The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.
The Great Recession was a period of economic contraction which came in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent bankruptcies among Wall Street financial institutions, the most significant of which being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. These economic convulsions caused consumer confidence, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), to drop sharply in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. How does the Consumer Confidence Index work? The CCI measures household's expectation of their future economic situation and, consequently, their likely future spending and savings decisions. A score of 100 in the index would indicate a neutral economic outlook, with consumers neither being optimistic nor pessimistic about the near future. Scores below 100 are then more pessimistic, while scores above 100 indicate optimism about the economy. Consumer confidence can have a self-fulfilling effect on the economy, as when consumers are pessimistic about the economy, they tend to save and postpone spending, contracting aggregate demand and causing the economy to slow down. Conversely, when consumers are optimistic and willing to spend, this can have a reinforcing effect as wages and employment may rise when consumers spend more. CCI and the Great Recession As the reality of the trouble which the U.S. financial sector was in set in over 2007, consumer confidence dropped sharply from being slightly positive, to being deeply pessimistic by the Summer of 2008. While confidence began to slowly rebound up until September 2008, with the panic caused by Lehman's bankruptcy and the freezing of new credit creation, the CCI plummeted once more, reaching its lowest point during the recession in February 2008. The U.S. government stepped in to prevent the bankruptcy of AIG in 2008, promising to do the same for any future possible failures in the financial system. This 'backstopping' policy, whereby the government assured that the economy would not be allowed to fall further into crisis, along with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies used to restart the economy, contributed to a rebound in consumer confidence in 2009 and 2010. In spite of this, consumers still remained pessimistic about the economy.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/legal/#copyright-public-domainhttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/legal/#copyright-public-domain
Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.
Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market
The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.
Market Panic and The Great Recession
As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.
The Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, reaching its lowest point in June 2009. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, during which a number of systemically critical financial institutions failed or came close to bankruptcy. The crisis in the financial sector quickly spread to the non-financial economy, where firms were adversely hit by the tightening of credit conditions and the drop in consumer confidence caused by the crisis. The largest monthly drop in the IPI came in September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. government was forced to step in to backstop the financial sector. Industrial production would begin to recover in the Summer of 2009, but remained far below its pre-crisis levels.
From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.
Global similarities, global differences
Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/legal/#copyright-citation-requiredhttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/legal/#copyright-citation-required
Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Jun 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
Abstract The paper aims to analyze the wide range of unconventional monetary policies adopted in the U.S. since the 2007-2008 financial crises, focusing on conceptual aspects, the implementation of different programs and measures adopted by FED, and their effectiveness. It is argued that the use of credit and quasi-debt policies had significant effects on the financial conditions and on a set of macroeconomic variables in the US, such as output and employment. This result raises questions about the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy and the forward guidance, both of which were key elements in the New Macroeconomics Consensus view that preceded the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
ABSTRACT This paper aims to evaluate the profitability of the major North-american banks after the crisis of 2007-2008, as well as to seek preliminary explanations to the results found. To do so, it assesses the historical data from 1932 until 2015. The results show that the share of total profits in the North-american economy captured by the financial sector has reduced compared to the peak of the last decade but is still at a higher level than the post-war baseline. The evidence points to the decrease of leverage by regulatory pressure as the main cause of the reduction.
The Great Recession (2008-2009) was an economic recession largely caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street. The administration of President George W. Bush took unprecedented measures to backstop the U.S. financial system and wider economy in 2008 with its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This program was designed to purchase non-performing assets from financial institutions, such as subprime mortgage loans and related financial instruments, which had been responsible for the crisis. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his department were given an initial authorization to spend up to 700 billion U.S. dollars on the program, although this was later lowered to 475 billion. From 2008 to 2012, the TARP program disbursed 417.6 billion U.S. dollars to purchase troubled assets and equity in the companies which held such assets. Of these funds, the majority was spent on the bank support programs, while significant amounts also went to bailouts of the car manufacturing industry and to the insurance giant American International Group (AIG).
As of January 2025, the largest all-time bankruptcy in the United States remained Lehman Brothers. The New York-based investment bank had assets worth 691 billion U.S. dollars when it filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. This event was one of the major points in the timeline of the Great Recession, as it was the first time a bank of its size had failed and had a domino effect on the global banking sector, as well as wiping almost five percent of the S&P 500 in one day. Bank failures in the U.S. In March 2023, for the first time since 2021, two banks collapsed in the United States. Both bank failures made the list of largest bankruptcies in terms of total assets lost: The failure of Silicon Valley Bank amounted to roughly 209 billion U.S. dollars worth of assets lost, while Signature Bank had approximately 110.4 billion U.S. dollars when it collapsed. These failures mark the second- and the third-largest bank failures in the U.S. since 2001. Unprofitable banks in the U.S. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank painted an alarming picture of the U.S. banking industry. In reality, however, the state of the industry was much better in 2022 than in earlier periods of economic downturns. The share of unprofitable banks, for instance, was 3.4 percent in 2022, which was an increase compared to 2021, but remained well below the share of unprofitable banks in 2020, let alone during the global financial crisis in 2008. The share of unprofitable banks in the U.S. peaked in 2009, when almost 30 percent of all FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions were unprofitable.
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/studies/26301/termshttps://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/studies/26301/terms
This study is part of a quadrennial series designed to investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public on matters related to foreign policy, and to define the parameters of public opinion within which decision-makers must operate. This public opinion study of the United States focused on respondents' opinions of the United States leadership role in the world and the challenges the country faces internationally and is comprised of two parts, the July 2008 and the September 2008 surveys. In particular, the July 2008 survey covers United States foreign policy, globalization, trade and immigration, the rise of China, and the United States-Japan relationship. Regarding United States foreign policy, respondents were asked to give their views on whether the United States should take an active part in world affairs, threats to vital interests in the next ten years, foreign policy goals, treaties and agreements, the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council, conflict between Christians and Muslims, and combating terrorism. Additional questions included whether respondents favored the United States having military bases in other countries, their opinions about justifications for the use of United States troops abroad, the Iraq War, nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel, and participants' views on several countries and world organizations. Regarding globalization, trade, and immigration, respondents gave their opinions on whether globalization is good or bad for the United States, lowering trade barriers, the trade practices of various countries, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), economic competitiveness of the United States economy, and the future of United States power and the next generation of Americans. In addition, on the topic of globalization and immigration, queries included the importance of Asia and Europe, the pace of globalization, fairness of income distribution, foreign investments in American companies, the level of legal immigration into the United States and whether or not immigration is good. Concerning the rise of China, respondents were asked to compare the size and potential of the United States and China economies and their implications, loans between the countries, how to deal with China's increase in power, and whether China or Japan is more important to the United States. On the subject of the United States-Japan relationship, participants gave their opinions regarding the amending of Japan's constitution to allow for a wider range of military activities, Japan's development of nuclear weapons, and what factors contribute to Japan's global influence. Part 2, the September 2008 survey, commissioned to gauge whether any substantial changes in attitudes occurred due to the financial crisis, repeated a subset of questions from the July 2008 survey and focused on respondents' attitudes toward trade and globalization. Demographic and other background information includes age, race, gender, marital status, religious affiliation, political party affiliation, employment status, education, household composition, type of housing, state of residence, and access to the Internet.
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
IntroductionThrough variations in reporting volume and discursive strategies, the media communicates risks to the public and shapes perceptions during crises.MethodsThis study conducted a corpus-based, quantitative analysis of topoi in American newspapers during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, comparing media representations of unemployment.ResultsIt identifies four recurrent topoi common to both crises that characterize media coverage of unemployment. However, differences in other recurring topics reflect variations in the distinct causes of the crises, unemployment dynamics, and social policy responses.DiscussionThese findings highlight the media’s distinct influences on the evolution of each crisis and its portrayal of unemployment. By examining how media strategies shape discourse on unemployment, this study deepens our understanding of the interplay between media, discourse analysis, and crisis management during major economic disruptions.
With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.
The home mortgage debt of households and nonprofit organizations amounted to approximately 13.3 trillion U.S. dollars in the first quarter of 2024. Mortgage debt has been growing steadily since 2014, when it was less than 10 billion U.S. dollars and has increased at a faster rate since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic due to the housing market boom. Home mortgage sector in the United States Home mortgage sector debt in the United States has been steadily growing in recent years and is beginning to come out of a period of great difficulty and problems presented to it by the economic crisis of 2008. For the previous generations in the United States, the real estate market was quite stable. Financial institutions were extending credit to millions of families and allowed them to achieve ownership of their own homes. The growth of the subprime mortgages and, which went some way to contributing to the record of the highest US homeownership rate since records began, meant that many families deemed to be not quite creditworthy were provided the opportunity to purchase homes. The rate of home mortgage sector debt rose in the United States as a direct result of the less stringent controls that resulted from the vetted and extended terms from which loans originated. There was a great deal more liquidity in the market, which allowed greater access to new mortgages. The practice of packaging mortgages into securities, and their subsequent sale into the secondary market as a way of shifting risk, was to be a major factor in the formation of the American housing bubble, one of the greatest contributing factors to the global financial meltdown of 2008.
https://search.gesis.org/research_data/datasearch-httpwww-da-ra-deoaip--oaioai-da-ra-de702523https://search.gesis.org/research_data/datasearch-httpwww-da-ra-deoaip--oaioai-da-ra-de702523
Abstract (en): The rescue of the US automobile industry amid the 2008-2009 recession and financial crisis was a consequential, controversial, and difficult decision made at a fraught moment for the US economy. Both of us were involved in the decision process at the time, but since have moved back to academia. More than five years have passed since the bailout began, and it is timely to look back at this unusual episode of economic policymaking to consider what we got right, what we got wrong, and why. In this article, we describe the events that brought two of the largest industrial companies in the world to seek a bailout from the US government, the analysis that was used to evaluate the decision (including what the alternatives were and whether a rescue would even work), the steps that were taken to rescue and restructure General Motors and Chrysler, and the performance of the US auto industry since the bailout. We close with general lessons to be learned from the episode.
The unemployment rate in fiscal year 2204 rose to 3.9 percent. The unemployment rate of the United States which has been steadily decreasing since the 2008 financial crisis, spiked to 8.1 percent in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The annual unemployment rate of the U.S. since 1990 can be found here. Falling unemployment The unemployment rate, or the part of the U.S. labor force that is without a job, fell again in 2022 after peaking at 8.1 percent in 2020 - a rate that has not been seen since the years following the 2008 financial crisis. The financial crash caused unemployment in the U.S. to soar from 4.6 percent in 2007 to 9.6 percent in 2010. Since 2010, the unemployment rate had been steadily falling, meaning that more and more people are finding work, whether that be through full-time employment or part-time employment. However, the affects of the COVID-19 pandemic created a spike in unemployment across the country. U.S. unemployment in comparison Compared to unemployment rates in the European Union, U.S. unemployment is relatively low. Greece was hit particularly hard by the 2008 financial crisis and faced a government debt crisis that sent the Greek economy into a tailspin. Due to this crisis, and the added impact of the pandemic, Greece still has the highest unemployment rate in the European Union.
Formaat: MP4
Omvang: 47,2 Mb
27 February 2008
Online beschikbaar: [01-12-2014]
Standard Youtube License
Uploaded on Jun 11, 2008
Video summary of the ALDE workshop "The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it?"
Event date: 27/02/08 14:00 to 18:00
Location: Room ASP 5G2, European Parliament, Brussels
This workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament, economists, academics and journalists as well as representatives of the European Commission to discuss the lessons that have to be drawn from the recent financial crisis caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market.
With the view of the informal ECOFIN meeting in April which will look at the financial sector supervision and crisis management mechanisms, this workshop aims at debating a wide range of topics including:
- how to improve the existing supervisory framework,
- how to combat the opacity of financial markets and improve transparency requirements,
- how to address the rating agencies' performance and conflict of interest,
- what regulatory lessons are to be learnt in order to avoid a repetition of the sub-prime and the resulting credit crunch.
PROGRAMME
14:00 - 14:10 Opening remarks: Graham Watson, leader of the of the ALDE Group
14:10 - 14:25 Keynote speech by Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, European Commission
14:25 - 14:40 Presentation by Daniel Daianu, MEP (ALDE) of his background paper
14:40 - 15:30 Panel I: Current features of the financial systems and the main causes of the current international crisis.
-John Purvis, MEP EPP
-Eric De Keuleneer, Solvay Business School, Free University of Brussels
-Nigel Phipps, Head of European Regulatory Affairs Moody's
-Wolfgang Munchau, journalist Financial Times
-Robert Priester, European Banking Federation (EBF), Head of Department Banking Supervision and Financial Markets
-Ray Kinsella, Director of the Centre for Insurance Studies University College Dublin
-Servaas Deroose, Director ECFIN.C, Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU, European Commission
-Leke Van den Burg, MEP PSE
-David Smith, Visiting Professor at Derby Business School
Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License information was derived automatically
This study examines the market return spillovers from the US market to 10 Asia-Pacific stock markets, accounting for approximately 91 per cent of the region’s GDP from 1991 to 2022. Our findings indicate an increased return spillover from the US stock market to the Asia-Pacific stock market over time, particularly after major global events such as the 1997 Asian and the 2008 global financial crises, the 2015 China stock market crash, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2008 global financial crisis had the most substantial impact on these events. In addition, the findings also indicate that US economic policy uncertainty and US geopolitical risk significantly affect spillovers from the US to the Asia-Pacific markets. In contrast, the geopolitical risk of Asia-Pacific countries reduces these spillovers. The study also highlights the significant impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on these spillovers. Given the increasing integration of global financial markets, the findings of this research are expected to provide valuable policy implications for investors and policymakers.
Abstract of associated article: This paper analyzes the effects of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) announcements on the stock returns of oil and gas companies around the financial crisis of 2008. Using event study methodology and regression analyses, we examine a set of 122 oil and gas related stocks listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for 35 announcements. Our results indicate that CFTC announcements, depending on their content, can affect the stock returns of oil and gas companies. In particular, this is found to hold true during the period of high-volatility in oil prices, i.e., the period following Lehman Brothers failure. During this period, oil and gas related stock returns respond positively to most regulatory announcements, showing that the CFTC's regulatory interventions are perceived positively by the stock market.
The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.