Graph and download economic data for FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Fed Funds Rate, Median (FEDTARMD) from 2025 to 2027 about projection, federal, median, rate, and USA.

Abstract (en): This data collection was used in the book, "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," by Henry Chappell, Rob Roy McGregor, and Todd Vermilyea, which examined the monetary policy preferences of members of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the process by which its members' preferences were translated into policy decisions. Chapter 4 Data files related to Chapter 4 of the book are contained in: Ch04WebFiles.zip. See the readme file contained within that zip file for documentation. Chapter 5 All data described in Chapter 5 is subsequently employed in Chapters 6-8. Descriptions are provided below in the sections for those chapters. Chapter 6 Data files related to Chapter 6 are contained in Chapter06_Data_for_Web.zip. See the readme file contained within that zip file for documentation. Many data files for Chapter 6 are the same as those used in Chapter 7. More details are provided below for Chapter 7. Chapter 7 Data and programs for this chapter come from the JMCB article from which the chapter is drawn. Data files related to the JMCB article are contained in: ChappellMcGregorVermilyea_Data_011503.zip. See the JMCB.pdf file contained within that zip file for documentation. Section 7.5.2 of this chapter also uses data describing the order of speaking within meetings. We have used this data more extensively in our working paper, "The Persuasive Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC." Data for that paper is provided in the: WEA_BeforeAfter_Data_Archive.zip. Chapter 8 Much of the data (and methods) used in Chapter 6 are used again in Chapter 8. Relevant data and program files and documentation are provided in: Chapter08_Data_for Web.zip. Funding insitution(s): National Science Foundation (SBR-9423095, 9422850, 9121941). These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

Graph and download economic data for FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Civilian Unemployment Rate, Median (UNRATEMD) from 2025 to 2027 about projection, civilian, median, unemployment, rate, and USA.

In January 2000, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) instituted the practice of issuing a "balance of risks" statement along with their policy decision immediately following each FOMC meeting. The authors evaluate the use of the balance-of-risks statement and the market's interpretation of it. They find that the balance-of-risks statement is one of the factors that market participants use to determine the likelihood that the FOMC will adjust its target for the federal funds rate at their next meeting. Moreover, they find that, on some occasions, the FOMC behaved in such a way as to encourage the use of the balance-of-risks statement for this purpose. The clarifying statements that sometimes accompany these balance-of-risks statements, as well as general remarks made by the Chairman and other FOMC members, often provide additional useful information.

Graph and download economic data for Longer Run FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Fed Funds Rate, Median (FEDTARMDLR) from 2012-01-25 to 2025-06-18 about projection, federal, median, rate, and USA.

Scholars often use voting data to estimate central bankers' policy preferences but consensus voting is commonplace. To get around this, we combine topic-based text analysis and scaling methods to generate theoretically motivated comparative measures of central bank preferences on the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee leading up to the financial crisis in a way that does not depend on voting behavior. We apply these measures to a number of applications in the literature. For example, we find that FOMC members that are Federal Reserve Bank Presidents from districts experiencing higher unemployment are also more likely to emphasize unemployment in their speech. We also confirm that committee members on schedule to vote are more likely to express consensus opinion than their off schedule voting counterparts.

The benchmark interest rate in the United States was last recorded at 4.50 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Fed Funds Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Graph and download economic data for FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Growth Rate of Real Gross Domestic Product, Central Tendency, Midpoint (GDPC1CTM) from 2025 to 2027 about projection, real, GDP, rate, and USA.

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections are important because they provide information for evaluating current monetary policy intentions and because they indicate what FOMC members think will be the likely consequence of their policies. Knowing the Fed's objectives, their forecasts, and recent deviations of the economy from the forecasts should be sufficient to understand how the Fed is making monetary policy. Results here show that the Blue Chip consensus forecasts are a good proxy for the FOMC views. For example, they match the policymakers' views as closely as do the Board staff forecasts presented at FOMC meetings. Using alternative forms of the Taylor rule, the authors show that the Blue Chip consensus and the Fed policymakers' forecasts have almost identical implications for the monetary policy process.

From 1983 through 1999, policy directives issued by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) contained a statement pertaining to possible future policy actions, which was known as the "symmetry," "tilt," or "bias" of the directive. In May 1999, the FOMC began to announce publicly the symmetry of its current directive. This resulted in much speculation about the meaning of asymmetric directives, which the FOMC had never officially defined. In this article, the authors. investigate three suggested interpretations: (1) Asymmetry was intended to convey likely changes in policy either between FOMC meetings or at the next meeting, (2) Asymmetry increased the chairman's authority to change policy in the direction indicated by the specified asymmetry, and (3) Asymmetric language was used primarily to build consensus among voting FOMC members. The authors find strong support in the implementation of monetary policy only for the consensus-building hypothesis.