945-2013. The ethnic fractionalization index corresponds to the probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic group. The new dataset is a natural extension of previous ethnic fractionalization indices and it allows its users to compare developments in ethnic fractionalization over time. The applications of HIEF pertain to the pattern of ethnic diversity across countries and over time.

This map shows ethnic fractionalization. The Ethnic Fractionalization Index is calculated using data from the 2007 Population and Housing Census. The striped areas show where marginality hotspots are. The map reveals that marginality hotspots are ethnically more homogeneous than non-hotspot areas. Quality/Lineage: This map shows the ethnic fractionalization index as developed by Taylor and Hudson (1970). The index is calculated as 1- sum(gi), where g is the proportion of people belonging to ethnic group i. The sum runs from 1 to n, where n is the number of ethnic groups in the country. The data used is taken from the 2007 Population and Housing Census (CSA, 2008) and is available on woreda (district) level.

We show that cultural and ethnolinguistic diversity on their own are not enough to describe ethnic political organization, but that co-ethnics need to reliably use ethnicity as a signal of cultural alignment. Using Benin and Senegal as a case study, we show that the overlap between cultural fractionalization and ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the two countries are statistically different from one another. Evidence from 2000 simulations and the Komolgrov-Smirnov test suggests that the degree to which cultural and ethnolinguistic diversity overlap serves as a first step in explaining why we observe political organization around ethnicity in Benin and not in Senegal--even though the two have statistically indistinguishable levels of ethnolinguistic and cultural diversity. This work informs the broader question of why ethnic politics emerge in some ethnically diverse settings and not in others.

This dataset contains ethnic fractionalization (EF) scores for Bolivia's municipalities. The original data comes from the 2001 Bolivia census, as published in "Bolivia: Atlas estadÃstico de municipios 2005" (INE/UNDP). EF values were calculated using the method described by Alesina et al (2003). The 2001 census asked individuals to identify themselves by their indigenous ethnic identity (if any). Respondents could answer "none" or give the name of one of the major indigenous groups: Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Moxo ("mojeño"), Chuiquitano, or "other" indigenous people ("Originario Otro Nativo"). The dataset uses "other" as a residual category that adds up all specific categories (none, Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Moxo, and Chiquitano) and subtracts it from one.

Do institutions rule when explaining cross-country divergence? By employing regression tree analysis to uncover the existence and nature of multiple development clubs and growth regimes, this paper finds that to a large extent they do. However, the role of ethnic fractionalization cannot be dismissed. The findings suggest that sufficiently high-quality institutions may be necessary for the negative impact on development from high levels of ethnic fractionalization to be mitigated. Interestingly, I find no role for geographic factors-neither those associated with climate nor physical isolation-in explaining divergence. There is also no evidence to suggest a role for religious fractionalization.

We examine the relationship between capitalism and income inequality for a large sample of countries using an adjusted economic freedom index as proxy for capitalism. Our results suggest that there is no robust relationship between economic freedom and Gini coefficients based on gross income. Subsequently, we analyze the relationship between income redistribution and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. We find that the impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on income redistribution is conditional on the level of economic freedom: countries that have a high degree of fractionalization redistribute income less, while capitalist countries that have a low degree of fractionalization redistribute income more.

These are the data used for the Racial and Ethnic Diversity for the Austin MSA story map. The story map was published July 2024 but displays data from 2000, 2010, and 2020. Decennial census data were used for all three years. 2000: DEC Summary File 1, P004 2010: DEC Redistricting Data (PL 94-171), P2 2020: DEC Redistricting Data (PL 94-171), P2 Geographic crosswalks were used to harmonize 2000, 2010, and 2020 geographies. Racial and Ethnic Diversity Index for the Austin MSA Storymap: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/88ee265f00934af7a750b57f7faebd2c City of Austin Open Data Terms of Use – https://data.austintexas.gov/stories/s/ranj-cccq

We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, values, and attitudes. Using survey data for 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. Although only a small portion of a country's overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, we find that various political economy outcomes (such as civil conflict and public goods provision) worsen when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture.

Ethnic diversity is generally associated with less social capital and lower levels of trust. However, most empirical evidence for this relationship is focused on generalized trust, rather than more theoretically appropriate measures of group-based trust. This paper evaluates the relationship between ethnic diversity – at national, regional, and local levels – and the degree to which coethnics are trusted more than non-coethnics, a value I call the “coethnic trust premium.” Using public opinion data from sixteen African countries, I find that citizens of ethnically diverse states express, on average, more ethnocentric trust. However, within countries, regional ethnic diversity is actually associated with less ethnocentric trust. This same negative pattern between diversity and ethnocentric trust appears across districts and enumeration areas within Malawi. I then show, consistent with these patterns, that diversity is only detrimental to intergroup trust at the national level in the presence of ethnic group segregation. These results highlight the importance of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups on intergroup relations, and question the utility of micro-level studies of interethnic interactions for understanding macro-level group dynamics.

This article analyzes the conditions under which ethnic minorities intensify or moderate their protest behavior. While this question has been previously asked, we find that prior studies tend to generalize explanations across a varied set of ethnic groups and assume that causal conditions can independently explain whether groups are more or less mobilized. By contrast, this study employs a technique – fuzzy-set analysis – that is geared toward matching comparable groups to specific analytical configurations of causal factors to explain the choice for strong and weak protest. The analysis draws on a sample of 29 ethnic minorities in Europe and uses three group and two contextual conditions inspired by Gurr’s ethnopolitical conflict model to understand why some ethnic minorities protest more frequently than others. We find that two group-related factors have the strongest claim to being generalizable: while territorial concentration is a necessary condition for strong protest, national pride is a necessary condition for weak protest. The contextual factors of level of democracy and ethnic fractionalization, which are often emphasized in the literature, and the perceived political discrimination of a group, are neither necessary nor individually sufficient conditions for either strong or weak protest. Hence, they help understanding some cases, but not all, and only in combination with other conditions. Such causal complexity, inherent in the phenomenon of ethnic protest, underscores the need for a case-sensitive, yet comparative, approach.

How does ethnic diversity in government impact public good provision? We construct a novel dataset linking the ethnicity of California city council candidates to election outcomes and expenditure decisions. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that increased diversity on the council leads to less spending on public goods. This is especially true in cities with high segregation and economic inequality. Those serving on councils that experience an increase in diversity also receive fewer votes when they run for reelection. These results point towards disagreement within the council generating lower spending.

Contained within the 5th Edition (1978 to 1995) of the National Atlas of Canada is a map that shows the index of concentration for Census Divisions and index of entropy (ethnic heterogeneity) for all 25 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). The graphs show the breakdown of ethnic population in each CMA, and for Canada.

This national, tract-level experienced racial segregation dataset uses data for over 66 million anonymized and opted-in devices in Cuebiq’s Spectus Clean Room data to estimate 15 minute time overlaps of device stays in 38.2m x 19.1m grids across the United States in 2022. We infer a probability distribution of racial backgrounds for each device given their home Census block groups at the time of data collection, and calculate the probability of a diverse social contact during that space and time. These measures are then aggregated to the Census tract and across the whole time period in order to preserve privacy and develop a generalizable measure of the diversity of a place. We propose that this dataset is a better measurement of the segregation and diversity as it is experienced, which we show diverges from standard measurements of segregation. The data can be used by researchers to better understand the determinants of experienced segregation; beyond research, we suggest this data can be used by policy makers to understand the impacts of policies designed to encourage social mixing and access to opportunities such as affordable housing and mixed-income housing, and more.

For the purposes of enhanced privacy, home census block groups were pre-calculated by the data provider, and all calculations are done at the Census tract, with tracts that have more than 20 unique devices over the period of analysis.

Contains data and code to replicate the results in the main text and the supplemental information for the article "Elite Responses to Ethnic Diversity and Interethnic Contact" published in Political Behavior. Refer to the Read_Me file for details on each file.

Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution attempts to explain if individual's preferences for redistribution change if the ethnic diversity increases in a municipality. In this case, selected parts of the Swedish Election Studies has been matched with municipal data for the time period between 1985 and 1994, when Sweden had an active placement program of refugees. This meant that the refugees themselves were not allowed to decide where to settle, but instead they were places in municipalities which had contracts with the Swedish Integration Board (Invandrarverket). Originally the idea of the program was to direct the refugees to municipalities with good labor market conditions, but since the number of refugees arriving to Sweden were larger than expected, so in practice more or less all municipalities were a part of the program. With the placement program refugees spread more across the country, than before the program. Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution focus primarily on refugees from nations which not were members in the OECD 1994 and Turkey.

The data comes from the Swedish Election Studies survey waves for the elections in 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994. Primarily it consists of various background variables and variables about individual's preferences for private health care, nuclear power and social benefits. The municipal data primarily consist of various socio-economic and political variables, such as population, tax base, welfare spending and share of refugees. Some of these variables are the average of the term (1986-1988, 1989-1991, and 1992-1994).

Purpose:

Investigate the causal link between the ethnic diversity in a society and its inhabitants´ preferences for redistribution.

According to recent research, racial and ethnic diversity reduces U.S. localities' investment in public goods. Yet we remain unsure about the mechanisms behind that relationship, and uncertain that the relationship is causal. This essay addresses these challenges by studying the impact of racial and ethnic demographics on property tax votes in Massachusetts and Texas. Employing novel time-series cross-sectional data, it departs from the emerging consensus by showing that diversity does not always influence local tax votes. Instead, diversity reduces localities' willingness to raise taxes only when localities are undergoing sudden demographic changes. Theoretically, this finding points us away from the dominant understanding of diversity as divergent preferences, and towards approaches that emphasize how sudden demographic changes can destabilize residents' expectations and influence local elites. To understand how diversity influences public good provision, we should look to those towns that are diversifying, not those towns that are diverse.

In 2020, about six percent of Ping An Insurance's workforce were from ethnic minorities. China has 56 ethnic groups and depending on the region, ethnic minorities can make up up to 90 percent of the local population.

A cross-national data set of 21 variables was assembled for 212 countries from three sources (Barro and Lee 1994; Gordon 2005; CIA World Fact Book 2005). Our data set includes several proxy measures for national wealth, cultural diversity, social instability (both at national and international levels), and demography. Separate diversity measures were calculated for three different cultural domains, namely language, religion and ethnic groups . In addition, wealth variables (per capita GDP, and GINI, the coefficient of income inequality) were assembled, along with indicators of societal functioning drawn from the literature (especially Barro and Lee 1994), including indices of political rights (PRIGHTSB), revolutions and coups d'états (REVCOUP), and political instability (PINSTAB). Measures of international conflict were extracted from the social science literature, and the following were used: the proportion of the time between 1960-85 the country was involved in an external war (WARTIME), the number of international disputes in which the country was involved (TOTINTDISP), and an index of total military expenditure (TOTMILITEXP). Possible confounding variables such as population size (POPSIZE) and the number of international borders (NBINTBORDERS) were also included.

Why does ethnic violence occur in some places but not others? This paper argues that the local ethnic configuration below the national level is an important determinant of how likely conflict is in any particular place. Existing studies of ethnicity and conflict focus on national-level fractionalization or dominance, but much of the politics surrounding ethnic groups’ grievances and disputes takes place at a more local level. We argue that the existence of multiple ethnic groups competing for resources and power at the level of sub-national administrative regions creates a significant constraint on the ability of states to mitigate ethnic groups’ grievances. This in turn increases the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups and the state. In particular, we argue that diverse administrative regions dominated by one group should be most prone for conflict. Using new data on conflict and ethnic group composition at the region level, we test the theory and find that units with one demographically dominant ethnic group among multiple groups are most prone to conflict.

A standard assumption in realistic threat theories is that the presence of ethnic minorities is associated with a rise of anti-immigrant sentiments. However, we do not know whether this presence has a specific local effect, or whether one can detect a more general nationwide perception of threat. Using data from a recent Belgian population survey, we assess the association between ethnic diversity within the local community and anti-immigrant sentiments. Results suggest a strong negative association between the level of ethnic diversity and anti-immigrant sentiments. Furthermore, while we do not find evidence for an association between ethnic diversity and radical right voting on the individual level, there is a strong negative correlation on the aggregate level. We conclude with some speculation about how anti-immigrant sentiments are created in areas with a very low levels of ethnic diversity, and what this implies for the electoral potential of radical-right parties.