This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in From Rapid Recovery to Slowdown: Why Recent Economic Growth in Latin America Has Been Slow, PIIE Policy Brief 15-6. If you use the data, please cite as: De Gregorio, José. (2015). From Rapid Recovery to Slowdown: Why Recent Economic Growth in Latin America Has Been Slow. PIIE Policy Brief 15-6. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

During the "Golden Age of Capitalism", from 1950 to 1973, GDP grew by annual averages of just under five percent in Western Europe*, four percent in the U.S., and ten percent in Japan. This period of prosperity came to an end with the recession of 1973-1975, however GDP growth rates did not return to their previous levels when the recession ended, as growth was fairly sporadic in the 1970s and then much slower throughout the 1980s. From 1973 to 1987, GDP grew annually at just two fifth of the Golden Age's rate in Europe and Japan, while the U.S.' annual rates were somewhat closer.

One major difference between the two given periods was that the U.S. was the dominant and most influential economy of all developed (non-communist) countries in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the 1970s and 1980s saw Japan and the European Communities (led by West Germany and France) emerge as major economic powers in their own right. While the U.S. remained the most powerful country in the world, other developed nations became more economically autonomous, and began asserting their own influence internationally.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States contracted 0.50 percent in the first quarter of 2025 over the previous quarter. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States GDP Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Antolin-Diaz, Juan, Drechsel, Thomas, and Petrella, Ivan, (2017) “Tracking the Slowdown in Long-Run GDP Growth.” Review of Economics and Statistics 99:2, 343-356.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in India expanded 7.40 percent in the first quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - India GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

In 2024, the growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in Mozambique was estimated at about 1.85 percent. Between 1980 and 2024, the figure dropped by approximately 2.38 percentage points, though the decline followed an uneven course rather than a steady trajectory. From 2024 to 2030, the growth will rise by around 9.56 percentage points, showing an overall upward trend with periodic ups and downs.This indicator describes the annual change in the gross domestic product at constant prices, expressed in national currency units. Here the gross domestic product represents the total value of the final goods and services produced during a year.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

In 2024, the growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in Brazil stood at approximately 3.40 percent. Between 1980 and 2024, the figure dropped by around 5.79 percentage points, though the decline followed an uneven course rather than a steady trajectory. The growth is forecast to decline by about 0.91 percentage points from 2024 to 2030, fluctuating as it trends downward.This indicator describes the annual change in the gross domestic product at constant prices, expressed in national currency units. Here the gross domestic product represents the total value of the final goods and services produced during a year.

Abstract Fiscal policy played a leading role in the debate on the trajectory of the Brazilian economy in the first half of 2010 to explain the economic slowdown and subsequent recession, both in orthodox and heterodox contributions. Orthodox economics points to uncontrolled public spending as being responsible for the fiscal deterioration, which would have led to worsening agents' expectations and falling investments. Heterodox economics, in a roughly opposite interpretation, points to an inflection of fiscal policy that, reducing spending, particularly investment, at the beginning of the decade, would have compromised the policy-inducing capacity in a demand-led growth model. This article aims to empirically evaluate these explanations. In addition to a descriptive analysis of the data, we propose a vector autoregression (VAR) model to examine how the fiscal policy elements pointed out by each of the perspectives discussed here have affected economic growth. In particular, we aim to investigate whether they are able to explain the downturn and the recession in the period analyzed. The results indicate, contrarily to the orthodox view, that spending did not skyrocket compared to previous governments, and that movements in output tend to precede changes in the fiscal outcome. They also point to the importance of public investment in determining the pace of activity, confirming a central element of the heterodox approach. However, by revealing that up to 2014 public spending continued to grow, indicates the insufficiency of the heterodox thesis to explain the slowdown in previous years and the depth of the subsequent recession. Given this, we present additional explanatory elements to understand the period.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States expanded 2 percent in the first quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States GDP Annual Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

The sharp deterioration in crude oil prices of the past two years has not only had impacts on Alberta’s business sector and on government finances, but is also affecting Alberta’s consumers as they are less confident about their job situation and are cutting back on their household purchases as a result.

This dataset is about books. It has 1 row and is filtered where the book is Input price shocks and the slowdown in economic growth. It features 7 columns including author, publication date, language, and book publisher.

As of February 2020, 75 percent of Indonesian respondents believed that the international economy would be greatly impacted by the COVID-19 outbreak. Shortly after Indonesia's President confirmed the first two cases in Indonesia at the beginning of March 2020, Indonesia's central bank, Bank Indonesia, said the country’s economic growth could still arise to 5.4 percent despite the ongoing spread of the coronavirus. For further information about the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, please visit our dedicated Facts and Figures page.

Mozambique has experienced rapid growth for over two decades. Growth accelerated remarkably following the end of the civil war, averaging 7.9 percent over 1993-2015, among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, growth decelerated sharply following the hidden debt crisis in 2016, which led to a crisis of economic governance and a protracted economic slowdown, with growth falling to 3 percent in 2016-2019. The growth slowdown has been further exacerbated by the natural disasters in 2019, the insurgency in Northern Mozambique, escalating since 2017, and the global pandemic since 2020. Mozambique’s existing growth strategy has been limited in its capacity to generate productive jobs and support accelerated poverty reduction. However, the discovery of some of the largest natural gas (LNG) reserves in the world is expected to provide Mozambique with a transformative opportunity for sustained and inclusive growth. The Mozambique Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) assesses Mozambique’s current growth model and presents a set of recommendations to: (i) make the best use of the non-renewable natural resource revenues, which includes putting in place an adequate policy and institutional framework well ahead of the revenue windfalls from the LNG sector; and (ii) promote growth in non-extractive sectors, accompanied by spatial transformation, and improved agricultural productivity. The report consists of five chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of Mozambique’s current growth model, asking what’s driving growth and outlining why this model needs rethinking. Chapter two provides analysis of the potential impact of Mozambique’s resource boom on GDP, exports, revenue, and employment, and discusses how to make good use of the opportunities and manage the associated risks. Chapter three tells Mozambique’s growth story from a spatial perspective. It constructs a unique district-by-district sectoral GDP database to identify the main growth nodes in Mozambique and understand why there is a weak link between growth and poverty reduction. The services sector is the subject of chapter four, exploring how to overcome bottlenecks to deliver on its potential to drive growth in Mozambique. Chapter five continues this theme, examining the challenges posed to private sector growth by weak governance and rising corruption. All five chapters make policy recommendations for the way forward.

The policy brief developed in partnership with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to review Cambodia's 2022 to 2025 socio-economic outlook with a focus on economic growth, poverty and employment, namely in view of rising fuel, food and fertilizer prices and the global economic slowdown.

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of China amounted to around 18.7 trillion U.S. dollars. In comparison to the GDP of the other BRIC countries India, Russia and Brazil, China came first that year and second in the world GDP ranking. The stagnation of China's GDP in U.S. dollar terms in 2022 and 2023 was mainly due to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar. China's real GDP growth was 3.1 percent in 2022 and 5.4 percent in 2023. In 2024, per capita GDP in China reached around 13,300 U.S. dollars. Economic performance in China Gross domestic product (GDP) is a primary economic indicator. It measures the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy over a certain time period. China's economy used to grow quickly in the past, but the growth rate of China’s real GDP gradually slowed down in recent years, and year-on-year GDP growth is forecasted to range at only around four percent in the years after 2024. Since 2010, China has been the world’s second-largest economy, surpassing Japan.China’s emergence in the world’s economy has a lot to do with its status as the ‘world’s factory’. Since 2013, China is the largest export country in the world. Some argue that it is partly due to the undervalued Chinese currency. The Big Mac Index, a simplified and informal way to measure the purchasing power parity between different currencies, indicates that the Chinese currency yuan was roughly undervalued by 38 percent in 2024. GDP development Although the impressive economic development in China has led millions of people out of poverty, China is still not in the league of industrialized countries on the per capita basis. To name one example, the U.S. per capita economic output was more than six times as large as in China in 2024. Meanwhile, the Chinese society faces increased income disparities. The Gini coefficient of China, a widely used indicator of economic inequality, has been larger than 0.45 over the last decade, whereas 0.40 is the warning level for social unrest.

Rio Tinto's Q4 2024 iron ore shipments saw a slight decline due to reduced demand from China, aligning with market expectations. The company's annual exports remained strong, and it continues to advance growth projects globally.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 5.20 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

World gdp growth rate for 2023 was 2.83%, a 0.4% decline from 2022.

<ul style='margin-top:20px;'>

<li>World gdp growth rate for 2022 was <strong>3.24%</strong>, a <strong>3.11% decline</strong> from 2021.</li>
<li>World gdp growth rate for 2021 was <strong>6.35%</strong>, a <strong>9.23% increase</strong> from 2020.</li>
<li>World gdp growth rate for 2020 was <strong>-2.88%</strong>, a <strong>5.55% decline</strong> from 2019.</li>
</ul>Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.