With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

This statistic shows the responses that adults from the United Kingdom (UK) gave when asked "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The economic crisis has damaged my confidence in business as a whole'" as of June 2014. A large share of respondents (** percent) felt that the economic crisis had damaged their confidence in business as a whole, and a third of respondents felt neutral to the question.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.

From 1st to 3rd digits Benford’s Law on net annual income (UK sample).

PurposeThe current research analyzes cosmetic earnings management practices in emerging and developed markets before and after the global financial crisis.Design/Methodology/ApproachUsing digital analysis, by applying Benford’s Law the study analyzes the earnings adjustments that exceed a key reference point to determine whether earnings management anomaly exists or not? Based on a sample of 87165 firm-year observations of UK, US, Brazil, Russia, India, China and Pakistan listed corporations.FindingsFindings show that the managers of emerging markets have more incentive to manipulate earnings than their counterparts from developed markets. Further, the implementation of strict governance and legislative measures after the global financial crisis have significantly reduced the opportunistic behaviour of managers to manipulate earnings. However, the impact is lesser in emerging markets as compared to UK and US.Research implicationsThe empirical findings of this research are useful for policy making and regulatory authorities, investors and other stakeholders as our findings shed light on the restriction of cosmetic earnings management practices.Originality/ValueFirst study that tried to capture the cosmetic earnings management practices in both emerging and developed countries and in both pre and post financial crisis scenario.

This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies.

This study investigates the connection between network centrality and firm growth on a sample of 3224 financial services firms located in the UK in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The findings, based on a spatial econometric model of long-term firm growth, indicate that firms that span structural holes, engage in co-management appointments and have network connections to related companies in other financial centres grow faster. In contrast, such connections generate substantial negative indirect effects on proximate firms, leading to a divergence of growth rates between globally connected and locally embedded firms.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

COVID-19 is an economic shock analogous to the global financial crisis. Now, as then, there will be short-term changes as life, industry, and people adjust, but also more long-term structural changes that will live on long after COVID-19 has passed. This presents opportunities for decisive banks to right-size branch networks, optimize the digital experience, and establish sustainability credentials, thus emerging in a stronger position. But many banks will have been blindsided by this issue, which is evolving in fast and unpredictable ways. As in 2008, banks risk being immobilized by uncertainty, or getting caught in constant firefights that prevent a more considered, strategic response. And the costs of any missteps will be much higher than in 2008, as a variety of banking alternatives – including new digital banks, telcos, and tech companies – are poised and ready to grab market share. Read More

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

In 2025, the annual unemployment rate of the United Kingdom is expected to be 4.8 percent, compared with 4.3 percent in 2024. Unemployment is forecast to rise to 4.9 percent in 2026, gradually declining to 4.1 percent by 2030. Previous forecasts underestimated how high unemployment would be in 2025, with a rate of 4.1 percent predicted towards the end of 2024, which was revised upward to 4.5 percent the following March. Uptick in unemployment after falling to historic lows A common indicator of an economy’s relative health, the unemployment rate in the UK generally fell throughout most of the 2010s, after reaching 8.5 percent in late 2011. After a sudden increase in unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a steep decline that lasted until August 2022, when the unemployment rate was just 3.5 percent. There was then a rise in unemployment from 2023 onwards, which continued throughout 2024 and into 2025. This has been matched by a fall in UK job vacancies, which peaked at 1.3 million in May 2022, but has been falling in most months since then, with approximately 816,000 vacancies in February 2025. Revisions to GDP and inflation for 2025 Since the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK's economic growth has been poor, with the UK alternating between weak growth and slight contractions. For 2025, the UK economy is set to grow by just one percent, a downgrade from two percent predicted in late 2024. Inflation, which skyrocketed from late 2021 onwards, reached a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022, and although down to more usual levels by 2024, is expected to rise in 2025, reaching around 3.7 percent by the second half of the year.

Bankruptcies in the United Kingdom increased to 2029 Companies in October from 1995 Companies in September of 2025. This dataset provides - United Kingdom Bankruptcies - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Over the five years through 2025-26, UK banks' revenue is expected to climb at a compound annual rate of 4.8% to £136 billion, including an anticipated hike of 3.6% in 2025-26. After the financial crisis in 2007-08, low interest rates limited banks' interest in loans, hitting income. At the same time, a stricter regulatory environment, including increased capital requirements introduced under the Basel III banking reforms and ring-fencing regulations, constricted lending activity. To protect their profitability, banks like Lloyds have shut the doors of many branches and made substantial job cuts. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the Bank of England adopted an aggressive tightening of monetary policy, hiking interest rates to rein in spiralling inflation. The higher base rate environment lifted borrowing costs, driving interest income for banks, which reported skyrocketing profit in 2023-24. Although profit grew markedly, pressure to pass on higher rates to savers and fierce competition weighed on revenue growth at the tail end of the year. However, the prospect of rate cuts in 2024-25 saw many banks lower their savings rates, aiding revenue growth. In 2025-26, although further interest rate cuts are on the horizon, revenue is set to grow, due to lower borrowing costs driving activity in the housing market. Banks have also reduced their exposure to interest rate cuts through structural hedges, which lock in rates when they fluctuate. The FCA’s investigation into motor commissions has been a cause for concern over recent years, with banks like Lloyds and Santander ramping up provisions over 2024-25 in preparation for large payouts, if the Supreme Court deems banks were carrying out illegal activities. Over the five years through 2030-31, industry revenue is forecast to swell at a compound annual rate of 4% to reach £165.8 billion. Regulatory restrictions, tougher stress tests and stringent lending criteria will also hamper revenue growth. Competition is set to remain fierce – both internally from lenders that deliver their services exclusively via digital channels and externally from alternative finance providers, like peer-to-peer lending platforms. The possibility of legislation like the Edinburgh reforms will drive investment and lending activity in the coming years, if introduced. However, concerns surrounding the repercussions of less stringent capital requirements and the already fragile nature of the UK financial system pose doubt as to whether any significant changes will be made.

The gross domestic product of the United Kingdom in 2024 was around 2.78 trillion British pounds, an increase when compared to the previous year, when UK GDP amounted to about 2.75 trillion pounds. The significant drop in GDP visible in 2020 was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the smaller declines in 2008 and 2009 because of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Low growth problem in the UK Despite growing by 0.9 percent in 2024, and 0.4 percent in 2023 the UK economy is not that much larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since recovering from a huge fall in GDP in the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy has alternated between periods of contraction and low growth, with the UK even in a recession at the end of 2023. While economic growth picked up somewhat in 2024, GDP per capita is lower than it was in 2022, following two years of negative growth. UK's global share of GDP falling As of 2024, the UK had the sixth-largest economy in the world, behind the United States, China, Japan, Germany, and India. Among European nations, this meant that the UK currently has the second-largest economy in Europe, although the economy of France, Europe's third-largest economy, is of a similar size. The UK's global economic ranking will likely fall in the coming years, however, with the UK's share of global GDP expected to fall from 2.16 percent in 2025 to 2.02 percent by 2029.