The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

The statisic shows the concern among Americans around the impact of the European financial crisis on the United States economy. According to the source, 15 percent of those polled stated that they were 'not too concerned' about the impact of the European financial crisis on the U.S. economy.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Jun 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for Equity Market Volatility Tracker: Financial Crises (EMVFINCRISES) from Jan 1985 to May 2025 about volatility, uncertainty, equity, financial, and USA.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

United States Recession Probability data was reported at 14.120 % in Oct 2019. This records a decrease from the previous number of 14.505 % for Sep 2019. United States Recession Probability data is updated monthly, averaging 7.668 % from Jan 1960 (Median) to Oct 2019, with 718 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 95.405 % in Dec 1981 and a record low of 0.080 % in Sep 1983. United States Recession Probability data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S021: Recession Probability.

This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and Its Long-Term Impact: An Interrupted Time-Series Natural Experimental Analysis" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.

The Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, reaching its lowest point in June 2009. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, during which a number of systemically critical financial institutions failed or came close to bankruptcy. The crisis in the financial sector quickly spread to the non-financial economy, where firms were adversely hit by the tightening of credit conditions and the drop in consumer confidence caused by the crisis. The largest monthly drop in the IPI came in September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. government was forced to step in to backstop the financial sector. Industrial production would begin to recover in the Summer of 2009, but remained far below its pre-crisis levels.

A deep financial and economic crisis ravaged many Asian nations during 1997 and 1998. In this article, the authors examine the impact of the crisis on corporate risk for a subset of large United States firms that are included in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 100 stock market index. They find that the Asian crisis changed many of these firms' exposure to stock market movements -- that is, their "betas," or sensitivity to stock market risk. In particular, the extent of a firm's sales exposure to Asia appears to be an important link through which the crisis affected beta. This effect is amplified by greater financial leverage.

This file contains the data and code for the publication "The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Effects: An Interrupted Time-Series Analysis of the Impact of its Quantitative Easing Programs" by A. C. Kamkoum, 2023.

Abstract (en): This collection, A Longitudinal Study of Public Response, was conducted to understand the trajectory of risk perception amidst an ongoing economic crisis. A nation-wide panel responded to eight surveys beginning in late September 2008 at the peak of the crisis and concluded in August 2011. At least 600 respondents participated in each survey, with 325 completing all eight surveys. The online survey focused on perceptions of risk (savings, investments, retirement, job), negative emotions toward the financial crisis (sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, worry, stress), confidence in national leaders to manage the crisis (President Obama, Congress, Treasury Secretary, business leaders), and belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives despite the crisis. Latent growth curve modeling was conducted to analyze change in risk perception throughout the crisis. Demographic information includes ethnic origin, sex, age, marital status, income, political affiliation and education. This longitudinal panel study was launched on September 29, 2008, the day the Dow experienced its largest one-day point drop. The first of seven waves of data collection was dedicated almost exclusively to public response to the financial crisis. Further data collection followed on October 8, 2008, November 5, 2008, December 6, 2008, March 21, 2009, June 30, 2009, October 6, 2009, and August 9, 2011. The surveys were spaced closer together in the beginning of the study believing that the most change would occur early in the crisis and, of course, not knowing how long the crisis would last. Collecting the first seven waves of data over a year's period allowed time for the public to respond to different phases of the crisis. A panel of over 800 individuals participated in the study. This ongoing Internet panel was developed by Decision Research through word-of-mouth and Internet recruiting (e.g., paying for Google search words). Nonrespondents (panelists invited to participate but who chose not to) did not differ significantly from respondents in terms of age, gender, or education. Surveys were left open for completion for four to six days, although most panelists responded in the first 24 hours. These online panelists were paid at the rate of $15 per hour with a typical payment of $6 and an incentive if they completed all surveys. Any panelist who appeared to rush through the survey was eliminated and not invited to participate again. N/A ICPSR data undergo a confidentiality review and are altered when necessary to limit the risk of disclosure. ICPSR also routinely creates ready-to-go data files along with setups in the major statistical software formats as well as standard codebooks to accompany the data. In addition to these procedures, ICPSR performed the following processing steps for this data collection: Created variable labels and/or value labels.; Created online analysis version with question text.; Checked for undocumented or out-of-range codes.. Presence of Common Scales: Lipkus Numeracy Score, Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale, Individualism-Communitarianism Response Rates: Wave 1: 81 percent; Wave 2: 89 percent; Wave 2a:80 percent; Wave 3: 87 percent; Wave 4: 85 percent; Wave 5: 91 percent; Wave 6: 76 percent; Wave 7: 74 percent; Wave 8: 79 percent Smallest Geographic Unit: None Convenience sample of Decision Research web-panel participation located throughout the United States. Funding insitution(s): National Science Foundation (SES-0901036). web-based survey

ABSTRACT This paper was written in 2003-04 and aims to investigate the two cycles of US economic expansion in the late of the 20th Century and the 2001 financial crisis. For this purpose, it starts an examination of the mutations of the capital since the 1970s. In the end, it analyzes the international context and the changes in the US hegemony nature at the beginnings of the 21st Century.

Graph and download economic data for Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator (SAHMREALTIME) from Dec 1959 to Jun 2025 about recession indicators, academic data, and USA.

The estimated number of banks and thrifts in the United States fell from around ****** in 1920 to ****** in 1929, when the onset of the Great Depression would then see it fall further, below ****** in 1933. This marks a cumulative decline of over ****** banks and thrifts, which is equal to a drop of more than ** percent in 13 years. Tumultuous Twenties Despite the economic prosperity associated with the Roarin' 1920s in the U.S., it was a tumultuous decade in financial terms, with more separate recessions than any other decade. However, the ***** was also privy to frivolous lending policies among many banks, which saw the banking sector collapse in the wake of the Wall Street Crash in 1929. Many banks failed as the Great Depression and unemployment spread across the country, and customers or businesses could not afford to repay their loans. It was only after this financial crisis where the federal government began keeping more stringent and accurate records on its banking sector, therefore precise figures and the reasons behind these bank failures are not always clear. Franklin D. Roosevelt Just two days after assuming office in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt drastically declared a bank holiday, and all banks in the country were closed from ******* until ********. This break allowed Congress to pass the Emergency Banking Act on *******, which saw the Federal Reserve provide deposit insurance for all reopened banks thereafter. Through his first fireside chat, Roosevelt then encouraged Americans to re-deposit their money in the banks again, which successfully restored much of the public's faith in the banking system - it is estimated that over half of the cash withdrawn during the Great Depression was then returned to the banks by ********.

The financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 brought a sharp increase in the number of bank failures in the United States. This article investigates characteristics of banks that failed and regional patterns in bank failure rates during 2007-2010. The article compares the recent experience with that of 1987-1992, when the United States last experienced a high number of bank failures.

This study examines the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission among the USA, Germany, and four major Eastern European emerging stock markets, with particular attention to the impact of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The results show that both the long-run price relationship and the dynamic price transmission were strengthened among these markets after the crisis. The influence of Germany became noticeable on all the Eastern European markets only after the crisis but not before the crisis. We also conduct a rolling generalized VAR analysis to confirm the robustness of the main findings.

The Great Recession was a period of economic contraction which came in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent bankruptcies among Wall Street financial institutions, the most significant of which being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. These economic convulsions caused consumer confidence, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), to drop sharply in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. How does the Consumer Confidence Index work? The CCI measures household's expectation of their future economic situation and, consequently, their likely future spending and savings decisions. A score of 100 in the index would indicate a neutral economic outlook, with consumers neither being optimistic nor pessimistic about the near future. Scores below 100 are then more pessimistic, while scores above 100 indicate optimism about the economy. Consumer confidence can have a self-fulfilling effect on the economy, as when consumers are pessimistic about the economy, they tend to save and postpone spending, contracting aggregate demand and causing the economy to slow down. Conversely, when consumers are optimistic and willing to spend, this can have a reinforcing effect as wages and employment may rise when consumers spend more. CCI and the Great Recession As the reality of the trouble which the U.S. financial sector was in set in over 2007, consumer confidence dropped sharply from being slightly positive, to being deeply pessimistic by the Summer of 2008. While confidence began to slowly rebound up until September 2008, with the panic caused by Lehman's bankruptcy and the freezing of new credit creation, the CCI plummeted once more, reaching its lowest point during the recession in February 2008. The U.S. government stepped in to prevent the bankruptcy of AIG in 2008, promising to do the same for any future possible failures in the financial system. This 'backstopping' policy, whereby the government assured that the economy would not be allowed to fall further into crisis, along with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies used to restart the economy, contributed to a rebound in consumer confidence in 2009 and 2010. In spite of this, consumers still remained pessimistic about the economy.

The Asian financial crisis caused a decline in most states' exports of manufactured goods to East Asia during 1998, but the severity of the decline varied across states. In this article, the authors estimate the size of this export shock for all states. Primarily because western states tend to be more dependent on East Asian markets for export sales, they were hit the hardest by the sharp reduction in Asian demand for United States-produced manufactured goods. Of the states in which the decline in exports to East Asia lowered the growth of manufacturing output by more than 1 percent, two-thirds were western states. The export changes caused by the Asian crisis, however, were found to matter little for manufacturing employment growth across states during 1998. Meanwhile, states with a high concentration of manufacturing industries that use petroleum products extensively as an input tended to have larger manufacturing employment increases during 1998 than other states. Consequently, the authors conclude that the oil price declines during late 1997 and 1998, some portion of which can be attributed to the Asian crisis, appear to be more important than the export effects in influencing manufacturing employment across states.