Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
The world's most accurate population datasets. Seven maps/datasets for the distribution of various populations in Lebanon: (1) Overall population density (2) Women (3) Men (4) Children (ages 0-5) (5) Youth (ages 15-24) (6) Elderly (ages 60+) (7) Women of reproductive age (ages 15-49).
MIT Licensehttps://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
License information was derived automatically
In the search for democratic solutions to global conflicts over the last two decades, one model of post-conflict governance has prevailed. power-sharing. Consociational power-sharing entails the representation and participation of major societal groups in the process of governing. Governmance based on consociational principles has facilitated war-to-peace transition in some of the world's most deeply divided places, from Burundi to Lebanon, Kosovo, Macedonia, Northern ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq. Yet, while consociational power-sharing has been heralded as a democratic and inclusive approach to managing ethnic difference, it faces a significant trade-off. For the system to stabilise and pacify divided societies, it must marginalise those actors who were not directly involved in the conflict. By making inclusion of the dominant groups in society central to democratic governance, power-sharing excludes other groups who align with alternative identities. Our project addressed this inherent dilemma in power-sharing of exclusion amid inclusion (EAI Dilemma). We have investigated the institutional bias in power-sharing systems in favour of large groups over “non-dominant minorities” who are not explicitly included in the settlement, such as non-ethnic collectives, women and migrant communities. This project sought solutions to this democratic deficit in post-conflict societies. from over 100 interviews with primarily, political elites and members of civil society across Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Lebanon and North Macedonia we identifed how power-sharing arrangements can be designed, refined and improved in ways that address the EAI problem.In 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled 14-3 that Bosnia-Herzegovina's election rules for its tripartite presidency, which allow only Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs to stand for election, were discriminatory against other minority groups, namely the Roma and Jewish communities. This is because Bosnia's constitutional framework, alongside the presidential arrangement, is designed to accommodate and include the three constituent peoples but not members who prefer not to identify in terms of three ethnic groups. While this was thought necessary to end the 1992-5 war (Weller and Wolff 2005), it has forestalled the consolidation of democracy and has marginalised individuals and groups who do not identify with the three dominant communities. As Jakob Finci, the leader of Bosnia's Jewish community who took the case to the ECHR, noted in response to the ruling, Bosnia's institutional rules are "a problem of injustice that divides Bosnian people into first and second class citizens" (Balkanist 2015). Power-sharing, which entails the representation and participation of major societal (ethnic) actors in the process of governing, has been adopted in places as diverse as Burundi, Lebanon, Kosovo, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq and has facilitated a war-to-peace transition in some of the world's most deeply divided places. However, while power-sharing is often heralded as a democratic and inclusive approach to managing ethnic difference, it faces a significant trade-off. For power-sharing to create stability and pacify the divided groups, it must marginalise those actors who were not directly involved in conflict, who we refer to as non-dominant groups. As part of this project, we identify three kinds of non-dominant groups who were neglected in the original design of power-sharing institutions and remain on the sidelines of postconflict politics: non-ethnic minorities, re-aligned minorities, and micro-minorities. We refer to this institutional bias in favour of large groups as the "exclusion amid inclusion" (EAI) dilemma. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? This research project is designed to confront the EAI dilemma and offer feasible and viable recommendations for its resolution. We seek to answer the following research question: How can power-sharing arrangements best be implemented to account for the EAI problem? We answer this question through a threefold methodological approach. We shall conduct 1) a macro-political analysis of power-sharing institutions to assess their ability to redress the EAI dilemma, 2) four comparative case studies (Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon and Macedonia) investigating the relationship between the inclusion of dominant groups and the exclusion of non-dominant groups, employing a "structured, focused" method of comparison (George and Bennett 2005), and 3) semi-structured interviews with politicians from parties that participate in power-sharing and from parties that struggle for legislative representation, community activists from the three kinds of non-dominant groups identified, and representatives of international organisations engaged in democracy promotion and conflict resolution. Overall, we assess the experiences of states engaged in power-sharing in order to develop a series of policy proposals for modifying the institutional framework to accommodate identity groups that have either been marginalised under the initial institutional design, or who have emerged during the period of peace. This is of timely relevance: our conceptual framework can be extended to societies beyond our comparative cases where peace is marred by episodic violence, frozen conflict, and/or active violent conflict between the dominant groups, but also affecting the non-dominant groups.
Why do individuals sympathize with others’ wars, an antecedent of the decision to become a foreign fighter? By collecting original public opinion data from Lebanon, in 2015, and Turkey in 2017, about the actors of conflict in Syria, we test the argument that an ethno-religious cleavage at home shapes the proclivity of individuals to support others’ wars. Individuals may perceive a war abroad as endangering political and social balance of power at home—and hence own survival. Therefore, when transnational identities map onto a national cleavage, as in the Sunni–Shia cleavage in Lebanon, and Turk – Kurd cleavage in Turkey, individuals are more disposed to show sympathy for others’ wars both to help their kin and to protect the balance of power at home. Our findings imply that efforts to end the trend toward citizens becoming foreign fighters must start at home by mending the relations between ethnic and religious groups.
https://dataverse.ada.edu.au/api/datasets/:persistentId/versions/2.0/customlicense?persistentId=doi:10.26193/MAJFVJhttps://dataverse.ada.edu.au/api/datasets/:persistentId/versions/2.0/customlicense?persistentId=doi:10.26193/MAJFVJ
As part of the wider study of Issues in Multicultural Australia, a survey of adults resident in Australia and born in Malta, Vietnam or Lebanon was conducted. This survey provided supplementary data to that obtained in four other surveys: a general sample of the population; a sample of non-English speaking born immigrants (the NESB sample); persons born in Australia whose father or mother was born in a non-English speaking country (the second generation sample); and persons who migrated to Australia since July 1981 from non-English speaking countries (the new arrivals sample). The general aims of this study are: to examine multiculturalism as a policy, through the experience of Australians; as a set of beliefs, through their attitudes; and as an aspect of cultural maintenance, through their perceptions. The survey concentrates on three broad themes. First, it examines the attitudes of the Australian and overseas born towards multiculturalism, focussing in particular on views about the maintenance of customs, ways of life and patterns of behaviour among immigrants. Second, the barriers which exist to providing full access and equity to overseas born groups are analysed, principally in the fields of education, jobs and in the provision of general health and welfare programmes and services. Third, the study looks at levels of participation in the social and political spheres in community, cultural and work related organisations, and in the use of the political process to remedy problems and grievances. Separate sections of the questionnaire deal with the respondent's background - country of birth and parents' country of birth, father's occupation and educational level; language - English language ability, languages spoken, use of own language; ethnicity - identification with ethnic groups, government aid to such groups, religious observance; education - school leaving age, qualifications obtained, recognition of overseas qualifications, transition to employment; current job - job status, occupation, industry, working conditions, trade union membership, gross income, problems looking for work; spouse - country of birth, education and qualifications, occupation and industry, income and income sources; immigration - attitudes to immigration policy, opportunities for immigrants, social distance from various ethnic groups, and attitudes to authority; family and social networks - numbers of children, siblings in Australia, numbers of close friends in Australia, neighbours; citizenship - citizenship status, participation in political matters and interest in politics; trust in government; and multiculturalism - views on what multiculturalism means, and its importance to Australian society.
Not seeing a result you expected?
Learn how you can add new datasets to our index.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
The world's most accurate population datasets. Seven maps/datasets for the distribution of various populations in Lebanon: (1) Overall population density (2) Women (3) Men (4) Children (ages 0-5) (5) Youth (ages 15-24) (6) Elderly (ages 60+) (7) Women of reproductive age (ages 15-49).