In 2023, about 21.6 billion U.S. dollars' worth of commercial mortgage-based securities (CMBS) originations were issued in the United States. These are fixed income investment products which are backed by mortgages on commercial properties. The value of originations peaked in 2007 before the financial crisis at 241 billion U.S. dollars. Commercial mortgage delinquencies increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the hotel and retail sectors.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

The year 2021 saw the peak in issuance of residential mortgage backed securities (MBS), at 3.7 trillion U.S. dollars. Since then, MBS issuance has slowed, reaching 1.1 trillion U.S. dollars in 2023. What are mortgage backed securities? A mortgage backed security is a financial instrument in which a group of mortgages are bundled together and sold to the investors. The idea is that the risk of these individual mortgages is pooled when they are packaged together. This is a sound investment policy, unless the foreclosure rate increases significantly in a short amount of time. Mortgage risk Since mortgages are loans backed by an asset, the house, the risk is often considered relatively low. However, the loan maturities are very long, sometimes decades, meaning lenders must factor in the risk of a shift in the economic climate. As such, interest rates on longer mortgages tend to be higher than on shorter loans. The ten-year treasury yield influences these rates, since it is a long-term rate that most investors accept as risk-free. Additionally, a drop in the value of homeowner equity could lead to a situation where the debtor is “underwater” and owes more than the home is worth.

We argue that the vast bulk of movements in aggregate real economic activity during the Great Recession were due to financial frictions. We reach this conclusion by looking through the lens of an estimated New Keynesian model in which firms face moderate degrees of price rigidities, no nominal rigidities in wages, and a binding zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our model does a good job of accounting for the joint behavior of labor and goods markets, as well as inflation, during the Great Recession. According to the model the observed fall in total factor productivity and the rise in the cost of working capital played critical roles in accounting for the small drop in inflation that occurred during the Great Recession. (JEL E12, E23, E24, E31, E32, E52)

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q3 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

We investigate the macroeconomic consequences of fluctuations in the effectiveness of the labor market matching process with a focus on the Great Recession. We conduct our analysis in the context of an estimated medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and equilibrium search unemployment that features a shock to the matching efficiency (or mismatch shock). We find that this shock is not important for unemployment fluctuations in normal times. However, it plays a somewhat larger role during the Great Recession when it contributes to raise the actual unemployment rate by around 1.3 percentage points and the natural rate by around 2 percentage points. The mismatch shock is the dominant driver of the natural rate of unemployment and explains part of the recent shift of the Beveridge curve.

This paper analyses the effect of the economic crisis in the years 2008 and 2009 on individual training activities of different employee groups within establishments. We use a unique German linked employer–employee panel dataset with detailed information on individual training history (WeLL-ADIAB). The so-called Great Recession can be seen as an exogenous, unexpected, and time-limited shock. Although our results cannot be interpreted in a strictly causal manner, our Diff-in-Diff analyses suggest a direct negative effect of the crisis on individual training activities in 2009 and 2010. The negative effect therefore sets in with a time lag and lasts until after the recession. Furthermore, the recession has a stronger effect for employees in unskilled jobs than for employees in skilled jobs.

During the Great Recession, exceptionally harsh economic conditions were often countered by austerity policies that, according to many, further worsened and protracted the negative conjuncture. Both elements, the poor state of the economy and the contractionary manoeuvers, are supposed to reduce the electoral prospects for incumbents. In this article, we compare the relative explanatory powers of these two theories before and during the economic crisis. We demonstrate that in normal times citizens are fiscally responsible, whereas during the Great Recession, and under certain conditions, austerity policies systematically reduced the support for incumbents on top of the state of the economy. This happened when the burdens of the manoeuvers were shared by many, in more equal societies, when the country was constrained by external conditionalities and when readjustments were mostly based on tax increases.

During the Great Recession many incumbent parties were not confirmed in power by the ballots. The harsh law of the economic vote severely undermined their electoral chances. Yet it is unclear if they were punished by the absolute poor state of affairs, or by the relative deterioration of the economy; by a direct judgement of the domestic situation, or by its comparison with some external benchmark capturing more global dynamics; and whether or not the global crisis modified all these parameters. This exploratory analysis looks into all these issues using a dataset covering all the elections that took place in 38 democracies in the period 2000-2015, and contributing to the recent debate about the actual benchmarking of the state of the economy from behalf of voters. The Great Recession confirms its exceptional character, revealing that absolute reference points became more important than tailored benchmarks and short-term comparisons.

This research paper builds on previous literature and documents general changes in the labor market for Native American women that occurred during the Great Recession using extracts of data from the Current Population Survey Annual Earnings file, known as the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG). Wages, unemployment, and other labor market variables for Native American women are contrasted with those of Native American men and white women to determine the relative change in labor market inequality that occurred during the Great Recession.

We examine how participation in social safety net programs differs by income-to-poverty levels, and how that relationship changed after the Great Recession. We define income-to-poverty based on the average of 2 years of merged CPS data, and investigate program participation among households with income less than 300 percent of poverty. We find changes in both the level and distribution of safety-net program participation during the Great Recession, with SNAP expanding most at the bottom, the EITC expanding most in the middle, and UI expanding most at the top of the income ranges that we investigate; TANF did not expand.

The Great Recession undoubtedly reduced the electoral prospects of incumbent parties, coherently with the expectations of the economic vote theory. Yet, the exceptionality of the period may have displaced other elements of that theory, such as, for instance, the moderating impact that globalization is supposed to have on the retrospective mechanism. By using an original dataset comparing 168 elections in 38 democratic countries in the period 2000–2015, we detail how the crisis modified and even reversed that conditional effect. Furthermore, we differentiate our results by separating the impact of economic openness from that of political globalization. In so doing, we improve our understanding of the mechanisms that trigger the conditional effect on the economic vote in normal and exceptional times.

The US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is designed to provide income support to workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting disability. In this study, we use administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to disability onset. We analyze the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Feb 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Trade Policy toward Supply Chains after the Great Recession, PIIE Working Paper 18-13. If you use the data, please cite as: Bown, Chad P. (2018). Trade Policy toward Supply Chains after the Great Recession. PIIE Working Paper 18-13. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Contains replication data and code for analyses used in the paper.

We show that policy uncertainty about how the rising public debt will be stabilized accounts for the lack of deflation in the US economy at the zero lower bound. We first estimate a Markov-switching VAR to highlight that a zero-lower-bound regime captures most of the comovements during the Great Recession: a deep recession, no deflation, and large fiscal imbalances. We then show that a microfounded model that features policy uncertainty accounts for these stylized facts. Finally, we highlight that policy uncertainty arises at the zero lower bound because of a trade-off between mitigating the recession and preserving long-run macroeconomic stability.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Income Inequality Developments in the Great Recession, PIIE Policy Brief 14-3. If you use the data, please cite as: Hellebrandt, Tomas. (2014). Income Inequality Developments in the Great Recession. PIIE Policy Brief 14-3. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Graph and download economic data for Resources and Assets: Investment Portfolios Arising from the Great Recession: Net Portfolio Holdings of Maiden Laine I LLC (RAIPGRNPML1) from 2008-07-02 to 2018-04-11 about maiden lane, recession indicators, investment, Net, assets, and USA.