In January 2000, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) instituted the practice of issuing a "balance of risks" statement along with their policy decision immediately following each FOMC meeting. The authors evaluate the use of the balance-of-risks statement and the market's interpretation of it. They find that the balance-of-risks statement is one of the factors that market participants use to determine the likelihood that the FOMC will adjust its target for the federal funds rate at their next meeting. Moreover, they find that, on some occasions, the FOMC behaved in such a way as to encourage the use of the balance-of-risks statement for this purpose. The clarifying statements that sometimes accompany these balance-of-risks statements, as well as general remarks made by the Chairman and other FOMC members, often provide additional useful information.

Graph and download economic data for Liabilities: Deposits: Member Bank Reserve Account (LDMB) from 1914-11-20 to 2002-12-11 about accounts, reserves, liabilities, deposits, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

U.S. monetary-policy decisions are made by the 12 voting members of the FOMC. Seven of these members inherently represent national-level interests. The remaining members, a rotating group of presidents from the 12 Federal Reserve districts, come instead from sub-national jurisdictions. Does this structure have implications for the monetary policy-making process? We provide novel evidence that regional economic conditions influence the voting behavior of district presidents. Specifically, a regional unemployment rate that is one-percentage-point higher than the national level is associated with an approximately nine-percentage-points higher probability of dissenting in favor of looser policy at the FOMC.

Graph and download economic data for Member Banks in New York City (M14115M156NNBR) from Jan 1918 to May 1956 about New York, NY, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Scholars often use voting data to estimate central bankers' policy preferences but consensus voting is commonplace. To get around this, we combine topic-based text analysis and scaling methods to generate theoretically motivated comparative measures of central bank preferences on the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee leading up to the financial crisis in a way that does not depend on voting behavior. We apply these measures to a number of applications in the literature. For example, we find that FOMC members that are Federal Reserve Bank Presidents from districts experiencing higher unemployment are also more likely to emphasize unemployment in their speech. We also confirm that committee members on schedule to vote are more likely to express consensus opinion than their off schedule voting counterparts.

Graph and download economic data for Reserves Held at Federal Reserve Banks, All Member Banks for United States (M14064USM144NNBR) from Jan 1917 to Nov 1965 about reserves, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Failures and Assistance Transactions of State Charter Fed Member Commercial Banks Supervised by the Federal Reserve (SM) for the United States and Other Areas was 0.00000 Number of Institutions in January of 2025, according to the United States Federal Reserve. Historically, Failures and Assistance Transactions of State Charter Fed Member Commercial Banks Supervised by the Federal Reserve (SM) for the United States and Other Areas reached a record high of 25.00000 in January of 1988 and a record low of 0.00000 in January of 1935. Trading Economics provides the current actual value, an historical data chart and related indicators for Failures and Assistance Transactions of State Charter Fed Member Commercial Banks Supervised by the Federal Reserve (SM) for the United States and Other Areas - last updated from the United States Federal Reserve on June of 2025.

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections are important because they provide information for evaluating current monetary policy intentions and because they indicate what FOMC members think will be the likely consequence of their policies. Knowing the Fed's objectives, their forecasts, and recent deviations of the economy from the forecasts should be sufficient to understand how the Fed is making monetary policy. Results here show that the Blue Chip consensus forecasts are a good proxy for the FOMC views. For example, they match the policymakers' views as closely as do the Board staff forecasts presented at FOMC meetings. Using alternative forms of the Taylor rule, the authors show that the Blue Chip consensus and the Fed policymakers' forecasts have almost identical implications for the monetary policy process.

United States Bank Failures: Charter Class: SM - State Charter Fed Member data was reported at 1.000 Unit in Jul 2023. This stayed constant from the previous number of 1.000 Unit for Mar 2023. United States Bank Failures: Charter Class: SM - State Charter Fed Member data is updated monthly, averaging 1.000 Unit from Feb 1936 (Median) to Jul 2023, with 145 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 5.000 Unit in May 1992 and a record low of 1.000 Unit in Jul 2023. United States Bank Failures: Charter Class: SM - State Charter Fed Member data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.O030: Bank Failure and Assistance.

Graph and download economic data for Failures and Assistance Transactions of State Charter Fed Member Commercial Banks Supervised by the Federal Reserve (SM) for the United States and Other Areas (BKCCSMA641N) from 1934 to 2025 about Fed Member, failures, charter, assistance, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Fed Funds Rate, Median (FEDTARMD) from 2025 to 2027 about projection, federal, median, rate, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for Time Deposits, Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System for United States (M1479AUSM027NNBR) from Jan 1919 to Aug 1934 about deposits, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for State Member Banks in Federal Reserve District 7: Chicago (X15CIDTPLSMB) from 1916 to 1941 about FRB CHI District, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Civilian Unemployment Rate, Median (UNRATEMD) from 2025 to 2027 about projection, civilian, median, unemployment, rate, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for State Member Banks in Federal Reserve District 2: New York (X15NYDTPLSMB) from 1916 to 1941 about FRB NY District, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for Percentage of Reserves Held to Reserves Required, All Member Banks, Federal Reserve System for United States (M1486BUSM156NNBR) from Jan 1929 to Jun 1944 about reserves, percent, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for State Member Banks in Federal Reserve District 12: San Francisco (X15SFDTPLSMB) from 1917 to 1941 about FRB SF District, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for Interbank Deposits, Weekly Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System, New York City (M1439AUS35620M144NNBR) from Apr 1920 to Aug 1935 about New York, deposits, NY, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for State Member Banks in Federal Reserve District 4: Cleveland (X15CLDTPLSMB) from 1916 to 1941 about FRB CLEV District, banks, depository institutions, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for State Member Banks in Federal Reserve District 11: Dallas (X15DDTPLSMB) from 1916 to 1941 about FRB DAL District, banks, depository institutions, and USA.