The 1973-1975 recession marked the end of a remarkably prosperous period for developed economies. Apart from the United States, who experienced a brief recession in 1969-70, the other nations had enjoyed a period of uninterrupted growth in the 25 years leading up to this event. Japan in particular had the fastest growth of any major economy. This ended, however, following the 1973 oil crisis, which saw the member states of the OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) place an embargo on the nations who supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, particularly the U.S., who supplied arms to Israel. As a result, oil prices quadrupled in some periods; the U.S. and most of its major economic partners then went into recession due to their dependency on oil imports. Additional factors exacerbated the effects of the recession in each country, such as the miners' strike in the United Kingdom, or Nixon's unstable economic policies in the early 1970s. It was not until 1976 when the major OECD economies would come out of their recession, although real GDP growth rates would not return to the consistent highs experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. Additionally, while GDP growth resumed within a few years, inflation rates and unemployment rates generally remained higher going into the 1980s.

From the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the Summer of 2007, the world economy experienced an almost unprecedented period of turmoil in which millions of people were made unemployed, businesses declared bankruptcy en masse, and structurally critical financial institutions failed. The crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent losses by investment banks such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. These institutions, which had become over-leveraged with complex financial securities known as derivatives, were tied to each other through a web of financial contracts, meaning that the collapse of one investment bank could trigger the collapse of several others. As Lehman Brothers failed on September 15. 2008, becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, shockwaves were felt throughout the global financial system. The sudden stop of flows of credit worldwide caused a financial panic and sent most of the world's largest economies into a deep recession, later known as the Great Recession. The World Economy in recession
More than any other period in history, the world economy had become highly interconnected and interdependent over the period from the 1970s to 2007. As governments liberalized financial flows, banks and other financial institutions could take money in one country and invest it in another part of the globe. Financial institutions and other non-financial companies became multinational, meaning that they had subsidiaries and partners in many regions. All this meant that when Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York City, was shaken by bankruptcies and credit freezes in late 2007, other advanced economies did not need to wait long to feel the tremors. All of the G7 countries, the seven most economically advanced western-aligned countries, entered recession in 2008, before experiencing an even deeper trough in 2009. While all returned to growth by 2010, this was less stable in the countries of the Eurozone (Germany, France, Italy) over the following years due to the Eurozone crisis, as well as in Japan, which has had issues with low growth since the mid-1990s.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q1 2025 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Formaat: Adobe FlashOmvang: 6,6 MbDuur: 3:14Online beschikbaar: [07-01-2015]Standard YouTube LicenseUploaded on Mar 14, 2011Beschrijving:In a two-part series, Martin Khor addresses issues relating to debt and international trade. Since the debt crisis began in the 1970s, many developing countries have had to agree to new loan conditions imposed on them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These conditions, of benefit to many western commercial interests, often prevent national governments from implementing their own key economic, development and environmental policies. Trade liberalization is one such condition. Dr Khor describes the adverse effects a liberal trade agenda can have on these countries, particularly on their farmers and small industries. He argues that developing countries must be given the freedom to adopt policies of their own. Finally, he welcomes the G8's decision to cancel the debt of some 18 countries, but warns that the terms and scope will need careful study.Dit betreft enkel deel 2, deel 1 is opgeslagen als "Kwalitatieve analyse: kunst én kunde - 09. "Martin Khor - Debt in the Developing World—Part One".This is part 2, part 1 is saved as "Kwalitatieve analyse: kunst én kunde - 09. "Martin Khor - Debt in the Developing World—Part One".

Formaat: Adobe FlashOmvang: 4,8 MBDuur: 02:21Online beschikbaar: [07-01-2015]Standard Youtube LicenseUploaded on Mar 14, 2011Beschrijving:In a two-part series, Martin Khor addresses issues relating to debt and international trade. Since the debt crisis began in the 1970s, many developing countries have had to agree to new loan conditions imposed on them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These conditions, of benefit to many western commercial interests, often prevent national governments from implementing their own key economic, development and environmental policies. Trade liberalization is one such condition. Dr Khor describes the adverse effects a liberal trade agenda can have on these countries, particularly on their farmers and small industries. He argues that developing countries must be given the freedom to adopt policies of their own. Finally, he welcomes the G8's decision to cancel the debt of some 18 countries, but warns that the terms and scope will need careful study.Dit betreft enkel deel 1, deel 2 is opgeslagen als "Handboek kwalitatief onderzoek: kunst én kunde - 10. "Martin Khor - Debt in the Developing World—Part Two".

ABSTRACT This research analyzes the Brazilian structural economic crisis throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the political responses of the Authoritarian National Developmentalism (1964-1985). Firstly, the study highlights the nature of the international oil crises of 1973 and 1979, showing an unexpected rise in interest rates by the US Central Bank and the tightening of external credit after 1979. Rising interest rates meant the end of liquidity in the international credit finance market and the beginning of a drastically recessive policy in Brazil. These factors contributed to the erosion of the growth model based on external debt, a model reflected in two main paradigms: the “economic miracle” (1968-1973) marked by high GDP growth rates; and the II National Development Plan (II PND) (1974-1979), focused on deepening the import substitution industrialization (ISI). The collapse of authoritarianism led to hyperinflation, external indebtedness, and the state’s fiscal crisis, exposing the hegemony of rentier, nonproductive financial capitalism. The second part of the article investigates the negative externalities of the structural economic crisis at the social level, such as concentration, centralization, and closing of the decision-making process, hindering workers’ participation; the intensification of union mobilizations for wage recomposition; the spread of unemployment/underemployment in metropolitan regions; the wage squeeze; the increase in unhealthy labor relations and, therefore, the thinning of the social fabric.

During the period beginning roughly in the mid-1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the U.S. economy experienced a time of relative economic calm, with low inflation and consistent GDP growth. Compared with the turbulent economic era which had preceded it in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of extreme fluctuations in the business cycle led some commentators to suggest that macroeconomic issues such as high inflation, long-term unemployment and financial crises were a thing of the past. Indeed, the President of the American Economic Association, Professor Robert Lucas, famously proclaimed in 2003 that "central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes". Ben Bernanke, the future chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics recipient, coined the term 'the Great Moderation' to describe this era of newfound economic confidence. The era came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the GFC in the Summer of 2007, as the U.S. financial system began to crash due to a downturn in the real estate market.

Causes of the Great Moderation, and its downfall

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Great Moderation including central bank monetary policies, the shift from manufacturing to services in the economy, improvements in information technology and management practices, as well as reduced energy prices. The period coincided with the term of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan (1987-2006), famous for the 'Greenspan put', a policy which meant that the Fed would proactively address downturns in the stock market using its monetary policy tools. These economic factors came to prominence at the same time as the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the U.S. attaining a new level of hegemony in global politics, as its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. During the Great Moderation, the U.S. experienced a recession twice, between July 1990 and March 1991, and again from March 2001 tom November 2001, however, these relatively short recessions did not knock the U.S. off its growth path. The build up of household and corporate debt over the early 2000s eventually led to the Global Financial Crisis, as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 reverberated across the financial system, with a subsequent credit freeze and mass defaults.

Stagflation (stagnation and inflation in one word) depicts a time period when an economy is not only suffering from a recession (declining GDP), but high unemployment and inflation rates as well. Usually unemployment and inflation are inversely related, which makes stagflation a rare occurrence. It first happened in the 1970s, when OPEC put an oil embargo on the United States, resulting in oil prices skyrocketing to three times the standard value at that time. As of September 2023, the price of oil fell by 20 percent in comparison to last year after having increased by 76 perent as a result of Russian invasion of Ukraine. The has been signs of stagflation in some countries through 2022 and 2023, but falling inflation rates indicate that the worst has been avoided.

The economic failures of the communist began to show throughout the 1970s, as the oil crises of 1973 to 1980 exposed the Eastern Bloc's many financial instabilities. The 1973-1975 Recession in the West had a knock-on effect on the Eastern Bloc, particularly on Poland and Romania, as Western debtors began demanding repayment, imports into the Eastern Bloc became more expensive, and exports were no longer in high demand. Growth rates also began to fall further at the end of the decade, as the post-war economic boom ended. At the beginning of the 1970s, Eastern Europe's debt totaled six billion U.S. dollars; by the end of the decade, it was almost 80 billion. Although austerity in the 1980s did bring some measure of control to the Eastern economies, it only limited the growth rate of indebtedness across the region, which eventually rose to 110 billion dollars (over a third of which belonged to Poland alone) when European communism fell, around 1990.

It has been 40 years since the oil crisis of 1973/74. This crisis has been one of the defining economic events of the 1970s and has shaped how many economists think about oil price shocks. In recent years, a large literature on the economic determinants of oil price fluctuations has emerged. Drawing on this literature, we first provide an overview of the causes of all major oil price fluctuations between 1973 and 2014. We then discuss why oil price fluctuations remain difficult to predict, despite economists' improved understanding of oil markets. Unexpected oil price fluctuations are commonly referred to as oil price shocks. We document that, in practice, consumers, policymakers, financial market participants, and economists may have different oil price expectations, and that, what may be surprising to some, need not be equally surprising to others.

The decades that followed the Second World War were among the most prosperous in modern history, and are referred to as the Golden Age of Capitalism in many countries. This period came to an end, however, with the 1973-1975 recession. Differences across the bloc Across the OECD member states, there was a significant drop in real GDP growth over the two decades, falling from an average of five percent annual growth in the 1960s to just 3.5 percent annually in most of the 1970s. Of all OECD countries shown here, Japan experienced the highest rate of real GDP growth in both decades, although it dropped from 11 to six percent between these years (Japan's real GDP growth was still higher in the 1970s than the other members' rates in the 1960s). Switzerland saw the largest relative decline over the two periods, with growth in the 1970s below one third of its growth rate in the 1960s. What caused the end of rapid growth? The Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbors (primarily Egypt and Syria) resulted in the Arab oil-producing states placing an embargo on Israel's Western allies. This resulted in various energy and economic crises, compounded by other issues such as the end of the Bretton Woods financial system, which had far-reaching consequences for the OECD bloc. Additionally, the cost of agricultural goods and raw materials increased, and there was a very rare case of stagflation across most of the world's leading economies.

This statistic shows the national debt of Greece from 2020 to 2023, with projections until 2030. In 2023, the national debt in Greece was around 420.4 billion U.S. dollars. In a ranking of debt to GDP per country, Greece is currently ranked third. Greece's struggle after the financial crisis Greece is a developed country in the EU and is highly dependent on its service sector as well as its tourism sector in order to gain profits. After going through a large economic boom from the 1950s to the 1970s as well as somewhat high GDP growth in the early to mid 2000s, Greece’s economy took a turn for the worse and struggled intensively, primarily due to the Great Recession, the Euro crisis as well as its own debt crisis. National debt within the country saw significant gains over the past decades, however roughly came to a halt due to financial rescue packages issued from the European Union in order to help Greece maintain and improve their economical situation. The nation’s continuous rise in debt has overwhelmed its estimated GDP over the years, which can be attributed to poor government execution and unnecessary spending. Large sums of financial aid were taken from major European banks to help balance out these government-induced failures and to potentially help refuel the economy to encourage more spending, which in turn would decrease the country’s continuously rising unemployment rate. Investors, consumers and workers alike are struggling to see a bright future in Greece, whose chances of an economic comeback are much lower than that of other struggling countries such as Portugal and Italy. However, Greece's financial situation might improve in the future, as it is estimated that at least its national debt will decrease - slowly, but steadily. Still, since its future participation in the European Union is in limbo as of now, these figures can only be estimates, not predictions.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Germany stagnated 0 percent in the third quarter of 2025 over the previous quarter. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Germany GDP Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Article Abstract: Amidst growing financial internationalization, public banks are a reemerging mode of financial governance that can serve as a policy tool for counter-cyclical crisis financing, proactive investment (e.g., green finance), or protectionist lending. Yet no systematic studies examine what leads governments to form public banks in the first place, in part due to a lack of data. This paper introduces an original dataset, conceptual framework, and descriptive empirical insights to serve as the basis for future research. I discuss contending definitions of public banks to advance the more targeted conceptualization of ‘government-initiated public banks’ (G-Pubs), or banks that are formed by governments and remain under government control through ownership and/or management. The dataset includes 1,355 banks and spans 195 countries for the period 1401-2020. Using these data, I test prevailing assumptions suggesting G-Pubs are more likely to form in less developed or more autocratic countries. I show that for the period 1970-2020, G-Pub formation is instead associated with developed democracies. Descriptive analysis prior to the 1970s further supports a more complex view. These findings underscore the need for a renewed research agenda on public banking that considers both domestic and international political economic dynamics, including international diffusion, financial integration, and crisis mechanisms.

Graph and download economic data for Inflation, consumer prices for the United States (FPCPITOTLZGUSA) from 1960 to 2024 about consumer, CPI, inflation, price index, indexes, price, and USA.

The 1973-1975 recession saw growth rates across Europe and the OECD fall drastically, from an average of around six percent growth in Western Europe and the OECD as a whole in 1973, to negative growth in 1975. Disparities between European and overall growth varied, due to the recession's effect on individual countries. For example, Japan's growth fell to -1 percent in 1974, but recovery then saw growth reach 2.4 percent in 1975, even though the OECD collectively experienced negative growth.

During the "Golden Age of Capitalism", from 1950 to 1973, GDP grew by annual averages of just under five percent in Western Europe*, four percent in the U.S., and ten percent in Japan. This period of prosperity came to an end with the recession of 1973-1975, however GDP growth rates did not return to their previous levels when the recession ended, as growth was fairly sporadic in the 1970s and then much slower throughout the 1980s. From 1973 to 1987, GDP grew annually at just two fifth of the Golden Age's rate in Europe and Japan, while the U.S.' annual rates were somewhat closer.

One major difference between the two given periods was that the U.S. was the dominant and most influential economy of all developed (non-communist) countries in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the 1970s and 1980s saw Japan and the European Communities (led by West Germany and France) emerge as major economic powers in their own right. While the U.S. remained the most powerful country in the world, other developed nations became more economically autonomous, and began asserting their own influence internationally.

The aim of the present study is to get insights of the postulated correlation between ‘basic innovations’ and ‘growth industry’ on the basis of the industrial net production’s growth rates of 50 industrial branches. It is demonstrated, that the growth industries of the 1950s and 1960s are identical with those industries, which has been affected by significant basic innovations in the 1930s and 1940s (plastics processing, oil industry, aircraft construction, electrical engineering, chemical industry, and vehicle construction). At the same time it is shown that the phenomenon of economic recession at the end of the 1970s coincides with the relative stagnation of these growth industries. Following the published research results on the historical emergence of basic innovations by Gerhard Mensch in 1977 (see: Mensch, G., 1977: Das technologische Patt – Innovationen überwinden die Depression. Frankfurt/M.) the investigator Kleinknecht developed hypotheses and first examination steps for an innovation theoretical interpretation of longer trend periods of economic growth. The researcher Mensch showed, that basic innovations on particular time points become more frequent (by about 1830/40, by about 1885 and by about 1935). These time points emerged in a period, which was discussed in the literature as phase of weaker economic development. According to the innovation theorists these basic innovations would create new markets and growth industries (in the case of product innovations) and existing industries change radically (in the case of process innovations). Due to the diffusion of new products or production processes sectoral growth spurts may occur, which extend over several economic cycles and therefore enables stable economic growth. In periods of accelerated economic growth only few new basic innovations are enforceable and accordingly an insufficient amount of new growth industries occurs. The economy would experience a period of instable growth and increased crise-prone which follows after the end of the sectoral growth spurts. This period of technological stand-off can only be resolved by new impulses of basic innovations. If this thesis carries a certain reality, it would be possible to show that during the periods of stronger economic growth these industries respectively emerge, which experienced weaker growth in past periods an which had been affected by basic innovations or which were developed by basic innovations. Drawing from an investment function, in which the development of industrial profit rates is defined as fundamental aspect of investments and growth, it would be possible to demonstrate, that basic innovations have a fundamental and positive effect on profit rates (return on capital) and its determinants. The hypotheses are tested using the example of the West German economy development between 1950 and 1977. The investigator Kleinknecht tied in with a casebook of basic innovations in the 1930s and 1940s, collected by Gerhard Mensch (1977). In his analysis Kleinknecht act on the assumption, that most of the basic innovations, which have been catched on after the strong economy crisis in 1929/32, principally developed their growth potential during the 1950s and the 1960s. In the first step single cases of basic innovation has been allocated to those branches of industry, which has been concerned with the production of innovative products in a decisive way or which has integrated process innovations in their production. As categorization system the list of industrial groups and industrial sectors („Verzeichnis der Industriegruppen und –zweige“) was used, which has been also taken as a basis for the development of statistical indices series for 48 sectors of the processing industry and the mining industry by the German Institute of Economic Research (Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW, Berlin)). Kleinknecht refers in his work to these series of the DIW, when he analyzes the industrial production, the capital output ratio, etc. . For the analysis of the growth rates of 48 West German industrial sectors (manufacturing Industry and mining) the growth rates of the industrial net production at constant prices, calculated in the study of Krengel et al., were used and in the following calculated for the whole period of investigation and for subdivided time frames of the investigation period. The subdivided time frames corresponds the economic cycles between 1950 and 1977. Datatables in the search- and downloadsystem HISTAT (Topic: Growth, Economic Cycles, and Crisis = Wachstum, Konjunktur und Krisen): Annotation: HISTAT is offered in German. A. Identifikation der Wachstumsindustrien (Produktionszuwächse): A.01a Durchschnittliche jährliche Zuwächse der industriellen Nettoproduktion nach Industriezweigen (1950-1973) A.01b Relative Beiträge der einzelnen Zweige zum Gesamtzuwachs der Industrieproduktion nach Industriezweigen (1950-1973) A.02 Zyklendurchschnittliche Zuwächse der ´Inno...

This paper analyses the socioeconomic effects of a group of governmental politics of infrastructure and financial/tax subsidies (Programa Grande Carajás) that from the late 1970’s had established a siderurgical zone for commodities production (pig iron) designed for exportation at the eastern Amazon area of Maranhão state. These governmental efforts trigged the emergence of a labour market around steel and forest workers, by the consequence of the use of charcoal as a input for siderurgical production. The analytic effort will be based on the theoretic paradigm of Global Production Networks, which stands as a multicentric approach that stresses the action of diversified social world actors to understand the process of configuration of that market, focusing the changes caused by the 2008’s economic crisis, highlighting the role performed by trade unions, corporates and state agents in this process.