In the first quarter of 2024, 51.8 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials own around 9.4 percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there is almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States.

Inequality in family wealth is high, yet we know little about how much and how wealth inequality is maintained across generations. We argue that a long-term perspective reflective of wealth’s cumulative nature is crucial to understand the extent and channels of wealth reproduction across generations. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that span nearly half a century, we show that a one decile increase in parental wealth position is associated with an increase of about 4 percentiles in offspring wealth position in adulthood. We show that grandparental wealth is a unique predictor of grandchildren’s wealth, above and beyond the role of parental wealth, suggesting that a focus on only parent-child dyads understates the importance of family wealth lineages. Second, considering five channels of wealth transmission — gifts and bequests, education, marriage, homeownership, and business ownership — we find that most of the advantages arising from family wealth begin much earlier in the life-course than the common focus on bequests implies, even when we consider the wealth of grandparents. We also document the stark disadvantage of African-American households in terms of not only their wealth attainment but also their intergenerational downward wealth mobility compared to whites.

In the first quarter of 2025, 51.4 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials owned around 10.3 percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there was almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States in 2024.

A growing body of research documents the importance of wealth and the racial wealth gap in perpetuating inequality across generations. We add to this literature by examining the impact of wealth on child income by race, while also extending our analysis to three generations. Our two stage least squares regressions reveal that grandparental and parental wealth and the younger generation’s household income is strongly positively correlated. We further explore the relationship between income and wealth by decomposing the child’s income by race. We find that the disparity in income between black and white respondents is mainly attributable to differences in family background. In context, differences in family background are stronger than differences in educational attainment. When we examine different income percentiles, however, we find that the effect of grandparental and parental wealth endowment is much stronger at the top of the income distribution. These findings indicate that wealth is an important source of income inequality.

In the third quarter of 2024, the top ten percent of earners in the United States held over ** percent of total wealth. This is fairly consistent with the second quarter of 2024. Comparatively, the wealth of the bottom ** percent of earners has been slowly increasing since the start of the *****, though remains low. Wealth distribution in the United States by generation can be found here.

In the third quarter of 2024, 51.6 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials owned around ten percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there is almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States.

The survey was fielded online by YouGov in November 2020. The questionnaire covers a range of topics, including:Beliefs about whether Britain was an equal or unequal society before the COVID-19 outbreak and whether this will change post-recoveryPerceptions of whether inequalities are increasing or decreasingConcern about a range of specific inequality types, including unequal outcomes in income and wealth, education and health, and between different genders, generations, racial or ethnic groups, and different areas of the UKIdentifying the groups most negatively affected by the pandemicPerceptions of income distributions, and their association with other forms of unequal outcomes (eg in health)Beliefs about the determinants of unequal outcomes and opportunities to get ahead in lifeAttitudes towards welfare, redistribution and the furlough schemeBeliefs around fairness and meritThe survey also contains a series of split samples, testing framing effects of questions around perceptions of inequalities, redistribution and fairness, as well as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire.

Data and code accompanying "The Racial Wealth Gap and the Role of Firm Ownership"This paper develops an overlapping generations model that isolates the impact of the U.S. racial wealth gap in 1962 on the long-run dynamics of wealth. The model predicts that one component of the initial gap, firm ownership, coupled with the intergenerational transfer of that ownership, results in a permanent wealth gap independent of other dimensions of inequality. This implies that even if all discrimination against black Americans had ceased upon the end of Jim Crow, the wealth gap would have persisted without a reparations policy addressing the fact that the initial firm ownership gap arose in the first place.

ABSTRACT This study investigates the association between SEW and EO, considering the moderating role of the generation that is involved in family businesses, considering that EO might benefit from the entrepreneurial and affective attitudes of the first generations. We collected a survey with a final sample of 107 family firms from the textile and clothing manufacturing industry in Brazil. As data analyses, we employed variance-based structural equation modeling using SmartPLS. Our results provide evidence that SEW is positively associated with EO’s three dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking; however, we only found a moderation effect of the generational stage for the relationship between SEW and innovativeness and risk-taking. We show that a high SEW effect on risk-taking is stronger for family firms in later generations than first generations. For higher levels of innovativeness, the level of SEW seems to be relevant only for later-generation family firms. We contribute to the literature on EO antecedents focusing on SEW and the differences in the generational stages. This study also provides insights into how family firms can nurture EO during different generational stage developments, considering family-centric nonfinancial goals.

In the first quarter of 2025, 51.4 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials own around 10.3 percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there was almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States in 2024.

This dataset encompasses the foundations and findings of a study titled "Housing Wealth Distribution, Inequality, and Residential Satisfaction," highlighting the evolution of residential properties from mere consumption goods to significant assets for wealth accumulation. Since the 1980s, with financial market deregulation in the UK, there has been a noticeable shift in homeownership patterns and housing wealth's role. The liberalisation of the banking sector, particularly mortgage lending, facilitated a significant rise in homeownership rates from around 50% in the 1970s to over 70% in the early 2000s, stabilizing at 65% in recent years. Concurrently, housing wealth relative to household annual gross disposable income has seen a considerable increase, underscoring the growing importance of residential properties as investment goods. The study explores the multifaceted impact of housing wealth on various aspects of life, including retirement financing, intergenerational wealth transfer, health, consumption, energy conservation, and education. Residential satisfaction, defined as the overall experience and contentment with housing, emerges as a critical factor influencing subjective well-being and labor mobility. Despite the evident influence of housing characteristics, social environment, and demographic factors on residential satisfaction, the relationship between housing wealth and satisfaction remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, the research meticulously assembles data from different surveys across the UK and the USA spanning 1970 to 2019, despite challenges such as data compatibility and measurement errors. Initial findings reveal no straightforward correlation between rising house prices and residential satisfaction, mirroring the Easterlin Paradox, which suggests that happiness levels do not necessarily increase with income growth. This paradox is dissected through the lenses of social comparison and adaptation, theorizing that relative income and the human tendency to adapt to changes might explain the stagnant satisfaction levels despite increased housing wealth. Further analysis within the UK context supports the social comparison hypothesis, suggesting that disparities in housing wealth distribution can lead to varied satisfaction levels, potentially exacerbating societal inequality. This phenomenon is not isolated to developed nations but is also pertinent to developing countries experiencing rapid economic growth alongside widening income and wealth gaps. The study concludes by emphasizing the significance of considering housing wealth inequality in policy-making, aiming to mitigate its far-reaching implications on societal well-being.Although China has almost eliminated urban poverty, the total number of Chinese citizens in poverty remains at 82 million, most of which are rural residents. The development of rural finance is essential to preventing the country from undergoing further polarization because of the significant potential of such development to facilitate resource interflows between rural and urban markets and to support sustainable development in the agricultural sector. However, rural finance is the weakest point in China's financial systems. Rural households are more constrained than their urban counterparts in terms of financial product availability, consumer protection, and asset accumulation. The development of the rural financial system faces resistance from both the demand and the supply sides. The proposed project addresses this challenge by investigating the applications of a proven behavioural approach, namely, Libertarian Paternalism, in the development of rural financial systems in China. This approach promotes choice architectures to nudge people into optimal decisions without interfering with the freedom of choice. It has been rigorously tested and warmly received in the UK public policy domain. This approach also fits the political and cultural background in China, in which the central government needs to maintain a firm control over financial systems as the general public increasingly demands more freedom. Existing behavioural studies have been heavily reliant on laboratory experiments. Although the use of field studies has been increasing, empirical evidence from the developing world is limited. Meanwhile, the applications of behavioural insights in rural economic development in China remains an uncharted territory. Rural finance studies on the household level are limited; evidence on the role of psychological and social factors in rural households' financial decisions is scarce. The proposed project will bridge this gap in the literature. The overarching research question of this project is whether and how behavioural insights can be used to help rural residents in China make sound financial decisions, which will ultimately contribute to the sustainable economic development in China. The research will be conducted through field experiments in rural China. By relying on field evidences, the project team will develop policy tools and checklists for policy makers to help rural households make sound financial decisions. Two types of tools will be developed for policy makers, namely, "push" tools that aim to achieve short-term policy compliance among rural households so that they can break out of the persistent poverty cycle and "pull" tools that can reduce fraud, error, and debt among rural households to prevent them from falling back into poverty. Finally, the project team will also use the research activities and findings as vehicles to engage and educate rural residents, local governments, regulators, and financial institutions. Standard and good practice will be proposed to interested parties for the designs of good behavioural interventions; ethical guidelines will be provided to encourage good practice. This important step ensures that the findings of this project will benefit academia and practice, with long-lasting, positive impacts. The findings will benefit researchers in behavioural finance and economics, rural economics, development economics, political sciences, and psychology. The findings of and the engagement in this project will help policy makers to develop cost-effective behavioural change policies. Rural households will benefit by being nudged into sound financial decisions and healthy financial habits. The project will provide insights on how to leverage behavioural insights to overcome persistent poverty in the developing world. Therefore, the research will be of interest to communities in China and internationally. The data were retrived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) between 1997 and 2008, when both residential satisfaction scores and home valuations are available.

The effects of direct and indirect taxation and benefits received in cash or kind on household income, across the generations and by age.

This data is estimated by combining multiple years of the Living Costs and Food Survey from 1978 to financial year ending March 2017 and the Household Finances Statistics, from financial year ending 2018 to financial year ending 2021 with the exception of 1979 and 1981. All financial amounts are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) excluding Council Tax, to their financial year ending March 2018. For example, the mean disposable income for those aged 35 and born in the 1970’s (£35,752) is estimated by taking the average (in real terms) of the household disposable income for these people across the combined dataset.

The Distributional Financial Accounts (DFAs) provide a quarterly measure of the distribution of U.S. household wealth since 1989, based on a comprehensive integration of disaggregated household-level wealth data with official aggregate wealth measures. The data set contains the level and share of each balance sheet item on the Financial Accounts' household wealth table (Table B.101.h), for various sub-populations in the United States. In our core data set, aggregate household wealth is allocated to each of four percentile groups of wealth: the top 1 percent, the next 9 percent (i.e., 90th to 99th percentile), the next 40 percent (50th to 90th percentile), and the bottom half (below the 50th percentile). Additionally, the data set contains the level and share of aggregate household wealth by income, age, generation, education, and race. The quarterly frequency makes the data useful for studying the business cycle dynamics of wealth concentration--which are typically difficult to observe in lower-frequency data because peaks and troughs often fall between times of measurement. These data will be updated about 10 or 11 weeks after the end of each quarter, making them a timely measure of the distribution of wealth.

ABSTRACT The international debate on wealth taxation has been subject to renewed interest amid new proposals coming out of the US electoral cycle and the salience of wealth inequality. This article reviews the case for taxing wealth and its transfer across generations (wealth and inheritance taxes), analyzing their design from an international comparative perspective, and extracting lessons for Brazil. The long-debated “Tax on Large Fortunes” has never been implemented and the state-level “Tax on Inheritances” has been watered down over time. We propose a framework for the progressive implementation and reform of both taxes in the country. We argue, given the historical record and current research, that they are technically and administratively feasible propositions, notwithstanding important political economy considerations.

In the first quarter of 2025, almost two-thirds percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by the top 10 percent of earners. In comparison, the lowest 50 percent of earners only owned 2.5 percent of the total wealth. Income inequality in the U.S. Despite the idea that the United States is a country where hard work and pulling yourself up by your bootstraps will inevitably lead to success, this is often not the case. In 2023, 7.4 percent of U.S. households had an annual income under 15,000 U.S. dollars. With such a small percentage of people in the United States owning such a vast majority of the country’s wealth, the gap between the rich and poor in America remains stark. The top one percent The United States was the country with the most billionaires in the world in 2025. Elon Musk, with a net worth of 342 billion U.S. dollars, was among the richest people in the United States in 2025. Over the past 50 years, the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio has exploded, causing the gap between rich and poor to grow, with some economists theorizing that this gap is the largest it has been since right before the Great Depression.

this graphs is ourdataworld :

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How are incomes and wealth distributed between people? Both within countries and across the world as a whole?

On this page, you can find all our data, visualizations, and writing relating to economic inequality.

This evidence demonstrates that inequality in many countries is substantial and, in numerous instances, has been escalating. Global economic inequality is extensive and exacerbated by intersecting disparities in health, education, and various other dimensions.

However, economic inequality is not uniformly increasing. In many countries, it has declined or remained steady. Furthermore, global inequality – following two centuries of ascent – is presently decreasing as well.

The significant variations observed across countries and over time are pivotal. They indicate that high and rising inequality is not inevitable and that the current extent of inequality is subject to change.

About this data This data explorer offers various inequality indicators measured according to two distinct definitions of income sourced from different outlets.

Data from the World Inequality Database pertains to inequality prior to taxes and benefits. Data from the World Bank pertains to either income post taxes and benefits or consumption, contingent on the country and year. For additional details regarding the definitions and methodologies underlying this data, refer to the accompanying article below, where you can also delve into and juxtapose a broader spectrum of indicators from various sources.

This paper investigates the accumulation and distribution of retirement wealth in a dynastic model with earnings risks, longevity uncertainties, and borrowing constraints. It resolves the wealth indeterminacy problem across generations in dynastic families by introducing a transaction cost for intergenerational transfers. It captures the pattern of inter vivos transfers, the relationship between wealth and earnings, and wealth inequality in the US data. Social security lowers precautionary savings by redistributing income from families with high earnings or short-lived parents to others, thus reducing investment, the growth rate in income per capita, inequality in retirees’ consumption, and the wealth-earnings correlation.

Our aim is to provide an overview of associations between income inequality and intergenerational mobility in the United States, Canada, and eight European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). We analyze whether this correlation is observed across and within countries over time. Developed countries have been experiencing increases in inequality in recent decades, mostly due to a steep concentration of income at the top of the distribution. We investigate Great Gatsby curves and perform meta-regression analyses based upon several papers on this topic. Results suggest that countries with high levels of inequality tend to have lower levels of mobility. Intergenerational income elasticities have stronger associations with the Gini coefficient, compared to associations with the top one percent income share. Once models are controlled for methodological variables, country indicators, and paper indicators, correlations of mobility with the Gini coefficient lose significance, but not with the top one percent income share. This result is an indication that recent increases in inequality at the top of the distribution (captured by the top one percent income share) might be negatively affecting mobility on a greater magnitude, compared to variations across the income distribution (captured by the Gini coefficient).

Graph and download economic data for Expenses for Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Establishments Subject To Federal Income Tax, Employer Firms (EPGTADEESTF32211) from 2009 to 2022 about power transmission, distributive, employer firms, establishments, electricity, tax, expenditures, federal, income, and USA.

The folder vomlehn_winberry_full_replication_packet contains data and programs replicating tables and figures from "The Investment Network, Sectoral Comovement, and the Changing U.S. Business Cycle", by vom Lehn and Winberry. Please see the "README full" file for additional details. The folder vomlehn_winberry_networks contains a subset of data and code to construct the Investment Network data. Please see the "README investment network" file for additional details.