As of July 22, 2025, the yield for a ten-year U.S. government bond was 4.38 percent, while the yield for a two-year bond was 3.88 percent. This represents an inverted yield curve, whereby bonds of longer maturities provide a lower yield, reflecting investors' expectations for a decline in long-term interest rates. Hence, making long-term debt holders open to more risk under the uncertainty around the condition of financial markets in the future. That markets are uncertain can be seen by considering both the short-term fluctuations, and the long-term downward trend, of the yields of U.S. government bonds from 2006 to 2021, before the treasury yield curve increased again significantly in the following years. What are government bonds? Government bonds, otherwise called ‘sovereign’ or ‘treasury’ bonds, are financial instruments used by governments to raise money for government spending. Investors give the government a certain amount of money (the ‘face value’), to be repaid at a specified time in the future (the ‘maturity date’). In addition, the government makes regular periodic interest payments (called ‘coupon payments’). Once initially issued, government bonds are tradable on financial markets, meaning their value can fluctuate over time (even though the underlying face value and coupon payments remain the same). Investors are attracted to government bonds as, provided the country in question has a stable economy and political system, they are a very safe investment. Accordingly, in periods of economic turmoil, investors may be willing to accept a negative overall return in order to have a safe haven for their money. For example, once the market value is compared to the total received from remaining interest payments and the face value, investors have been willing to accept a negative return on two-year German government bonds between 2014 and 2021. Conversely, if the underlying economy and political structures are weak, investors demand a higher return to compensate for the higher risk they take on. Consequently, the return on bonds in emerging markets like Brazil are consistently higher than that of the United States (and other developed economies). Inverted yield curves When investors are worried about the financial future, it can lead to what is called an ‘inverted yield curve’. An inverted yield curve is where investors pay more for short term bonds than long term, indicating they do not have confidence in long-term financial conditions. Historically, the yield curve has historically inverted before each of the last five U.S. recessions. The last U.S. yield curve inversion occurred at several brief points in 2019 – a trend which continued until the Federal Reserve cut interest rates several times over that year. However, the ultimate trigger for the next recession was the unpredicted, exogenous shock of the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, showing how such informal indicators may be grounded just as much in coincidence as causation.

We use the yield curve to predict future GDP growth and recession probabilities. The spread between short- and long-term rates typically correlates with economic growth. Predications are calculated using a model developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Released monthly.

At the end of 2024, the yield for a 30-year U.S. Treasury bond was **** percent, slightly higher than the yields for bonds with short-term maturities. Bonds of longer maturities generally have higher yields as a reward for the uncertainty about the condition of financial markets in the future.

View market daily updates and historical trends for 10-2 Year Treasury Yield Spread. from United States. Source: Department of the Treasury. Track economi…

An inverted Treasury yield curve—a yield curve where short-term Treasury interest rates are higher than long-term Treasury interest rates—is a good predictor of recessions. Because of this, economists and policymakers often assess the risk of a yield curve inversion when the yield curve is flattening. I study the forecastability of yield curve inversions. Professional forecasters did not predict the beginning of the yield curve inversions prior to the 1990–1991, 2001, and 2008–2009 recessions. In all three cases, professional forecasters failed to predict the magnitude of the rise in short-term interest rates. Prior to the 2008–2009 recession, forecasters also overpredicted long-term interest rates.

The yield on US 10 Year Note Bond Yield rose to 4.12% on December 2, 2025, marking a 0.02 percentage points increase from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has remained flat, and it is 0.11 points lower than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. US 10 Year Treasury Bond Note Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on December of 2025.

Source is Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/"NAME OF MEASURE" Column names are "Name of Measure" from FRED's catalog.

Group 1: Yield Curve Indicators These focus on the shape of the Treasury yield curve, comparing longer-term to shorter-term rates. They are primarily used to: Signal Economic Expectations: A normal curve (longer-term rates higher) suggests expectations of growth and possibly inflation. A flattening or inverted curve (short-term rates near or above long-term) could signal a potential slowdown or recession.

Group 2: Monetary Policy and Market Expectations These spreads look at the difference between Treasury yields and the Federal Funds Rate, the primary tool of monetary policy. They indicate: Market vs. Fed Outlook: Widening spreads could suggest the market expects faster rate hikes or higher long-term inflation than the Fed is signaling. Narrowing spreads could mean the opposite. Risk-Taking: When these spreads widen, it can be a sign of investors moving from safe Treasuries to riskier assets in search of yield.

Group 3: Credit Risk and Market Sentiment These spreads focus on corporate bond yields relative to Treasuries, highlighting the added compensation investors require for holding riskier corporate debt. They signal: Credit Conditions: Widening spreads suggest deteriorating credit conditions or lower risk tolerance among investors. Narrowing spreads suggest the opposite. Economic Confidence: Investors often demand higher premiums for corporate bonds during economic uncertainty, widening these spreads.

Group 4: Breakeven Inflation Rates The breakeven inflation rate represents a measure of expected inflation derived from 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Securities (BC_30YEAR) and 30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Constant Maturity Securities (TC_30YEAR). The latest value implies what market participants expect inflation to be in the next 30 years, on average.

Track real-time 10 Year Treasury Rate yields and explore historical trends from year start to today. View interactive yield curve data with YCharts.

Graph and download economic data for Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 5-Year Constant Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis, Inflation-Indexed (DFII5) from 2003-01-02 to 2025-11-28 about TIPS, maturity, Treasury, securities, 5-year, interest rate, interest, real, rate, and USA.

The yield on Romania 10Y Bond Yield rose to 7.00% on December 2, 2025, marking a 0.04 percentage points increase from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has remained flat, and it is 0.38 points lower than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Romania 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on December of 2025.

PDLB is a triple whammy on those three themes.ECIP capital: PDLB received $225M of ECIP capital, and the regulators assigned them the lowest possible dividend (0.5%) on this capital for the first year of payments (announced in June). If we assume PDLB continues to pay 0.5% on this preferred and they have a cost of preferred equity of 10%, then we can calculate the value of this $225M liability as just $11M, with the rest a write-up to equity.This adjustment brings P/TBV from 82% to 46%.Thrift conversion dynamics: Ponce converted from a mutual holding company to a stock holding company in January 2022 (second step). PDLB is an unprofitable and under-levered bank. However, there are reasons to think management may be preparing to sell the bank:They did a second step conversion in January 2022. Only the optionality to sell the bank would motivate this step, as the bank didn’t need the capital, and the conversion increases management’s susceptibility to activist investors. This is highly praised by the best stock analysis websites.Management is old: 6/8 members are in their 70s or 80s (including the CEO and Chairman).Together, the Directors and Officers own >2M shares of stock, worth ~$20M. The CEO owns 580,000 shares, worth ~$6M. His total compensation is ~$1.3M (and he'll need to retire soon anyway). Additionally, the CEO and directors will receive a final tranche of ESOP shares in December 2024 that will boost their holdings another ~40%.Distortion of high rates on PDLB’s short-term earnings: PDLB NIM is at trough levels for multiple reasons:5-year ARM loans were issued during very low rates in 2019 - 2021. 5-year treasury yields were between 0.2% and 1.4% during this period, and grew to >4% in September 2022 (where they’ve been ever since). Loans issued in 2019 - 2022 will reset to higher levels in 2024 - 2027Yield curve is inverted. Ponce lends based on the long end of the curve (five-year rates at 4.1%) and funds on the short-end of the curve (brokered deposits come in at ~5.3%). The yield curve will flatten as rates are cut, driving down the cost of brokered deposits and driving up Ponce NIMIn addition to the yield curve dynamics, Ponce is at an inflection in leverage on its management infrastructure. It built out management capabilities for a much larger bank, and is currently seeing decreasing Q/Q non-interest cost, while assets and interest income are growing nicely.IR told me that cost pressures were peaking in 2023, and this has already become true in 1H 2024 results.Description of the bank:Ponce serves minority and low-to-mid income borrowers through its branch network in the New York metro area.Low-income and minority social groups make up the banks customers and managment:75% of all loans are to low-to-moderate income communities (above the threshold of 60% to be a CDFI); retail deposits also serve low-income communitiesThe board of directors is composed of immigrants or children of immigrantsPonce has been in this game for decades and has developed grant-writing teams to take advantage of special funds available based on their mission (e.g. $4.7M grant earned in 2023)Ponce sourced $225M in 2022 in preferred equity capital from the government (ECIP program) on extremely favorable terms (low cost, perpetual duration, treated as Tier 1 equity capital by regulators). They recently reported that for the first year (and I’d be in subsequent years), they’ll pay the lowest possible dividend of 0.5% (the range is up to 2% for the program). This number is inline with the one quoted by the best stock websites.Ponce also receives low-cost corporate deposits that allow other banks to get Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit with regulators. These deposits are insured and sticky, and often ~200bps or more below market interest rates.Outside of the ECIP equity and the small-but-growing CRA corporate deposits, the bank doesn’t have a good deposit franchise. The blended total cost of interest-bearing liabilities in 2023 is 4.0%.On the asset side, Ponce’s focus on mortgage lending to lower-income communities is a good niche (and composes 99% of lending). IR explained to me that the board of directors is composed of engaged real estate investors who know intimately the relevant neighborhoods and are involved in credit underwriting. Ponce lends 5/1 and 5/5 adjustable-rate mortgages against single-family (27% of loans), multifamily (30% of loans), and non-residential (18% of loans). Construction (23% of loans) properties are 36-month fixed-rate loans. LTVs on all these segments are ~55% and debt service coverage ratio >1.25x. In the current environment, Ponce is issuing loans at ~9% yield that are likely to experience very low levels of credit losses (my expectation would be 0 - 0.1% per year in annual credit cost). Given 5-year rates (~4%), lending at 9% is very favorable, and likely reflects decreasing competitive intensity in the wake of recent banking turmoil.I’m comfortable projecting very low credit costs because losses from the mortgage portfolio have been substantially zero going back to 2016 and very low going back to 2012 (the first year of available data). Charge-offs seemed to peak in 2013 at 0.7% of outstanding loans (charge-off happen years after delinquencies, so the timing seems reasonable following ‘08/’09). Given the peak of 0.7% and the more common experience of 0.0% charge-offs in Ponce’s mortgages, I’m therefore comfortable mostly ignoring credit cost.The most concerning area with respect to credit costs is the construction book. Although they scaled the construction business in 2023, it's not a new business for PDLB (they've been doing construction loans on the order of ~100M per year since 2017, and on a smaller scale before that). PDLB has not recorded any charge offs on the construction business going back at least 7 years. PDLB had no new delinquencies on this book in 2023 (I.e. from loans made in 2020). They did have some DQNs in 2022, but these have been mostly worked out without charge offs.Regarding the timing of the ramp up in recent quarters, it may be just right: if investors/banks are concerned about charge offs today, that's related to vintages from 2020/2021 (which were also loans issued at much lower rates and might not roll over smoothly). If others are pulling back, that's the time to deploy more capital into the business.The bank is currently very under-leveraged: Tier-1 equity / RWA is 21% (vs. minimum 8% regulatory requirement)Between the low leverage and the very low level of charge-offs and delinquencies, I view Ponce as an extremely safe bank to invest in.Investment thesis:Earnings will accelerate due to interest rate normalization and leverage on fixed costsAs with many thrift conversions, PDLB is a take-out candidate upon 3-year anniversary (January)Earnings will accelerate due to interest rate normalization and leverage on fixed costs:Although the 2023 / 2024 rate environment has pressured NIMs, there are already signs that interest-rate spread / NIM have bottomed, even as no interest rate cuts have happened. Interest rate spreads have leveled out in the past three quarters at ~1.7%. Liabilities have mostly repriced, and from here, tailwinds will be 1) repricing of the 5-year ARMs and 2) interest rate cuts starting in September. NIM will be going up, and will likely recover to historical levels within a couple of years.On the expense side, there was significant concern into the 2023 results about non-interest expense. Compensation and benefits grew by 13% CAGR from 2019 - 2023. Growth was 10% in 2023, showing deceleration but still to a high level. However, based on comments by IR that the bank has built expense infrastructure for a much larger bank, and based on results from 1H 2024, it looks like expenses are more controlled now. Non interest cost was in the 17.0M - 17.9M range for the last four quarters (prior to recently announced Q2). Q2, on the other hand, showed non-interest expense at 16.1M. Meanwhile, interest earning assets continued to grow at ~12% Y/Y. The combination of flat / decreasing costs and double-digit asset growth is very favorable for expense leverage.Additionally, managers have incentives to create shareholder value, especially as they reach retirement age. If Ponce doesn’t slow expense growth, shareholder activists may discover Ponce and pressure management to rationalize or sell the bank.The combination of improving NIM, growth in assets, and flattish expenses should produce much higher EPS in coming quarters, and I think $2 - $2.50 in EPS by 2026 is likely (if the bank isn’t sold).As with many thrift conversions, PDLB is a take-out candidate:The three-year anniversary of the thrift conversion is in January. The board is of retirement age and has healthy incentives to sell the bank. A buyout is likely a home-run from today’s stock price of $10.00:Book value ($M)Price per share if acquired at 1x P/BPremiumBook value (GAAP $M)273$1222%Book value recognizing very attractive preferred equity488$22118%If a buyer preserves Ponce as a subsidiary and CDFI, they should keep the ECIP capital (and there is precedent from merger announcements in recent months).Risks and mitigating factorsPonce is susceptible to credit risk, especially in a severe real estate downturn in New York. However, from what we can see of the wake of 2008/2009 financial crash, realized losses on the portfolio were quite low. Additionally, current credit metrics are pristine. 90-day delinquencies are just 0.5% of loans. Construction loans were the worst performers at 1.6%, followed by (counter-intuitively) owner-occupied at 1.4%. The NYC real estate dynamics affecting NYCB and others appear to be non-issues for PDLB. However it’s worth keeping a close eye on credit metrics.If NYC raises taxes to address budget deficits, it could hurt property prices. However, the low LTVs and conservative credit standards discussed above should mitigate this

The yield on Germany 10Y Bond Yield eased to 2.70% on November 21, 2025, marking a 0.02 percentage points decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.14 points and is 0.44 points higher than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Germany 10-Year Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on November of 2025.

The yield on Japan 10Y Bond Yield eased to 1.86% on December 2, 2025, marking a 0.02 percentage points decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.20 points and is 0.78 points higher than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Japan 10 Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on December of 2025.

The yield on India 5 Year Bond Yield eased to 6.25% on December 2, 2025, marking a 0.01 percentage points decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.06 points, though it remains 0.38 points lower than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. This dataset includes a chart with historical data for India 5Y.

The yield on Italy 10Y Bond Yield eased to 3.44% on December 3, 2025, marking a 0.02 percentage points decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.04 points and is 0.23 points higher than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Italy 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on December of 2025.

The yield on New Zealand 10Y Bond Yield rose to 4.38% on December 2, 2025, marking a 0.05 percentage points increase from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.27 points and is 0.06 points higher than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. New Zealand 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on December of 2025.

Sustainable intensification of agriculture requires understanding of the effect of soil characteristics and nutrient supply on crop growth. As farms are increasing in size by acquiring small fields from various farmers, the soil characteristics and nutrient supply might be very different from field to field, while at the same time specific soil properties might limit the nutrient uptake. As a result, there might be a large number of heterogeneous reasons why crop growth varies significantly. New data analysis techniques can help to explain variability in crop growth among fields. This paper introduces Exceptional Growth Mining (EGM) as a first contribution. EGM instantiates the data mining framework Exceptional Model Mining (EMM) such that subgroups of fields can be found that grow exceptionally in terms of three growth parameters (high/low maximum growth, steep/flat linear growth and early/late midpoint of maximum growth). As second contribution, we apply EGM to a case study by analyzing the dataset of a potato farm in the south of the Netherlands. EGM consists of (i) estimating growth curves by applying nonlinear mixed models, (ii) investigating the correlation between the estimated growth parameters, and (iii) applying EMM on these growth curve parameters using a growth curve-specific quality measure. By applying EGM on the data of the potato farm, we obtain the following results: 1) the estimated growth curves represent the variability in potato tuber growth very well (R2 of 0.92), 2) the steepness of the growth curve has a strong correlation with the maximum growth and the midpoint of maximum growth, and the correlation between the midpoint of maximum growth and maximum growth is weak, 3) the subgroup analyses indicate that: high values of K correspond to high maxima; low values of K correspond to low maxima, steep growth curves’, and a late midpoint of halfway growth; Mg influences the midpoint of the growth curve; values of B are higher on dry soils with high tuber growth, while low values of B are found on wet soils with high tuber growth; high values of Zn, Mn, and Fe are found in subgroups with low tuber weight, probably related to the soil’s low pH. In summary, this paper introduces EGM to obtain understanding in crop response to soil properties and nutrient supply. In addition, EGM provides a way to analyze only small parts of a large dataset, such that the impact of soil factors on growth can be analyzed on a more detailed level than existing methods.

View market daily updates and historical trends for Secured Overnight Financing Rate. from United States. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Track …

View the spread between a computed option-adjusted index of all BBB-rated bonds and a spot Treasury curve.

Graph and download economic data for Interest Rate on Reserve Balances (IORB Rate) (IORB) from 2021-07-29 to 2025-12-01 about reserves, interest rate, interest, rate, and USA.