The weekly value of all liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve Banks in the United States peaked in 2008, during the global financial crisis. On December 10th, 2008, the value of such facilities amounted to *** trillion U.S. dollars, the highest value during the observed period. There was another sharp increase in 2020, likely triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. As of September 17, 2025, the value of liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve amounted to roughly **** billion U.S. dollars.

The Federal Reserve's balance sheet has undergone significant changes since 2007, reflecting its response to major economic crises. From a modest *** trillion U.S. dollars at the end of 2007, it ballooned to approximately **** trillion U.S. dollars by October 29, 2025. This dramatic expansion, particularly during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic—both of which resulted in negative annual GDP growth in the U.S.—showcases the Fed's crucial role in stabilizing the economy through expansionary monetary policies. Impact on inflation and interest rates The Fed's expansionary measures, while aimed at stimulating economic growth, have had notable effects on inflation and interest rates. Following the quantitative easing in 2020, inflation in the United States reached ***** percent in 2022, the highest since 1991. However, by August 2025, inflation had declined to *** percent. Concurrently, the Federal Reserve implemented a series of interest rate hikes, with the rate peaking at **** percent in August 2023, before the first rate cut since September 2021 occurred in September 2024. Financial implications for the Federal Reserve The expansion of the Fed's balance sheet and subsequent interest rate hikes have had significant financial implications. In 2024, the Fed reported a negative net income of ***** billion U.S. dollars, a stark contrast to the ***** billion U.S. dollars profit in 2022. This unprecedented shift was primarily due to rapidly rising interest rates, which caused the Fed's interest expenses to soar to over *** billion U.S. dollars in 2023. Despite this, the Fed's net interest income on securities acquired through open market operations reached a record high of ****** billion U.S. dollars in the same year.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q1 2025 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

U.S. Economic and Financial Dataset

Dataset Description

This dataset combines historical U.S. economic and financial indicators, spanning the last 50 years, to facilitate time series analysis and uncover patterns in macroeconomic trends. It is designed for exploring relationships between interest rates, inflation, economic growth, stock market performance, and industrial production.

Key Features

• Frequency: Monthly
• Time Period: Last 50 years from Nov-24
• Sources:
  • Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
  • Yahoo Finance

Dataset Feature Description

1. Interest Rate (Interest_Rate):

   • The effective federal funds rate, representing the interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds overnight.

2. Inflation (Inflation):

   • The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, an indicator of inflation trends.

3. GDP (GDP):

   • Real GDP measures the inflation-adjusted value of goods and services produced in the U.S.

4. Unemployment Rate (Unemployment):

   • The percentage of the labor force that is unemployed and actively seeking work.

5. Stock Market Performance (S&P500):

   • Monthly average of the adjusted close price, representing stock market trends.

6. Industrial Production (Ind_Prod):

   • A measure of real output in the industrial sector, including manufacturing, mining, and utilities.

Dataset Statistics

1. Total Entries: 599
2. Columns: 6
3. Memory usage: 37.54 kB
4. Data types: float64

Feature Overview

• Columns:
  • Interest_Rate: Monthly Federal Funds Rate (%)
  • Inflation: CPI (All Urban Consumers, Index)
  • GDP: Real GDP (Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars)
  • Unemployment: Unemployment Rate (%)
  • Ind_Prod: Industrial Production Index (2017=100)
  • S&P500: Monthly Average of S&P 500 Adjusted Close Prices

Executive Summary

This project explores the interconnected dynamics of key macroeconomic indicators and financial market trends over the past 50 years, leveraging data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) and Yahoo Finance. The dataset integrates critical variables such as the Federal Funds Rate, Inflation (CPI), Real GDP, Unemployment Rate, Industrial Production, and the S&P 500 Index, providing a holistic view of the U.S. economy and financial markets.

The analysis focuses on uncovering relationships between these variables through time-series visualization, correlation analysis, and trend decomposition. Key findings are included in the Insights section. This project serves as a robust resource for understanding long-term economic trends, policy impacts, and market behavior. It is particularly valuable for students, researchers, policymakers, and financial analysts seeking to connect macroeconomic theory with real-world data.

Potential Use Cases

• Economic Analysis: Examine relationships between interest rates, inflation, GDP, and unemployment.
• Stock Market Prediction: Study how macroeconomic indicators influence stock market trends.
• Time Series Modeling: Perform ARIMA, VAR, or other models to forecast economic trends.
• Cyclic Pattern Analysis: Identify how economic shocks and recoveries impact key indicators.

Snap of Power Analysis

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b40e0ca-7d2e-4fbc-8cfd-df3f09e4fdb8">

To ensure sufficient power, the dataset covers last 50 years of monthly data i.e., around 600 entries.

Key Insights derived through EDA, time-series visualization, correlation analysis, and trend decomposition

• Interest Rate and Inflation Dynamics: The interest Rate and inflation exhibit an inverse relationship, especially during periods of aggressive monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve.
• Economic Growth and Market Performance: GDP growth and the S&P 500 Index show a positive correlation, reflecting how market performance often aligns with overall economic health.
• Labor Market and Industrial Output: Unemployment and industrial production demonstrate a strong inverse relationship. Higher industrial output is typically associated with lower unemployment
• Market Behavior During Economic Shocks: The S&P 500 experienced sharp declines during significant crises, such as the 2008 financial crash and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. These events also triggered increased unemployment and contractions in GDP, highlighting the interplay between markets and the broader economy.
• Correlation Highlights: S&P 500 and GDP have a strong positive correlation. Interest rates negatively correlate with GDP and inflation, reflecting monetary policy impacts. Unemployment is negatively correlated with industrial production but positively correlated with interest rates.

Link to GitHub Repo

https:/...

This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The previous banking crises in U.S. history reflected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large counterparty exposures among large complex financial intermediaries. In historical incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past appear less directly relevant for the current crisis.

Excess reserves—cash funds held by banks over and above the Federal Reserve’s requirements—have grown dramatically since the financial crisis. Holding excess reserves is now much more attractive to banks because the cost of doing so is lower now that the Federal Reserve pays interest on those reserves. The fact that banks are holding excess reserves in response to the risks and interest rates that they face suggests that the reserves are not likely to cause large, unexpected increases in bank loan portfolios. However, it is not clear what banks are likely to do in the future when the perceived conditions change.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Nov 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

This data is the minutes from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes from February, 2005 to December, 2008.

This is a public data and can be accessed from the link below. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm

From 2003 to 2025, the central banks of the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union exhibited remarkably similar interest rate patterns, reflecting shared global economic conditions. In the early 2000s, rates were initially low to stimulate growth, then increased as economies showed signs of overheating prior to 2008. The financial crisis that year prompted sharp rate cuts to near-zero levels, which persisted for an extended period to support economic recovery. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 led to further rate reductions to historic lows, aiming to mitigate economic fallout. However, surging inflation in 2022 triggered a dramatic policy shift, with the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank significantly raising rates to curb price pressures. As inflation stabilized in late 2023 and early 2024, the ECB and Bank of England initiated rate cuts by mid-2024. Moreover, the Federal Reserve also implemented its first cut in three years, with forecasts suggesting a gradual decrease in all major interest rates between 2025 and 2026. Divergent approaches within the European Union While the ECB sets a benchmark rate for the Eurozone, individual EU countries have adopted diverse strategies to address their unique economic circumstances. For instance, Hungary set the highest rate in the EU at 13 percent in September 2023, gradually reducing it to 6.5 percent by October 2024. In contrast, Sweden implemented more aggressive cuts, lowering its rate to 2.15 percent by October 2025, the lowest among EU members. These variations highlight the complex economic landscape that European central banks must navigate, balancing inflation control with economic growth support. Global context and future outlook The interest rate changes in major economies have had far-reaching effects on global financial markets. Government bond yields, for example, reflect these policy shifts and investor sentiment. As of October 2025, the United States had the highest 10-year government bond yield among developed economies at 4.09 percent, while Switzerland had the lowest at 0.27 percent. These rates serve as important benchmarks for borrowing costs and economic expectations worldwide.

Rates of US homeownership have declined in the past two decades, and the decline has been especially pronounced for young adults. Motivated by recent research that explores the ways in which personal experiences can affect financial attitudes and beliefs, we explore whether the negative homeownership experiences of parents during the 2008 financial crisis could have caused their children to view homeownership less favorably. We find that parental mortgage distress negatively correlates with the probability that a child will purchase a home, and we explore various channels through which this link may occur.

The U.S. federal funds effective rate underwent a dramatic reduction in early 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rate plummeted from 1.58 percent in February 2020 to 0.65 percent in March and further decreased to 0.05 percent in April. This sharp reduction, accompanied by the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing program, was implemented to stabilize the economy during the global health crisis. After maintaining historically low rates for nearly two years, the Federal Reserve began a series of rate hikes in early 2022, with the rate moving from 0.33 percent in April 2022 to 5.33 percent in August 2023. The rate remained unchanged for over a year before the Federal Reserve initiated its first rate cut in nearly three years in September 2024, bringing the rate to 5.13 percent. By December 2024, the rate was cut to 4.48 percent, signaling a shift in monetary policy in the second half of 2024. In January 2025, the Federal Reserve implemented another cut, setting the rate at 4.33 percent, which remained unchanged until September 2025, when another cut set the rate at 4.22 percent. In October 2025, the rate was further reduced to 4.09 percent. What is the federal funds effective rate? The U.S. federal funds effective rate determines the interest rate paid by depository institutions, such as banks and credit unions, that lend reserve balances to other depository institutions overnight. Changing the effective rate in times of crisis is a common way to stimulate the economy, as it has a significant impact on the whole economy, such as economic growth, employment, and inflation. Central bank policy rates The adjustment of interest rates in response to the COVID-19 pandemic was a coordinated global effort. In early 2020, central banks worldwide implemented aggressive monetary easing policies to combat the economic crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's dramatic reduction of its federal funds rate—from 1.58 percent in February 2020 to 0.05 percent by April—mirrored similar actions taken by central banks globally. While these low rates remained in place throughout 2021, mounting inflationary pressures led to a synchronized tightening cycle beginning in 2022, with central banks pushing rates to multi-year highs. By mid-2024, as inflation moderated across major economies, central banks began implementing their first rate cuts in several years, with the U.S. Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank all easing monetary policy.

In this Economic Commentary , we compare characteristics of the 2000–2006 house-price boom that preceded the Great Recession to the house-price boom that began in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. These two episodes of high house-price growth have important differences, including the behavior of rental rates, the dynamics of housing supply and demand, and the state of the mortgage market. The absence of changes in fundamentals during the 2000s is consistent with the literature emphasizing house-price beliefs during this prior episode. In contrast to during the 2000s boom, changes in fundamentals (including rent and demand growth) played a more dominant role in the 2020s house-price boom.

Though the recent recession was the worst downturn since the Great Depression, some observers argue that one silver lining is an upswing in entrepreneurship. Recessions, they claim, provide laid-off workers with the motivation to start their own businesses, and a recent study suggests that in 2009 the number people becoming self employed spiked to its highest level in more than a decade. Unfortunately, a careful look at multiple sources of data shows that the Great Recession was actually a time of considerable decline in entrepreneurial activity in the United States.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 wiped out US$37 trillions across global financial markets, this value is equivalent to the combined GDPs of the United States and the European Union in 2014. The defining moment of this crisis was the failure of Lehman Brothers, which precipitated the October 2008 crash and the Asian Correction (March 2009). Had the Federal Reserve seen these crashes coming, they might have bailed out Lehman Brothers, and prevented the crashes altogether. In this paper, we show that some of these market crashes (like the Asian Correction) can be predicted, if we assume that a large number of adaptive traders employing competing trading strategies. As the number of adherents for some strategies grow, others decline in the constantly changing strategy space. When a strategy group grows into a giant component, trader actions become increasingly correlated and this is reflected in the stock price. The fragmentation of this giant component will leads to a market crash. In this paper, we also derived the mean-field market crash forecast equation based on a model of fusions and fissions in the trading strategy space. By fitting the continuous returns of 20 stocks traded in Singapore Exchange to the market crash forecast equation, we obtain crash predictions ranging from end October 2008 to mid-February 2009, with early warning four to six months prior to the crashes.

Personal savings in the United States reached a value of 975 billion U.S. dollars in 2024, marking a slight increase compared to 2023. Personal savings peaked in 2020 at nearly 2.7 trillion U.S. dollars. Those figures remained very high until 2021. The excess savings during the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. and other countries were the main reason for that increase, as the measures implemented to contain the spread of the virus had an impact on consumer spending. Saving before and after the 2008 financial crisis During the periods of growth and certain economic stability in the pre-2008 crisis period, there were falling savings rates. People were confident the good times would stay and felt comfortable borrowing money. Credit was easily accessible and widely available, which encouraged people to spend money. However, in times of austerity, people generally tend to their private savings due to a higher economic uncertainty. That was also the case in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Savings and inflation The economic climate of high inflation and rising Federal Reserve interest rates in the U.S. made it increasingly difficult to save money in 2022. Not only does inflation affect the ability of people to save, but reversely, consumer behavior also affects inflation. On the one hand, prices can increase when the production costs are higher. That can be the case, for example, when the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil or other raw materials increases. On the other hand, when people have a lot of savings and the economy is strong, high levels of consumer demand can also increase the final price of products.

On average, capital ratios of US banks increased between 2009 and 2012, plateauing before the Basel III rules came into force, but timing varied by bank size and capitalization.

The U.S. federal funds rate peaked in 2023 at its highest level since the 2007-08 financial crisis, reaching 5.33 percent by December 2023. A significant shift in monetary policy occurred in the second half of 2024, with the Federal Reserve implementing regular rate cuts. By December 2024, the rate had declined to 4.48 percent. What is a central bank rate? The federal funds rate determines the cost of overnight borrowing between banks, allowing them to maintain necessary cash reserves and ensure financial system liquidity. When this rate rises, banks become more inclined to hold rather than lend money, reducing the money supply. While this decreased lending slows economic activity, it helps control inflation by limiting the circulation of money in the economy. Historic perspective The federal funds rate historically follows cyclical patterns, falling during recessions and gradually rising during economic recoveries. Some central banks, notably the European Central Bank, went beyond traditional monetary policy by implementing both aggressive asset purchases and negative interest rates.

Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q3 2025 about domestic offices, delinquencies, 1-unit structures, mortgage, family, residential, commercial, domestic, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.

During the period beginning roughly in the mid-1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the U.S. economy experienced a time of relative economic calm, with low inflation and consistent GDP growth. Compared with the turbulent economic era which had preceded it in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of extreme fluctuations in the business cycle led some commentators to suggest that macroeconomic issues such as high inflation, long-term unemployment and financial crises were a thing of the past. Indeed, the President of the American Economic Association, Professor Robert Lucas, famously proclaimed in 2003 that "central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes". Ben Bernanke, the future chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics recipient, coined the term 'the Great Moderation' to describe this era of newfound economic confidence. The era came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the GFC in the Summer of 2007, as the U.S. financial system began to crash due to a downturn in the real estate market.

Causes of the Great Moderation, and its downfall

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Great Moderation including central bank monetary policies, the shift from manufacturing to services in the economy, improvements in information technology and management practices, as well as reduced energy prices. The period coincided with the term of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan (1987-2006), famous for the 'Greenspan put', a policy which meant that the Fed would proactively address downturns in the stock market using its monetary policy tools. These economic factors came to prominence at the same time as the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the U.S. attaining a new level of hegemony in global politics, as its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. During the Great Moderation, the U.S. experienced a recession twice, between July 1990 and March 1991, and again from March 2001 tom November 2001, however, these relatively short recessions did not knock the U.S. off its growth path. The build up of household and corporate debt over the early 2000s eventually led to the Global Financial Crisis, as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 reverberated across the financial system, with a subsequent credit freeze and mass defaults.

The underemployment rate, the percent of employed people who are working part-time but prefer to be working full-time, moves closely with the unemployment rate, rising during recessions and falling during expansions. Following the Great Recession, the underemployment rate had stayed persistently elevated when compared to the unemployment rate, that is, until the COVID-19 recession. Since then, it has been consistent with its pre-2008 levels. We find that changes in relative industry size account for essentially none of the underemployment rate increase after the Great Recession nor the underemployment rate decrease after the COVID-19 recession. Based on this finding, we do not expect the underemployment rate to revert to its pre-COVID-19 levels if industry composition reverts to its pre-COVID-19 structure.