Portugal, Canada, and the United States were the countries with the highest house price to income ratio in 2024. In all three countries, the index exceeded 130 index points, while the average for all OECD countries stood at 116.2 index points. The index measures the development of housing affordability and is calculated by dividing nominal house price by nominal disposable income per head, with 2015 set as a base year when the index amounted to 100. An index value of 120, for example, would mean that house price growth has outpaced income growth by 20 percent since 2015. How have house prices worldwide changed since the COVID-19 pandemic? House prices started to rise gradually after the global financial crisis (2007–2008), but this trend accelerated with the pandemic. The countries with advanced economies, which usually have mature housing markets, experienced stronger growth than countries with emerging economies. Real house price growth (accounting for inflation) peaked in 2022 and has since lost some of the gain. Although, many countries experienced a decline in house prices, the global house price index shows that property prices in 2023 were still substantially higher than before COVID-19. Renting vs. buying In the past, house prices have grown faster than rents. However, the home affordability has been declining notably, with a direct impact on rental prices. As people struggle to buy a property of their own, they often turn to rental accommodation. This has resulted in a growing demand for rental apartments and soaring rental prices.

The home mortgage debt of households and nonprofit organizations amounted to approximately 13.46 trillion U.S. dollars in the first quarter of 2025. Mortgage debt has been growing steadily since 2014, when it was less than ten billion U.S. dollars and has increased at a faster rate since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic due to the housing market boom. Home mortgage sector in the United States Home mortgage sector debt in the United States has been steadily growing in recent years and is beginning to come out of a period of great difficulty and problems presented to it by the economic crisis of 2008. For the previous generations in the United States, the real estate market was quite stable. Financial institutions were extending credit to millions of families and allowed them to achieve ownership of their own homes. The growth of the subprime mortgages and, which went some way to contributing to the record of the highest US homeownership rate since records began, meant that many families deemed to be not quite creditworthy were provided the opportunity to purchase homes. The rate of home mortgage sector debt rose in the United States as a direct result of the less stringent controls that resulted from the vetted and extended terms from which loans originated. There was a great deal more liquidity in the market, which allowed greater access to new mortgages. The practice of packaging mortgages into securities, and their subsequent sale into the secondary market as a way of shifting risk, was to be a major factor in the formation of the American housing bubble, one of the greatest contributing factors to the global financial meltdown of 2008.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper employs the mixed-frequency Granger causality test, reverse unconstrained mixed-frequency data sampling models, and Chinese data from January 2006 to June 2024 to test the nexus between consumer confidence and the macroeconomy. The results show that changes in the real estate market, GDP, and urban unemployment rate are Granger causes of consumer confidence. In reverse, consumer confidence is a Granger cause of the CPI. Second, GDP and the real estate market (CPI and urban unemployment rate) have a significant positive (negative) impact on consumer confidence, while the conditions of industrial production, interest rate, and stock market do not. Third, the “animal spirits” extracted from consumer confidence cannot lead to noticeable fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy. This suggests that the “animal spirits” will not dominate economic growth, even though they affect the macroeconomy slightly and inevitably. The results are robust after replacing the dependent variable and considering the influence of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Building contractors and developers depend on various socio-economic factors, including property values, underlying sentiment in the housing market, the degree of optimism among downstream businesses and credit conditions. All of these drivers typically track in line with economic sentiment, with recent economic shocks spurring a difficult period for building contractors and developers. Nonetheless, the enduring need for building services, particularly to tackle housing shortages across the continent, ensures a strong foundation of work. Revenue is forecast to decline at a compound annual rate of 2.9% to €1.1 trillion over the five years through 2024. Building construction output recorded strong and consistent growth across Europe in the years leading up to the pandemic, buoyed by rising house prices and a return to economic stability as the effects of the financial crisis faded. Operational and supply chain disruption caused by the pandemic reversed the fortunes of building contractors and developers in 2020, as on-site activity tumbled and downstream clients either cancelled, froze or scaled back investment plans. Aided by the release of pent-up demand and supportive government policy, building construction output rebounded in 2021. Excess demand for key raw materials led to extended lead times during this period, while input costs recorded a further surge as a result of the effects of rapidly climbing energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Soaring costs and the impact of the economic slowdown on both the housing market and investor sentiment have led to a renewed slowdown in building construction activity across the continent. Revenue is forecast to decline by 1.5% in 2024. Revenue is forecast to increase at a compound annual rate of 4.9% to €1.5 trillion over the five years through 2029. Activity is set to remain sluggish in the medium term, as weak economic growth continues to constrain investor sentiment and high borrowing costs hold back the housing market. Contractors and developers will increasingly rely on public sector support, including measures to boost the supply of new housing as countries seek to tackle severe housing shortages.

The forecast horizon is H = 30. The optimal lag order is determined by the AIC. Notes: TSI = total spillover index in (6); FROM = DSi⋅(H) in (7), total liquidity spillovers received by the i-th sector from all other sectors; TO = DS⋅i(H) in (8), total liquidity spillovers transmitted by the i-th sector to all other sectors; TO (own) = total liquidity spillovers generated by the i-th sector, including the contribution of its own; NET = NSi(H) in (9), net spillovers (the difference between transmitted liquidity shocks and received liquidity shocks).

Following the drastic increase directly after the COVID-19 pandemic, the delinquency rate started to gradually decline, falling below *** percent in the second quarter of 2023. In the second half of 2023, the delinquency rate picked up but remained stable throughout 2024. In the second quarter of 2025, **** percent of mortgage loans were delinquent. That was significantly lower than the **** percent during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the peak of *** percent during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. What does the mortgage delinquency rate tell us? The mortgage delinquency rate is the share of the total number of mortgaged home loans in the U.S. where payment is overdue by 30 days or more. Many borrowers eventually manage to service their loan, though, as indicated by the markedly lower foreclosure rates. Total home mortgage debt in the U.S. stood at almost ** trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Not all mortgage loans are made equal ‘Subprime’ loans, being targeted at high-risk borrowers and generally coupled with higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. These loans have far higher delinquency rates than conventional loans. Defaulting on such loans was one of the triggers for the 2007-2010 financial crisis, with subprime delinquency rates reaching almost ** percent around this time. These higher delinquency rates translate into higher foreclosure rates, which peaked at just under ** percent of all subprime mortgages in 2011.

The Jarque-Bera statistic tests the null hypothesis of normality for the sample returns.

England accounts for the majority of sales in the residential real estate market in the United Kingdom. In May 2025, the total number of housing transactions in the country amounted to ******, with ****** of these property sales being completed in England. Historically, sales activity has observed notable fluctuations because of the seasonal nature of the market, but also other trends in the market, such as the slump in April 2020 related to the COVID-19 pandemic. A declining number of home sales The annual number of home sales in the UK has declined since 2021, with 2023 exhibiting the lowest transaction volume since 2012. The main reason for that trend is the increase in the cost of housing. House prices grew year-on-year between 2012 and 2022, with growth accelerating toward the end of the period due to the record-low mortgage rates. As the cost of living crisis hit in 2022, the Bank of England hiked interest rates, resulting in dramatically higher home finance costs. With house prices at their peak and a double increase in borrowing costs, many prospective homebuyers could not afford to buy and placed their plans on hold. How will prices develop in the next five years? After a slight decline in 2024, house prices in the UK are expected to pick up in the next year and continue on an upward trend until 2029. On average, house prices are projected to grow by *** percent per year.