In the first quarter of 2025, 51.4 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials own around 10.3 percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there was almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States in 2024.

Inequality in family wealth is high, yet we know little about how much and how wealth inequality is maintained across generations. We argue that a long-term perspective reflective of wealth’s cumulative nature is crucial to understand the extent and channels of wealth reproduction across generations. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that span nearly half a century, we show that a one decile increase in parental wealth position is associated with an increase of about 4 percentiles in offspring wealth position in adulthood. We show that grandparental wealth is a unique predictor of grandchildren’s wealth, above and beyond the role of parental wealth, suggesting that a focus on only parent-child dyads understates the importance of family wealth lineages. Second, considering five channels of wealth transmission — gifts and bequests, education, marriage, homeownership, and business ownership — we find that most of the advantages arising from family wealth begin much earlier in the life-course than the common focus on bequests implies, even when we consider the wealth of grandparents. We also document the stark disadvantage of African-American households in terms of not only their wealth attainment but also their intergenerational downward wealth mobility compared to whites.

A growing body of research documents the importance of wealth and the racial wealth gap in perpetuating inequality across generations. We add to this literature by examining the impact of wealth on child income by race, while also extending our analysis to three generations. Our two stage least squares regressions reveal that grandparental and parental wealth and the younger generation’s household income is strongly positively correlated. We further explore the relationship between income and wealth by decomposing the child’s income by race. We find that the disparity in income between black and white respondents is mainly attributable to differences in family background. In context, differences in family background are stronger than differences in educational attainment. When we examine different income percentiles, however, we find that the effect of grandparental and parental wealth endowment is much stronger at the top of the income distribution. These findings indicate that wealth is an important source of income inequality.

In the first quarter of 2025, 51.4 percent of the total wealth in the United States was owned by members of the baby boomer generation. In comparison, millennials owned around 10.3 percent of total wealth in the U.S. In terms of population distribution, there was almost an equal share of millennials and baby boomers in the United States in 2024.

The survey was fielded online by YouGov in November 2020. The questionnaire covers a range of topics, including:Beliefs about whether Britain was an equal or unequal society before the COVID-19 outbreak and whether this will change post-recoveryPerceptions of whether inequalities are increasing or decreasingConcern about a range of specific inequality types, including unequal outcomes in income and wealth, education and health, and between different genders, generations, racial or ethnic groups, and different areas of the UKIdentifying the groups most negatively affected by the pandemicPerceptions of income distributions, and their association with other forms of unequal outcomes (eg in health)Beliefs about the determinants of unequal outcomes and opportunities to get ahead in lifeAttitudes towards welfare, redistribution and the furlough schemeBeliefs around fairness and meritThe survey also contains a series of split samples, testing framing effects of questions around perceptions of inequalities, redistribution and fairness, as well as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire.

Overall, younger generations place greater importance on the issue of inequality at a national level, even when compared to other issues within their nations. Although fewer baby boomers find inequality to be as important as younger generations do, almost half found it to be important.

The study explores the role of "intergenerational wealth" - or inheritances and inter vivos transfers - in explaining racial disparities in wealth for the United States using data from the Federal Reserve Board's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), supplemented by additional data including estimates for Defined Benefit pension values, lifetime earnings, and "reconciled inheritance" values that are designed to be used with the SCF. The core SCF data and the supplemental files are for the 1989 to 2019 cross-sections of the survey.

The published Stata syntax file (do-file) and dataset (partial version of the 2022 Inequality Barometer) can be used to replicate the results reported in the article.

Climate change and most climate policies affect and reinforce different forms of inequalities. For instance, climate change policies that aim to change consumer behavior by increasing the price tag of goods and services that cause carbon emissions often carry a disproportionately higher burden (in terms of financial cost) to those with lower incomes. They can thereby either exacerbate existing income inequalities or contribute to generating new ones. Meanwhile, refraining from engaging with climate mitigation policies will incur other detrimental societal costs: the financial burden and the harmful consequences of climate change that future generations will have to bear if nothing is done. In this paper, we examine how the immediate economic inequality citizens face from climate mitigation policies (regarding carbon taxation) weighs against the long-term generational inequalities future generations will experience. We study how both types of inequality relate to policy support for climate change mitigation policies in the context of Germany. The German case is of special interest because a recent court ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court allows us to test whether making people aware of a new legal reality can bridge the gap between the economic and generational inequality. Our findings using a between-subjects survey experiment fielded among German citizens (N=6,319) in 2022 show that immediate economic concerns trump future generational concerns, generally making citizens less supportive of the policy. This negative support is however somewhat mitigated by the supportive signal from the court ruling.

Graph and download economic data for Net Worth Held by the Top 0.1% (99.9th to 100th Wealth Percentiles) (WFRBLTP1246) from Q3 1989 to Q2 2025 about net worth, wealth, percentile, Net, and USA.

The Distributional Financial Accounts (DFAs) provide a quarterly measure of the distribution of U.S. household wealth since 1989, based on a comprehensive integration of disaggregated household-level wealth data with official aggregate wealth measures. The data set contains the level and share of each balance sheet item on the Financial Accounts' household wealth table (Table B.101.h), for various sub-populations in the United States. In our core data set, aggregate household wealth is allocated to each of four percentile groups of wealth: the top 1 percent, the next 9 percent (i.e., 90th to 99th percentile), the next 40 percent (50th to 90th percentile), and the bottom half (below the 50th percentile). Additionally, the data set contains the level and share of aggregate household wealth by income, age, generation, education, and race. The quarterly frequency makes the data useful for studying the business cycle dynamics of wealth concentration--which are typically difficult to observe in lower-frequency data because peaks and troughs often fall between times of measurement. These data will be updated about 10 or 11 weeks after the end of each quarter, making them a timely measure of the distribution of wealth.

Data and code accompanying "The Racial Wealth Gap and the Role of Firm Ownership"This paper develops an overlapping generations model that isolates the impact of the U.S. racial wealth gap in 1962 on the long-run dynamics of wealth. The model predicts that one component of the initial gap, firm ownership, coupled with the intergenerational transfer of that ownership, results in a permanent wealth gap independent of other dimensions of inequality. This implies that even if all discrimination against black Americans had ceased upon the end of Jim Crow, the wealth gap would have persisted without a reparations policy addressing the fact that the initial firm ownership gap arose in the first place.

This map layer shows the prevalent generations that make up the population of the United States using multiple scales. As of 2018, the most predominant generations in the U.S. are Baby Boomers (born 1946-1964), Millennials (born 1981-1998), and Generation Z (born 1999-2016). Currently, Millennials are the most predominant population in the U.S.A generation represents a group of people who are born around the same time and experience world events and trends during the same stage of life through similar mediums (for example, online, television, print, or radio). Because of this, people born in the same generation are expected to have been exposed to similar values and developmental experiences, which may cause them to exhibit similar traits or behaviors over their lifetimes. Generations provide scientists and government officials the opportunity to measure public attitudes on important issues by people’s current position in life and document those differences across demographic groups and geographic regions. Generational cohorts also give researchers the ability to understand how different developmental experiences, such as technological, political, economic, and social changes, influence people’s opinions and personalities. Studying people in generational groups is significant because an individual’s age is a conventional predictor for understanding cultural and political gaps within the U.S. population.Though there is no exact equation to determine generational cutoff points, it is understood that we designate generational spans based on a 15- to 20-year gap. The only generational period officially designated by the U.S. Census Bureau is based on the surge of births after World War II in 1946 and a significant decline in birth rates after 1964 (Baby Boomers). From that point, generational gaps have been determined by significant political, economic, and social changes that define one’s formative years (for example, Generation Z is considered to be marked by children who were directly affected by the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001).In this map layer, we visualize six active generations in the U.S., each marked by significant changes in American history:The Greatest Generation (born 1901-1924): Tom Brokaw’s 1998 book, The Greatest Generation, coined the term ‘the Greatest Generation” to describe Americans who lived through the Great Depression and later fought in WWII. This generation had significant job and education opportunities as the war ended and the postwar economic booms impacted America.The Silent Generation (born 1925-1945): The title “Silent Generation” originated from a 1951 essay published in Time magazine that proposed the idea that people born during this period were more cautious than their parents. Conflict from the Cold War and the potential for nuclear war led to widespread levels of discomfort and uncertainty throughout the generation.Baby Boomers (born 1946-1964): Baby Boomers were named after a significant increase in births after World War II. During this 20-year span, life was dramatically different for those born at the beginning of the generation than those born at the tail end of the generation. The first 10 years of Baby Boomers (Baby Boomers I) grew up in an era defined by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, in which a lot of this generation either fought in or protested against the war. Baby Boomers I tended to have great economic opportunities and were optimistic about the future of America. In contrast, the last 10 years of Baby Boomers (Baby Boomers II) had fewer job opportunities and available housing than their Boomer I counterparts. The effects of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal led a lot of second-wave boomers to lose trust in the American government. Generation X (born 1965-1980): The label “Generation X” comes from Douglas Coupland’s 1991 book, Generation X: Tales for An Accelerated Culture. This generation was notoriously exposed to more hands-off parenting, out-of-home childcare, and higher rates of divorce than other generations. As a result, many Gen X parents today are concerned about avoiding broken homes with their own kids.Millennials (born 1981-1998): During the adolescence of Millennials, America underwent a technological revolution with the emergence of the internet. Because of this, Millennials are generally characterized by older generations to be technologically savvy.Generation Z (born 1999-2016): Generation Z or “Zoomers” represent a generation raised on the internet and social media. Gen Z makes up the most ethnically diverse and largest generation in American history. Like Millennials, Gen Z is recognized by older generations to be very familiar with and/or addicted to technology.Questions to ask when you look at this mapDo you notice any trends with the predominant generations located in big cities? Suburbs? Rural areas?Where do you see big clusters of the same generation living in the same area?Which areas do you see the most diversity in generations?Look on the map for where you, your parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents live. Do they live in areas where their generation is the most predominant?

According to a survey conducted in 2023, Gen Z adults in the United States were divided on whether college is a smart investment in the future or more of a gamble that may not pay off in the end, with 49 percent of Gen Z agreeing with both of these statements. In comparison, Millennials were more likely to say that college was more of a gamble that may not pay off in the end, with 57 percent sharing this belief.

ABSTRACT The international debate on wealth taxation has been subject to renewed interest amid new proposals coming out of the US electoral cycle and the salience of wealth inequality. This article reviews the case for taxing wealth and its transfer across generations (wealth and inheritance taxes), analyzing their design from an international comparative perspective, and extracting lessons for Brazil. The long-debated “Tax on Large Fortunes” has never been implemented and the state-level “Tax on Inheritances” has been watered down over time. We propose a framework for the progressive implementation and reform of both taxes in the country. We argue, given the historical record and current research, that they are technically and administratively feasible propositions, notwithstanding important political economy considerations.

The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is normally a triennial cross-sectional survey of U.S. families. The survey data include information on families' balance sheets, pensions, income, and demographic characteristics.

This dataset encompasses the foundations and findings of a study titled "Housing Wealth Distribution, Inequality, and Residential Satisfaction," highlighting the evolution of residential properties from mere consumption goods to significant assets for wealth accumulation. Since the 1980s, with financial market deregulation in the UK, there has been a noticeable shift in homeownership patterns and housing wealth's role. The liberalisation of the banking sector, particularly mortgage lending, facilitated a significant rise in homeownership rates from around 50% in the 1970s to over 70% in the early 2000s, stabilizing at 65% in recent years. Concurrently, housing wealth relative to household annual gross disposable income has seen a considerable increase, underscoring the growing importance of residential properties as investment goods.

The study explores the multifaceted impact of housing wealth on various aspects of life, including retirement financing, intergenerational wealth transfer, health, consumption, energy conservation, and education. Residential satisfaction, defined as the overall experience and contentment with housing, emerges as a critical factor influencing subjective well-being and labor mobility. Despite the evident influence of housing characteristics, social environment, and demographic factors on residential satisfaction, the relationship between housing wealth and satisfaction remains underexplored.

To bridge this gap, the research meticulously assembles data from different surveys across the UK and the USA spanning 1970 to 2019, despite challenges such as data compatibility and measurement errors. Initial findings reveal no straightforward correlation between rising house prices and residential satisfaction, mirroring the Easterlin Paradox, which suggests that happiness levels do not necessarily increase with income growth. This paradox is dissected through the lenses of social comparison and adaptation, theorizing that relative income and the human tendency to adapt to changes might explain the stagnant satisfaction levels despite increased housing wealth.

Further analysis within the UK context supports the social comparison hypothesis, suggesting that disparities in housing wealth distribution can lead to varied satisfaction levels, potentially exacerbating societal inequality. This phenomenon is not isolated to developed nations but is also pertinent to developing countries experiencing rapid economic growth alongside widening income and wealth gaps. The study concludes by emphasizing the significance of considering housing wealth inequality in policy-making, aiming to mitigate its far-reaching implications on societal well-being.

Although China has almost eliminated urban poverty, the total number of Chinese citizens in poverty remains at 82 million, most of which are rural residents. The development of rural finance is essential to preventing the country from undergoing further polarization because of the significant potential of such development to facilitate resource interflows between rural and urban markets and to support sustainable development in the agricultural sector. However, rural finance is the weakest point in China's financial systems. Rural households are more constrained than their urban counterparts in terms of financial product availability, consumer protection, and asset accumulation. The development of the rural financial system faces resistance from both the demand and the supply sides.

The proposed project addresses this challenge by investigating the applications of a proven behavioural approach, namely, Libertarian Paternalism, in the development of rural financial systems in China. This approach promotes choice architectures to nudge people into optimal decisions without interfering with the freedom of choice. It has been rigorously tested and warmly received in the UK public policy domain. This approach also fits the political and cultural background in China, in which the central government needs to maintain a firm control over financial systems as the general public increasingly demands more freedom.

Existing behavioural studies have been heavily reliant on laboratory experiments. Although the use of field studies has been increasing, empirical evidence from the developing world is limited. Meanwhile, the applications of behavioural insights in rural economic development in China remains an uncharted territory. Rural finance studies on the household level are limited; evidence on the role of psychological and social factors in rural households' financial decisions is scarce. The proposed project will bridge this gap in the literature.

The overarching research question of this project is whether and how behavioural insights can be used to help rural residents in China make sound financial decisions, which will ultimately contribute to the sustainable economic development in China. The research will be conducted through field experiments in rural China. By relying on field evidences, the project team will develop policy tools and checklists for policy makers to help rural households make sound financial decisions. Two types of tools will be developed for policy makers, namely, "push" tools that aim to achieve short-term policy compliance among rural households so that they can break out of the persistent poverty cycle and "pull" tools that can reduce fraud, error, and debt among rural households to prevent them from falling back into poverty. Finally, the project team will also use the research activities and findings as vehicles to engage and educate rural residents, local governments, regulators, and financial institutions. Standard and good practice will be proposed to interested parties for the designs of good behavioural interventions; ethical guidelines will be provided to encourage good practice. This important step ensures that the findings of this project will benefit academia and practice, with long-lasting, positive impacts.

The findings will benefit researchers in behavioural finance and economics, rural economics, development economics, political sciences, and psychology. The findings of and the engagement in this project will help policy makers to develop cost-effective behavioural change policies. Rural households will benefit by being nudged into sound financial decisions and healthy financial habits. The project will provide insights on how to leverage behavioural insights to overcome persistent poverty in the developing world. Therefore, the research will be of interest to communities in China and internationally.

Graph and download economic data for Expenses for Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Establishments Subject To Federal Income Tax, Employer Firms (EPGTADEESTF32211) from 2009 to 2022 about power transmission, distributive, employer firms, electricity, establishments, tax, expenditures, federal, income, and USA.

A survey conducted in July 2022 in the United States, found that consumers from older generations were more likely to believe their financial situation had gotten worse, or would become worse in the coming year. 54 percent of Baby Boomers said their financial situation had worsened over the last 12 months, versus 45.9 percent of Gen Z respondents.

Graph and download economic data for Total Revenue for Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Establishments Subject to Federal Income Tax (REV2211TMSA) from Q1 2010 to Q2 2025 about power transmission, distributive, revenue, electricity, establishments, tax, federal, income, and USA.

Supplementary files for article Long-term relatedness and income distribution: understanding the deep roots of inequalityThis article explores the role of long-term relatedness between countries, captured by an index of genetic distance, in driving worldwide differences in income inequality. The main hypothesis is that genetic distance gives rise to barriers to the international diffusion of redistributive policies and measures, and institutions, leading to greater income disparities. Using cross-country data, I consistently find that countries that are genetically distant to Denmark—the world frontier of egalitarian income distribution—tend to suffer from higher inequality, ceteris paribus. I also demonstrate that genetic distance is associated with greater bilateral differences in income inequality between countries. Employing data from the European Social Survey, I document that second-generation Europeans descending from countries with greater genetic distance to Denmark are less likely to exhibit positive attitudes towards equality. Further evidence suggests that effective fiscal redistribution is a key mechanism through which genetic distance to Denmark transmits to greater income inequality.