This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies.

The economy was seen by 49 percent of people in the UK as one of the top three issues facing the country in June 2025. The ongoing cost of living crisis afflicting the UK, driven by high inflation, is still one of the main concerns of Britons. Immigration has generally been the second most important issue since the middle of 2024, just ahead of health, which was seen as the third-biggest issue in the most recent month. Labour's popularity continues to sink in 2025 Despite winning the 2024 general election with a strong majority, the new Labour government has had its share of struggles since coming to power. Shortly after taking office, the approval rating for Labour stood at -2 percent, but this fell throughout the second half of 2024, and by January 2025 had sunk to a new low of -47 percent. Although this was still higher than the previous government's last approval rating of -56 percent, it is nevertheless a severe review from the electorate. Among several decisions from the government, arguably the least popular was the government withdrawing winter fuel payments. This state benefit, previously paid to all pensioners, is now only paid to those on low incomes, with millions of pensioners not receiving this payment in winter 2024. Sunak's pledges fail to prevent defeat in 2024 With an election on the horizon, and the Labour Party consistently ahead in the polls, addressing voter concerns directly was one of the best chances the Conservatives had of staying in power in 2023. At the start of that year, Rishi Sunak attempted to do this by setting out his five pledges for the next twelve months; halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce national debt, cut NHS waiting times, and stop small boats. A year later, Sunak had at best only partial success in these aims. Although the inflation rate fell, economic growth was weak and even declined in the last two quarters of 2023, although it did return to growth in early 2024. National debt was only expected to fall in the mid to late 2020s, while the trend of increasing NHS waiting times did not reverse. Small boat crossings were down from 2022, but still higher than in 2021 or 2020. .

The classification of finiancial crisis interventions

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Financial Crisis and Statitical Classification

This dataset provides information on 18 in United Kingdom as of June, 2025. It includes details such as email addresses (where publicly available), phone numbers (where publicly available), and geocoded addresses. Explore market trends, identify potential business partners, and gain valuable insights into the industry. Download a complimentary sample of 10 records to see what's included.

The housing costs inflation rate for low-income households in the United Kingdom was noticeably higher than that of high-income ones between April 2022 and April 2023, during a serious cost of living crisis in the UK. As of June 2024, however, the inflation rate for high-income households was higher than that of middle or low incomes ones.

With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

Between 1820 and 1957, over 4.5 million people emigrated from Great Britain to the United States. The period with the highest levels of migration came during the 1860s, 70s and 80s, with almost 110 thousand people migrating in 1888 alone. The period with the lowest levels of migration came in the 1930s and early 40s, as the Great Depression caused an economic crisis across the globe, hitting the US and Great Britain particularly hard. Economic recovery in the late 1930s caused the migration rate to increase again, before the Second World War brought the numbers back down in the first half of the 1940s.

This article reports on an audience costs experiment embedded into a survey of the British public (N = 2235). We extend previous research into audience costs in three main directions. First, we provide clear and direct evidence that they exist for a second-order democratic power, the United Kingdom. Second, we show that the extent of audience costs varies, and at times substantially, along with features of the crisis situation that have not been examined empirically in this context before. In particular, the type of crisis strongly influences public reactions both to bluffing in general and to the wisdom or otherwise of escalating crises before backing down. While audience costs do appear to exist for a UK Prime Minister, he or she cannot inflate them by moving up the escalation chain. Rather, a limited use of force tends to mitigate these costs among the British public because it appears to them a more consistent strategy. Third, we show that public disapproval of a failed bluffing strategy is stronger among the more politically engaged, increasing the likelihood that audience costs will be paid at the ballot box.

Massenarbeitslosigkeit und soziales Elend prägten Anfang der dreißiger Jahre das Leben breiter Bevölkerungsschichten in den von der Weltwirtschaftskrise betroffenen Industriegesellschaften. Den zeitgenössischen Politikern und staatlichen Institutionen stellte sich die Lösung dieser Probleme als innenpolitische Hauptaufgabe. Dabei waren sie auf die Mitarbeit der großen wirtschaftlichen Interessenverbände der Arbeitgeber und der Arbeitnehmer angewiesen. Dies galt im europäischen Kontext auf Arbeitnehmerseite insbesondere für die deutsche und britische Gewerkschaftsbewegung, die die mit Abstand stärksten Organisationen im Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbund (IGB) stellten. Die deutschen und britischen Gewerkschaften entwickelten eine Vielzahl an Vorschlägen und Forderungen zur Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit, die in der vorliegenden Studie vergleichend dargestellt werden. Dabei steht der jeweilige Dachverband – auf der einen Seite der Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), auf der anderen Seite der Trade Union Congress (TUC) – im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. Die vergleichende Analyse der gewerkschaftlichen Arbeitslosenpolitik fragt darüber hinaus nach dem jeweiligen Beitrag der beiden Organisationen zum Erhalt der politischen Stabilität in ihrem Land. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zur gewerkschaftlichen Arbeitslosenpolitik in der Weltwirtschaftskrise lässt sich in zwei größere, thematische Teilbereiche aufspalten. Der eine umfasst die politische und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, die Frage nach Radikalisierungstendenzen in der Bevölkerung, den Machtverhältnissen in Staat und Gesellschaft, der Repräsentation gesellschaftlicher Interessen im politischen Bereich, der Veränderung der demokratischen Institutionen. Den zweiten Bereich bilden die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräume von Staat und Gewerkschaften und insbesondere die Frage nach den Durchsetzungs- und Erfolgsmöglichkeiten einer alternativen Konjunkturpolitik.In dem ersten Abschnitt stellt Claudia Kaiser die Strukturen und die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit in ausgewählten Statistiken für das Deutschland und Großbritannien dar. Der zweite Abschnitt zeichnet zunächst ein Gesamtbild der ökonomischen Entwicklung und widmet sich daran anschließend der staatlichen Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Sozialpolitik. Der dritte Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den organisatorischen Handlungsspielräumen des ADGB und des TUC in der Weltwirtschaftskrise. Hier werden insbesondere auch die Mitgliederentwicklung und der Organisationsgrad der gewerkschaftlichen Dachverbände berücksichtigt. In dem vierten Abschnitt werden die deutschen und britischen Arbeitsbeziehungen diskutiert. Die Auseinandersetzung der Gewerkschaften mit dem politischen Extremismus folgt im fünften Abschnitt. Der sechste Abschnitt umfasst die programmatischen Reaktionen auf die Weltwirtschaftskrise (Konjunkturpolitik und Planung). Themen Datentabellen in HISTAT (Thema: Erwerbstätigkeit): Tab. 1 Arbeitslosigkeit im Deutschen Reich und im Vereinigten Königreich (1921-1928)Tab. 2 Arbeitslosigkeit als Anteil an der gesamten Erwerbsbevölkerung: Deutsches Reich, Vereinigtes Königreich, USA (1920-1938)Tab. 3 Entwicklung der Bruttoanlageinvestitionen im Deutschen Reich und im Vereinigten Königreich (1925-1932)Tab. 4 Öffentliche Ausgaben im Vereinigten Königreich und im Deutschen Reich (1925-1939)Tab. 5 Bruttoanlageinvestitionen des privaten, öffentlichen und halböffentlichen Sektors zu konstanten Preisen von 1930 in Großbritannien (1920-1938)Tab. 6 Wohnwirtschaftliche Bruttoanlageinvestitionen des privaten, öffentlichen Sektors in Deutschland (1925-1934)Tab. 7 Mitgliederentwicklung, Organisationsgrad und Parteimitgliedschaft im Trade Union Congress (1918-1939)Tab. 8 Mitgliederentwicklung und Organisationsgrad in den Freien Gewerkschaften (1918-1932)

James‘ study is a comprehensive approach to present the special features of Germany’s economic crisis during the period of the world economic crisis. Germany’s very specific crisis factors are described using new sources and considering new research questions. It is an analysis of the political and economic sociological structure of the crisis. The economic crisis was a significant turning point in the economic activities of people. The change in expectations and behaviours manifested in two ways: in the politicization of the economy and in the states’ obligation on the principle of economic interventionism. Harold James classifies the German crisis into a wider framework. The distinguishing characteristic of the German crisis in comparison to other countries is the degree of politicization, the close association of economic and political crisis.In the research there are three different explanations for the depression that lay the main emphasis on international relations. The explanations focus on the degree of global technical progress, the development of world trade, and the development of the international capital markets. Other approaches favour a purely domestic economic explanation of the economic crisis. James starts from two problem areas in his analysis: first, the slow growth of world trade in the twenties and second, the German tax burden. Five aspects of the problem area are analysed:1. How big was the willingness of taxpayers to accept the tax increases?2. How was the organizational development of German industry and what were the reasons for the development? What consequences had the organizational structure of the industry for the German economy?3. How affected the wage push of the late twenties the German economy structure, and what policy responses have been evoked by the wage push?4. How did the German agricultural sector succeeded in influencing the political decision-making processes so strong that there has been no price fall of agricultural products during the depression? What were the consequences of the agricultural development on the overall economic development?5. The bank system and the credit system was in the period of the twenties highly unstable. Its instability has contributed significantly to the worsening of the depression. To what extent was the increasing instability due to political calculation? Datatables in the search- and downloadsystem HISTAT (Topic: Growth, Economy, and Crisis (=Wachstum, Konjunktur und Krisen) ): A. Die öffentlichen Finanzen (= Official Finances: revenues, expenses, national dept, municipal dept, tax revenues) A.01a Staatseinnahmen, Staatsausgaben und Staatsverschuldung in Deutschland, in Millionen Reichmark (1926-1933)A.01b Zunahme der deutschen Kommunalverschuldung, in Millionen Reichmark (1928-1931)A.02 Steuereinnahmen der Kommunen, in Millionen Reichsmark (1928-1933)A.03 Schulden der Kommunen mit über 10.000 Einwohnern, in Millionen Reichmark (1928-1930) B. Die industrielle Struktur: Stagnation und Immobilität(= Industrial Structure: stagnation and immobility. Average yearly growth rate of german industrial products; share of taxes and social expenditurs on the national income; lending; industrial investment) B.01 Durchschnittliche jährliche Zuwachsraten der deutschen Industrieproduktion, in Prozent (1913-1932)B.02 Anteil der Steuern und Sozialabgaben am Volkseinkommen in Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland, in Prozent (1925-1929) B.03 Kreditvergabe der Kreditinstitute, ohne Waren- und Wertpapierlombardgeschäfte (1913-1933)B.04 Industrielle Investitionen von Kapitalgesellschaften, in Millionen Reichsmark (1924-1931)B.05 Der Steinkohlenbergbau des Ruhrgebiets (1913-1931) C. Lohnentwicklung(= Wage-Development. Real Wages; hourly wages and productivity; share of wages on national income) C.01a Kumulierte Reallohnposition, Basisjahr 1938 (1925-1933)C.01b Stundenlöhne und Produktivität in der deutschen Industrie und im deutschen Handwerk (1925-1932)C.02 Stundenlohnsätze, im Jahresdurchschnitt (1925-1932)C.03 Anteil der Löhne am Volkseinkommen (1927-1939) D. Beschäftigung (= occupation. Labour disputes; number of employees of Siemens and of the rhenish-westphalian heavy industry) D.01 Durch Arbeitskämpfe in Deutschland ausgefallene Arbeitstage (1924-1932)D.02 Zahl der Beschäftigten bei Siemens & Halske und der Siemens-Schuckertwerke GmbH (1928-1934)D.03 Zahl der Beschäftigten in der rheinisch-westfälischen Schwerindustrie (1927-1932) E. Die Landwirtschaft(= agricultural sector: Germany´s crop yields; average weight of animals for slaughter; Germany’s animal stock; level of dept of Germany’s agriculture) E.01a Bodenerträge in Deutschland, (1913-1924)E.01b Durchschnittsgewicht der Schlachttiere (1906-1924)E.01c Gesamtviehbestand in Deutschland (1913-1924)E.02 Die Verschuldung der deutschen Landwirtschaft (1925-1930)E.03 Zinsbelastung der deutschen Landwirtschaft (1924-1932) F. Die Bankenkrise(= banking crisis. Dept and investments) F.01 Schu...

In response to the cost of living crisis, the government of the United Kingdom announced a series of measures to help households in the country. The most widespread of these packages was a 400 British pound energy bill grant announced in 2022, which was allocated to all households in the country. The measure with the highest overall value was the cost of living payment, which will saw approximately eight million UK households on low income receive 650 pounds in two separate payments in 2022, and a further 900 pounds paid in three installments throughout the 2023/24 financial year.

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This corpus is part of my PhD project entitled 'Constrained Partisanship: A Comparative Study of Policy Choices and Party Discourses in the British and Spanish Crisis Experiences (2008-2014)'. The dataset contains transcripts of 45 speeches and parliamentary interventions on macroeconomic policy from government leaders in Spain and the United Kingdom between 2008 and 2014. This bilingual corpus (in English and Spanish) has been manually compiled from publicly available sources: websites of national parliaments, official government sites, research databases and party websites. All documents are available in open file format.

The corpus as a whole is shared under a CC BY licence but the dataset contains individual publicly available political speeches that are released under their own licences and have their own copyright holders. If reusing any of the individual political speeches then please refer to the original source and licence information as outlined in the file 'PIQUER_Corpus description.csv', paying particular attention to the information in the following columns: 'Original source' and 'Licence'.

This dataset is about book series. It has 1 row and is filtered where the books is Britain and the Suez crisis. It features 2 columns including publication dates.

In March 2025, 66 percent of households in Great Britain reported that their cost of living had increased in the previous month, compared with 45 percent in July 2024. Although the share of people reporting a cost of living increase has generally been falling since August 2022, when 91 percent of households reported an increase, the most recent figures indicate that the Cost of Living Crisis is still ongoing for many households in the UK. Crisis ligers even as inflation falls Although various factors have been driving the Cost of Living Crisis in Britain, high inflation has undoubtedly been one of the main factors. After several years of relatively low inflation, the CPI inflation rate shot up from 2021 onwards, hitting a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022. In the months since that peak, inflation has fallen to more usual levels, and was 2.5 percent in December 2024, slightly up from 1.7 percent in September. Since June 2023, wages have also started to grow at a faster rate than inflation, albeit after a long period where average wages were falling relative to overall price increases. Economy continues to be the main issue for voters Ahead of the last UK general election, the economy was consistently selected as the main issue for voters for several months. Although the Conservative Party was seen by voters as the best party for handling the economy before October 2022, this perception collapsed following the market's reaction to Liz Truss' mini-budget. Even after changing their leader from Truss to Rishi Sunak, the Conservatives continued to fall in the polls, and would go onto lose the election decisively. Since the election, the economy remains the most important issue in the UK, although it was only slightly ahead of immigration and health as of January 2025.

Policy development, implementation, and effective contingency response rely on a strong evidence base to ensure success and cost-effectiveness. Where this includes preventing the establishment or spread of zoonotic or veterinary diseases infecting companion cats and dogs, descriptions of the structure and density of the populations of these pets are useful. Similarly, such descriptions may help in supporting diverse fields of study such as; evidence-based veterinary practice, veterinary epidemiology, public health and ecology. As well as maps of where pets are, estimates of how many may rarely, or never, be seen by veterinarians and might not be appropriately managed in the event of a disease outbreak are also important. Unfortunately both sources of evidence are absent from the scientific and regulatory literatures. We make this first estimate of the structure and density of pet populations by using the most recent national population estimates of cats and dogs across Great Britain and subdividing these spatially, and categorically across ownership classes. For the spatial model we used the location and size of veterinary practises across GB to predict the local density of pets, using client travel time to define catchments around practises, and combined this with residential address data to estimate the rate of ownership. For the estimates of pets which may provoke problems in managing a veterinary or zoonotic disease we reviewed the literature and defined a comprehensive suite of ownership classes for cats and dogs, collated estimates of the sub-populations for each ownership class as well as their rates of interaction and produced a coherent scaled description of the structure of the national population. The predicted density of pets varied substantially, with the lowest densities in rural areas, and the highest in the centres of large cities where each species could exceed 2500 animals.km-2. Conversely, the number of pets per household showed the opposite relationship. Both qualitative and quantitative validation support key assumptions in the model structure and suggest the model is useful at predicting the populations of cats at geographical scales important for decision-making, although it also indicates where further research may improve model performance. In the event of an animal health crisis, it appears that almost all dogs could be brought under control rapidly. For cats, a substantial and unknown number might never be bought under control and would be less likely to receive veterinary support to facilitate surveillance and disease management; we estimate this to be at least 1.5 million cats. In addition, the lack of spare capacity to care for unowned cats in welfare organisations suggests that any increase in their rate of acquisition of cats, or any decrease in the rate of re-homing might provoke problems during a period of crisis.

This dataset is about books. It has 1 row and is filtered where the book is Rumors of the Great War : the British press and Anglo-German relations during the July Crisis. It features 7 columns including author, publication date, language, and book publisher.

This is an Active Citation data project. Active Citation is a precursor approach toAnnotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI). It has now been converted to the ATI format. The assembled project can be viewed at: https://qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/sir-edward-greys-ambiguous-policy Project Summary This project is drawn from a larger study of pivotal deterrence policies – attempts by a third-party power to deter conflict among others while avoiding firm commitments to one side. The book chapter selected for activation focuses on Britain’s pivotal deterrence policy during the July crisis and the effects it had on the behavior of the major European powers—France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. This case was selected because it matched a particular “cell” in a typological framework, embodying a constellation of initial conditions and values on explanatory and control variables. The British July Crisis case is an instance in which the pivotal deterrer was a “peer” (in terms of its power relative to the target’s): it would be constrained in its ability to achieve leverage over the targets of its policy. The pivotal deterrer was also initially a player in the conflict, with secondary interests at stake: when the crisis started, only secondary British interests were at stake in the dispute between Serbia and Austria. These two factors, in some ways, “controlled” the case in the larger study’s comparative research design. In relation to that latter variable, the British case also captured theoretically important longitudinal change. Once the crisis escalated to near-war between Germany and France, then Britain’s vital interests were engaged. As Britain’s interests shifted over time, its approach to (and the effects of) its pivotal deterrence policy would be expected to change in certain ways anticipated by the theory. So the case analysis examines whether the policy changes that occurred were consistent with those expectations. This is also a “hard case” analysis, because the policy was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing war, and the deck was stacked against success by other theoretically important factors pointing toward war. The empirical analysis—using congruence testing and process tracing methods—shows, nevertheless, that the policy had intermediate effects on the other actors’ policies and actions that are consistent with the “isolation avoidance” dynamic posited in the pivotal deterrence theory (even though, in terms of its ultimate effect, it did not deter them from going to war). In short, the theorized causal mechanics of pivotal deterrence are revealed even in this hard case, where failure of the policy was in many ways over-determined. Finally, the case offers a “hoop test” of another component of the theory—the conditioning variable of the targets’ “alignment options”. When the targets of pivotal deterrence have strong alignment options, the theory expects that the pivotal deterrer will have little leverage with which to restrain them. In the British case, Germany and France had very strong alignment options embodied in their continental allies. Accordingly, the case analysis shows that these relationships indeed blunted Britain’s pivotal deterrence policy in ways that conform to the political dynamics pivotal deterrence failure posited in the theory. Data Abstract The data for the case analysis were collected from primary textual sources--published official collections of documents (British and German volumes of correspondence, the latter translated into English) and autobiographies—and secondary sources (synthetic histories, monographs, and articles). The author relied on secondary sources to develop the general narrative elements in the case, and to clarify competing perspectives on matters of controversy and on secondary histories in English based on work in the relevant documents and archives, to extract evidence revealing of internal deliberations in and relevant to decision process tracing of European countries from Great Britain to Russia in the months from July to August 1914. Files Description Data were initially collected from documents via note-taking and photocopying. The present effort to activate the sources involves additionally scanning the documents. The full page (or pages) on which quoted passages, or key evidence for causal process claims, appear are provided so that surrounding context is made transparent; specific passages that pertain to causal process arguments are highlighted by the author. Logic of Annotation and Activation: Which citations were activated and to what degree was based on the following logics: 1. Sourced active citations—at a minimum, for all official documents referenced in the chapter the full source information was provided; 2. Fully active citation—for all official documents and secondary sources from which primary process tracing evidence is quoted or referenced in the chapter. When the connection to the inference is not obvious, an annotated explanation...