In February 2021, nearly 73 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises in Angola mentioned financial problems amid the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The lack of liquidity and difficulties to pay employees salaries were the main issues referred by businesses, with shares of 27.5 percent and 10.7 percent, respectively. In contrast, 18.7 percent of the organizations reported a normal or stable financial situation. Among these enterprises, mainly were from the manufacturing, extractive, and health sectors.

In March 2021, Fidesz-KDNP voters felt satisfied with the way the government reacted to the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19). However, respondents who preferred oppositional parties only gave the government's economic crisis management a rating of two points out of five.

.xlsx file for the replication of the Paper The Complex Crises Database: 70 years of Macroeconomic Crises. It contains the term frequencies of 20 crises sentiment indexes computed from the IMF country report for the period 1956-2016 for 181 countries. (2021-07-02)

As of January 2025, the largest all-time bankruptcy in the United States remained Lehman Brothers. The New York-based investment bank had assets worth 691 billion U.S. dollars when it filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. This event was one of the major points in the timeline of the Great Recession, as it was the first time a bank of its size had failed and had a domino effect on the global banking sector, as well as wiping almost five percent of the S&P 500 in one day. Bank failures in the U.S. In March 2023, for the first time since 2021, two banks collapsed in the United States. Both bank failures made the list of largest bankruptcies in terms of total assets lost: The failure of Silicon Valley Bank amounted to roughly 209 billion U.S. dollars worth of assets lost, while Signature Bank had approximately 110.4 billion U.S. dollars when it collapsed. These failures mark the second- and the third-largest bank failures in the U.S. since 2001. Unprofitable banks in the U.S. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank painted an alarming picture of the U.S. banking industry. In reality, however, the state of the industry was much better in 2022 than in earlier periods of economic downturns. The share of unprofitable banks, for instance, was 3.4 percent in 2022, which was an increase compared to 2021, but remained well below the share of unprofitable banks in 2020, let alone during the global financial crisis in 2008. The share of unprofitable banks in the U.S. peaked in 2009, when almost 30 percent of all FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions were unprofitable.

In 2021, the majority of Hungarians were completely or rather satisfied with the government's economic crisis management and the measures taken in order to protect workplaces during the pandemic. At the same time, 11 percent of the respondents were not satisfied at all.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

Inflation is generally defined as the continued increase in the average prices of goods and services in a given region. Following the extremely high global inflation experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, global inflation has been relatively stable since the turn of the millennium, usually hovering between three and five percent per year. There was a sharp increase in 2008 due to the global financial crisis now known as the Great Recession, but inflation was fairly stable throughout the 2010s, before the current inflation crisis began in 2021. Recent years Despite the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the global inflation rate fell to 3.26 percent in the pandemic's first year, before rising to 4.66 percent in 2021. This increase came as the impact of supply chain delays began to take more of an effect on consumer prices, before the Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated this further. A series of compounding issues such as rising energy and food prices, fiscal instability in the wake of the pandemic, and consumer insecurity have created a new global recession, and global inflation in 2024 is estimated to have reached 5.76 percent. This is the highest annual increase in inflation since 1996. Venezuela Venezuela is the country with the highest individual inflation rate in the world, forecast at around 200 percent in 2022. While this is figure is over 100 times larger than the global average in most years, it actually marks a decrease in Venezuela's inflation rate, which had peaked at over 65,000 percent in 2018. Between 2016 and 2021, Venezuela experienced hyperinflation due to the government's excessive spending and printing of money in an attempt to curve its already-high inflation rate, and the wave of migrants that left the country resulted in one of the largest refugee crises in recent years. In addition to its economic problems, political instability and foreign sanctions pose further long-term problems for Venezuela. While hyperinflation may be coming to an end, it remains to be seen how much of an impact this will have on the economy, how living standards will change, and how many refugees may return in the coming years.

Out of the world's seven largest economies, the United Kingdom was the most negatively affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. During the third quarter of 2020, the GDP growth rate of the UK stood at minus 7.7 percent compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the GDPs of India and Japan were contracted by minus 5.3 percent. Only China experienced a positive GDP growth rate of 4.9 percent during that same period. However, in 2021, all the largest economies worldwide started to recover, with growth rates varying from 1.2 percent (Japan) to over nine percent (India).

The banking sector of the leading European countries showed similar tendencies in terms of asset growth rate between 2008 and 2021. As a consequence of the global financial crisis, each observed banking industry saw a decrease in the asset growth in 2008 and 2009 but managed to improve their asset growth in the following years. As the recession in the Euro area in 2011 hit, asset growth decreased again. Surprisingly, only Italy's banking sector had a declining growth rate in 2020, but the other leading countries joined this trend in 2021.

Panel of 93 Spanish listed companies with annual data from 2008 to 2015. Suitable for difference-in-differences analysis

Corporate investment and other accounting, financial and corporate governance data for 95 Spanish listed companies.

The objective of this study is to explore the impact of working capital management on firms’ financial performance in China’s agri-food sector from 2006 to 2021. In addition, we analyze whether this impact is the same during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Working capital management is measured by working capital investment policy (measured by current assets to total assets ratio), working capital financing policy (measured by current liabilities to total assets ratio), cash conversion cycle, and net working capital ratio. The results reveal that current assets to total assets ratio and net working capital ratio positively influence financial performance measured through return on assets (ROA), while current liabilities to total assets ratio and cash conversion cycle negatively influence ROA. We also find that the relationship between working capital management and financial performance is more affected during COVID-19 than in the 2008 financial crisis. The findings might provide important implications for company managers to make optimal working capital management practices, depending on the economic environment.

Recent studies highlight economic complexity’s role in mitigating fiscal crises, often measured via an economy’s trade structure. Trade, however, is just one facet of an economy’s structure and omits critical innovative activities like research. Here, we investigate how a multidimensional approach to economic complexity—including both trade and research structures—relates to fiscal instability. By using data on over 230 national fiscal crises from 1995 to 2021 and hazard duration analysis, we assess how measures of trade and research complexity combine to explain crisis likelihood. We find that the interaction of complexity dimensions significantly reduces crisis probability, whereas individual indexes alone are not robust predictors. This suggests that economies focusing on a single dimension may be more vulnerable, thus highlighting the importance of balanced development across multiple areas. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers aiming to enhance economic resilience and mitigate fiscal risks.

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 is associated with a rapid collapse of the Afghan economy. However, assessing the scale of this collapse is proving difficult as official data are scarce. To complement qualitative measures obtained through rapid surveys of the population, we employ monthly nightlights data as a proxy measure for changes in economic activity. By combining a synthetic control approach with nightlights data from neighboring countries, our analysis reveals a significant shift in Afghanistan’s economic trajectory: from positive growth to a deep recession, even considering the impact of the Covid pandemic. Our estimations suggest that Afghanistan’s GDP has declined by approximately 16% from 2020 to 2022, notably less than the World Bank’s current survey-based measure of a 28% decline in 2021 alone. In contrast to other available estimates, our reporting includes confidence intervals to convey the uncertainties surrounding these point estimates. This study showcases the potential applicability of our methodology and the use of appropriately processed monthly nightlights data in scenarios where administrative data is limited or unreliable.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

Abstract

Ten years into the Syria conflict, Lebanon remains at the forefront of one of the worst humanitarian crises. The economic downturn, steep inflation, COVID-19 and finally the Beirut blast have pushed vulnerable communities in Lebanon - including Syrian refugees - to the brink, with thousands of families sinking further into poverty. The Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimates that the country hosts 1.5 million of the 6.6 million Syrians who have fled the conflict since 2011. The Syrian refugee population in Lebanon remains one of the largest concentration of refugees per capita in the world. The 2021 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) was the ninth annual survey assessing the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon to identify changes and trends in their vulnerabilities. Considering the prolonged socio-economic status in Lebanon and COVID-19, it was crucial to provide needs-based estimates on Syrian refugees in the country. Since VASyR 2021 was one of the few assessments that were conducted face-to-face, the implementation was accompanied by a comprehensive protocol to ensure the safety of families and field workers. The criticality of conducting the VASyR 2021 was to provide insights about Syrian refugees impacted by the political and economic crisis that hit Lebanon in late 2019 and by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Geographic coverage

National coverage

Analysis unit

Household and individual

Kind of data

Sample survey data [ssd]

Sampling procedure

Sampling for the VASyR follows a two-stage cluster approach, keeping with the methodology of previous years. UNHCR database of known Syrian refugees as of 2021 served as the sample frame. Cases with missing addresses were excluded. Sampling was based on a "30 x 7" two-stage cluster scheme initially developed by the World Health Organization. This method outlines a sample size of 30 clusters per geographical area and seven households per cluster which provides a precision of +/- 10 percentage points. Districts were considered as the geographical level within which 30 clusters were selected. There are 26 districts in Lebanon, where Beirut and Akkar each represent a district and a governorate. As such, to ensure similar representativeness with other governorates, an additional two cluster samples were considered for each, yielding 90 cluster selections for each. The governorate of Baalbek Hermel is made up of only two districts, as such, and to ensure an adequate sample in that governorate, one additional cluster sample was considered. The primary sampling unit was defined as the village level (i.e. cluster) and UNHCR cases served as the secondary sampling unit. A case was defined as a group of people who are identified together as one unit (usually immediate family/household) under UNHCR databases. Using Emergency Nutrition Assesment (ENA) software, villages were selected using probability proportionate to size where villages with a larger concentration of refugees was more likely to be selected and 30 clusters/villages were selected with four replacement clusters, per district. In order to estimate the sample size needed to generate results that are representative on a district, governorate and national level, the following assumptions were used: - 50% estimated prevalence - 10% precision - 1.5 design effect - 5% margin of error Using the above parameters, 165 cases per district/cluster selection was required, leading to a target of 5,000 cases nationally. Due to the known high level of mobility of the Syrian refugee population and based on experience in previous rounds of VASyR and other household level surveys, a 40% non-response rate was considered.

Mode of data collection

Face-to-face [f2f]

Research instrument

The 2021 VASyR questionnaire collected data at the household level and individual level including demographics, legal documentation, safety and security, shelter, WASH, health, food security, livelihoods, expenditures, food consumption, debt, coping strategies and assistance, as well as questions specifically relating to women, children and people with disabilities.

The foreclosure rate in the United States has experienced significant fluctuations over the past two decades, reaching its peak in 2010 at 2.23 percent following the financial crisis. Since then, the rate has steadily declined, with a notable drop to 0.11 percent in 2021 due to government interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2024, the rate stood slightly higher at 0.23 percent but remained well below historical averages, indicating a relatively stable housing market. Impact of economic conditions on foreclosures The foreclosure rate is closely tied to broader economic trends and housing market conditions. During the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the share of non-performing mortgage loans climbed significantly, with loans 90 to 180 days past due reaching 4.6 percent. Since then, the share of seriously delinquent loans has dropped notably, demonstrating a substantial improvement in mortgage performance. Among other things, the improved mortgage performance has to do with changes in the mortgage approval process. Homebuyers are subject to much stricter lending standards, such as higher credit score requirements. These changes ensure that borrowers can meet their payment obligations and are at a lower risk of defaulting and losing their home. Challenges for potential homebuyers Despite the low foreclosure rates, potential homebuyers face significant challenges in the current market. Homebuyer sentiment worsened substantially in 2021 and remained low across all age groups through 2024, with the 45 to 64 age group expressing the most negative outlook. Factors contributing to this sentiment include high housing costs and various financial obligations. For instance, in 2023, 52 percent of non-homeowners reported that student loan expenses hindered their ability to save for a down payment.

On behalf of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, the polling institute Forschungsgruppe Wahlen conducted a representative survey in March 2021 to examine respondents´ trust in the state and in society. The current survey wave builds on two survey waves in April 2020 and June/July 2020. The current survey focused on respondents´ attitudes towards the state and their trust in institutions and in actors, their assessment of the Corona measures and their expectations in the Corona crisis (COVID-19). The image of society, assessments of cohesion during the pandemic and experiences during the Corona crisis were also recorded.
Greatest personal burden or restriction in the context of the Corona crisis; further great burden or restriction; trust in institutions (courts, science and research, churches, police, federal government, politicians, parties, media); satisfaction with democracy; assessment of democracy as a form of government; social lines of conflict; lines of conflict between external parties; assessment of leaders in Germany; attitudes towards the role of the state in the Corona crisis; assessment of individual measures to combat the pandemic; responsibilities in the Corona crisis (federal government/ state/ city); assessment of the support measures of the federal government (for companies and businesses, for employees in health and care facilities, to protect the health of the population, for the economic situation of the population); assessment of people´s behaviour in the pandemic; assessment of people´s behaviour in the case of recommendations for action instead of rules; feeling of restriction due to the Corona crisis and the measures associated with it; effects on the financial situation; experiences with a health authority (e.g. because of a Corona test), with an employment agency, authorities, police/regulation office in the context of the Corona crisis; evaluation of these experiences; assessment of cohesion in society during the Corona crisis and afterwards; assessment of cohesion in personal surroundings; party sympathy; satisfaction with life; optimism about the future; trust in humanity.

Demography: sex; age; education: school-leaving qualification or school-leaving qualification aspired to; university degree; occupation; job security; type of occupation; professional position; public service; household size; number of persons in household aged 18 and over; German citizenship.

Additionally coded were: Respondent ID; federal state; Berlin East/West; city size; weighting factors (with and without linear correction); information for dual-frame weighting (reached via mobile or landline).

This study aims to investigate the temporal and spatial attributes of the exit of Taiwanese enterprises from mainland China between 2001 and 2021, by applying enterprise database data. Furthermore, the influence of strategic coupling on Taiwanese enterprises’ exit from mainland China was also investigated. The following are the key findings: The spatial distribution pattern of the exit rate of Taiwanese enterprises in mainland China varied at different phases. In contrast, the inland regions of the country’s central and western zones, which are characterized by comparatively less developed economies, maintained consistently high exit rates, whereas the eastern coastal region retained a low exit rate. Particularly, the relationship between Taiwanese enterprises and the invested areas changed from Captive coupling to Cooperative coupling and subsequently to Absorptive Coupling. Similarly, the coupling modes significantly influenced the exit of Taiwanese enterprises from mainland China. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the backward connection of Taiwanese corporations, which have become more reliant on the mainland China market and local suppliers than earlier. Taiwan-favoring policies and the regional innovation environment have consequently emerged as the primary locational advantages for retaining Taiwanese enterprises in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Therefore, the aforementioned factors may help to reduce the Taiwanese enterprises’ exit from mainland China and possess valuable policy implications for Taiwan investment zones in mainland China.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.4 percent in 2023, 4.8 percent in 2022, 8.6 percent in 2021, and a record 10.3 percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.